CONFIRMED -- Iran allowed to collect own samples at nuclear military base -- Verification expert on self-inspection deal: "You need the eyes and the brain to look where to sample... video camera opens up additional methods of deceiving"
The Israel Project's Omri Ceren reports that it has now been confirmed that Iran was in fact allowed to 'inspect' its own nuclear military facility at Parchin. I received this by email.
Reuters this morning conveyed Iranian
media reports establishing that the Iranians recently took their own
environmental samples at their Parchin military facility, where they
conducted tests relevant to the detonation of nuclear warheads, in lieu
of having IAEA inspectors take the samples (Reuters story below;
original IRNA story here [a]).
The IAEA has long sought access to Parchin: the agency needs to
clarify the nature and scope of Iran's past nuclear weapons work - the
possible military dimensions (PMDs) of Iran's atomic program - to
establish what the Iranians did and how far they got, which are the
prerequisites to setting up a verification regime against future
violations. The Obama administration had promised lawmakers that IAEA
inspectors would be able to inspect Parchin and resolve all PMD issues
before any final deal was inked [b][c][d][e][f].
Instead the JCPOA
allowed Iran to sign a secret side deal with the IAEA permitting the
Iranians to self-inspect the facility rather than grant IAEA inspector
robust access.
That side deal was subsequently revealed and published by the AP: the
Iranians would get to collect their own samples, those samples would
have to come from mutually agreed upon areas under overlapping photo and
video surveillance, and the number of the samples would be limited
[g][h]. An Iranian statement this morning confirmed that the Iranians
collected their own samples: "Iranian experts took samples from specific
locations in Parchin facilities this week without IAEA inspectors being
present" [i]. An IAEA statement confirmed the sampling was done from
mutually agreed upon areas under overlapping photo and video
surveillance: "the determination of the spots where the samples are
taken is a separate, important, careful activity…. [that] have to
satisfy our requirements… the actual swiping or other sample taking
[place] under redundant continuous surveillance" [j]. It's not yet clear
whether the AP was also correct about the number of samples being
limited.
The arrangement means that the IAEA will not be able to establish what happened at Parchin.
David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and
International Security, explained at a panel hosted earlier this month
by the Hudson Institute that self-sampling under surveillance is
inadequate. Inspectors need to be on the ground to identify dusty nooks
and corners where violators forgot to dust; the mutually agreed upon
areas are by definition the ones that violators know have been
sanitized [k]:
What you have is, is the situation where there'll be videotaping
of the potential locations where sampling would take place. Then the
IAEA would direct the Iranians to take the samples. And that's not the
normal way to do things.
If I could give the example in Iran of Kalaya Electric, a secret
centrifuge research and development facility that Iran denied was such a
thing. The IAEA got access and it brought in a very top level
centrifuge expert with that access, who looked around. And when they did
the sampling finally they didn't find any trace of enriched uranium in
the areas that had been heavily modified. But in a another, a secondary
building they found in a ventilation duct - which had not been modified -
they found traces of enriched uranium...
You need the eyes and the brain to look where to sample.
I brought an example of sampling in North Korea... they sampled
in the Yongbyon reprocessing plant in the early 90s... you can see in
the sampling they're looking behind this box... Look for where it's
dusty. The idea is that it's not been disturbed. In the case of Parchin,
it would be look for where the paint doesn't look solid. And so, that's
very hard to do with a video camera. So I think the video camera opens
up additional methods of deceiving the IAEA. And it's not the normal way
they've been doing it. And so I think that's a problem...
The sampling would be done, and then the IAEA access would
follow. And so the access is coming at a point where it's not as
useful... You want it to drive the inspection effort and the
environmental sampling effort, not be done at the end of the process [7:29].
The arrangement was also read more broadly as kneecapping the IAEA.
On the experts side, CNN got analysis from Olli Heinonen, former
director of the IAEA's verification shop, as Albright, president of the
Institute for Science and International Security: "It is very unusual...
I find it really hard to understand why you would let someone else take
the samples and only see through the camera" and "It's really not
normal... I don't know why they accepted it. I think the IAEA is
probably getting a little desperate to settle this" [l]. On the
Congressional side, a visit by Amano to the Hill on the side deals left
Senators fuming [m].
The IAEA reacted to this morning's leak by issuing more assurances
about the adequacy of Iranian self-inspections. White House validators
have already picked up the "redundant continuous surveillance" theme and
you're likely to hear more of it [n].
The problem is that the IAEA assurances read a little bit like a
hostage note: lawmakers, experts, and journalists know that the
arrangement is unprecedented and that inspectors need to be on the
ground, so the IAEA statements may be read as evidence that the agency
has bent to political pressure.
The confidential IAEA report, obtained by Reuters, said:
"Since
(our) previous report (in May), at a particular location at the Parchin
site, the agency has continued to observe, through satellite imagery,
the presence of vehicles, equipment, and probable construction
materials. In addition, a small extension to an existing building"
appeared to have been built.
The changes were first observed last month, a senior diplomat familiar with the Iran file said.
The
IAEA says any activities Iran has undertaken at Parchin since U.N.
inspectors last visited in 2005 could jeopardize its ability to verify
Western intelligence suggesting Tehran carried out tests there relevant
to nuclear bomb detonations more than a decade ago. Iran has dismissed
the intelligence as "fabricated".
...
"We cannot know or speculate what's in the
(extended) building ... It's something we will technically clarify over
the course of the year," the senior diplomat said. The report said the
extended building was not the one that some countries suspect has housed
the controversial experiments.
"It’s
funny that the IAEA claims there has been a small extension to a
building ... Iran doesn't need to ask for the IAEA's permission to do
construction work on its sites," Reza Najafi, Iran's envoy to the
agency, was quoted as saying by ISNA news agency.
I can't even say what I'd like to say about this. Certainly not in any forum that is likely to be widely dispersed.
Messiah should be arriving soon. It's the only solution.
I don't know when on Thursday this press release from IAEA director Yukia Amano was posted - it only has a date, but no time on it. But as I've reported already, the IAEA's agreement with Iran has been posted by AP despite Amano. Here's what the IAEA director had to say (Hat Tip: Memeorandum).
I am disturbed by statements suggesting that the IAEA has given
responsibility for nuclear inspections to Iran. Such statements
misrepresent the way in which we will undertake this important
verification work.
The separate arrangements under the Road-map agreed between the IAEA
and Iran in July are confidential and I have a legal obligation not to
make them public – the same obligation I have for hundreds of such
arrangements made with other IAEA Member States.
However, I can state that the arrangements are technically sound and
consistent with our long-established practices. They do not compromise
our safeguards standards in any way.
The Road-map between Iran and the IAEA is a very robust agreement,
with strict timelines, which will help us to clarify past and present
outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.
If I were sitting in a press conference with Mr. Amano, here's what I would ask:
Mr. Amano, can you name another country aside from Iran in which the IAEA relies solely on photos, videos and soil samples provided by the country under inspection?
Can you name any other country in which an IAEA inspection is merely a 'courtesy visit'?
If Olympic athletes were allowed to provide urine samples without anyone ensuring that they were their own, would you consider that reliable? How could you ensure their authenticity?
How can you ensure the authenticity of a soil sample that you did not watch being taken?
Unbelievable. This whole 'inspection' is a farce. And Amano has been caught with his pants down (I will assume he released that statement before AP released the agreement).
When I went to sleep last night, a Max Fisher piece attacking that report was trending. Fisher's report was largely based on conversations with Jeffrey Lewis, a guy known on Twitter as @ArmsControlWonk.
"If true" turns out to be a major issue here, as upon closer
examination the inflammatory headline, as it has been widely
interpreted, appears to largely not be true.
In fact, the text of the article said something much more modest. It
said that in a one-time set of inspections at one military facility
known as Parchin, Iranians, rather than nuclear inspectors, would take
"environmental samples" (such as soil samples). It said that nuclear
inspectors would not be permitted to visit, and that Iran would not
provide photos or videos of the site. But still, it was concerning.
"The story was the Iranians would take the samples under some kind of
IAEA monitoring," Jeffrey Lewis, the arms control expert, told me. "The
details of that monitoring were not provided, so it's hard to say how
weird that is. Some IAEA officials say that it's not unusual to let a
country physically take the samples if there's an IAEA inspector
present."
The sourcing in the story, though, seemed to water it down a bit
more. The report was not based not on an actual agreement, but rather on
a copy of a draft agreement. The anonymous source who showed AP the
document said there was a final version that is similar, but
conspicuously refused to show AP the final version or go into specifics.
"The oldest Washington game is being played in Vienna," Lewis said.
"And that is leaking what appears to be a prejudicial and one-sided
account of a confidential document to a friendly reporter, and using
that to advance a particular policy agenda."
1. Iran will provide to the Agency photos of the locations, including
those identified in paragraph 3 below, which would be mutually agreed
between Iran and the Agency, taking into account military concerns.
2. Iran will provide to the Agency videos of the locations, including
those identified in paragraph 3 below, which would be mutually agreed
between Iran and the Agency, taking into account military concerns.
3. Iran will provide to the Agency 7 environmental samples taken from
points inside one building already identified by the Agency and agreed
by Iran, and 2 points outside of the Parchin complex which would be
agreed between Iran and the Agency.
4. The Agency will ensure the technical authenticity of the
activities referred to in paragraphs 1-3 above. Activities will be
carried out using Iran's authenticated equipment, consistent with
technical specifications provided by the Agency, and the Agency's
containers and seals.
5. The above mentioned measures would be followed, as a courtesy by
Iran, by a public visit of the Director General, as a dignitary guest of
the Government of Iran, accompanied by his deputy for safeguards.
6. Iran and the Agency will organize a one-day technical roundtable on issues relevant to Parchin.
For the International Atomic Energy Agency: Tero Varjoranta, Deputy Director General for Safeguards
For the Islamic Republic of Iran: Ali Hoseini Tash, Deputy Secretary of Supreme National Security Council for Strategic Affairs
What I want to know is, why can the AP get this stuff when Congress couldn't?
Iran's engraved invitation to develop nuclear weapons
It was bad enough when we heard that the United States cannot send nuclear inspectors to Iran. At all. It was worse when we heard that Iran had the right to approve any nuclear inspectors who did show up. Now, we're beyond that. It turns out that the IAEA cannot inspect Iran's Parchin site - where it is known to have worked on nuclear weapons - either. With reports already circulating that Iran is sanitizing Parchin in broad daylight, it now turns out that Parchin will have an excessively lenient inspection regime... to be carried out by Iran itself. This is from a Wall Street Journal editorial.
But that spin started to unravel three weeks ago with the discovery
that the Parchin inspections were part of a secret side agreement
between the IAEA and Iran—not between Iran and the six negotiating
countries. Secretary of State John Kerry has said he hasn’t read the side deal, though his negotiating deputy Wendy Sherman told MSNBC that she “saw the pieces of paper” but couldn’t keep them. IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano has told Members of the U.S. Congress that he’s bound by secrecy and can’t show them the side deals.
That
secrecy should be unacceptable to Congress—all the more so after the AP
dispatch. The news service says it has seen a document labelled
“separate arrangement II.” The document says Iran will provide the IAEA
with photos and locations that the IAEA says are linked to Iran’s
weapons work, “taking into account military concerns.”
In other
words, the country that lied for years about its nuclear weapons program
will now be trusted to come clean about those lies. And trusted to such
a degree that it can limit its self-inspections so they don’t raise
“military concerns” in Iran.
Keep in mind that the side deal
already excludes a role for the U.S., and that the IAEA lacks any way to
enforce its side deal since it has no way of imposing penalties for
violations. Iran has also already ruled out any role for American or
Canadian nationals on the inspection teams.
Why not cut out the IAEA middle man and simply let Qasem Soleimani, the head of Iran’s Quds Force, sign a personal affadavit?
The
AP report hadn’t been contradicted by our deadline on Wednesday, and a
White House spokesman told AP merely that the U.S. is “confident in the
agency’s technical plans for investigating the possible military
dimensions of Iran’s former program.” That sounds like a confirmation.
The
news raises further doubts about a nuclear pact that is already leaking
credibility. Unfettered access to Parchin is crucial to understanding
Iran’s past nuclear work, which is essential to understanding how close
Iran has come to getting the bomb. Without that knowledge it’s
impossible to know if Iran really is a year or more away from having the
bomb, which is the time period that Mr. Kerry says is built into the
accord and makes it so worth doing.
Earlier this year President
Obama signed the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, which says Congress
must receive all documents related to the deal, including any “entered
into or made between Iran and any other parties.” That has to mean the
IAEA.
Republican Presidential Candidate and Senator Ted Cruz went ballistic over this (Hat Tip: Memeorandum).
“Enough,” Cruz told TheBlaze in a statement. “Enough of the concessions,
capitulations and backroom deals that make up President Obama’s
catastrophic nuclear deal with the Islamic Republic of Iran.”
He continued: “The most recent revelation that Iran will be selecting
its own inspectors to verify the nature of its nuclear program is made
all the more egregious by the fact that as the single largest
contributor to the IAEA (support that is mandated in the JCPOA) United
States taxpayers will be paying for a farce that is a direct threat to
their own security.”
Cruz, who has been an outspoken critic of the Iran nuclear deal since
it was announced, argued the agreement is a matter of national
security, not politics.
“This is not a partisan issue. It is not about President Obama’s
political legacy. It is about the future of our country, and that of our
allies,” he told TheBlaze. “We have to stop this disastrous deal.”
Iran: Nuclear weapon site won't be inspected, Amano didn't disclose agreement to Congress
An Iranian spokesman said on Monday that IAEA Director General Yukia Amano was warned not to disclose Iran's agreement with his agency to the US Congress when he testified there. The spokesman also said that the agreement abides by Iran's red lines, which include no inspection of military facilities. That would include Parchin where the Iranians worked on nuclear weapons.
"In a letter to Yukiya Amano, we underlined that
if the secrets of the agreement (roadmap between Iran and the IAEA) are
revealed, we will lose our trust in the Agency; and despite the US
Congress's pressures, he didn’t give any information to them," Spokesman
of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Behrouz Kamalvandi
said in a meeting with the Iranian lawmakers in Tehran on Monday.
"Had he done so, he himself would have been harmed," he added.
In relevant remarks early this month, Iran's Envoy
to the International Atomic Energy Agency Reza Najafi warned the UN
nuclear watchdog to avoid disclosing its secret agreements with Tehran.
"The agreements signed between a member country
and the IAEA are definitely secret and cannot be presented to any other
country at all," Najafi said.
Referring to the discussions at the US Congress
during which the US officials elaborated on the nuclear agreement
between Iran and the Group 5+1 (the US, Russia, China, Britain and
France plus Germany), he said, "The discussions revealed that the secret
texts between Iran and the Agency have not even been provided to the US
administration."
"For the very same reason, they cannot be presented to the Senate members either," Najafi added.
...
Amano and Head of the AEOI Ali Akbar Salehi signed a roadmap of cooperation in Vienna on July 14.
The roadmap contains secret arrangements stated in
one or two documents entailing on the methods to be used by the two
sides in their cooperation.
Senior Iranian nuclear officials have said that
all IAEA member states have such secret agreements and the UN nuclear
watchdog is duty bound to keep them secret to any third party individual
or state.
After the roadmap was signed, Salehi announced
that the new agreement would fully settle all unresolved issues
pertaining to Tehran's nuclear activities in the past.
"All past issues will be resolved completely after
Iran and the Agency adopt some measures," Salehi told reporters after
signing an agreement called the Iran-IAEA Cooperation 'Roadmap'.
He said that all agreements, including the
measures decided for Parchin military site, will be implemented with
full respect to Iran's redlines.
Iran had earlier announced that inspection of the country's military sites are one of its redlines.
It starts: US intel warns Congress Iran is sanitizing Parchin in broad daylight
US intelligence officials have informed Congress that it has detected that Iran is 'sanitizing' its Parchin facility outside Tehran where Western countries are virtually certain it has carried out nuclear weapons development activity in the past. The 'sanitizing,' which is being carried out in broad daylight, is apparently a last-ditch effort by Tehran to thwart the ability of IAEA inspectors to reconstruct the extent of the PMD's (possibly military dimensions) of Iran's nuclear program at Parchin. This is from Eli Lake and Josh Rogin.
Intelligence officials and lawmakers who have seen the new evidence,
which is still classified, told us that satellite imagery picked up by
U.S. government assets in mid- and late July showed that Iran had moved
bulldozers and other heavy machinery to the Parchin site and that the
U.S. intelligence community concluded with high confidence that the
Iranian government was working to clean up the site ahead of planned
inspections by the IAEA.
The intelligence community shared its
findings with lawmakers and some Congressional staff late last week,
four people who have seen the evidence told us. The Office of the
Director of National Intelligence briefed lawmakers about the evidence
Monday, three U.S. senators said.
“I am familiar with it,” Senate
Intelligence Committee Chairman Richard Burr told us Tuesday. “I think
it’s up to the administration to draw their conclusions. Hopefully this
is something they will speak on, since it is in many ways verified by
commercial imagery. And their actions seem to be against the grain of
the agreement.”
Burr said Iran’s activities at Parchin complicate
the work of the IAEA inspectors who are set to examine the site in the
coming months. IAEA's director general, Yukiya Amano, was in Washington
on Wednesday to brief lawmakers behind closed doors about the side
agreements.
“They are certainly not going to see the site that
existed. Whether that’s a site that can be determined what it did, only
the technical experts can do that,” Burr said. “I think it’s a huge
concern.”
The Obama administration is already spinning.
A senior intelligence official, when asked about the satellite
imagery, told us the IAEA was also familiar with what he called
"sanitization efforts" since the deal was reached in Vienna, but that
the U.S. government and its allies had confidence that the IAEA had the
technical means to detect past nuclear work anyway.
Another
administration official explained that this was in part because any
trace amounts of enriched uranium could not be fully removed between now
and Oct. 15, the deadline for Iran to grant access and answer remaining
questions from the IAEA about Parchin.
So what? I'm not a nuclear expert, but couldn't removing soil or destroying buildings result in the uranium concentration in the area being lower? Not to mention....
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Corker told us Tuesday
that while Iran’s activity at Parchin last month isn’t technically a
violation of the agreement it signed with the U.S. and other powers, it
does call into question Iran’s intention to be forthright about the
possible military dimensions of its nuclear program.
Did anyone ever expect them to be forthright about this? It's kind of like....
Several senior lawmakers, including Democrats, are concerned that Iran
will be able to collect its own soil samples at Parchin with only
limited supervision, a practice several lawmakers have compared to
giving suspected drug users the benefit of the doubt to submit specimens
unsupervised. Iran’s sanitization of the site further complicates that
verification.
Yeah. If this goes through, I think the Obama administration should advocate for Tom Brady being able to choose which footballs to let the NFL examine after each game.
David Albright, the president of the Institute for Science and
International Security, obtained a commercially available image of the
Parchin site taken by satellites on July 26 that shows renewed activity
at the Parchin site. He told us there are two new large vehicles,
alterations ongoing to roofs of two of the buildings and new structures
near two of the buildings.
“You have to worry that this could be
an attempt by Iran to defeat the sampling, that it’s Iran’s last-ditch
effort to eradicate evidence there,” he said. “The day is coming when
they are going to have to let the IAEA into Parchin, so they may be
desperate to finish sanitizing the site.”
After all, if you can't trust a country whose motto is 'death to America, death to Israel,' who can you trust?
Meanwhile, for the Obama administration, all is going according to plan.
Secretary of State John Kerry has said that the U.S. government has “absolute knowledge”
about what Iran has done in the past. Ahead of the vote on the
agreement next month, many lawmakers don't share Kerry's confidence.
Iran would seem to have its doubts as well, since it's still trying to
cover its tracks.
Senate demands to see Parchin and PMD ('possible military dimensions') deals - UPDATED
The Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee - Bob Corker (R-Tn) and Ben Cardin (D-Md) - have demanded from Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz - who was deeply involved in the P5+1 negotiations - that the White House demanding to see the secret agreements whose existence was disclosed on Tuesday by the IAEA to Congressman Bob Pompeo (R-Ks) and Senator Tom Cotton (R-Ark) (Hat Tip: Memeorandum).
The Cotton-Pompeo trip is already affecting the debate over the
Iran deal on Capitol Hill. According to The Hill, Senate Foreign
Relations Committee chairman Bob Corker and ranking member Ben Cardin
met with Department of Energy secretary Ernest Moniz yesterday to demand
copies of the side agreements discovered by Cotton and Pompeo. The two
senators also sent a joint letter to President Obama asking for copies
of these documents.
Fred Fleitz (at that first link) also explains the significance of what's being hidden.
Former Department of Energy official William Tobey explained in a
July 15 Wall Street Journal op-ed why it is crucial that Iran resolve
the PMD issue. According to Tobey, “for inspections to be meaningful,
Iran would have to completely and correctly declare all its relevant
nuclear activities and procurement, past and present.”
According to the Cotton/Pompeo press release, there will be a secret,
opaque procedure to verify Iran’s compliance with these side agreements.
The press release says:
According to the IAEA, the Iran agreement negotiators, including the
Obama administration, agreed that the IAEA and Iran would forge
separate arrangements to govern the inspection of the Parchin military
complex — one of the most secretive military facilities in Iran — and
how Iran would satisfy the IAEA’s outstanding questions regarding past
weaponization work. Both arrangements will not be vetted by any
organization other than Iran and the IAEA, and will not be released even
to the nations that negotiated the JCPOA [Iran nuclear agreement].
This
means that the secret arrangements have not been released for public
scrutiny and have not been submitted to Congress as part of its
legislatively mandated review of the Iran deal.
This means that two crucial measures of Iranian compliance with the
nuclear agreement will not be disclosed to Congress despite the
requirements of the Corker-Cardin bill (the Iran Nuclear Agreement
Review Act), which requires the Obama administration to provide the U.S.
Congress with all documents associated with the agreement, including
all “annexes, appendices, codicils, side agreements [emphasis added],
implementing materials, documents, and guidance, technical, or other
understandings and any related agreements, whether entered into or
implemented prior to the agreement or to be entered into or implemented
in the future.”
It also means that Congress will have no way of knowing whether Iran
complied with either side agreement.
...
This is especially troublesome for the PMD issue. I wrote in
National Review on June 15 and June 17 that the Obama administration was
trying to find a way to let Iran off the hook for past nuclear
weapons-related work. It seems to have found a way to do this with a
secret procedure shielded from the American public and the U.S.
Congress.
Still waiting for the Democrats to stand up to Obama on this. Ben Cardin? Chuck Schumer? The only one I'm betting on is Bob Menendez - he has nothing to lose.
On Morning Joe on Wednesday morning, State Department Spokesman John Kirby refused to answer questions regarding the existence of side deals that were not shown to Congress.
Obama cut separate deals with Iran over Parchin and military nukes, hid deals from Congress
Congressman Mike Pompeo (R-Ks) and Senator Tom Cotton (R-Ark) have been told by the IAEA at a meeting in Vienna on Friday that President Hussein Obama cut separate deals with Iran over its Parchin military complex (you know, the one they won't show to the IAEA) and its military nuclear program, and then hid the deals from Congress.
“According to the IAEA, the Iran agreement negotiators, including the
Obama administration, agreed that the IAEA and Iran would forge
separate arrangements to govern the inspection of the Parchin military
complex – one of the most secretive military facilities in Iran – and
how Iran would satisfy the IAEA’s outstanding questions regarding past
weaponization work. Both arrangements will not be vetted by any
organization other than Iran and the IAEA, and will not be released even
to the nations that negotiated the JCPOA. This means that the secret
arrangements have not been released for public scrutiny and have not
been submitted to Congress as part of its legislatively mandated review
of the Iran deal.”
The American public has not been given all the facts on the Iran
deal, nor has congress. This is not only distressing but a violation:
“Even under the woefully inadequate Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act,
the Obama administration is required to provide the U.S. Congress with
all nuclear agreement documents, including all “annexes, appendices,
codicils, side agreements, implementing materials, documents, and
guidance, technical or other understandings and any related agreements,
whether entered into or implemented prior to the agreement or to be
entered into or implemented in the future.”
Both Pompeo and Cotton are U.S. military veterans. Each of them included a personal statement in the press release:
The International Atomic Energy Agency has signed a roadmap with Iran under which they will allegedly resolve all inspection issues by year-end. But one facility to which the IAEA will apparently not be granted access is the Parchin military compound where Iran likely tested nuclear weapons. This is from the first link.
VIENNA,
July 14 (Reuters) - The U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency signed a
roadmap with Iran on Tuesday with the aim of resolving all outstanding
questions it has about the country's nuclear programme by the end of the
year, the IAEA's director general said on Tuesday.
Future
access to Iran's Parchin military site, which the agency had repeatedly
sought, is part of a separate "arrangement", Yukiya Amano said.
"By
15 December 2015, the Director General will provide... the final
assessment on the resolution of all past and present outstanding
issues," he added.
Iranian Revolutionary Guard: 'No foreigners allowed in our military sites'
Waiting for President Hussein Obama to cave in 5... 4... 3... 2... 1....
A senior commander in Iran's Revolutionary Guard said Sunday that
inspectors would be barred from military sites under any nuclear
agreement with world powers.
Gen. Hossein Salami, the Guard's
deputy leader, said on state TV that allowing the foreign inspection of
military sites is tantamount to "selling out."
"We will respond
with hot lead (bullets) to those who speak of it," Salami said. "Iran
will not become a paradise for spies. We will not roll out the red
carpet for the enemy."
...
A fact sheet on the framework accord issued by the State Department
said Iran would be required to grant the U.N. nuclear agency access to
any "suspicious sites." Iran has questioned that and other language in
the fact sheet, notably that sanctions would only be lifted after the
International Atomic Energy Agency has verified Tehran's compliance.
Iran's leaders have said the sanctions should be lifted on the first day
of the implementation of the accord.
The fact sheet said Iran has
agreed to implement the Additional Protocol to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, which would grant the IAEA expanded access to both declared and
undeclared nuclear facilities.
But Salami said allowing foreign
inspectors to visit a military base would amount to "occupation," and
expose "military and defense secrets."
"It means humiliating a
nation," Salami said on state TV. "They will not even be permitted to
inspect the most normal military site in their dreams."
So there won't be inspections. We can trust Iran, right? What difference does it make?
How inconvenient: Another 'secret' Iranian enrichment plant exposed
As the Obama administration pulls out all the stops to defend its intention to sign a deal that would allow Iran to become a nuclear power, the Iranian opposition throws a crowbar into the juggernaut by exposing yet another previously undisclosed uranium enrichment plant outside of Tehran.
The specifics contained in the NCRI’s
report give it credibility because they make the report easy to either
verify or debunk. The report pinpoints the hidden nuclear site with
satellite photography, explains its internal structuring and shows the
entrances as well as the location of an elevator to access a 200-meter
underground tunnel. There’s even an up-close photograph of one of the
shielded doors used at the site to conceal radiation.
The secret site is called Lavizan-3 and
is operated by the Ministry of Intelligence and Security. It is within a
military compound so that the regime can declare it off-limits to IAEA
inspectors. Construction of the site began in early 2004 and is believed
to have finished in 2008 or around that time.
According to the group’s sources
inside Iran, the site is used for enriching uranium and building,
testing and installing advanced centrifuges that enable Iran to produce
the uranium for a nuclear bomb more quickly. The centrifuges at this
location are of the IR2, IR3 and IR4 types. These centrifuges can
potentially cut the time needed to make bomb-grade uranium from low-enriched uranium in half, from 18-24 months to 9-12 months.
NCRI also listed the names of key personnel involved in the hidden site. One of them is Morteza Behzad, an engineer involved with the Fordo uranium enrichment site that is buried 300 feet underground and was exposed in 2009. The Treasury Department sanctioned him in 2012.
The Lavizan-3 site can only hold 3,000 centrifuges, making it
unsuitable for an a civilian energy program but entirely suitable for
nuclear weapons creation.
Four top nuclear experts said earlier this month that they now consider Iran to be a nuclear-ready state,
warning that Iran poses an Electro-Magnetic Pulse threat to the U.S.
and its satellite launches show that it has intercontinental ballistic
missiles capable of reaching the U.S.
The IAEA confirms that Iran is still not being transparent about its nuclear activity. The agency’s September 5 report stated
that Iran is still denying inspectors access to the Parchin site where
the regime is believed to conducted research inarguably related to
nuclear weapons. The regime also continued to deny that it has worked on
nuclear warheads and has not adequately addressed the IAEA’s evidence.
Report ties Parchin blast to Iran's nuclear weapons program
Israel's Channel 10 is reporting that there's a connection between last week's explosion at Iran's Parchin weapons testing facility and Iran's nuclear weapons program.
Despite the claims of an accident, chairman of Iran's national
security council Mohammed Saleh has summoned security sources to clarify
the cause of the explosion which reportedly killed a "nuclear expert,"
confirming suspicions it was not a simple accident.
The Iranian state-run Fars News Agency on
Monday in follow-up reports about the supposed ammunition explosion
admitted it happened due to a "private company" that was given a tender
to manage the transportation following government privatization.
Channel 10 reports that the inquiry apparently is focused on a private transportation company "Hamana," which roughly four years ago was
privatized and given given offices adjacent to the Parchin base
entrance, where it is authorized to transport dangerous materials in and
out of the base.
The public relations picture of Hamana features an image of a nuclear
explosion, hinting in a not-so-subtle manner that the company may also
be involved in transporting radioactive materials as part of Iran's
secretive nuclear program.
Suspicions that the blast was an act of sabotage by a foreign nation were strengthened by the reports, given that a cyber attack would be possible on Hamana's trucks.
Hamana reportedly owns five trucks allowed to enter Parchin, which
are equipped with GPS and AVL (Automatic Vehicle Location) systems. The
trucks' movements are supervised online, in a system that allows
distress signals to be sent out - and even allows remote control over
the truck's engine.
I wonder whether the Mossad has a company called Hamana. Heh.
Iran admits it was exploding 'bridge wires' that could cause nuclear explosion at Parchin
Iran has admitted that Sunday's explosion at its Parchin testing facility for nuclear weapons was caused by an explosion of 'bridge wires.' But it continues to deny that it was exploding nuclear detonators.
State news agency IRNA reported that a fire broke out at an
"explosive materials production unit" Sunday night and killed two
employees, citing Iran's Defense Industries Organization.
Iranian opposition site Sahamnews described the incident as an explosion near Parchin that shattered windows 9 miles away.
...
In 2011, IAEA investigators described "a large explosive containment
vessel" at the site more than a decade ago, according to a confidential
report obtained by the Associated Press. Later U.S. and IAEA reports
described demolition at the site that U.S. diplomats have said look like
efforts to destroy evidence of what happened there.
Iran, which claims its nuclear program has peaceful aims, says it tested "exploding bridge wires" at the site, and not nuclear detonators. But it has yet to allow the IAEA to inspect the site.
And what exactly are 'bridge wires'? Marc Langfan explains.
Langfan shows how 'bridge wires' can cause a nuclear explosion:
The semi-official Isna news agency claimed the explosion took place after a fire erupted in an "explosive materials production unit".
"Unfortunately, due to the incident, two workers of this production
unit lost their lives," the site reported. Other Iranian outlets cited
witnesses who said a "loud explosion" could be heard several kilometers
away.
The opposition Sahamnews outlet claimed the blast was so
powerful it shattered windows some 15 kilometers away from the site,
raising the possibility that a far more destructive explosion had taken
place than official outlets are letting on.
In the first official comment on the incident, official Iranian sources
said that there had been an “incident,” but not an explosion, at the
Parchin plant. Two people are classified as “missing.” The sources added
that there was no nuclear work being done at Parchin.
Dr. Emily Landau, who heads the Arms Control and Regional
Security Program at the Institute for National Security Studies, expressed concern
over the White House’s ongoing silence in the face of Iranian attempts to
redefine the Geneva agreement after its signing.
Landau cited recent
examples of Iranian interpretations of the agreement that contradict claims put
forward by the US, including the “immediate Iranian rejection of the White House
fact sheet [on the Geneva interim accord].”
According to Iran’s
publication of its own interpretation of what was achieved in Geneva and an
announcement by Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, within days of
the agreement, Iran will continue construction work at Arak.
On Monday,
Landau noted, Iran announced that it is testing its advanced new-generation
centrifuges.
All the while, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei is
continuing to air “horrific rhetoric,” Landau said.
Well, yeah, unless the Iranian interpretation is the real one and Obama and Kerry are just lying. Where have I heard that possibility before?
This ISIS image shows suspected cleanup activities at a building alleged
to contain a high-explosive chamber used for nuclear weapon tests in
the Parchin military complex in Iran [Archive]
The Institute for Science and
International Security released four new satellite images Thursday,
showing what ISIS analysts said was "progressive asphalting" of an area
of the Parchin military complex, which the U.N.'s International Atomic
Energy Agency has said was a possible location for testing conventional
explosive triggers for a nuclear blast.
Photos of the Parchin compound dated from Dec.
12, 2011, to Aug. 13 this year and show a gradually increasing area of
what appears to be blacktop around structures, with only about a quarter
remaining bare in the last image.
Alluding to earlier satellite photos
indicating dismantling of buildings, apparent hosing down of the area in
what the IAEA fears may be an attempt to wash away evidence, and other
work, ISIS said the images "clearly document activities at the Parchin
site that are completely unrelated to any road-building activity."
Iran has said the asphalting is part of
regular maintenance and road work. But with its probe blocked -- and
signs of other activity -- IAEA concerns have grown that this might be
an attempt to cover up work on a weapons program while Iran keeps
inspectors away.
Graph shows Iran developing bomb three times the size of Hiroshima
A diagram obtained by the Associated Press shows that Iran is working on a nuclear weapon with more than three times the power of the bomb that the United States dropped on Hiroshima at the end of World War II. Earlier this month, the IAEA reported that Iran has doubled its enrichment capabilities at its underground facility at Fordow, meaning that it may be only a few months away from developing a nuclear weapon.
The International Atomic Energy Agency — the Vienna-based U.N.
nuclear watchdog — reported last year that it had obtained diagrams
indicating that Iran was calculating the "nuclear explosive yield" of
potential weapons. A senior diplomat who is considered neutral on the
issue confirmed that the graph obtained by the AP was indeed one of
those cited by the IAEA in that report. He spoke only on condition of
anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss the issue.
The IAEA report mentioning the diagrams last year did not give
details of what they showed. But the diagram seen by the AP shows a bell
curve — with variables of time in micro-seconds, and power and energy
both in kilotons — the traditional measurement of the energy output, and
hence the destructive power of nuclear weapons. The curve peaks at just
above 50 kilotons at around 2 microseconds, reflecting the full force
of the weapon being modeled.
The bomb that the United States dropped on Hiroshima in Japan during
World War II, in comparison, had a force of about 15 kilotons. Modern
nuclear weapons have yields hundreds of times higher than that.
The diagram has a caption in Farsi: "Changes in output and in energy
released as a function of time through power pulse." The number "5'' is
part of the title, suggesting it is part of a series.
David Albright, whose Institute for Science and International
Security is used by the U.S. government as a go-to source on Iran's
nuclear program, said the diagram looks genuine but seems to be
designed more "to understand the process" than as part of a blueprint
for an actual weapon in the making.
"The yield is too big," Albright said, noting that North Korea's
first tests of a nuclear weapon were only a few kilotons. Because the
graph appears to be only one in a series, others might show lower
yields, closer to what a test explosion might produce, he said.
Prime Minister Netanyahu should be happy that yesterday's Likud primary is likely to yield him an inner cabinet that will be far more hawkish on Iran than the current one. It looks like Israel will need to take action soon.
IAEA reports 'continued activity' at Iran's nuclear weapons facility at Parchin
The IAEA reports seeing 'continued activity' at Iran's former nuclear weapons testing facility at Parchin. Iran is trying to clean the facility before allowing inspectors to see it.
Asked whether Iran was continuing to dismantle the facility, which UN
inspectors want to visit and now only monitor via satellite imagery,
Amano said: "Yes ... We continue to see activities."
...
During a visit to London, Amano also said he hoped a new high-level
meeting with Iran about Tehran's disputed atomic program could be held
"quite soon".
Amano said the IAEA was committed to dialogue with
Iran: "We are willing to meet with them in the very near future ... I
hope we can have a meeting quite soon."
I am an Orthodox Jew - some would even call me 'ultra-Orthodox.' Born in Boston, I was a corporate and securities attorney in New York City for seven years before making aliya to Israel in 1991 (I don't look it but I really am that old :-). I have been happily married to the same woman for thirty-five years, and we have eight children (bli ayin hara) ranging in age from 13 to 33 years and nine grandchildren. Four of our children are married! Before I started blogging I was a heavy contributor on a number of email lists and ran an email list called the Matzav from 2000-2004. You can contact me at: IsraelMatzav at gmail dot com
