Marie Harf and the Washington Post lie about Israeli support for Iran deal
Some of you may have seen this tweet by former State Department spokescritter Marie Harf, and the underlying article from the Washington Post, last week.
There's one small problem:
Harf and the Washington Post lied.
Tharoor first mentions Ami Ayalon, a former head of the Shin Bet, Israel's internal security service, and links to a Daily Beast piece entitled "Ex-Intel Chief: Iran Deal Good for Israel."
Unfortunately for Tharoor (and
for Daily Beast commentator Jonathan Alter), Ayalon, who begrudgingly
supports the deal because it is "the best plan currently on the table"
and because he believes there are no available alternatives, nonetheless
has said in no uncertain terms, "I think the deal is bad. It's not good."
Tharoor then cites former intelligence chief Efraim Halevy, but strangely links to an Op-Ed Halevy wrote after a framework agreement was finalized in Lausanne last April but before the details of this final deal were agreed upon in Vienna this month. In a more recent (and thus relevant) Op-Ed,
Halevy described what he sees as several strong points in the agreement
and concludes that it is "important to hold a profound debate in Israel
on whether no agreement is preferable to an agreement which includes
components that are crucial for Israel's security."
He didn't explicitly state which side of the debate he favors,
although there is a sense that leans toward the idea that Israel must
get behind the deal. But like Ayalon, his tepid defense of the deal, if
it is even that, seems to hinge on the idea that this agreement makes
the emergence of any other, better deals unrealistic. "There will be no
other agreement and no other negotiations," Halevy says in his recent
Op-Ed.
What he does not say is that the deal signed in Vienna is, as a whole, "good." In an interview with Israel's Channel 2, he repeats his call for national debate, and paints a much more equivocal picture: "This is not an agreement that is entirely bad,"
Halevy said. "There are positive elements in it." Later, he added
that "this agreement has a number of very good elements for Israel, and
there are elements that are not as good." That quote, with its shades of
gray, might not make for as dramatic a headline as the one chosen by
the Washington Post.
But if equivocation is what the newspaper
has to work with, then equivocation is what it should be capturing in
its headlines—even if that means the piece can't be used by State
Department officials.
Next, Tharoor mentions Amos Yadlin, a former head of Israel's
Military Intelligence branch. It is not clear why: Yadlin, who has
cautioned against panic and excesses on the part of Israel's government,
nonetheless believes, as explained in an interview with Israel's Ynet, "This is not a good deal. This a problematic deal. You also could call it a bad deal."
Tharoor's article intially gave no hint of Yadlin's criticism of the
deal, but sometime later the author snuck in a throw-away
statement noting that Yadlin is "not a fan of the deal." (The stealth
correction appears to violate the newspaper's correction policy.)
Finally, the Washington Post blogger mentions Meir Dagan, another former Mossad chief. It appears, though, that Dagan has not gone on record
one way or another about the nuclear deal finalized in Vienna. (We
looked for any recent statements by him in Hebrew or English, and came
up with nothing. We will of course add an update if we find any relevant
commentary by Dagan from before Tharoor wrote his article.)
Hmmm. I'm shocked. Just totally shocked. (Not!).Labels: Ami Ayalon, Amos Yadlin, Barack Hussein Obama, Ephraim HaLevy, Iran Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran sanctions regime, Iranian nuclear threat, John Kerry, Marie Harf, Meir Dagan, P 5+1, Wendy Sherman
What's the end game?
Unfortunately, it seems that Prime Minister Netanyahu isn't quite sure what the end game in Gaza will be.
On Sunday, Israel announced a
seven-hour humanitarian cease fire starting at 10:00 am on Monday.
Hamas has already rejected it.
In a statement quoted by AFP, the group’s spokesman said that the terrorist group “does not trust” the ceasefire.
"The unilateral ceasefire announced by Israel is an attempt to divert
the attention from Israeli massacres," the spokesman, Sami Abu Zuhri.
"We do not trust this ceasefire, and call on our people to be very cautious," he said, according to AFP.
A senior IDF source says that the IDF
could have taken Gaza in a week, but that wasn't the mission.
“Had we been ordered to defeat Hamas, we would have done it. We would have drafted four divisions, evacuated the Gazan population from battlegrounds, conquered the area and scanned it thoroughly.
It would take a week to take Gaza, and up to two years to destroy terrorist infrastructure,” the source said.
In such a scenario, “A guerrilla war would have started. This was not the mission given to the IDF, and rightfully so,” the source said. “The IDF divided up Gaza dozens of times, most recently in Operation Cast Lead [in 2009]. Every brigade can do it. The question is, what is the aim?” The goal of the offensive was not to topple Hamas, but to create a better security environment for Israel, the source continued.
Maybe the goal should have been to topple Hamas - that's what most Israelis seem to think the mission was supposed to be.
“The Israeli interest is for there to be one address in Gaza,” the source said. “We want one element to control Gaza. That’s why toppling Hamas has not been set as a goal. Who would be responsible for Gaza on the day after? Hence, Israel hit very strongly, but not enough to topple Hamas.”
You mean that we
want Hamas to control Gaza? You mean that Netanyahu has bought in to Michael Flynn's argument (on behalf of Obama and Kerry) that
whatever follows Hamas would be worse? Please say it isn't so. Did anyone ask
Amos Yadlin?
Nevertheless, if Hamas insists on continuing the conflict, the IDF is prepared to hit it “deep in its territory,” the source said.
Ground forces can be sent into Gaza to destroy a large portion of Hamas’s command and control sites, as well as weapons storage and production facilities.
The source added that Israel has replenished its deterrence against Hamas, but that an arrangement allowing Hamas to end the conflict has not yet been drawn up.
Hamas dearly wishes to see such an arrangement, he added.
Really? Hamas sure isn't acting that way. They reject (see above) or
violate every cease fire that is offered to them.
In the meantime, the IDF has destroyed a lot less tunnels than most Israelis think according to Prime Minsiter Netanyahu's former National Security Adviser,
Yaakov Amidror.
Amidror clarified that there are three different kinds of tunnel
networks in Gaza. The first two - smuggling tunnels from the Sinai
Peninsula into Gaza, and the vast "labyrinth" of tunnels under Gaza's
urban population centers, meticulously constructed in preparation for
any IDF ground operation - were not the target of Operation Protective
Edge, although those discovered in the course of fighting were usually
destroyed by IDF forces.
Only the limited number of tunnels leading into Israeli
territory (several dozen - although the precise number may never be
known), in preparation for deadly raids or kidnappings were actively
targeted by Israel.
Echoing statements made earlier on Sunday to Arutz Sheva
by a senior military official, Amidror said the IDF was close to
completing that mission - although he suggested a post-operation
committee of inquiry be set up to determine what gaps, if any, there
were between the tunnels which were known about in advance, and those
which were eventually discovered.
That being the case, there was therefore simply "no military logic"
for forces to remain where they were once they had cleared the areas in
question.
But if Israelis are anticipating complete quiet when and if the IDF leaves Gaza, they are in for a rude awakening.
But as for the still constant rocket-fire against Israel's civilian
population, Amidror emphasized that there is "no way" for the current
operation to succeed in physically putting an end to it once and for
all.
"No one promised or said that Israel can neutralize all of Hamas's
rockets without gaining control of (all of) the ground in Gaza. There is
no technical way to do it," he said.
What the current operation can achieve - and largely has - is "to
destroy all the rockets and launchers that we know about," and then rely
on the Iron Dome system to frustrate Hamas and Islamic Jihad's attempts
to inflict significant harm on Israel's civilian population with what
remains.
"You can't neutralize 10,000 rockets purely with air power," Amidror noted.
According to Amidror, Israel has two options, neither of which is very good.
The first would be to accept the aforementioned operational
limitations and, once the tunnels had been destroyed along with what
rockets and other terrorist infrastructure can be reached, to dig in for
a long, attritional battle, in which both sides will slug it out for
many more weeks or even months. (It is impossible to know precisely what
remains of Gaza's arsenal of rockets, although Amidror estimates
anything between 25-50% still remain out of approximately 10,000 rockets
- enough to keep going for quite some time.)
The IDF could then choose to keep its forces where they are inside
Gaza and engage with terrorist forces as they surface, or equally to
withdraw altogether and exchange fire from Israeli territory, as it did
during the initial phase of Operation Protective Edge.
Either way, says Amidror, Israel would eventually emerge the victor - at least in the short-term.
...
The second option - one advocated by several cabinet ministers, most notably Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman - would be to redeploy forces deeper inside Gaza, overthrowing Hamas and seizing complete control of the entire territory.
Clearing the Gaza Strip of all "weapons systems" and arresting or
killing all terrorists there would take between 6-12 months in Amidror's
estimation, and "cost us the lives of many soldiers and officers."
That option would provide a real and lasting solution to both the
threat of rocket fire and "terror tunnels", rather than simply
"postponing the next round with Hamas."
But such an operation would be "very costly, and very bloody."
Although he refused to speculate on what kind of casualty figures he
would expect Israel to endure in such an offensive, "you can see from
the first stage, which only involved the outlying parts of Gaza, what
kind of price" both sides would pay.
Apart from the Israeli casualties, many more Palestinians would be
killed in such an operation as well, given that it would involve
entering Gaza's most densely-populated areas, which ground forces have
so far avoided - bringing to bear more international pressure on Israel.
It would also pose long-term problems; such as what to do with the
roughly 1.8 million Arabs living in the Gaza Strip "who no one wants to
take responsibility for."
"If you are ready to pay the price, you have a solution," Amidror
notes dryly. He observed that both options were "logical" in their own
right, despite each having their own distinct disadvantages: "Either to pay a high price but to solve the problem, or not to pay the price and to meet the problem every five years."
Amidror admits that most Israelis want the problem solved and want the second option. Amidror is not convinced that most Israelis understand the price that we would pay.
Labels: Amos Yadlin, Binyamin Netanyahu, Gaza, Hamas, IDF, Operation Protective Edge, Yaakov Amidror
'Asking Hamas to demilitarize Gaza is like asking a Priest to convert to Judaism'
Former Israeli military intelligence chief Amos Yadlin says that asking Hamas to demilitarize Gaza is like asking a Priest to convert to Judaism. It won't happen.
If Israel wants Gaza demilitarized, the IDF must do it.
“This is their ideology, what they believe in, their resistance,” he
added. “They will not demilitarize Gaza voluntarily. The only one who
can demilitarize them is the IDF.”
Yadlin, who is currently the head of the Institute for National Security
Studies in Tel Aviv, said that Israel needed to apply “much more
military pressure” on Hamas' military wing, which he acknowledge has
been “beaten,” but not hard enough.
Neither Hamas' leaders, nor its “main terrorist fighters,” have been
killed, Yadlin said in a conference call organized by The Israel
Project.
The only way to achieve a durable ceasefire and a political arrangement
in the long run “is either by weakening or even destroying Hamas,” he
said.
Yadlin also dismissed the
US claim that if we destroy Hamas we will get something worse.
Yadlin said that the paradigm that the devil you know is better than the
one you don't, and that at least with Hamas in control of Gaza there
was an “address,” was applicable up until two months ago.
But since then, he said, Hamas has proven to be “not an address, but a
military threat. I don't see any alternative that will be worse than
Hamas. I call to waken and destroy Hamas as much as we can.”
Yadlin also said that Israel has known about the tunnels since the Shalit kidnapping in 2006, but could not act against them preemptively because the 'international community' would not have let us. He also said that there are greater threats to Israel in the region.
Read the whole thing.
Labels: Amos Yadlin, Gaza, Hamas, IDF, ISIS, Operation Protective Edge, terror tunnels
Shimon Peres' legacy
The saddest part about this Caroline Glick column is that most of the world still sees Slimy Shimon Peres as an angel in disguise and not as the sleaze bag he really is. Shimon Peres' legacy is a
nuclear-armed Iran.
Peres’s legacy will be Iran’s nuclear arsenal.
For years, many Israelis as well as Israel’s supporters in the US, the
Sunni Arab states in the Persian Gulf and even the French have been
scratching their heads wondering why Israel hasn’t struck Iran’s nuclear
installations yet. Over the past few months, we received our answer.
The ongoing police investigation into allegedly illegal conduct by
then-IDF Chief of Staff Lt.- Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi has revealed the source
of Israel’s paralysis.
Apparently led by Peres, the triumvirate of security chiefs serving
between 2008 and 2011 – Ashkenazi, then-Mossad director Meir Dagan and
then-Shin Bet director Avi Dichter – colluded to undermine Prime
Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s and then-defense minister Ehud Barak’s
legal authority to order Israel’s security forces to take action against
Iran.
According to a Haaretz report on Wednesday, between 2008 and 2011, the
four men leaked plans and discussions of possible Israeli strikes on
Iran to the media in order to prevent them from being carried out. The
four men opposed an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear installations and
stridently rejected any Israeli operation not coordinated with the US.
Ashkenazi and his associates are being investigated by the police for
crimes associated with criminal insubordination to Israel’s elected
leadership. Attorney-General Yehuda Weinstein ordered the police probe
in January after information unearthed by the media and by the State
Comptroller’s Office raised strong suspicions of a conspiracy led by
Ashkenazi to usurp the powers of the government.
According to media reports of the investigation, the police have
discovered tape recordings of numerous telephone conversations between
Ashkenazi and Peres. According to Channel 1 and Haaretz, Peres’s
attorney requested that Weinstein prohibit the publication of the
details of phone conversations.
Haaretz’s report didn’t specifically state that the conversations in
question related to actions by Peres and the security chiefs to prevent
military operations against Iran’s nuclear weapons program. But the same
day the report appeared, Amir Oren, Haaretz’s senior commentator,
published an article praising Peres for preventing Israel from attacking
Iran.
Oren wrote, “Peres’s involvement in blocking the Iranian adventure
[i.e., a military attack against Iran’s nuclear installations] is… the
most important action he took as president.”
As Amnon Lord wrote last December in Makor Rishon, Peres’s role in the
security chiefs’ conspiracy to prevent Netanyahu and Barak from ordering
a strike against Iran’s nuclear installations was to provide
“pseudo-constitutional and pseudo- moral support” for their unlawful
subversion.
The four men were very likely not acting by themselves. Lord argued
that the Obama administration was a fifth partner in this criminal
conspiracy.
The US was represented in its efforts by the then-chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Michael Mullen. Mullen visited Israel almost every
month during this period and constantly praised Ashkenazi’s leadership
publicly.
As Lord noted, these trips were reciprocated by Ashkenazi and
then-Military Intelligence commander Maj.-Gen. Amos Yadlin who flew
regularly to Washington.
For the Americans, Lord wrote, the point of cultivating these ties was
“to influence the IDF’s high command and cut it off from the political
leadership of Israel.”
In the case of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, as in the case of the
phony peace process, Peres’s motivation, like that of Ashkenazi, Dichter
and Dagan, was clear and crass. He wanted power.
The facts already established by the Ashkenazi et. al. conspiracy
probe reveal that from his earliest days as chief of staff, Ashkenazi
was preparing the ground for a post-IDF run for prime minister. His will
to rule distorted his perception of his place in the chain of command.
Instead of viewing Netanyahu and Barak as his commanders, as the law
stipulates, he saw them as his political rivals, and behaved
accordingly.
As for Peres, he had been searching for a leftist politician who
could defeat Netanyahu. Ashkenazi was his knight in shining armor.
Read the whole thing.
Labels: Amos Yadlin, Gabi Ashkenazi, Haaretz, Iranian nuclear threat, Israel's Hebrew Palestinian daily, Meir Dagan, Middle East peace process, Oslo accords, Shimon Peres
Don't hold your breath on a reconciliation with Turkey
More than a year after President Hussein Obama promised that reconciliation between Israel and Turkey was at hand, and after numerous false starts, the Turks may have brought the reconciliation prospects to an end on Monday. A Turkish court asked Interpol to issue a red notice for the
arrest four retired senior IDF officers in connection with the May 2010 Mavi Marmara incident. The four are former IDF Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi, former Navy chief V.-Adm. (res.) Eliezer Marom, ex-Military Intelligence
chief Maj.-Gen. (res.) Amos Yadlin, and former Air Force intel chief
Avishai Levi. On Tuesday morning, Israel reacted the only way it could have reacted, telling Interpol that the arrest request is political. Under Interpol's rules, that should
end any prospect that the four will be arrested... by Interpol.
The former Israeli commanders were tried in absentia at the Istanbul 7th Court of Serious Crimes, reported the Hurriyet Daily News,
adding that Turkey’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement saying “the
judiciary process is ongoing” and “the ruling is being examined by law
experts.”
Interpol statutes state that proceedings related to
political or military affairs are not ones in which Interpol may
intervene, so it is more than likely that they will not put out
international arrest warrants for the four officers.
The move came
after months of negotiations between Turkey and Israel to end a
diplomatic crisis over the commando raid on the Turkish ship challenging
Israel’s naval blockade of the Gaza Strip, run by Hamas.
Yet another Middle East problem botched by Obama....
Labels: Amos Yadlin, Gabi Ashkenazi, Interpol, Mavi Marmara, Turkish obsession with Israel
What a shock: Newsweek reporter who accused Israel of 'unprecedented spying' 'has a history'
What a surprise. Jeff Stein, the Newsweek reporter who accused Israel of 'unprecedented spying' on the US - including a claim that an Israeli agent was
caught in an air conditioning duct at Jerusalem's King David Hotel (pictured) - '
has a history' of anti-Israel activity.
Last year, in his blog SpyTalk, Stein commented on the potential nomination
of then-Congresswoman Jane Harman to head the CIA: “Congress is already
Israeli-occupied territory. The last thing Washington needs is to cede
another settlement in Langley.” The idea that Israel or Jews control or
occupy the American government is common trope of anti-Semites.
The problem with Stein’s reporting isn’t limited to his own
judgments, but also his choice of sources. One source he used is Philip
Giraldi. Giraldi is a writer for the Council for the National Interest, a Washington-based anti-Israel organization. In one of his recent analyses,
Giraldi referred to New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie as an
“Israel-firster,” adopting the language of those who consider supporters
of Israel to be suspect of disloyalty to the U.S.
Another source for Stein is a website, the Institute for Research: Middle Eastern Policy (IRmep). The website describes
one of sections the “Israel Lobby Archive” as documenting “one of the
most harmful forces driving policy formulation in the U.S. political
process.”
Stein, in his own words and his choice of sources, shows himself to
be not merely a critic of Israel but someone who believes that support
for Israel is inimical to the interests of the United States.
For those wondering about the air conditioning duct story, the hotel manager assures us that
a cat could not fit in there.
Labels: Al Gore, Amos Yadlin, anti-Israel media bias, Barack Hussein Obama, Binyamin Netanyahu, Edward Snowden, Jonathan Pollard, spying
Steinitz blasts Newsweek accusations
Shavua tov, a good week to everyone.
Strategic Affairs Minister Yuval Steinitz has blasted reports in Newsweek accusing Israel of spying on the United States, and has asked
who is seeking to harm relations between the two countries.
Media reports surfaced last week that Israel’s intelligence operations
in the US are “unrivaled and unseemly,” extending to surveillance of
senior White House officials.
...
Strategic Affairs Minister Yuval Steinitz, who holds the
intelligence portfolio in the Netanyahu government, accused “someone of
trying to maliciously and intentionally harm relations between Israel
and the United States.”
Steinitz “unequivocally” denied the report, featured in Newsweek magazine, as having “no basis” in fact.
But
the initial report was followed by one that detailed alleged US
efforts to “cover up” Israel’s spying on then vice president Al Gore in
1998. It claimed that the US Secret Service caught an Israeli “agent”
in an air duct in the process of bugging the vice president’s hotel
room.
Since National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden
leaked classified documents on American intelligence tactics, President
Barack Obama has suggested that the US spies on its allies – with the
tacit understanding being that the practice is mutual.
Publicly,
Obama has drawn the line at spying on foreign leaders, after
revelations that the US had tapped the cellphone of German Chancellor
Angela Merkel. But the US president has said that foreign allies would
conduct greater surveillance if they had the capability to do so.
...
Former Military Intelligence chief Maj.-Gen. (res.) Amos Yadlin also dismissed the allegations.
“Israel
is certainly not spying in the United States,” Yadlin said. “This is a
former Military Intelligence head telling you this. If you bring all
of the past Military Intelligence chiefs from the past 29 years, since
the of [the arrest of Jonathan] Pollard, or the past heads of the
Mossad, they will tell you the same .”
Yadlin said he expects the
leaders of the US intelligence community to address the American
public in response to the report, and to “either say that this is
baseless, or present facts.”
You don't think the Obama administration would cook up something like this to cover for the fact that they have spied on every country in the world, do you?
Labels: Al Gore, Amos Yadlin, Barack Hussein Obama, Binyamin Netanyahu, Edward Snowden, Jonathan Pollard, spying, Yuval Steinitz
Israel's former head of Military Intelligence... insane?
Insanity, as I'm sure you all know, is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result. Israel withdrew unilaterally from Lebanon in 2000, and now we have 60,000 or more rockets pointing at us courtesy of Hezbullah. Israel withdrew unilaterally from Gaza in 2005 (and expelled the Jewish population), and the strip was taken over by Hamas and is now a base for shooting rockets at Israel. Now, former Military Intelligence chief Amos Yadlin is advocating doing the same thing again in Judea and Samaria.
Insane? You bet 'ya.
With the chances of success in the Israeli-Palestinian talks "very
small," and as the Palestinians have a detailed Plan B for when the
talks fail, Israel needs to be proactive and consider a "coordinated
unilateral" withdrawal to lines it deems suitable, Amos Yadlin said
Monday.
Yadlin, a former chief of Military Intelligence who today
heads the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv, said that
although unilateralism got a "bad name" in Israel because of the 2005
withdrawal from Gaza and the 2000 withdrawal from Lebanon, "it is not
necessarily a bad strategy" if done right.
Yadlin, speaking at a briefing marking his think tank's publication
of its 2013-2014 Strategic Survey for Israel, and a day prior to the
organization's annual two-day international conference, said that a
unilateral step in the West Bank would not be Israel's first option, and
that it would prefer an agreement. But if that is not possible, Israel
should consider withdrawing to the security barrier, leaving some 15
percent of the West Bank – including the Jordan Valley – in its hands.
He
said that one of the lessons learned from the Gaza withdrawal was that
it was a mistake to withdraw from 100 percent of the territory, because
then there is no incentive for the other side to continue to negotiate.
Why would we unilaterally give up territory that everyone agrees has strategic value? What would we accomplish by doing this aside from worsening our position and endangering our lives? How would people in the Jordan Valley get back and forth to any other part of the country if the IDF is not there to protect them? And if we give the 'Palestinians' 85% of the territory for free, why wouldn't they just wait for the rest?
Insane. Simply insane.
Labels: Amos Yadlin, Judea and Samaria, unilateral withdrawal
Reports of Iran's potential retaliation are greatly exaggerated
Former Military Intelligence Chief Amos Yadlin says that reports of the potential scope of
retaliation by Iran for a strike against its nuclear facilities are exaggerated.
Yadlin, formally
head of Military Intelligence, and Avner Golov, a senior INSS researcher,
published, together, a systematic overview of Iran’s military capabilities and
assessed the likely Iranian strategic calculations when choosing a
response.
They concluded that the nightmare scenarios of regional
full-scale war is exaggerated and “serves Iran as an excellent deterrence
mechanism, since it weakens the credibility of the military option and decreases
the chances of the Iranian regime agreeing to a diplomatic
solution.”
They said that “the option of an attack on Iran, as well as
the threat of it, is an important and central mechanism in the service of
diplomacy.”
Read the whole thing. It's detailed and fascinating.
Labels: Amos Yadlin, Iranian nuclear threat, Israeli attack on Iran
Yadlin: Iran deal would be bad if it were final, but it's not
Former Military Intelligence chief and the head of the Institute for National Security Studies, Amos Yadlin told a conference call on Sunday that the P 5+1 deal with Iran would be a bad deal if it were final, but it's not final yet. Yadlin also credited Prime Minister Netanyahu with '
improving' the deal since its previous incarnation, and urged quiet diplomacy going forward. Yadlin argues that Iran is being tested.
"The world powers wanted to reach an agreement. I hope that the prime
minister is now formulating a strategy to see what happens in the next
six months. That, and not what happened last night, is what is
important," Yadlin said.
Although not a "dream agreement," when
compared to the proposed deal floated in Geneva earlier this month,
Sunday's agreement is an improvement, Yadlin argued.
He credited Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu
with improvements that appeared in the second draft agreement. Unlike
the first draft, the current arrangement freezes nearly all Iranian
activities at the Arak heavy water reactor (a suspected plutonium path
for the nuclear program), and forces the Iranians to neutralize their
stockpile of 20% uranium.[Not quite on that last point. CiJ]
...
A final, reasonable agreement would see Iran disband its tens of
thousands of centrifuges, while also shipping out its stockpile of low
enriched uranium, currently enough to make six to seven atomic bombs, he
said.
A final agreement must also significantly increase
international supervision, allowing for daily inspections at all sites,
including ones that have been off limits to IAEA inspectors, he added.
"The
Americans are going to put the Iranians to the test. This needs time.
We'd all be happier if the current agreement would have rolled Iran back
more. Both sides needed an initial agreement to gain legitimacy at home
for additional steps. There's no need to be too excited by this,"
Yadlin said.
I don't know why Yadlin has such faith in the Obama administration's intentions. There's certainly nothing until now that indicates that they are going to put the Iranians to any test or that they intend to improve the terms of any final agreement.
Labels: Amos Yadlin, Barack Hussein Obama, Binyamin Netanyahu, Iran sanctions regime, Iranian nuclear threat, plutonium, uranium enrichment
The definition of idiocy is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result
Albert Einstein allegedly said that the definition of idiocy is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result. Former IDF intelligence chief Amos Yadlin is
suggesting that the Israeli government act like idiots.
Israel should put the Clinton parameters from 2001, or the Olmert proposals from
2008, back on the table to avoid "losing the world," even though it is clear the
Palestinians will not accept them, former Military Intelligence head Amos Yadlin
said Tuesday.
Yadlin, speaking in Tel Aviv at the Calcalist conference,
said putting forward these proposals – which both call for generous territorial
concessions and the division of Jerusalem – would allow Israel to refill its
"battery of legitimacy." "Unfortunately, as a Military Intelligence head who
knows the Palestinian strategy, they will reject it, but it will return to us
the moral leadership and the legitimacy that we lost," he said. Then, he added,
Israel can take the steps it feels it needs to determine its
borders.
You've got to be kidding. The 'Palestinians' already have - and think they have pocketed - the Clinton and Olmert concessions. They can't be put on the table again if for no other reason than that there is no table on which to put them. The 'Palestinians' will not even come to the table without more concessions (e.g. a 'settlement freeze') and even when Israel provides those concessions, the 'Palestinians' will not come to the table with Netanyahu.
As to the 'international community,' making these offers will not make them love us, nor will it refill our 'battery of legitimacy.' It might push us off the front page of the New York Times for a week. Big deal.
But what such an offer would do is to once again reinforce in the 'Palestinians' the view that they need not make any concessions to bring about peace. Rather, all they have to do is to sit back and wait for Israel to finish negotiating against itself.
And as to Israel 'taking the steps it feels it needs to determine its borders,' that reeks of unilateral expulsion to me. Don't go there. The US military determined more than 40 years ago that
any concession Israel makes in Judea and Samaria will endanger our security. That's enough for me.
If doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result is idiocy, what does this proposal make Mr. Yadlin?
Labels: Amos Yadlin, Bill Clinton, Ehud K. Olmert, negotiations without preconditions, Palestinian state RIGHT NOW syndrome, settlement freeze, two-state solution
Does Obama want to stop Iran?
Writing in Friday's Washington Post, former IDF intelligence chief Amos Yadlin gives the Obama administration
a roadmap to convince Israel not to attack Iran.
The U.S. president should visit Israel and tell its leadership — and, more important, its people — that preventing a nuclear Iran is a U.S. interest, and if we have to resort to military action, we will. This message, delivered by the president of the United States to the Israeli Knesset, would be far more effective than U.S. officials’ attempts to convey the same sentiment behind closed doors. The administration should also take five immediate steps to convince allies and adversaries alike that military action is real, imminent and doable — which are key to making it less likely.
First, Obama should notify the U.S. Congress in writing that he reserves the right to use military force to prevent Iran’s acquisition of a military nuclear capability. This would show the president’s resolve, and congressional support for such a measure is likely to be strong. Forty-four senators signed a bipartisan letter to Obama in June, urging him to “reevaluate the utility of further talks at this time” and focus instead on sanctions and “making clear that a credible military option exists.”
Second, Washington should signal its intentions via a heightened U.S. military presence in the gulf, military exercises with Middle East allies and missile defense deployment in the region. Media coverage of these actions should be encouraged.
Third, Washington should provide advanced military technology and intelligence to strengthen Israel’s military capabilities and extend the window in which Israel can mortally wound Iran’s program. This support would be contingent on Israeli pledges to give sanctions and diplomacy more time to work.
Read the whole thing. These steps might have a chance of working if Obama were serious about trying to stop Iran.
But he's not. This is Benny Weinthal in the National Review:
Writing in today’s Wall Street Journal, David Feith, an assistant editorial features writer at the paper, delves into “what Obama isn’t saying about Iran.”
He outlines Obama’s reluctance to aggressively enforce sanctions targeting Iran’s energy sector. “All of Iran’s major oil-trading partners — 20 of them — received exemptions from U.S. sanctions,” Feith writes about the administration’s decision to decrease pressure on Tehran.
Sadly, the Obama administration has made no real effort to convince its European allies to outlaw Iran’s instruments terror, namely the Lebanese-based Hezbollah group and its parent organization, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). The U.S. designated Hezbollah a global terror entity in 1995 and the Bush administration blacklisted the IRGC as a global terrorist organization in 2007. Hezbollah uses Europe as a base to raise funds for its organization and murder Iranian dissidents.
...
Writing in his New York Post column this week, Benny Avni noted that that top U.S. diplomats are struggling to persuade U.N. head Ban Ki-moon to not attend a meeting of Non-Allied Movement countries in Iran. Avni notes, “if the West’s top diplomats can’t use their tact and talent to convince even the most pro-Western UN chief in memory to keep Iran off his itinerary, how will they ever manage to isolate Iran so completely that the mullahs will quit their most prized pet project?”
All of this helps to make the case that Obama’s timidity toward Iran’s rulers, and Europe’s meek posture toward Hezbollah and the IRGC, reminds the mullahs that he is not serious about stopping their nuclear-weapons program.
Coming to Israel and speaking to the Knesset won't help unless Obama is serious about stopping Iran. Until and unless he means it, coming to Israel is just another campaign stop.
Labels: Amos Yadlin, Barack Hussein Obama, Campaign 2012, Iranian nuclear threat, Israeli attack on Iran
Yadlin defends Barak and Netanyahu
Former director of Military Intelligence Amos Yadlin has
come to the defense of Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Barak on Iran, blasting former Mossad Director Meir Dagan and former General Security Service Director Yuval Diskin.
Yadlin, who left his post in 2010 and is currently the head of the Institute for National Security Studies, said that the forum that deals with Iran – once the septet but now expanded with the addition of Shaul Mofaz to nine members – is made up of “very serious people” and includes three former chiefs of staff along with “others who devote a lot of time to this issue.”
In a reference to Diskin’s and Dagan’s comments, Yadlin – one of eight pilots who took part in the 1981 attack on an Iraqi reactor – said that unelected officials needed to be “very careful” when making public statements on sensitive issues.
“We sat in closed meeting in the most select forums,” he said.
“We expressed ourselves straightforwardly, with a great deal of integrity and professionalism. But when we are regular citizens, we should impose on ourselves a cooling-off period, and not come out with explosive statements.”
Indeed!
Labels: Amos Yadlin, Binyamin Netanyahu, Ehud Barak, Iranian nuclear threat, Israeli attack on Iran, Meir Dagan, Yuval Diskin
Soccer Dad's Middle East Media Sampler
Here's Soccer Dad's Middle East Media Sampler for Wednesday, May 9.
1) Who doesn't get mentioned
A Former Spy Chief Questions the Judgment of Israeli Leaders - June 3, 2011:
The former intelligence chief, Meir Dagan, who stepped down after eight years in the post, has made several unusual public appearances and statements in recent weeks. He made headlines a few weeks ago when he asserted at a Hebrew University conference that a military attack on Iran would be “a stupid idea.”
This week Mr. Dagan, speaking at Tel Aviv University, said that attacking Iran “would mean regional war, and in that case you would have given Iran the best possible reason to continue the nuclear program.” He added, “The regional challenge that Israel would face would be impossible.”
...
On Thursday he got more specific, naming Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak, but this time through a leaked statement to journalists. The statement had to do with his belief that his retirement and the retirement of other top security chiefs had taken away a necessary alternative voice in decision making.
Remarks by Former Official Fuel Israeli Discord on Iran - April 28, 2012:
Yuval Diskin, who retired last year as the director of Shin Bet, the Israeli equivalent of the F.B.I., said at a public forum on Friday night that he had “no faith” in the ability of the current leadership to handle the Iranian nuclear threat.
“I don’t believe in a leadership that makes decisions based on messianic feelings,” he told a gathering in Kfar Saba, a central Israeli city of 80,000. “I have observed them from up close,” he added, broadening his critique to include the handling of the Palestinian conflict as well. “I fear very much that these are not the people I’d want at the wheel.”
Analysts here say there has long been a rift between the elected leaders and the defense and intelligence professionals over the urgency of the Iran threat, the efficacy of an independent Israeli strike and its likely repercussions. But while the substance of Mr. Diskin’s case echoed that made in recent months by Meir Dagan, the former chief of the Mossad spy agency, the tone was far more blunt, biting and personal.
Along with Dagan who headed the Mossad and Diskin who headed Shin Bet, Gen. Amos Yadlin headed military intelligence. Gen. Yadlin wasn't treated to any such story. Though the New York Times did publish an op-ed by Gen. Yadlin, Israel's last chance to strike Iran, he has also written this week, Beware a Bad Deal with Tehran. (via Martin Kramer):
A deal with the following parameters would be considered good: significant limitations on continuing enrichment until Iran has regained the trust of the international community; removing most of the enriched uranium from Iran, both that enriched to 3.5 percent as well as that enriched to 20 percent, closing the facility dug into the mountainside near Qom; signing the IAEA "additional protocol"; and providing satisfying explanations for the questions that remain between the IAEA and Iran. Such a deal would ensure that an Iranian breakout to nuclear weapons would be a long process and thus place Iran outside the "immunity zone." It would not meet all past demands made on Iran, but it would be better than the alternative of Iran having the bomb or being bombed. However, the probability of Iran accepting such an agreement is very low.
A bad deal, one that the Iranians are likely to offer and that the international community would be tempted to accept, would include explicit legitimacy for Iran enriching uranium on its soil up to the 5 percent level but would not include removal of most of the already-enriched uranium from within Iran’s borders. The bad deal also would include not limiting the number or type of centrifuges and enrichment sites. Iran then would be able to continue securing its sites in a way that would make damaging them much harder than it is at present. With such a deal, Iran would be able to improve its chances of breaking out toward nuclear weapons in a relatively short time after making the decision to do so.
Yadlin's commentary isn't newsworthy because he didn't portray PM Netanyahu as some whacked out messianic figure when it comes to Iran.
Oh, and by the way, Ronen Bergman is rethinking his conclusion that Israel would definitely strike Iran:
“Many things happened in the last three months” to ease the fear of a looming Israel attack on Iran’s nuclear program, Bergman said, including the Obama-Netanyahu White House meeting in March, which he said left administration officials feeling “a bit more relaxed” that the two leaders held similar positions regarding Iran. Another key factor is the upcoming presidential election in November, he added. (The interview took place before this week’s Likud-Kadima deal, which also appears Iran-related, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said to be seeking to solidify his political position prior to the American elections.)
Bergman, a prominent print journalist who also has a television show in Israel, said that as recently as two weeks ago a senior Israeli official told him that “nothing has changed” in terms of the thought process of government leaders, who believe that Israel’s decision regarding a military strike will be made strictly based on its assessment of Iran’s actions.
Regarding the tougher economic sanctions in place, Bergman said that two years ago Israeli officials would not have believed them possible and “would have been cheering” over what has been accomplished. “But is it too late” to stop Iran’s push for nuclear arms, he wondered, pointing out that Iran will not meet any of the “four or five preconditions” Israel has set regarding the upcoming negotiations between Iran and the U.S. and its Western allies.
By bringing Shaul Mofaz, a skeptic about a military strike against Iran, into his broad coalition, Netanyahu signaled that he isn't the reckless war monger that his critics portray him as. Yet they are the ones whose opinions were treated as news.
2) Leave it to Ha'aretz
Leave it to Ha'aretz (and the Forward) to put a negative spin on the recent coalition agreement struck between PM Netanyahu and Kadima head, Shaul Mofaz, Bibi Deal Driven by Power Not Public Good: Poll.
Not everyone is so cynical. The Lid writes:
In the end the political shocker announced by Bibi Netanyahu and Shaul Mofaz last night will change Israeli politics forever...in a good way. It will result in stronger coalitions with greater legitimacy to deal with the major problems of the day, and unity on security issues that will allow the Jewish State to stand up to unfair pressure should (God-forbid) Barack Obama be re-elected. Israel will still have a broad base of political parties in the Knesset, but governments will be able to move ahead unencumbered by small and sometimes single-issue parties.
David Weinberg sees the scope of the coalition's likely success to be narrower:
This brings us to Iran, which is the one issue on which far-reaching and momentous decisions are imminent. Netanyahu’s government and inner cabinet now includes three former IDF chiefs-of-staff (Barak, Yaalon, and Mofaz), something which in itself is a form of deterrence. This ought to give pause to the Iranians and the Obama administration, and to stiffen the backs of the P5+1 negotiators. It is an important counter-weight to the nasty insinuations of “irresponsibility and messianism” in government decision-making regarding Iran made by former intelligence chiefs Dagan and Diskin.
Evelyn Gordon allows for more optimism:
With Kadima on board, however, both these issues become solvable. Netanyahu now has a solid majority even without Shas, enabling him to tackle the draft exemptions issue. And the government is now stable enough to survive the remaining 18 months of its term, so passing a responsible budget becomes feasible.
The unity government is clearly a better option than new elections, which not only cost a lot of money, but would largely put the government on hold during a potentially critical period: The Knesset would be dissolved, and MKs and ministers would be devoting most of their time and energy to campaigning. It’s possible that Netanyahu was hoping for this outcome all along.
Though I think he meant it to be funny, one of the seven reasons for the forming the coalition offered by Jeffrey Goldberg is (via memeorandum):
6) Bibi wants to be able to say to President Obama: More than three-quarters of the Knesset is with me. I am Israel.
I don't know if Netanyahu needs to be to say this to President Obama or his other critics. Rather it should demonstrate to those who believe that Netanyahu is some right wing crazy, that he is the new mainstream in Israel.
Finally getting back to the cynicism, we have the release from the Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism:
A reduction in opposition voices within the Knesset could have serious consequences for relations with Iran and with the Palestinians. If there is no room within the Israeli political sphere to speak out against the hawkish foreign policy of Netanyahu and his defense secretary Ehud Barak, then war with Iran may seem to be the only “pro-Israel” option. Similarly, the lack of a credible opposition within the Knesset could make a return to the negotiating table with the Palestinians unlikely because there would be less outside pressure on Netanyahu to take such action.
Who do they think they are? J-Street?
3) 40 years ago
Yesterday marked 40 years since The Raid on Sabena Flight 571. (h/t Israel Matzav)
The Sabena flight reached Tel-Aviv, landing in Lod Airport (now Ben-Gurion Airport). Captain Levy was sent out to show the waiting Israelis a sample of the explosives on the plane, to convince them of the threat. Aboard the plane, passengers were crying or hysterical.
A team of 16 elite commandos (Hebrew: Sayeret Matkal) approached the grounded aircraft in white overalls, disguised as airplane technicians. They convinced the terrorists that the aircraft was in desperate need of repairs.
Within ten minutes of boarding the plane, the squad of elite commandos managed to kill the two male terrorists, arrest the two female terrorists, and neutralize the threat to the passengers. Nearly all civilians on board were unharmed, except for three, one of whom later died from her injuries.
Pictures of the two of the commandos - currently among Israel's political leaders - are available at the link.
Labels: Amos Yadlin, Binyamin Netanyahu, Ehud Barak, Iranian nuclear threat, Meir Dagan, Middle East Media Sampler, New York Times, Shaul Mofaz, Soccer Dad, Yuval Diskin
'The Left won't wake up until it's too late'
This past week, the IDF's outgoing director of military intelligence, Amos Yadlin (pictured) gave a very
pessimistic assessment of Israel's strategic situation.
“The next conflict, even if it is limited in scale,” warned the former IAF general, “will be much bigger, much broader, and with many more casualties than we saw in Operation Cast Lead or the Second Lebanon War.”
Such a conflict, predicted the 59-year old Yadlin, will be played out on two or more fronts; moreover, Israel’s enemies “believe that the only way to overcome Israel’s deterrence is through longrange missile fire and improving air defense capabilities.”
Pulling no punches, Yadlin warned that the cutting-edge anti-aircraft system that Syria has purchased from Russia could send the IDF and IAF’s capabilities “back to their status in the 1970s Suez years,” according to a source present at the meeting.
“With the S-300, we are talking about relatively cheap missiles – but no less deadly,” Yadlin cautioned during his foreboding address to the committee. In addition, he said, the Russians are upgrading older Syrian weapons systems to make them far more advanced.
In outlining how the weapons deal benefited Damascus, the MI chief said the Syrians are conducting “intense efforts to acquire extremely advanced weapons – so advanced that everything just off of the production line in Russia ends up in Syria.”
And that's not even counting Iran.
In an interview with Arutz 7, military historian, Dr. Uri Milstein, expressed even more pessimism.
But perhaps even more serious was the forecast by Israel's IDF military history expert Dr. Uri Milstein, a respected researcher and iconoclastic analyst . “I have begun to have my doubts as to whether the IDF is up to the task of defending this country,” Milstein told Arutz 7. “Our enemies have grown stronger, while in some circles, our motivation has fallen. Part of our society is frightened. Even if more people die on their side, they are more willing to sacrifice than we are.”
...
Speaking to Arutz 7, Milstein, who has long been critical of the IDF and political establishment's management of Israel's defense, said that little has changed since the Yom Kippur war, which Milstein critiqued in the first of over two dozen books he has written over the years. Describing Yadlin's straightforward presentation of the troubles Israel is facing as “better late than never,” Milstein said that Yadlin, who was military intelligence chief during the Second Lebanon war, had apparently learned a lesson.
In the past, Milstein has written that in that war, as in previous battles, Yadlin and other security chiefs did not realize that advanced weapons alone are not enough for victory. “Now it seems he does understand the situation,” Milstein said. “During the Second Lebanon War we did not achieve our goals of defeating Hizbullah, and instead they grew stronger. During Operation Cast Lead we attempted to strike a death blow to Hamas, but they just got stronger. So, obviously, the situation will be more difficult next time,” he said. Milstein doubts that the IDF will be able to achieve the goals it needs to during the coming war. “Our enemies have gotten much stronger, and they know how to accept losses much better than we can.”
The problem, Milstein says, is the left. “In the leftist bastions of Ramat Aviv and Kfar Shmaryahu, they are still convinced that peace will come if we give up Judea and Samaria and the Golan. They probably won't change their minds even if missiles rain down on Tel Aviv. The only way they will change their mind is if we do surrender these areas, and they find that the Arabs still make war against us.”
Milstein, who was appointed official historian of the paratroopers by the late Rafael Eitan, has written histories of each of Israel's wars, including the War of Independence. In 1995 he published a work critical of Yitzchak Rabin during his tenure as commander of the Palmach pre-state fighting organization, called “The Rabin File: How the Myth Was Inflated.” After Rabin's assassination, Milstein was discharged from Bar-Ilan University on account of his writings about Rabin.
One theme in his books is that Israel has been in thrall to the left, at least since the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War. Nearly all aspects of the IDF are politicized, he says, from the way its history is presented to the way it trains officers. If is this “intellectual prison” that Israel must break free from if it hopes to prevail in the next war. But, he says, “unfortunately for us, the left is still a prisoner of this false vision of peace with the Arabs.”
Let's see anyone beyond Arutz 7 notice Milstein's analysis first. Anyone think one of the big newspapers will pick it up? With the possibly exception of Yisrael HaYom or Caroline Glick's column in the JPost, don't hold your breaths.
Labels: Amos Yadlin, IDF, military intelligence, Uri Milstein, Yitzchak Rabin
Next war will be bigger, broader, deadlier; Iran has two new nuke facilities
In his final briefing to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, outgoing military intelligence chief Amos Yadlin warned that Israel's next war would take longer, be fought on more fronts and would
cause more casualties (God forbid) than its two previous wars - Operation Cast Lead and the Second Lebanon War (Hat Tip:
Gershon D).
Syria, particularly, posed a greated military obstacle to Israel than at any time in the past three decades, Yadlin said, having amassed advanced Russian-built antiaircraft missiles that seriously limited the operational freedom of the Israel Air Force.
While Syria had failed to acquire Russian S-300 missiles, seen by Israel as the greatest potential threat to its aircraft, Damascus had improved its defense systems enough to push the military balance with Israel "back to the 1970s", Yadlin said.
In 1973, Israel came close to defeat by a suprise Syrian attack before eventually emerging victorious in the Yom Kippur War.
Yadlin also hinted at Israel's involvement in attacking a Syrian nuclear facility in September 2007. That strike has been widely attributed to Israel, but the government has never officially taken responsibility for the operation.
The veteran soldier, who turns 60 next year, told the committee that during his position as MI chief he had contended with two enemy nuclear programs - apparently a reference to Iran and Syria.
"I've seen three defense ministers, two chiefs of staff and two prime ministers come and go, I've been through two wars and I've contended with two nuclear programs of enemy states," Yadlin said, summing up the last years of his career.
"I headed a group of thousands of people working 24 hours a day to collect information that the enemy was not volunteering, information that had to be extracted from difficult places," he added.
Yadlin also warned of a growing threat from the Iranian nuclear program, saying Iran now had enough highly enriched uranium to build a bomb.
That's not all Iran has. Yadlin also told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that Israel had detected
two new nuclear facilities in Iran (read the headline - the text doesn't seem to have much to do with it).
But perhaps the most frightening part of Yadlin's briefing was his assessment of a
future conflict.
“The next conflict, even if it is limited in scale,” warned the former IAF general, “will be much bigger, much broader, and with many more casualties than we saw in Operation Cast Lead or the Second Lebanon War.”
Such a conflict, predicted the 59-year old Yadlin, will be played out on two or more fronts; moreover, Israel’s enemies “believe that the only way to overcome Israel’s deterrence is through longrange missile fire and improving air defense capabilities.”
Pulling no punches, Yadlin warned that the cutting-edge anti-aircraft system that Syria has purchased from Russia could send the IDF and IAF’s capabilities “back to their status in the 1970s Suez years,” according to a source present at the meeting.
“With the S-300, we are talking about relatively cheap missiles – but no less deadly,” Yadlin cautioned during his foreboding address to the committee. In addition, he said, the Russians are upgrading older Syrian weapons systems to make them far more advanced.
In outlining how the weapons deal benefited Damascus, the MI chief said the Syrians are conducting “intense efforts to acquire extremely advanced weapons – so advanced that everything just off of the production line in Russia ends up in Syria.”
Yadlin also disclosed that Israel had detected the Iranians laying the groundwork for two new nuclear sites – but did not reveal their locations.
“Iran is the greatest threat to Israel and to the well-being of the entire region,” he said.
And in an ominous note, Yadlin informed the committee that Iran already had enough uranium enriched to 20 percent to make one nuclear bomb – and before long, enough for two nuclear devices.
“Iran’s progression towards a bomb is slower than they had hoped for,” advised the general. “They are running into quite a few problems. But Iran is also taking radical action regarding the transfer of money, technology, weapons and intelligence.”
Yadlin pointed out that with 3,000 to 4,000 centrifuges in operation, Iran could very easily make the leap from civilian-grade enriched uranium to the higher enrichment required for building a nuclear explosive device.
If Yadlin told the Knesset anything about the likelihood that the Obama administration would support Israel in the event of a future war, it hasn't been reported. Still, his assessment is quite depressing even without that detail.
Labels: Amos Yadlin, Iran, Israel, Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Syria
