'Secret' appendix to JCPOA cuts Iran's 'breakout' time to six months
If you thought President Obama and the P5+1 made a bad deal with Iran, it just got a bit worse.
An anonymous diplomat has shared with the Associated Press a secret appendix to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) which removes many of the limitations on Iran's uranium enrichment activities about ten years from now. And the result cuts Iran's 'breakout' time from what's claimed to be a year to six months or less.
The confidential document is the only text linked to last year's deal
between Iran and six foreign powers that hasn't been made public,
although U.S. officials say members of Congress who expressed interest
were briefed on its substance. It was given to the AP by a diplomat
whose work has focused on Iran's nuclear program for more than a decade,
and its authenticity was confirmed by another diplomat who possesses
the same document.
Both demanded anonymity because they were not authorized to share or discuss the document.
The diplomat who shared the text with the AP described it as an
add-on agreement to the nuclear deal in the form of a document submitted
by Iran to the International Atomic Energy Agency outlining its plans
to expand its uranium enrichment program after the first 10 years of the
nuclear deal.
...
But although some of the constraints extend for 15 years, documents
in the public domain are short on details of what happens with Iran's
most proliferation-prone nuclear activity — its uranium enrichment —
beyond the first 10 years of the agreement.
The document obtained by the AP fills in the gap. It says that as of
January 2027 — 11 years after the deal was implemented — Iran will start
replacing its mainstay centrifuges with thousands of advanced machines.
Centrifuges churn out uranium to levels that can range from use as
reactor fuel and for medical and research purposes to much higher levels
for the core of a nuclear warhead. From year 11 to 13, says the
document, Iran will install centrifuges up to five times as efficient as
the 5,060 machines it is now restricted to using.
Those new models will number less than those being used now, ranging
between 2,500 and 3,500, depending on their efficiency, according to the
document. But because they are more effective, they will allow Iran to
enrich at more than twice the rate it is doing now.
Components other than centrifuge numbers and efficiency also go into
the mix of how quickly a nation can make a nuclear weapon. They include
how much enriched uranium it has to work with, and restrictions on
Iran's stockpile extend until the end of the deal, crimping its full
enrichment program.
But a comparison of outputs between the old and newer machines shows
the newer ones work at double the enrichment rate. That means they would
reduce the time Iran could make enough weapons grade uranium to six
months or less from present estimates of one year.
And that time frame could shrink even more. While the document
doesn't say what happens with centrifuge numbers and types past year 13,
U.S. Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz told The AP that Iran will be free
to install any number of advanced centrifuges beyond that point, even
though the nuclear deal extends two additional years.
That will give Iran a huge potential boost in enrichment capacity,
including bomb making should it choose to do so. But it can be put to
use only after the deal expires.
Here in Israel, we'd like to thank President Obama for being an Islamophile and a sleazebag. We hope you live long enough to die - slowly and painfully - as a result of an Iranian nuclear explosion. We'd like to thank all the Senate Democrats who voted in favor of the deal for putting party loyalty above common sense, world safety and peace and tranquility. We'd like to thank all those former heads of our intelligence services who made Netanyahu look like a fool for opposing the Iranian sellout.
And we'd like to ask Prime Minister Netanyahu where he misplaced his junk in 2012.
Marie Harf and the Washington Post lie about Israeli support for Iran deal
Some of you may have seen this tweet by former State Department spokescritter Marie Harf, and the underlying article from the Washington Post, last week.
.@JohnKerry now: How the Iran deal is good for Israel, according to Israelis who know what they’re talking about: https://t.co/y8YrN3kuoM
Tharoor first mentions Ami Ayalon, a former head of the Shin Bet, Israel's internal security service, and links to a Daily Beast piece entitled "Ex-Intel Chief: Iran Deal Good for Israel."
Unfortunately for Tharoor (and
for Daily Beast commentator Jonathan Alter), Ayalon, who begrudgingly
supports the deal because it is "the best plan currently on the table"
and because he believes there are no available alternatives, nonetheless
has said in no uncertain terms, "I think the deal is bad. It's not good."
Tharoor then cites former intelligence chief Efraim Halevy, but strangely links to an Op-Ed Halevy wrote after a framework agreement was finalized in Lausanne last April but before the details of this final deal were agreed upon in Vienna this month. In a more recent (and thus relevant) Op-Ed,
Halevy described what he sees as several strong points in the agreement
and concludes that it is "important to hold a profound debate in Israel
on whether no agreement is preferable to an agreement which includes
components that are crucial for Israel's security."
He didn't explicitly state which side of the debate he favors,
although there is a sense that leans toward the idea that Israel must
get behind the deal. But like Ayalon, his tepid defense of the deal, if
it is even that, seems to hinge on the idea that this agreement makes
the emergence of any other, better deals unrealistic. "There will be no
other agreement and no other negotiations," Halevy says in his recent
Op-Ed.
What he does not say is that the deal signed in Vienna is, as a whole, "good." In an interview with Israel's Channel 2, he repeats his call for national debate, and paints a much more equivocal picture: "This is not an agreement that is entirely bad,"
Halevy said. "There are positive elements in it." Later, he added
that "this agreement has a number of very good elements for Israel, and
there are elements that are not as good." That quote, with its shades of
gray, might not make for as dramatic a headline as the one chosen by
the Washington Post.
But if equivocation is what the newspaper
has to work with, then equivocation is what it should be capturing in
its headlines—even if that means the piece can't be used by State
Department officials.
Next, Tharoor mentions Amos Yadlin, a former head of Israel's
Military Intelligence branch. It is not clear why: Yadlin, who has
cautioned against panic and excesses on the part of Israel's government,
nonetheless believes, as explained in an interview with Israel's Ynet, "This is not a good deal. This a problematic deal. You also could call it a bad deal."
Tharoor's article intially gave no hint of Yadlin's criticism of the
deal, but sometime later the author snuck in a throw-away
statement noting that Yadlin is "not a fan of the deal." (The stealth
correction appears to violate the newspaper's correction policy.)
Finally, the Washington Post blogger mentions Meir Dagan, another former Mossad chief. It appears, though, that Dagan has not gone on record
one way or another about the nuclear deal finalized in Vienna. (We
looked for any recent statements by him in Hebrew or English, and came
up with nothing. We will of course add an update if we find any relevant
commentary by Dagan from before Tharoor wrote his article.)
Netanyahu’s hard-line coalition partner, Education Minister Naftali
Bennett added: “Today a terrorist nuclear superpower is born, and it
will go down as one of the darkest days in world history.”
Yeah, but that's only because he's hardline, right? Hmmm. Maybe not.
Israeli social media accounts were filled with images of former
British prime minister Neville Chamberlain, who pushed a policy of
appeasement toward Adolf Hitler and the Nazis on the eve of World War
II.
Netanyahu and other Israeli leaders blasted the deal even as
negotiators in Vienna were still making the announcement and providing
details.
“Israel will defend itself,” Bennett warned, vowing
that military action is still an option for the Jewish State.
Like-minded Israelis feel they are in the crosshairs of a belligerent
enemy, where last week protesters in Tehran were chanting “Death to
Israel!”
Israel’s security cabinet unanimously rejected the Iran
deal, also saying that Israel reserves the right to take action to
protect the state.
But an Israeli attack seems unlikely right now....
Opposition leaders were united in condemning the Iran deal, but they
also called its signing a major diplomatic failure for Netanyahu.
Speaking
on Israel Radio, Efraim Halevy, former head of the Israeli intelligence
agency Mossad, said that perhaps it would have been better to avoid a
head-on clash with Obama and, instead, seek to apply pressure through
more discreet channels and have more of a role in shaping the
negotiations.
Because after all, former Mossad heads have just been so helpful in helping the government deal with this. Nearly as helpful as Israel's 'loyal opposition.'
Yair Lapid, a top opposition figure and leader of an Israeli
political party, said there is “no daylight” between Israelis in
condemning the Iran deal. But he said Netanyahu bungled the diplomacy.
On
the evening news in Israel, a rough consensus among political
commentators concluded that Netanyahu has been rendered irrelevant,
dismissed by the U.S. administration.
The United States remains
Israel’s closest — and sometimes only — ally in the world, supplying
diplomatic cover and billions of dollars in military aid over the years,
including some of the most sophisticated U.S. arms technology.
In
an interview with Israel’s Army Radio, main opposition leaders Isaac
Herzog and Tzipi Livni both criticized Netanyahu for allowing the deal
to be reached.
“If you go to a deal, as bad as it may be, the way
to minimize its damage is by arriving at an agreement with the U.S. on a
very significant security package,” said Herzog.
And that could still happen after (and when and if) the deal is signed. But Obama wouldn't talk about that before the deal with Iran was done.
Caspit: At the end of the day, Netanyahu to blame for failure to attack Iran
If I am to believe Ben Caspit, Binyamin Netanyahu was a gutsy soldier and is a yellow-bellied Prime Minister. Caspit looks at Caroline Glick's confrontation with Meir Dagan and Gabi Ashkenazi at the Jerusalem Post conference over the weekend, and argues that the real question is not why Israel did not attack Iran in 2010 (when Dagan was heading the Mossad and Ashkenazi the IDF), but rather why it did not attack in 2012.
This dialogue in New York, about five years after the fact,
reveals just the tip of the iceberg of what was taking place behind
closed doors during those long, tense months in the conference rooms of
Israel’s top defense leadership. All the heads of the various security
forces were unanimous in their opinion that an Israeli attack on Iran
would be a historic mistake that could result in disaster. At the same
time, however, decisions in Israel are made by the political leadership.
The defense establishment is then expected to carry them out without
hesitation. On the other hand, to follow through with a perilous,
strategically historic move such as attacking Iran, any Israeli prime
minister would want the support of his defense leadership, or at least
the chief of staff.
Netanyahu is an overly cautious prime minister with an
aversion to military adventurism, for reasons of personal
political survival. He knew that if something went wrong with the attack
and it then became public that he gave the order despite the
recommendations of all of the professionals in the security services, it
would be the end of his political career. At first, he invested
enormous energy in trying to convince some of the defense chiefs to
adopt his position. The event reported here occurred when he finally
gave up.
The question that the Israeli right should ask Netanyahu is
why he didn’t attack Iran in the summer of 2012. As far as Netanyahu
was concerned, that summer was seemingly the ultimate moment: The heads
of the security forces had left the IDF and were replaced with a new
crop of generals lacking experience, charisma or influence among the
public. At that time, Netanyahu had a weak and anonymous chief of staff
in the person of Benny Gantz, a novice director of the Mossad with Tamir
Pardo, a new chief of military intelligence and a new director of the
Shin Bet on the way. At the same time, the United States was caught up
in a bitter presidential election, in which President Barack Obama was
fighting for his second term. Netanyahu was seemingly free to act. There
was nothing to prevent him from attacking Iran in July, August or
September 2012, but he hesitated and eventually put his dream aside. At
the time, however, there was no one to interfere in any significant way.
So why didn’t he go through with it? First of all, because Netanyahu was afraid. Second, Barak made a sharp, last minute U-turn and switched to the opponents’ side. And there must be other reasons.
So why did Netanyahu back down? What are those 'other reasons'? Here are a couple that might have played a role:
1. The 'most pro-Israel administration evah' made very clear that it would not have Israel's back if Israel attacked Iran. One of the working assumptions to that point was that if Israel went ahead with the attack and found itself endangered in the aftermath, the United States would step in. In August 2012, we were told clearly that was not the case.
2. Those who were 'out of power' were not exactly without influence.
Caroline Glick confronts Meir Dagan and Gabi Ashkenazy over refusal to carry out order to bomb Iran (with video)
JPost columnist Caroline Glick confronted former Mossad Director Meir Dagan and former IDF Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazy at the newspaper's conference in New York on Sunday, and accused them of refusing to carry out an order to bomb Iran's nuclear facilities.
Let's go to the videotape.
"In 2010, according to a report from 2012 on the Israeli news program
Uvda, we learned that two of the men on this panel were given an order
to prepare a strike against Iran's military installations and they
refused," Glick said.
"Because it was an illegal order," Dagan interjected.
"You were ordered by the security cabinet," Glick said.
"You don't know what happened there," Dagan answered.
"It
is not in your expert legal opinion to determine whether or not the
prime minister of Israel and defense minister of Israel have a right to
order Israel to take action in its national defense. We would not be
where we are today. We would not now be faced with a situation where no
international coalition will be built, where now we are seeing the
United States moving forward at the end of the month to conclude a
nuclear agreement with Tehran that will enable them to acquire the bomb.
We would be in a different position.," Glick charged.
Ashkenazi
said that what Glick was saying was "stupid," later apologizing and
saying he meant "insulting." He rejected the idea that the military
echelon could prevent the political echelon from attacking Iran.
Glick is 1000% correct. Too bad it won't help at all today.
I cannot think of any other country in the West where something like this could happen.
Only in Israel: 'Commitment to peace' claimed to trump taking $600,000 in bribes
Only in Israel would a disgraced former Prime Minister have the gall to call as a character witness the former Prime Minister of a foreign country to urge a reduced sentence for taking $600,000 in bribes because of his 'commitment to peace.' The disgraced former Prime Minister is Ehud K. Olmert (pictured above being greeted in jail by convicted rapist and former President Moshe Katzav). The former Prime Minister of a foreign country is Britain's Tony Blair.
Blair's letter, which highlighted Olmert's commitment to "ensuring that
Israel was protected," but noted his appreciation that "peace was an
indispensable part of such protection," was issued to the court as
Olmert's defense team attempted to roll back the scrutiny assailing
Olmert's reputation and pleaded for the former Labor leader not to serve
any jail time.
...
The Defense emphasized Olmert's personal relationship with other major
figures during his tenure, with Blair's letter suggesting that the two
leader's report going "beyond that between heads of Government", being
"based on friendship and trust with a clear understanding of the needs
and sensitivities of the other side."
A second letter was issued on Olmert's behalf by former Mossad chief Meir Dagan, a man who has probably done more than any other Israeli to ensure that Iran becomes a nuclear weapons state.
Just how corrupt is Olmert? From the original link above:
[I]n March, the court assessed the new [Olmert's former secretary Shula] Zaken recordings, her journal and
much of her testimony, changing their conclusion from acquittal into
convicting Olmert after finding that the evidence proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that at least $153,950 out of the over $600,000 Olmert
was accused of using for illegal personal use was in fact used
illegally.
Damningly, the court found that a recording of Olmert
telling Zaken she could take funds from a secret safe for her illegal
use contradicted his narrative that he was unaware of any such funds
or that he thought they were being used for permitted political
purposes.
Yes, Israelis, our government is often as corrupt as we think it is.
The saddest part about this Caroline Glick column is that most of the world still sees Slimy Shimon Peres as an angel in disguise and not as the sleaze bag he really is. Shimon Peres' legacy is a nuclear-armed Iran.
Peres’s legacy will be Iran’s nuclear arsenal.
For years, many Israelis as well as Israel’s supporters in the US, the
Sunni Arab states in the Persian Gulf and even the French have been
scratching their heads wondering why Israel hasn’t struck Iran’s nuclear
installations yet. Over the past few months, we received our answer.
The ongoing police investigation into allegedly illegal conduct by
then-IDF Chief of Staff Lt.- Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi has revealed the source
of Israel’s paralysis.
Apparently led by Peres, the triumvirate of security chiefs serving
between 2008 and 2011 – Ashkenazi, then-Mossad director Meir Dagan and
then-Shin Bet director Avi Dichter – colluded to undermine Prime
Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s and then-defense minister Ehud Barak’s
legal authority to order Israel’s security forces to take action against
Iran.
According to a Haaretz report on Wednesday, between 2008 and 2011, the
four men leaked plans and discussions of possible Israeli strikes on
Iran to the media in order to prevent them from being carried out. The
four men opposed an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear installations and
stridently rejected any Israeli operation not coordinated with the US.
Ashkenazi and his associates are being investigated by the police for
crimes associated with criminal insubordination to Israel’s elected
leadership. Attorney-General Yehuda Weinstein ordered the police probe
in January after information unearthed by the media and by the State
Comptroller’s Office raised strong suspicions of a conspiracy led by
Ashkenazi to usurp the powers of the government.
According to media reports of the investigation, the police have
discovered tape recordings of numerous telephone conversations between
Ashkenazi and Peres. According to Channel 1 and Haaretz, Peres’s
attorney requested that Weinstein prohibit the publication of the
details of phone conversations.
Haaretz’s report didn’t specifically state that the conversations in
question related to actions by Peres and the security chiefs to prevent
military operations against Iran’s nuclear weapons program. But the same
day the report appeared, Amir Oren, Haaretz’s senior commentator,
published an article praising Peres for preventing Israel from attacking
Iran.
Oren wrote, “Peres’s involvement in blocking the Iranian adventure
[i.e., a military attack against Iran’s nuclear installations] is… the
most important action he took as president.”
As Amnon Lord wrote last December in Makor Rishon, Peres’s role in the
security chiefs’ conspiracy to prevent Netanyahu and Barak from ordering
a strike against Iran’s nuclear installations was to provide
“pseudo-constitutional and pseudo- moral support” for their unlawful
subversion.
The four men were very likely not acting by themselves. Lord argued
that the Obama administration was a fifth partner in this criminal
conspiracy.
The US was represented in its efforts by the then-chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Michael Mullen. Mullen visited Israel almost every
month during this period and constantly praised Ashkenazi’s leadership
publicly.
As Lord noted, these trips were reciprocated by Ashkenazi and
then-Military Intelligence commander Maj.-Gen. Amos Yadlin who flew
regularly to Washington.
For the Americans, Lord wrote, the point of cultivating these ties was
“to influence the IDF’s high command and cut it off from the political
leadership of Israel.”
In the case of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, as in the case of the
phony peace process, Peres’s motivation, like that of Ashkenazi, Dichter
and Dagan, was clear and crass. He wanted power.
The facts already established by the Ashkenazi et. al. conspiracy
probe reveal that from his earliest days as chief of staff, Ashkenazi
was preparing the ground for a post-IDF run for prime minister. His will
to rule distorted his perception of his place in the chain of command.
Instead of viewing Netanyahu and Barak as his commanders, as the law
stipulates, he saw them as his political rivals, and behaved
accordingly.
As for Peres, he had been searching for a leftist politician who
could defeat Netanyahu. Ashkenazi was his knight in shining armor.
Via the Economist, the mainstream of the international community admitted that its campaign against Iran's nuclearization has ended in failure. And via this journal, the school that favors containing a nuclear Iran came out of the closet.
While Israel was busy with light entertainment in the form of political reality shows, The Economist informed it this week that a difficult strategic reality is taking shape around it. What the world promised would never happen is happening at this very moment. What the top ranks of Israel's defense establishment promised would never happen is in fact happening. Iran is becoming a nuclear power, while Israel (which is sunk in summer daydreams ) stands alone.
From 2009 to 2012, a vigorous debate over Iran took place here. On one side were the optimists: President Shimon Peres, then-Mossad chief Meir Dagan, then-Shin Bet security service chief Yuval Diskin, then-Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi, the defense establishment, the media establishment and the refreshing spirit of hoping for the best. On the other side was a gloomy, besmirched pessimist: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
America is there, said the optimists. No, it isn't, said the pessimist. There's a hidden hand, said the optimists. No, there isn't, said the pessimist. There's time, said the optimists. No, there isn't, said the pessimist. Iran's nuclear program must be stopped by the fall of 2012, the pessimist said. It's not Iran's nuclear program that's the problem, but the prime minister, the optimists said.
For three and a half years, the optimists went from one journalist to another and from one American to another and said that the pessimist is a dangerous purveyor of doom and gloom who sees molehills as mountains and doesn't understand that the world won't let Iran go nuclear. For three and a half years, the optimists tied the pessimist's hands on the basis of the threefold promise of America, the hidden hand and time.
But suddenly, this week, along comes The Economist and says that the optimists' absolute promise was a false promise. That it's too late. That the enriched uranium horses have already fled the stables. The international optimists and the Israeli optimists were wrong, big time. Surprise surprise: Benjamin Netanyahu was right.
...
While the optimists were misled by their illusions, the pessimist read reality correctly. While the defense establishment and the media establishment were smitten with weakness and apathy, the pessimist kept sounding alarms. But because neither the sinking West nor partying Israel paid attention to his warnings, the world has entered a new and dangerous strategic reality. Wolf? Wolf? Wolf! A strategic wolf with nuclear teeth is now at the gate.
Perhaps it's still possible to disprove The Economist's situation assessment. Perhaps an immediate, complete diplomatic and economic blockade of Iran could still cause it to suspend its nuclear program in order to preserve its regime. But anyone who wants to refute the prophecy of disaster diplomatically rather than militarily must act immediately. We're out of time. We're really out of time.
Waking up at one minute to midnight will be hard. But waking up at one minute after midnight is liable to be catastrophic.
Meir Dagan should hang by his big toes. He has done more than anyone to prevent Israel from making use of a military option. It doesn't really sound like there's a diplomatic option left.
Two and a half years too late, Harpaz to be indicted
Two and a half years too late, JPost reports that Boaz Harpaz is to be indicted for forging a document that prevented Yoav Galant (pictured above) from being appointed IDF Chief of Staff by then-Defense Minister Ehud Barak. What's more interesting is that Gabi Ashkenazi, who was the outgoing chief of staff at the time, may also be indicted.
Boaz Harpaz forged the Harpaz Document and will be indicted,
according to Ran Nizri, a top aide to Attorney-General Yehuda Weinstein,
in statements made to the Knesset Control Committee on Tuesday.
Nizri
said the indictment was mostly prepared already and that the only
reasons for the delay in indicting him two-and-a-half years after the
affair exploded onto the public agenda was to allow the continuing
investigations to be completed and to add all additional leads to the
indictment.
Magistrate Advocate General Maj.-Gen. Danny Efroni reported to the
Committee that he could not give an exact timeline for a decision on
whether he would indict former IDF chief-of-staff Lt.-Gen. (res.) Gabi
Ashkenazi and his former top aid Col. (res.) Ezer Viner.
Pressed
by Committee Chairman (Shas) MK Amnon Cohen on whether a decision would
be made within two to four months, Efroni demurred, but said that
investigators would work as hard as they could to come to a decision as
soon as possible.
Ashkenazi and Viner are under investigation for the military law violation of conduct unbecoming during their IDF service.
Benny Gantz was eventually appointed chief of staff.
Caroline Glick reports how former Mossad director Meir Dagan and former IDF chief of staff Gabi Ashkenazi may be weakening Israel's defenses against Iran.
Since
the beginning of his first term as prime minister 15 years ago,
Binyamin Netanyahu has consistently warned that the greatest dangers
Israel faces stem from the forces of global jihad generally and the
Iranian regime and its nuclear program specifically. After taking office
for the second time in 2009, Netanyahu made blocking Iran’s rise to
nuclear power his top priority. He ordered the heads of the Mossad and
the IDF to prepare plans to attack Iran’s nuclear installations.
Last
Friday, Haaretz reported that former Mossad chief Meir Dagan and former
IDF chief of General Staff Lt.-Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi refused to obey his
order. Rather than prepare strike plans, Dagan and Ashkenazi warned that
such a strike would foment a regional war. That is, rather than do
their jobs, they made excuses for failing to fulfill their duty to obey
Israel’s elected leadership.
Not wanting to take them on
directly, Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak decided to wait them
out. Dagan and Ashkenazi were both set to finish their terms at the
beginning of the year, and Netanyahu and Barak figured they could
replace them with commanders who would abide by the government’s wishes.
Specifically, Barak and Netanyahu believed that by replacing Ashkenazi
with his deputy Maj.-Gen. Yoav Galant, they would have a military leader
willing and able to take on the central challenge of preventing Iran
from becoming a nuclear power.
Barak announced last August that
Galant would replace Ashkenazi as IDF chief in January. Galant’s
appointment was approved by the government and by the Senior
Appointments Commission. But in late January, the government was forced
to cancel it. And this week we received new indications that Galant’s
appointment fell victim to what has been likened to a palace coup. That
is, the government was denied its right to choose its military leader by
a group of senior officials who deliberately usurped that power from
the government.
In January, we learned that Ashkenazi’s close
associate Lt.-Col. (ret.) Boaz Harpaz had forged a document that was
transferred by Ashkenazi’s office to Channel 2. The forgery purported to
be a memo written for Galant by the public relations firm owned by Eyal
Arad – Kadima’s public relations guru. The forged memo detailed a
public relations campaign that would discredit Galant’s rivals and
Ashkenazi, and so pave the way for Galant’s appointment as chief of
General Staff. Channel 2’s broadcast of the memo seriously harmed
Galant’s public image.
The police opened an investigation, and
Harpaz admitted to forging the document. Despite revelations that Harpaz
was in intensive, continuous contact with Ashkenazi’s wife Ronit and
had a longstanding close friendship with Ashkenazi himself, the Military
Advocate- General decided not to investigate Ashkenazi or any other
officer about their ties to Harpaz and his forged document.
Well, at least they're now (apparently) investigating Ashkenazi. But read the whole thing. Should Weinstein be indicted too?
“In no
other democracy in the world would six heads of the security services line up,
lend themselves to be quoted and blame their government,” Arad said of the
documentary, which features six former directors of the Shin Bet (Israel
Security Agency) in a film highly critical of Israel’s policies in the
territories.
In an interview on the sidelines of the Herzliya Conference,
which opened on Monday, Arad said he could not imagine six former heads of the
FBI or MI5 lining up to bash their countries’ policies.
“This is hefkerut
[anarchy],” he said, “a lack of respect. It shows a lack of
professionalism. The head of the secret service has to know to keep his
mouth shut, both during and after his service. If he cannot, he is no
professional and has betrayed his profession.”
Arad added that the
“prevailing feeling” the documentary left within the ranks of Israel’s
intelligence community was “one of betrayal and contempt.”
The
willingness of the six – Ami Ayalon, Avi Dichter, Yuval Diskin, Carmi Gillon,
Yaakov Peri and Avraham Shalom – to take part in the documentary “shows a very
low sensitivity to democratic norms,” Arad said, rejecting the idea that the men
felt it was imperative for them to go public with their criticism.
Indeed. The same can be said about former Mossad director Meir Dagan. And no, I cannot think of a whole lot of other democracies in the world where doing something that ought to be considered treason makes you a hero.
Here's some more from that Meir Dagan session this morning, which may help give you an idea why I think he's so off base.
Former Mossad chief Meir Dagan predicted Wednesday that the Arab Spring will not reach Jordan and that in case it did "the regime would find the right way to satisfy the people's wishes with reforms."
I think it would be a shame if it doesn't reach Jordan, because then Jordan will become the 'Palestinian' state. But I think it will reach Jordan and that Abdullah will go quietly once it does. Abdullah is not Assad and doesn't have the stomach to start murdering his people.
Dagan estimated that the Arab Spring is far from over. "I am worried about Islamist parties with a radical agenda that will take power. It will present a big problem for us," he said.
Asked about the situation in Syria, Dagan said: "Assad has to go, we need to help anyone who is working to get rid of him." He estimated that the outcomes in Syria will affect the entire region, particularly Lebanon.
I agree with the concern about the Islamists, but if that is true, why back the al-Qaeda-led rebels in Syria? And as to Lebanon, Hezbullah is firmly in charge and doesn't need Syria's help - except to take their weapons out of storage.
But the most curious thing about that session was the quip - I think by the moderator - that this was the first time she had heard Dagan speak in recent years without mentioning Iran. Maybe even he is beginning to realize that sanctions are not going to work and that there is no choice.
There are a lot of resources at the website, but what ought to be of particular interest would be sections devoted to Historical Documents and Recollections from Arab Countries. I believe that these two sections, especially, give context that is so often missing from modern reporting and analysis.
During the past year (or more) the New York Times has published articles about criticisms coming from former Israeli intelligence officials such as Meir Dagan and Yuval Diskin criticizing Israel's political leaders (specifically PM Netanyahu and Defense Minister Barak) for being too anxious to attack Iran. These stories have a breathless quality to them, as if they are revealing a major schism in Israeli leadership.
Current Chief of Staff, Benny Gantz though put a damper on the importance of the statements of the former officials (h/t Israel Matzav):
While discussing Israel's current security situation at a meeting of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Gantz said that in regard to a potential attack on Iran, "Only a very few people know what is and is not possible. Many people claim to know, but don't really know, and there are those that knew at one time, but don't know today." The chief of staff's comments appeared to be directed at former Mossad chief Meir Dagan and Former Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) chief Yuval Diskin, who have publicly questioned Israel's current leadership for threatening an attack against Iran's nuclear facilities and suggested that such an attack would not be effective in seriously curbing Iran's nuclear program.
This is important. While the New York Times has (and other news organizations have) an interest in sensationalizing a story, especially one that pits "sober" former officials speaking out against "reckless" current government officials, intelligence changes fast. The former officials may once have been correct and may have once been fully informed. But the situation isn't static. Their knowledge is now outdated.
Last month's coalition agreement that brought Shaul Mofas into the government is probably more important than the statements of Dagan and Diskin. Mofaz wsa known to be skeptical of an attack on Iran, so his agreement suggests that Netanyahu was able to convince him that he wasn't about to launch a reckless raid on Iran.
3) Free and open debate
I had seen a few of these news stories and thought of putting them together, but I see that Elder of Ziyon has seen many more stories and combined them into a single post, Muslims suppressing freedom of expression worldwide.
Those who know aren't telling and those who are telling don't know
We've heard from former IDF Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi, former Mossad Director Meir Dagan and former General Security Service Chief Yuval Diskin, all of whom warned the Netanyahu government not to attack Iran. And we've heard from Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Barak who are attempting to retain Israel's deterrent power against the Mullahcracy. But we had not heard from the current IDF Chief of Staff, Benny Ganz. Until now.
IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Benny Gantz on Tuesday took an apparent swipe at former defense establishment officials making public pronouncements about the Iranian nuclear threat, saying that "there is a lot of idle chatter on the issue."
While discussing Israel's current security situation at a meeting of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Gantz said that in regard to a potential attack on Iran, "Only a very few people know what is and is not possible. Many people claim to know, but don't really know, and there are those that knew at one time, but don't know today."
"The three vectors are – international diplomatic and political isolation, economic pressure applied through international sanctions, and curbing the development of different projects."
The IDF chief stated that in order to create a viable military threat, "The army must be super ready, and as far as I am concerned it is super ready.
"The only ones that can decide to give up the nuclear program are the Iranians themselves, and as an army we are prepared for this option as well," he added.
Ganz also had more to say about Dagan and Diskin.
"The Iranian issue is dynamic and very few people know what is there and what is not there; what is possible and what is impossible. Quite a few people boast about knowing things that they don't know. There is a big gap between the professional dialogue that should be held in the right forums and the public chatter that is taking place," he said.
Yadlin, who left his post in 2010 and is currently the head of the Institute for National Security Studies, said that the forum that deals with Iran – once the septet but now expanded with the addition of Shaul Mofaz to nine members – is made up of “very serious people” and includes three former chiefs of staff along with “others who devote a lot of time to this issue.”
In a reference to Diskin’s and Dagan’s comments, Yadlin – one of eight pilots who took part in the 1981 attack on an Iraqi reactor – said that unelected officials needed to be “very careful” when making public statements on sensitive issues.
“We sat in closed meeting in the most select forums,” he said.
“We expressed ourselves straightforwardly, with a great deal of integrity and professionalism. But when we are regular citizens, we should impose on ourselves a cooling-off period, and not come out with explosive statements.”
The former intelligence chief, Meir Dagan, who stepped down after eight years in the post, has made several unusual public appearances and statements in recent weeks. He made headlines a few weeks ago when he asserted at a Hebrew University conference that a military attack on Iran would be “a stupid idea.” This week Mr. Dagan, speaking at Tel Aviv University, said that attacking Iran “would mean regional war, and in that case you would have given Iran the best possible reason to continue the nuclear program.” He added, “The regional challenge that Israel would face would be impossible.” ... On Thursday he got more specific, naming Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak, but this time through a leaked statement to journalists. The statement had to do with his belief that his retirement and the retirement of other top security chiefs had taken away a necessary alternative voice in decision making.
Yuval Diskin, who retired last year as the director of Shin Bet, the Israeli equivalent of the F.B.I., said at a public forum on Friday night that he had “no faith” in the ability of the current leadership to handle the Iranian nuclear threat. “I don’t believe in a leadership that makes decisions based on messianic feelings,” he told a gathering in Kfar Saba, a central Israeli city of 80,000. “I have observed them from up close,” he added, broadening his critique to include the handling of the Palestinian conflict as well. “I fear very much that these are not the people I’d want at the wheel.” Analysts here say there has long been a rift between the elected leaders and the defense and intelligence professionals over the urgency of the Iran threat, the efficacy of an independent Israeli strike and its likely repercussions. But while the substance of Mr. Diskin’s case echoed that made in recent months by Meir Dagan, the former chief of the Mossad spy agency, the tone was far more blunt, biting and personal.
Along with Dagan who headed the Mossad and Diskin who headed Shin Bet, Gen. Amos Yadlin headed military intelligence. Gen. Yadlin wasn't treated to any such story. Though the New York Times did publish an op-ed by Gen. Yadlin, Israel's last chance to strike Iran, he has also written this week, Beware a Bad Deal with Tehran. (via Martin Kramer):
A deal with the following parameters would be considered good: significant limitations on continuing enrichment until Iran has regained the trust of the international community; removing most of the enriched uranium from Iran, both that enriched to 3.5 percent as well as that enriched to 20 percent, closing the facility dug into the mountainside near Qom; signing the IAEA "additional protocol"; and providing satisfying explanations for the questions that remain between the IAEA and Iran. Such a deal would ensure that an Iranian breakout to nuclear weapons would be a long process and thus place Iran outside the "immunity zone." It would not meet all past demands made on Iran, but it would be better than the alternative of Iran having the bomb or being bombed. However, the probability of Iran accepting such an agreement is very low. A bad deal, one that the Iranians are likely to offer and that the international community would be tempted to accept, would include explicit legitimacy for Iran enriching uranium on its soil up to the 5 percent level but would not include removal of most of the already-enriched uranium from within Iran’s borders. The bad deal also would include not limiting the number or type of centrifuges and enrichment sites. Iran then would be able to continue securing its sites in a way that would make damaging them much harder than it is at present. With such a deal, Iran would be able to improve its chances of breaking out toward nuclear weapons in a relatively short time after making the decision to do so.
Yadlin's commentary isn't newsworthy because he didn't portray PM Netanyahu as some whacked out messianic figure when it comes to Iran.
“Many things happened in the last three months” to ease the fear of a looming Israel attack on Iran’s nuclear program, Bergman said, including the Obama-Netanyahu White House meeting in March, which he said left administration officials feeling “a bit more relaxed” that the two leaders held similar positions regarding Iran. Another key factor is the upcoming presidential election in November, he added. (The interview took place before this week’s Likud-Kadima deal, which also appears Iran-related, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said to be seeking to solidify his political position prior to the American elections.) Bergman, a prominent print journalist who also has a television show in Israel, said that as recently as two weeks ago a senior Israeli official told him that “nothing has changed” in terms of the thought process of government leaders, who believe that Israel’s decision regarding a military strike will be made strictly based on its assessment of Iran’s actions. Regarding the tougher economic sanctions in place, Bergman said that two years ago Israeli officials would not have believed them possible and “would have been cheering” over what has been accomplished. “But is it too late” to stop Iran’s push for nuclear arms, he wondered, pointing out that Iran will not meet any of the “four or five preconditions” Israel has set regarding the upcoming negotiations between Iran and the U.S. and its Western allies.
By bringing Shaul Mofaz, a skeptic about a military strike against Iran, into his broad coalition, Netanyahu signaled that he isn't the reckless war monger that his critics portray him as. Yet they are the ones whose opinions were treated as news.
In the end the political shocker announced by Bibi Netanyahu and Shaul Mofaz last night will change Israeli politics forever...in a good way. It will result in stronger coalitions with greater legitimacy to deal with the major problems of the day, and unity on security issues that will allow the Jewish State to stand up to unfair pressure should (God-forbid) Barack Obama be re-elected. Israel will still have a broad base of political parties in the Knesset, but governments will be able to move ahead unencumbered by small and sometimes single-issue parties.
David Weinberg sees the scope of the coalition's likely success to be narrower:
This brings us to Iran, which is the one issue on which far-reaching and momentous decisions are imminent. Netanyahu’s government and inner cabinet now includes three former IDF chiefs-of-staff (Barak, Yaalon, and Mofaz), something which in itself is a form of deterrence. This ought to give pause to the Iranians and the Obama administration, and to stiffen the backs of the P5+1 negotiators. It is an important counter-weight to the nasty insinuations of “irresponsibility and messianism” in government decision-making regarding Iran made by former intelligence chiefs Dagan and Diskin.
With Kadima on board, however, both these issues become solvable. Netanyahu now has a solid majority even without Shas, enabling him to tackle the draft exemptions issue. And the government is now stable enough to survive the remaining 18 months of its term, so passing a responsible budget becomes feasible. The unity government is clearly a better option than new elections, which not only cost a lot of money, but would largely put the government on hold during a potentially critical period: The Knesset would be dissolved, and MKs and ministers would be devoting most of their time and energy to campaigning. It’s possible that Netanyahu was hoping for this outcome all along.
Though I think he meant it to be funny, one of the seven reasons for the forming the coalition offered by Jeffrey Goldberg is (via memeorandum):
6) Bibi wants to be able to say to President Obama: More than three-quarters of the Knesset is with me. I am Israel.
I don't know if Netanyahu needs to be to say this to President Obama or his other critics. Rather it should demonstrate to those who believe that Netanyahu is some right wing crazy, that he is the new mainstream in Israel.
Finally getting back to the cynicism, we have the release from the Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism:
A reduction in opposition voices within the Knesset could have serious consequences for relations with Iran and with the Palestinians. If there is no room within the Israeli political sphere to speak out against the hawkish foreign policy of Netanyahu and his defense secretary Ehud Barak, then war with Iran may seem to be the only “pro-Israel” option. Similarly, the lack of a credible opposition within the Knesset could make a return to the negotiating table with the Palestinians unlikely because there would be less outside pressure on Netanyahu to take such action.
The Sabena flight reached Tel-Aviv, landing in Lod Airport (now Ben-Gurion Airport). Captain Levy was sent out to show the waiting Israelis a sample of the explosives on the plane, to convince them of the threat. Aboard the plane, passengers were crying or hysterical. A team of 16 elite commandos (Hebrew: Sayeret Matkal) approached the grounded aircraft in white overalls, disguised as airplane technicians. They convinced the terrorists that the aircraft was in desperate need of repairs. Within ten minutes of boarding the plane, the squad of elite commandos managed to kill the two male terrorists, arrest the two female terrorists, and neutralize the threat to the passengers. Nearly all civilians on board were unharmed, except for three, one of whom later died from her injuries.
Pictures of the two of the commandos - currently among Israel's political leaders - are available at the link.
Two seasoned military commanders and counterterrorism experts with impeccable credentials, privy to Israel’s most guarded secrets, have taken upon themselves to fight the predominant narrative put forward by the government vis-à-vis Iran and the Palestinians.
Both Dagan and Diskin, like any other serious leader interested in having an impact, are political animals. They understand the impact of their words. But it would be disingenuous to blame these two of acting solely in the name of narrow interests considering that during the long years in which they held their respective official positions, Diskin and Dagan remained out of the limelight and devoted themselves exclusively to defending their country.
With their long years of service behind them, the two apparently feel morally impelled to speak out against what they perceive to be existential dangers.
Actually, it's far more likely that two people who stayed out of the limelight for years are seeking to get their names in the media for political gain. How many of you - especially outside of Israel - had ever heard of either of them before they started attacking Netanyahu?
BUT PERHAPS the most distasteful and undemocratic response to Diskin’s and Dagan’s outspokenness has been a legislative initiative that, if passed, would severely restrict the open debate and criticism that characterizes Israeli political discourse.
Dubbed the “Dagan Law,” the legislative initiative would prevent former security officials from making public comments on matters related to their field of expertise without authorization from the Defense Ministry. First drafted last year, the bill has garnered new interest in the aftermath of Diskin’s comments. MKs such as Miri Regev (Kadima), who drafted the original bill, and Danny Danon (Likud), among others, are pushing to get the Dagan Law passed. They claim to be out to defend Israel from the potential danger caused by irresponsible comments made by the likes of Dagan and Diskin.
But in actuality, stifling the free exchange of ideas and criticism among those most qualified to express these ideas and criticism is the real danger to Israel’s security.
Funny, but I don't see any public debate in Iran over whether or how far to go in developing nuclear weapons. I don't recall any public debate in the US over whether and how to kill Bin Laden. And although I wasn't around then, I don't recall reading about any public debate in the US over whether to use nuclear weapons on Japan until after the bombers had already dropped their loads on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Some decisions can only be taken in secret.
As to the so-called Dagan Law, I don't know of any other country in the world where the recently retired director of intelligence goes shooting off his mouth in public about the critical security issues facing his country, and claims to know more than anyone else because of his being privy to state secrets. Dagan's, and now Diskin's, behavior is simply galling.
And as to the Post, if they are going to just be Haaretz lite, who needs them? Once again, I have no regrets that I canceled my subscription.
As I am sure many of you have already heard, over the weekend, retired General Security Service chief Yuval Diskin attacked Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Rabin over their handling of the Iranian nuclear threat. While the reaction here in Israel has been largely mooted (except for an overdone piece about it on Israel Television's nightly news magazine on Sunday), it has drawn a lot of reaction abroad. It's important to point out, as Jonathan Tobin does, that the criticism is really a tempest in a teapot.
Though foreign news outlets treated Diskin’s remarks as a huge story that can be spun as part of a negative trend for Netanyahu, even the left-wing press in Israel is skeptical about that. Haaretz’s Yossi Verter noted that the personal nature of Diskin’s rant against Netanyahu and Barak at what he termed a “gathering of defense establishment pensioners” undermined their credibility. Unlike the foreign press, most Israelis are aware that Dagan’s animus against Netanyahu and Barak stems from the fact that he was fired from his post. That Diskin was passed over to replace Dagan may also explain his hard feelings. Moreover, the utter lack of public support for alternatives to Netanyahu or his policies makes farcical the claim in today’s New York Times that there is an “avalanche” of criticism about his stand on Iran.
...
The animus against Netanyahu and his center-right government from the defense establishment and the government bureaucracy as well as most of the country’s traditional media outlets is well-known. Their frustration about his survival in power is compounded by the fact that he appears to be set for a cakewalk in the next elections which, incredibly, some opposition parties are pushing to be advanced from their scheduled date next year. As journalist Amir Mizroch writes, Dagan and Diskin — two men with axes to grind against the prime minister – may be “smelling elections in the air.”
Although the Dagan and Diskin affairs are in a sense unprecedented, because until now Israeli defense and security officials have not misbehaved in this manner, what is going on is just Israeli politics as usual. If these men and those Israeli and foreign journalists who are trying to make this into a major story are frustrated and angry now, just imagine how they’ll feel after Netanyahu is re-elected.
Indeed.
And it's looking more and more like elections will be in August or September.
Last July, Caroline Glick wrote a piece in the JPost that she called the Palace Coup (my blog of it here), in which she explained how a group of senior Israeli officials, led by former Mossad director Meir Dagan and former IDF Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi, thwarted the appointment of Yoav Galant as IDF Chief of Staff. Galant was the choice of both Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu because he favored acting against Iran.
Fast forward nine months. Unsurprisingly, the current IDF Chief of Staff, Benny Gantz, tells Haaretz that Iran is not going to develop a nuclear weapon because they are - get this - rational. This is from the New York Times' soon-to-be bureau chief Jodi Rudoren (the last link).
The Israeli military chief described the Iranian government as “rational” in interviews published Wednesday and said he did not believe it would build a nuclear bomb, appearing to put some distance between himself and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak.
“I believe he would be making an enormous mistake, and I don’t think he will want to go the extra mile,” the chief of staff of the Israeli Defense Force, Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz, told the left-leaning newspaper Haaretz, referring to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
“I think the Iranian leadership is composed of very rational people,” General Gantz added. “But I agree that such a capability, in the hands of Islamic fundamentalists who at particular moments could make different calculations, is dangerous.”
...
Several analysts saw his comments as more in line with the views of Israel’s military and intelligence establishment, including the former Mossad chief Meir Dagan, than with the harder line taken by the government. They were also seen as parallel to the position of his United States counterpart, Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
“What he said,” said George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in an Associated Press article, is “consistent with the views of the U.S. military leadership, the U.S. intelligence community. What’s interesting is why he said it out loud.”
Meir Javedanfar, an Iranian-Israeli expert who lives in Tel Aviv, told The Guardian newspaper that Mr. Gantz’s comments were “a welcome development” that “takes the hysterics out of Israel’s public assessment of the Iranian nuclear program.”
Three points: First, I believe that Ganz is wrong, as do many, many (maybe even most) Israelis.
Second, let's assume for a minute that Ganz is right and Iran does not actually develop a nuclear weapon. Let's say that - like Japan - they go to the edge and stop. Do we really want to live with a nuclear-capable Iran? Most Israelis do not.
Third, looking back on Glick's article, you should all be struck by the importance of the circumstances in which Gantz was appointed. Once again, the branja, the country's wealthy Ashkenazi (no relation to the former IDF chief of staff) elite has imposed their will on the country by force, because they know better than us. When will it stop?
Today, as suspicions about Iran’s nuclear ambitions have provoked tough sanctions and threats of military confrontation, top administration officials have said that Iran still has not decided to pursue a weapon, reflecting the intelligence community’s secret analysis. But if that assessment changes, it could lift a brake set by President Obama, who has not ruled out military options as a last resort to prevent Iran gaining nuclear arms.
Publicly and privately, American intelligence officials express confidence in the spy agencies’ assertions. Still, some acknowledge significant intelligence gaps in understanding the intentions of Iran’s leaders and whether they would approve the crucial steps toward engineering a bomb, the most covert aspect of one of the most difficult intelligence collection targets in the world.
Much of what analysts sift through are shards of information that are ambiguous or incomplete, sometimes not up to date, and that typically offer more insight about what the Iranians are not doing than evidence of what they are up to.
As a result, officials caution that they cannot offer certainty. “I’d say that I have about 75 percent confidence in the assessment that they haven’t restarted the program,” said one former senior intelligence official.
Another former intelligence official ... added, “We’re not on the ground, and not having our people on the ground to catch nuance is a problem.”
Iran says its nuclear program is for peaceful civilian purposes, but American intelligence agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency have picked up evidence in recent years that some Iranian research activities that may be weapons-related have continued since 2003, officials said. That information has not been significant enough for the spy agencies to alter their view that the weapons program has not been restarted.
Mossad, Israel’s intelligence service, agrees with the American intelligence assessments, even while Israeli political leaders have been pushing for quick, aggressive action to block Iran from becoming what they describe as an existential threat to the Jewish state.
“Their people ask very hard questions, but Mossad does not disagree with the U.S. on the weapons program,” said one former senior American intelligence official, who, like others for this article, would speak only on the condition of anonymity about classified information. “There is not a lot of dispute between the U.S. and Israeli intelligence communities on the facts.”
I cannot believe that the Mossad believes this. Israel, as the article goes on to note, has 'assets' on the ground in Iran - mostly from the opposition MEK which is banned as a terror group in the US - but the US discounts that information out of fear of repeating its mistake with Ahmad Chalabi in the run-up to the Iraq war.
But I find it hard to believe that the US believes this either. You don't move innocent civilian nuclear activity 200 meters underground at an enormous cost. What happened at Parchin a few months ago? What was destroyed? Why is Iran now trying to remove nuclear waste from the facility?
I find it hard to believe that the US actually believes this, and there is no way that the Mossad does. Recall that even Meir Dagan only argued for a delay - he didn't argue that Iran is not developing nuclear weapons. And he said that there are many more facilities than four.
I am an Orthodox Jew - some would even call me 'ultra-Orthodox.' Born in Boston, I was a corporate and securities attorney in New York City for seven years before making aliya to Israel in 1991 (I don't look it but I really am that old :-). I have been happily married to the same woman for thirty-five years, and we have eight children (bli ayin hara) ranging in age from 13 to 33 years and nine grandchildren. Four of our children are married! Before I started blogging I was a heavy contributor on a number of email lists and ran an email list called the Matzav from 2000-2004. You can contact me at: IsraelMatzav at gmail dot com
