The former chief of the Shin Bet General Security Service has been imitating Chicken Little, telling a conference on Wednesday that the 'Palestinian problem' is a bigger danger to Israel than a nuclear Iran, and of course, that 'settlements' must be stopped.
To solve the conflict, Israel must immediately freeze Jewish
building in the West Bank outside the settlement blocs, and pledge to release
all Palestinian prisoners at the end of the negotiations, Diskin said at the
10th anniversary event hosted by the Geneva Initiative.
“The implications
of the absence of a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is more
existential than the Iranian nuclear issue,” Diskin told an audience at the Tel
Aviv Museum of Art.
A few comments:
1. There is very little actual building going on outside the 'settlement blocs' and none going on outside the boundaries of existing Jewish cities and towns.
2. Officially freezing Jewish building gives the 'Palestinians' hope that they can just drag
the 'negotiations' out forever, since it means that they have nothing to lose by not negotiating seriously.
3. 'Palestinian prisoners' are terrorist murderers. We're already releasing them to bring the 'Palestinians' to the table. Does Diskin think that's a good idea too? eave aside whether th was a good deal or the right thing to do. at
4. We agreed to release those 'Palestinian' murderers in exchange for NOT having a 'settlement freeze.' Leave aside whether that was a good deal or the right thing to do. If we now give the 'Palestinians' a 'settlement freeze' as a gift, what message are we sending the 'Palestinians'?
5. The absence of a solution to the Israeli-'Palestinian' conflict is not an existential issue, and is certainly not more of an existential issue than a nuclear Iran. But giving the 'Palestinians' all of their demands would place Israel in existential danger.
Sources close to Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu
slammed Diskin and his comments, saying that “anyone who thinks that the
Palestinian threat is greater than the threat of a nuclear bomb in the hands of
Iran, which calls for the destruction of the Sate of Israel is divorced from
reality and lacking any strategic vision.”
...
Netanyahu will be influenced by neither “recycled statements,
nor the righteous preaching that flows from the personal frustration of someone
who wanted to be appointed the head of the Mossad, but did not get the job,” the
sources said.
Very nice but the international community - correctly - sees Netanyahu as spineless and pliable and as long as that continues to be the case, he and we will be under pressure.
“In no
other democracy in the world would six heads of the security services line up,
lend themselves to be quoted and blame their government,” Arad said of the
documentary, which features six former directors of the Shin Bet (Israel
Security Agency) in a film highly critical of Israel’s policies in the
territories.
In an interview on the sidelines of the Herzliya Conference,
which opened on Monday, Arad said he could not imagine six former heads of the
FBI or MI5 lining up to bash their countries’ policies.
“This is hefkerut
[anarchy],” he said, “a lack of respect. It shows a lack of
professionalism. The head of the secret service has to know to keep his
mouth shut, both during and after his service. If he cannot, he is no
professional and has betrayed his profession.”
Arad added that the
“prevailing feeling” the documentary left within the ranks of Israel’s
intelligence community was “one of betrayal and contempt.”
The
willingness of the six – Ami Ayalon, Avi Dichter, Yuval Diskin, Carmi Gillon,
Yaakov Peri and Avraham Shalom – to take part in the documentary “shows a very
low sensitivity to democratic norms,” Arad said, rejecting the idea that the men
felt it was imperative for them to go public with their criticism.
Indeed. The same can be said about former Mossad director Meir Dagan. And no, I cannot think of a whole lot of other democracies in the world where doing something that ought to be considered treason makes you a hero.
Oscar nominates a 'documentary' that's pure fiction
Some of you might think we Israelis would be proud of having an Oscar-nominated film for Best Documentary. But most Israelis are not flocking to see The Gatekeepers, a film that spliced together interviews with the last six heads of Israel's General Security Service (roughly the equivalent of the FBI and the Secret Service rolled into one in the US). Jodi Rudoren reported on complaints about that in the New York Times last week.
“Most Israelis are not listening,” Mr. Ayalon, who ran the Shin Bet from
1996 to 2000, said in an interview. “When it is too tough, the easiest
way to deal with it is to close our eyes and to close our ears.”
The big question is whether the 97-minute, $1.5 million “Gatekeepers” will change that. It has already captured the attention of the world:
at least 10 American film critics, including two from The New York
Times, put it in their best-of-2012 lists, and Israel’s Foreign Ministry
gets inquiries almost daily from its embassies about how to handle the
reaction in countries where “The Gatekeepers” will soon be screened. (After an Oscar-qualifying run last year the movie opens in New York and Los Angeles on Friday.)
Here in Israel the film has received positive reviews and praise by
newspaper columnists since its festival premiere last summer and opening
on Jan. 1 but has not exactly started a revolution. The issues it
raises were not, for example, a factor in the elections
on Tuesday. By last Sunday about 22,000 people here had seen the film —
a lot for an Israeli documentary but still a tiny fraction of the
population of nearly eight million.
...
While public opinion polls show most Israeli Jews still support the
creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, increasing numbers
have lost faith that it could happen in their lifetimes.
“The question is whether those people who believe there is no one to
talk with, nothing to talk about, and we are condemned to go on fighting
and killing for the next 10 generations — and they are supported and
empowered by our political community — whether they will be open to see
the different view,” Mr. Ayalon said. “Probably it is too difficult.”
Mr. Ayalon is a confessed liar, whose word cannot be trusted about anything. He belongs in jail for abuse of power during his term at the GSS.
But perhaps there are other reasons that Israelis aren't flocking to put their money on the table to see this film. Rick Richman reports that the film's claims to be the first to ever interview previous GSS chiefs are bogus. There were similar interviews in 2003. Richman reports on what happened as a result of those interviews.
On November 13, 2003, Israel's largest-circulation newspaper published a two-hour joint interview
with all four ex-Shin Bet chiefs, with a front-page banner headline
reading: “Four directors of [Shin Bet] warn: Israel in grave danger.” The New York Times reported the interview the next day; so did the Washington Post, on its own front page.
In Britain, the Guardian's story was headlined “Israel on road to ruin, warn Shin Bet chiefs.” CNN, ABC, Fox and almost all the important press in the world carried extensive coverage of the interview. The ex-Shin Bet chiefs urged Israel to start dismantling settlements even before reaching a peace agreement.
At the time of the 2003 interview, Israel was insisting that before
negotiating a Palestinian state, the Palestinians had to stop their
terror war against Israel. The war had commenced in September 2000,
after Yasser Arafat was offered a state at Camp David – and walked away.
In December 2000, the Clinton Parameters were presented to both sides:
they were accepted by Israel and rejected by Arafat.
In April 2003, the Palestinians agreed to the “Performance-Based Roadmap,”
which required dismantlement of their terrorist groups in Phase I
before final status talks in Phase III. By November, 2003, they still
had not done so. Prime Minister Sharon’s position remained that security
must precede a Palestinian state — and that any shortcuts in the
process would fail.
The bombshell 2003 interview was intended to force a change of course
on Mr. Sharon, who had campaigned in 2001 on a promise to keep the Gaza
settlements for Israeli security (because “the fate of Netzarim will be
the fate of Tel Aviv”). A former president, Ezer Weizman, called the ex-Shin Bet leaders the “four musketeers” and castigated them for undermining the government. Mr. Sharon was deeply offended by the interview, but felt forced to change course.
Five weeks later Mr. Sharon shocked the Israeli public (and the United States) by announcing his disengagement plan. As it was developed over the next year, the plan
involved the removal of every settlement and soldier from Gaza and
dismantlement of four more settlements in Samaria (to show the policy
would be “Gaza first, not Gaza last”). In Haaretz, Aluf Benn reported why Mr. Sharon adopted the plan:
[T]he fateful decision was made between November 10th and 17th, 2003.
… The main topic was a joint interview in Yedioth Ahronot by four
former chiefs of the Shin Bet … in which they warned that Sharon was
leading the country to the abyss … [T]he former Shin Bet chiefs managed
to shake Sharon’s self-confidence; he broke and agreed to unilateral
withdrawal.
The rest is history: Israel withdrew from Gaza, and Gaza turned into Hamastan within a week. A new rocket war against Israel commenced from Judenrein
Gaza, and Hamas took over the whole area in 2007 in a coup. Israel had
to take military action to stop the rockets in 2008 and again in 2012.
There is no realistic possibility of negotiating a Palestinian state
while half of it remains in the hands of a terrorist group (and the
other half in the hands of a Palestinian “president” currently in the
ninth year of his four-year term).
In other words, the current film may be an attempt to force Prime Minister Netanyahu's hand much as Sharon's hand was forced in 2003. We've been there and done that and don't want to do it again. Perhaps that's a sign of maturity.
Another reason Israelis may not be flocking to see the film is that we know that at least one of the six, Yuval Diskin, holds a grudge against Netanyahu for not appointing him the head of the Mossad.
By the way, one Israeli who has no intention of seeing the movie is Prime Minister Netanyahu. This is Rudoren again.
A spokesman for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the prime
minister had not seen “The Gatekeepers” and had no plans to. Mr. Moreh,
whose dream “is to go to the White House and show the film to Obama,”
said Mr. Netanyahu had also not sent a message of congratulations about
the Oscar nomination.
And if he wins?
“I’m not expecting him to call me,” Mr. Moreh said. “I would ask him to
go and see the film and to think over what is said in the film from the
people who are most responsible for the security of the state of
Israel.”
The only people who will go to see this film in Israel are the Leftist true believers. For them - and for the unthinking Jews on the Upper West Side of Manhattan - this film is a dream come true. I'll bet it wins an Oscar. It fits their agenda.
Yuval Diskin tells all and the Left's game of trust
This week on the Tribal Update, Yuval Diskin exposes Netanyahu's true
character, we bring you a behind the scenes look at the attempted
unification between the three competing leftist parties, and Habayit
Hahyehudi's advertising campaign is revealed.
There are a lot of resources at the website, but what ought to be of particular interest would be sections devoted to Historical Documents and Recollections from Arab Countries. I believe that these two sections, especially, give context that is so often missing from modern reporting and analysis.
During the past year (or more) the New York Times has published articles about criticisms coming from former Israeli intelligence officials such as Meir Dagan and Yuval Diskin criticizing Israel's political leaders (specifically PM Netanyahu and Defense Minister Barak) for being too anxious to attack Iran. These stories have a breathless quality to them, as if they are revealing a major schism in Israeli leadership.
Current Chief of Staff, Benny Gantz though put a damper on the importance of the statements of the former officials (h/t Israel Matzav):
While discussing Israel's current security situation at a meeting of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Gantz said that in regard to a potential attack on Iran, "Only a very few people know what is and is not possible. Many people claim to know, but don't really know, and there are those that knew at one time, but don't know today." The chief of staff's comments appeared to be directed at former Mossad chief Meir Dagan and Former Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) chief Yuval Diskin, who have publicly questioned Israel's current leadership for threatening an attack against Iran's nuclear facilities and suggested that such an attack would not be effective in seriously curbing Iran's nuclear program.
This is important. While the New York Times has (and other news organizations have) an interest in sensationalizing a story, especially one that pits "sober" former officials speaking out against "reckless" current government officials, intelligence changes fast. The former officials may once have been correct and may have once been fully informed. But the situation isn't static. Their knowledge is now outdated.
Last month's coalition agreement that brought Shaul Mofas into the government is probably more important than the statements of Dagan and Diskin. Mofaz wsa known to be skeptical of an attack on Iran, so his agreement suggests that Netanyahu was able to convince him that he wasn't about to launch a reckless raid on Iran.
3) Free and open debate
I had seen a few of these news stories and thought of putting them together, but I see that Elder of Ziyon has seen many more stories and combined them into a single post, Muslims suppressing freedom of expression worldwide.
Those who know aren't telling and those who are telling don't know
We've heard from former IDF Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi, former Mossad Director Meir Dagan and former General Security Service Chief Yuval Diskin, all of whom warned the Netanyahu government not to attack Iran. And we've heard from Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Barak who are attempting to retain Israel's deterrent power against the Mullahcracy. But we had not heard from the current IDF Chief of Staff, Benny Ganz. Until now.
IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Benny Gantz on Tuesday took an apparent swipe at former defense establishment officials making public pronouncements about the Iranian nuclear threat, saying that "there is a lot of idle chatter on the issue."
While discussing Israel's current security situation at a meeting of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Gantz said that in regard to a potential attack on Iran, "Only a very few people know what is and is not possible. Many people claim to know, but don't really know, and there are those that knew at one time, but don't know today."
"The three vectors are – international diplomatic and political isolation, economic pressure applied through international sanctions, and curbing the development of different projects."
The IDF chief stated that in order to create a viable military threat, "The army must be super ready, and as far as I am concerned it is super ready.
"The only ones that can decide to give up the nuclear program are the Iranians themselves, and as an army we are prepared for this option as well," he added.
Ganz also had more to say about Dagan and Diskin.
"The Iranian issue is dynamic and very few people know what is there and what is not there; what is possible and what is impossible. Quite a few people boast about knowing things that they don't know. There is a big gap between the professional dialogue that should be held in the right forums and the public chatter that is taking place," he said.
Yadlin, who left his post in 2010 and is currently the head of the Institute for National Security Studies, said that the forum that deals with Iran – once the septet but now expanded with the addition of Shaul Mofaz to nine members – is made up of “very serious people” and includes three former chiefs of staff along with “others who devote a lot of time to this issue.”
In a reference to Diskin’s and Dagan’s comments, Yadlin – one of eight pilots who took part in the 1981 attack on an Iraqi reactor – said that unelected officials needed to be “very careful” when making public statements on sensitive issues.
“We sat in closed meeting in the most select forums,” he said.
“We expressed ourselves straightforwardly, with a great deal of integrity and professionalism. But when we are regular citizens, we should impose on ourselves a cooling-off period, and not come out with explosive statements.”
The former intelligence chief, Meir Dagan, who stepped down after eight years in the post, has made several unusual public appearances and statements in recent weeks. He made headlines a few weeks ago when he asserted at a Hebrew University conference that a military attack on Iran would be “a stupid idea.” This week Mr. Dagan, speaking at Tel Aviv University, said that attacking Iran “would mean regional war, and in that case you would have given Iran the best possible reason to continue the nuclear program.” He added, “The regional challenge that Israel would face would be impossible.” ... On Thursday he got more specific, naming Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak, but this time through a leaked statement to journalists. The statement had to do with his belief that his retirement and the retirement of other top security chiefs had taken away a necessary alternative voice in decision making.
Yuval Diskin, who retired last year as the director of Shin Bet, the Israeli equivalent of the F.B.I., said at a public forum on Friday night that he had “no faith” in the ability of the current leadership to handle the Iranian nuclear threat. “I don’t believe in a leadership that makes decisions based on messianic feelings,” he told a gathering in Kfar Saba, a central Israeli city of 80,000. “I have observed them from up close,” he added, broadening his critique to include the handling of the Palestinian conflict as well. “I fear very much that these are not the people I’d want at the wheel.” Analysts here say there has long been a rift between the elected leaders and the defense and intelligence professionals over the urgency of the Iran threat, the efficacy of an independent Israeli strike and its likely repercussions. But while the substance of Mr. Diskin’s case echoed that made in recent months by Meir Dagan, the former chief of the Mossad spy agency, the tone was far more blunt, biting and personal.
Along with Dagan who headed the Mossad and Diskin who headed Shin Bet, Gen. Amos Yadlin headed military intelligence. Gen. Yadlin wasn't treated to any such story. Though the New York Times did publish an op-ed by Gen. Yadlin, Israel's last chance to strike Iran, he has also written this week, Beware a Bad Deal with Tehran. (via Martin Kramer):
A deal with the following parameters would be considered good: significant limitations on continuing enrichment until Iran has regained the trust of the international community; removing most of the enriched uranium from Iran, both that enriched to 3.5 percent as well as that enriched to 20 percent, closing the facility dug into the mountainside near Qom; signing the IAEA "additional protocol"; and providing satisfying explanations for the questions that remain between the IAEA and Iran. Such a deal would ensure that an Iranian breakout to nuclear weapons would be a long process and thus place Iran outside the "immunity zone." It would not meet all past demands made on Iran, but it would be better than the alternative of Iran having the bomb or being bombed. However, the probability of Iran accepting such an agreement is very low. A bad deal, one that the Iranians are likely to offer and that the international community would be tempted to accept, would include explicit legitimacy for Iran enriching uranium on its soil up to the 5 percent level but would not include removal of most of the already-enriched uranium from within Iran’s borders. The bad deal also would include not limiting the number or type of centrifuges and enrichment sites. Iran then would be able to continue securing its sites in a way that would make damaging them much harder than it is at present. With such a deal, Iran would be able to improve its chances of breaking out toward nuclear weapons in a relatively short time after making the decision to do so.
Yadlin's commentary isn't newsworthy because he didn't portray PM Netanyahu as some whacked out messianic figure when it comes to Iran.
“Many things happened in the last three months” to ease the fear of a looming Israel attack on Iran’s nuclear program, Bergman said, including the Obama-Netanyahu White House meeting in March, which he said left administration officials feeling “a bit more relaxed” that the two leaders held similar positions regarding Iran. Another key factor is the upcoming presidential election in November, he added. (The interview took place before this week’s Likud-Kadima deal, which also appears Iran-related, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said to be seeking to solidify his political position prior to the American elections.) Bergman, a prominent print journalist who also has a television show in Israel, said that as recently as two weeks ago a senior Israeli official told him that “nothing has changed” in terms of the thought process of government leaders, who believe that Israel’s decision regarding a military strike will be made strictly based on its assessment of Iran’s actions. Regarding the tougher economic sanctions in place, Bergman said that two years ago Israeli officials would not have believed them possible and “would have been cheering” over what has been accomplished. “But is it too late” to stop Iran’s push for nuclear arms, he wondered, pointing out that Iran will not meet any of the “four or five preconditions” Israel has set regarding the upcoming negotiations between Iran and the U.S. and its Western allies.
By bringing Shaul Mofaz, a skeptic about a military strike against Iran, into his broad coalition, Netanyahu signaled that he isn't the reckless war monger that his critics portray him as. Yet they are the ones whose opinions were treated as news.
In the end the political shocker announced by Bibi Netanyahu and Shaul Mofaz last night will change Israeli politics forever...in a good way. It will result in stronger coalitions with greater legitimacy to deal with the major problems of the day, and unity on security issues that will allow the Jewish State to stand up to unfair pressure should (God-forbid) Barack Obama be re-elected. Israel will still have a broad base of political parties in the Knesset, but governments will be able to move ahead unencumbered by small and sometimes single-issue parties.
David Weinberg sees the scope of the coalition's likely success to be narrower:
This brings us to Iran, which is the one issue on which far-reaching and momentous decisions are imminent. Netanyahu’s government and inner cabinet now includes three former IDF chiefs-of-staff (Barak, Yaalon, and Mofaz), something which in itself is a form of deterrence. This ought to give pause to the Iranians and the Obama administration, and to stiffen the backs of the P5+1 negotiators. It is an important counter-weight to the nasty insinuations of “irresponsibility and messianism” in government decision-making regarding Iran made by former intelligence chiefs Dagan and Diskin.
With Kadima on board, however, both these issues become solvable. Netanyahu now has a solid majority even without Shas, enabling him to tackle the draft exemptions issue. And the government is now stable enough to survive the remaining 18 months of its term, so passing a responsible budget becomes feasible. The unity government is clearly a better option than new elections, which not only cost a lot of money, but would largely put the government on hold during a potentially critical period: The Knesset would be dissolved, and MKs and ministers would be devoting most of their time and energy to campaigning. It’s possible that Netanyahu was hoping for this outcome all along.
Though I think he meant it to be funny, one of the seven reasons for the forming the coalition offered by Jeffrey Goldberg is (via memeorandum):
6) Bibi wants to be able to say to President Obama: More than three-quarters of the Knesset is with me. I am Israel.
I don't know if Netanyahu needs to be to say this to President Obama or his other critics. Rather it should demonstrate to those who believe that Netanyahu is some right wing crazy, that he is the new mainstream in Israel.
Finally getting back to the cynicism, we have the release from the Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism:
A reduction in opposition voices within the Knesset could have serious consequences for relations with Iran and with the Palestinians. If there is no room within the Israeli political sphere to speak out against the hawkish foreign policy of Netanyahu and his defense secretary Ehud Barak, then war with Iran may seem to be the only “pro-Israel” option. Similarly, the lack of a credible opposition within the Knesset could make a return to the negotiating table with the Palestinians unlikely because there would be less outside pressure on Netanyahu to take such action.
The Sabena flight reached Tel-Aviv, landing in Lod Airport (now Ben-Gurion Airport). Captain Levy was sent out to show the waiting Israelis a sample of the explosives on the plane, to convince them of the threat. Aboard the plane, passengers were crying or hysterical. A team of 16 elite commandos (Hebrew: Sayeret Matkal) approached the grounded aircraft in white overalls, disguised as airplane technicians. They convinced the terrorists that the aircraft was in desperate need of repairs. Within ten minutes of boarding the plane, the squad of elite commandos managed to kill the two male terrorists, arrest the two female terrorists, and neutralize the threat to the passengers. Nearly all civilians on board were unharmed, except for three, one of whom later died from her injuries.
Pictures of the two of the commandos - currently among Israel's political leaders - are available at the link.
Hamas leader Khaled Meshal held secret talks with former Shin Bet head Yuval Diskin in the spring of 2006, journalist Shlomi Eldar says in a book published in Hebrew this week. In "Getting To Know Hamas," published by Keter, Eldar says then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was aware of the talks, which were brokered by a European mediator.
The European mediator approached two Israelis with whom he had work contact in April 2006 and asked them, on Meshal's behalf, whether Israel would agree to a strategic settlement in the wake of Hamas' election triumph in January that year, the book says.
One of the two Israelis was businessman Nimrod Novick, a former aide to Shimon Peres. The other remains anonymous. The two contacted Diskin and relayed the message from the European mediator. Diskin agreed to talk to the man, whom he had met in the past. About a month before IDF soldier Gilad Shalit was abducted, the envoy came to Israel for a special meeting with Diskin and outlined Meshal's ideas, the book reports.
Diskin passed these ideas on to Olmert at a tete-a-tete and Olmert said he was willing to hear more details of Hamas' proposals to Israel, Eldar writes.
In early June 2006 the European mediator flew to Damascus, where Meshal had been based, to meet with him and senior Hamas officials Mousa Abu Marzook and Imad al-Alami. They discussed a document detailing the way Hamas sees its future relations with Israel.
The introduction to the document, entitled "Peaceful Coexistence," says negotiations between Israel and Hamas will be conducted with mediators at first.
The envoy left Damascus some two weeks later and met Diskin, who promised he would deliver the message to the prime minister himself and would otherwise keep the talks under wraps.
According to Eldar, Diskin received the document a day after Shalit's abduction, which took place on June 25, 2006. After the abduction Diskin and the two Israelis contacted the European envoy and asked him to ask Meshal for clarifications regarding the contradiction between the abduction and the message conveyed by the document.
The mediator called them back a few hours later, saying Meshal had not known of the abduction near the Gaza border and was shocked by it. Novick and the other unnamed Israeli told the mediator to tell Meshal that Israel would not release prisoners in exchange for Shalit. At best, they said, it might release prisoners only on a humanitarian basis.
The mediator talked to Meshal, who said he would be ready to accept this, but only on the basis of continued discussions between Israel and Hamas over a settlement. But Olmert's public announcement saying Israel would not negotiate with terrorists was tantamount to giving Meshal a negative answer, the book says.
Diskin isn't commenting on this story, but several other people supposedly involved are denying it. I would bet that the author didn't get all the details, but he's got the general gist of what happened correctly.
Two seasoned military commanders and counterterrorism experts with impeccable credentials, privy to Israel’s most guarded secrets, have taken upon themselves to fight the predominant narrative put forward by the government vis-à-vis Iran and the Palestinians.
Both Dagan and Diskin, like any other serious leader interested in having an impact, are political animals. They understand the impact of their words. But it would be disingenuous to blame these two of acting solely in the name of narrow interests considering that during the long years in which they held their respective official positions, Diskin and Dagan remained out of the limelight and devoted themselves exclusively to defending their country.
With their long years of service behind them, the two apparently feel morally impelled to speak out against what they perceive to be existential dangers.
Actually, it's far more likely that two people who stayed out of the limelight for years are seeking to get their names in the media for political gain. How many of you - especially outside of Israel - had ever heard of either of them before they started attacking Netanyahu?
BUT PERHAPS the most distasteful and undemocratic response to Diskin’s and Dagan’s outspokenness has been a legislative initiative that, if passed, would severely restrict the open debate and criticism that characterizes Israeli political discourse.
Dubbed the “Dagan Law,” the legislative initiative would prevent former security officials from making public comments on matters related to their field of expertise without authorization from the Defense Ministry. First drafted last year, the bill has garnered new interest in the aftermath of Diskin’s comments. MKs such as Miri Regev (Kadima), who drafted the original bill, and Danny Danon (Likud), among others, are pushing to get the Dagan Law passed. They claim to be out to defend Israel from the potential danger caused by irresponsible comments made by the likes of Dagan and Diskin.
But in actuality, stifling the free exchange of ideas and criticism among those most qualified to express these ideas and criticism is the real danger to Israel’s security.
Funny, but I don't see any public debate in Iran over whether or how far to go in developing nuclear weapons. I don't recall any public debate in the US over whether and how to kill Bin Laden. And although I wasn't around then, I don't recall reading about any public debate in the US over whether to use nuclear weapons on Japan until after the bombers had already dropped their loads on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Some decisions can only be taken in secret.
As to the so-called Dagan Law, I don't know of any other country in the world where the recently retired director of intelligence goes shooting off his mouth in public about the critical security issues facing his country, and claims to know more than anyone else because of his being privy to state secrets. Dagan's, and now Diskin's, behavior is simply galling.
And as to the Post, if they are going to just be Haaretz lite, who needs them? Once again, I have no regrets that I canceled my subscription.
As I am sure many of you have already heard, over the weekend, retired General Security Service chief Yuval Diskin attacked Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Rabin over their handling of the Iranian nuclear threat. While the reaction here in Israel has been largely mooted (except for an overdone piece about it on Israel Television's nightly news magazine on Sunday), it has drawn a lot of reaction abroad. It's important to point out, as Jonathan Tobin does, that the criticism is really a tempest in a teapot.
Though foreign news outlets treated Diskin’s remarks as a huge story that can be spun as part of a negative trend for Netanyahu, even the left-wing press in Israel is skeptical about that. Haaretz’s Yossi Verter noted that the personal nature of Diskin’s rant against Netanyahu and Barak at what he termed a “gathering of defense establishment pensioners” undermined their credibility. Unlike the foreign press, most Israelis are aware that Dagan’s animus against Netanyahu and Barak stems from the fact that he was fired from his post. That Diskin was passed over to replace Dagan may also explain his hard feelings. Moreover, the utter lack of public support for alternatives to Netanyahu or his policies makes farcical the claim in today’s New York Times that there is an “avalanche” of criticism about his stand on Iran.
...
The animus against Netanyahu and his center-right government from the defense establishment and the government bureaucracy as well as most of the country’s traditional media outlets is well-known. Their frustration about his survival in power is compounded by the fact that he appears to be set for a cakewalk in the next elections which, incredibly, some opposition parties are pushing to be advanced from their scheduled date next year. As journalist Amir Mizroch writes, Dagan and Diskin — two men with axes to grind against the prime minister – may be “smelling elections in the air.”
Although the Dagan and Diskin affairs are in a sense unprecedented, because until now Israeli defense and security officials have not misbehaved in this manner, what is going on is just Israeli politics as usual. If these men and those Israeli and foreign journalists who are trying to make this into a major story are frustrated and angry now, just imagine how they’ll feel after Netanyahu is re-elected.
Indeed.
And it's looking more and more like elections will be in August or September.
As I am sure some of you have noticed, I've published summaries of some cables from Wikileaks dealing with Israel this week. This is because Wikileaks has turned over at least part of its 'Israel file' to Haaretz (who else?) for publication. Here are some more Wikileaks stories. This time, I took them from Maan.
The cables show Prime Minster Benjamin Netanyahu criticizing President Mahmoud Abbas in November 2009 for “sulking”, remarking in conversation with a group of US lawmakers that sulking “is not a good policy,” according to Israel's Haaretz daily.
The meeting report continued: “The premier also accused the Palestinians of exploiting ‘the stereotype that Netanyahu is a peace obstructionist,’ even though he had moved considerably toward them.”
Netanyahu complained that he had endorsed the two-state solution, removed West Bank movement restrictions, and tamed settlement construction with little in response, according to the documents.
“What have they [the Palestinians] done?” the prime minister laments, retorting, “Precondition upon precondition.”
Nothing earth-shattering there. The problem is that former Prime Minister Ehud K. Olmert had set his successor up for trouble.
Just before Netanyahu assumed office in March 2009, then Prime Minister Ehud Olmert gave a different evaluation of Palestinian leaders, also in a meeting with US congressmen.
Abbas is not like Arafat, the cable quotes him saying: Arafat was a killer but Abbas is a “pleasant guy.”
Abbas and the Israeli premier spent many hours “in wonderful talks,” Olmert said.
Abbas’ electoral majority in 2005 gave him authority, but he did not use it, in Olmert’s opinion.
Caretaker Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, however, “was a good manager but not a politician,” according to Olmert.
Asked what advice Olmert would give his successor, the prime minister said he did not want to embarrass Netanyahu, noting his successor would give his ideas to Abbas but the president might tell him “to go to hell.”
The latest cables to be released, detailed in Haaretz, show Israel’s internal security chief telling a US diplomat in May 2008 that Palestinians in Israel "have taken their rights too far."
The Shin Bet is a "voice for assisting Arab-Israelis constructively," the agency’s director Yuval Diskin said before continuing to outline the threat posed by Palestinian members of the Israeli parliament and Palestinians entering Israel via family unification.
The reunification of West Bank- and Gaza-born family members of Palestinians with Israeli citizenship or residency has been in effect halted since 2003.
Diskin said prior allowances for reunification had been "foolish," as Palestinians in Israel have family connections with "bad people on the other side doing bad things," and such relatives "brought their bad ideas with them."
The security chief also alluded to race-based concerns about maintaining a Jewish minority. He said that "The Bedouin have brought women with them from the Gaza Strip and Jenin, and now have many children."
"We need to manage this immigration in a controlled way," he continued.
Diskin criticized the role of Palestinian members of Israel's parliament, the Knesset, saying that "these people don’t spread Israel's democratic values and principles, and abuse their diplomatic immunity."
They are "flirting with the enemy," he alleged, "co-opted by people like [Syrian President] Bashar Assad."
He accused Palestinian Knesset members of trying to take the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a new direction and give it a new “national color."
"Thankfully, they are not succeeding, and their efforts are not filtering down to the general public, which is more concerned with daily life."
On Friday Palestinian MKs reacted angrily to the leaked remarks.
"With this statement Diskin has defined us as enemies and not citizens," MK Hanin Zoabi of the predominantly Palestinian party Balad told Ynet, an Israeli news site.
"We know what Diskin means when he says we bring negative ideas with us. He wants to shut us up," she said.
"We don't care what people say about our participation in Palestinian conferences together with people from all over the world. What Diskin fears is what we say about Israeli democracy and the new laws."
MK Taleb El-Sana, United Arab List-Ta'al, called for an investigation, Ynet reported.
Diskin "has gone too far," he said.
Zoabi has had her special privileges as an MK listed due to her participation in the IHH's Mavi Marmara last May. Among other things, she was filmed trying to prevent the IDF from evacuating wounded passengers. Both Zoabi and a-Sana accepted an invitation to visit and visited Muammar Gadhafi in Libya. A-Sana has also been to Syria on more than one occasion. A-Sana also lost his diplomatic passport five times before it occurred to anyone that maybe they shouldn't issue him another one.
Does anyone think Diskin's assessment was wrong? I didn't think so.
How did Israel go from 452 suicide attacks in 2003 to two in 2007 bli ayin hara (warding off evil eyes)? Shin Bet (General Security Service) chief Yuval Diskin explains.
According to Yuval Diskin, Director, Israel Security Agency (ISA – Shin Bet), the winning formula developed by Israel’s security services is based on jointness – the ability of all services to work together, sharing operational concepts (CONOPS), with a clear definition of the combined objective for all the organizations engaged in homeland security and defense. Multidisciplinary intelligence activity, based on advanced technological and human intelligence, tailored and channeled through processing and dissemination, means to turn intelligence from raw data into an operationally valuable, real-time asset. “Operational systems must be adapted and learn to operate as efficiently as possible with such real-time intelligence assets” said Diskin.
Such adaptation is enabled by introducing technological means to improve connectivity, interoperability and joint operations by combined task forces, composed of elements from different organizations, such as ISA, National Police, Army and Air Force. Under such a cooperation umbrella, different organizations must share common counter-terror techniques, tactics and procedures (TTP), optimizing for rapid response, based on real-time intelligence. According to Diskin, the main advantage of the joint-operating concept is by combining the unique capabilities and characteristics of each of the participating organizations. “The main challenge is not integrating the technologies, but overcoming leadership and human nature obstacles” Diskin added. One of the keys to establishing jointness was the setup of inter-service command posts, manned by representatives from all the services and organizations involved in operations.
Diskin considers the legal infrastructure a critical element in the success of Israel’s counter-terror campaign. “It took Israeli lawmakers 14 years to agree on the legal framework for the ISA, until the so-called ‘ISA Law’ was completed in 2002. Once implemented, this legal foundation became instrumental for the success of Israel’s counter-terror campaign.” Said Diskin.
Remember the dispute last year in the US over who should handle the 'underwear bomber'? Hopefully, that wouldn't happen here.
I am an Orthodox Jew - some would even call me 'ultra-Orthodox.' Born in Boston, I was a corporate and securities attorney in New York City for seven years before making aliya to Israel in 1991 (I don't look it but I really am that old :-). I have been happily married to the same woman for thirty-five years, and we have eight children (bli ayin hara) ranging in age from 13 to 33 years and nine grandchildren. Four of our children are married! Before I started blogging I was a heavy contributor on a number of email lists and ran an email list called the Matzav from 2000-2004. You can contact me at: IsraelMatzav at gmail dot com
