CONFIRMED -- Iran allowed to collect own samples at nuclear military base -- Verification expert on self-inspection deal: "You need the eyes and the brain to look where to sample... video camera opens up additional methods of deceiving"
The Israel Project's Omri Ceren reports that it has now been confirmed that Iran was in fact allowed to '
inspect' its own nuclear military facility at Parchin. I received this by email.
Reuters this morning conveyed Iranian
media reports establishing that the Iranians recently took their own
environmental samples at their Parchin military facility, where they
conducted tests relevant to the detonation of nuclear warheads, in lieu
of having IAEA inspectors take the samples (Reuters story below;
original IRNA story here [a]).
The IAEA has long sought access to Parchin: the agency needs to
clarify the nature and scope of Iran's past nuclear weapons work - the
possible military dimensions (PMDs) of Iran's atomic program - to
establish what the Iranians did and how far they got, which are the
prerequisites to setting up a verification regime against future
violations. The Obama administration had promised lawmakers that IAEA
inspectors would be able to inspect Parchin and resolve all PMD issues
before any final deal was inked [b][c][d][e][f].
Instead the JCPOA
allowed Iran to sign a secret side deal with the IAEA permitting the
Iranians to self-inspect the facility rather than grant IAEA inspector
robust access.
That side deal was subsequently revealed and published by the AP: the
Iranians would get to collect their own samples, those samples would
have to come from mutually agreed upon areas under overlapping photo and
video surveillance, and the number of the samples would be limited
[g][h]. An Iranian statement this morning confirmed that the Iranians
collected their own samples: "Iranian experts took samples from specific
locations in Parchin facilities this week without IAEA inspectors being
present" [i]. An IAEA statement confirmed the sampling was done from
mutually agreed upon areas under overlapping photo and video
surveillance: "the determination of the spots where the samples are
taken is a separate, important, careful activity…. [that] have to
satisfy our requirements… the actual swiping or other sample taking
[place] under redundant continuous surveillance" [j]. It's not yet clear
whether the AP was also correct about the number of samples being
limited.
The arrangement means that the IAEA will not be able to establish what happened at Parchin.
David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and
International Security, explained at a panel hosted earlier this month
by the Hudson Institute that self-sampling under surveillance is
inadequate. Inspectors need to be on the ground to identify dusty nooks
and corners where violators forgot to dust; the mutually agreed upon
areas are by definition the ones that violators know have been
sanitized [k]:
What you have is, is the situation where there'll be videotaping
of the potential locations where sampling would take place. Then the
IAEA would direct the Iranians to take the samples. And that's not the
normal way to do things.
If I could give the example in Iran of Kalaya Electric, a secret
centrifuge research and development facility that Iran denied was such a
thing. The IAEA got access and it brought in a very top level
centrifuge expert with that access, who looked around. And when they did
the sampling finally they didn't find any trace of enriched uranium in
the areas that had been heavily modified. But in a another, a secondary
building they found in a ventilation duct - which had not been modified -
they found traces of enriched uranium...
You need the eyes and the brain to look where to sample.
I brought an example of sampling in North Korea... they sampled
in the Yongbyon reprocessing plant in the early 90s... you can see in
the sampling they're looking behind this box... Look for where it's
dusty. The idea is that it's not been disturbed. In the case of Parchin,
it would be look for where the paint doesn't look solid. And so, that's
very hard to do with a video camera. So I think the video camera opens
up additional methods of deceiving the IAEA. And it's not the normal way
they've been doing it. And so I think that's a problem...
The sampling would be done, and then the IAEA access would
follow. And so the access is coming at a point where it's not as
useful... You want it to drive the inspection effort and the
environmental sampling effort, not be done at the end of the process [7:29].
The arrangement was also read more broadly as kneecapping the IAEA.
On the experts side, CNN got analysis from Olli Heinonen, former
director of the IAEA's verification shop, as Albright, president of the
Institute for Science and International Security: "It is very unusual...
I find it really hard to understand why you would let someone else take
the samples and only see through the camera" and "It's really not
normal... I don't know why they accepted it. I think the IAEA is
probably getting a little desperate to settle this" [l]. On the
Congressional side, a visit by Amano to the Hill on the side deals left
Senators fuming [m].
The IAEA reacted to this morning's leak by issuing more assurances
about the adequacy of Iranian self-inspections. White House validators
have already picked up the "redundant continuous surveillance" theme and
you're likely to hear more of it [n].
The problem is that the IAEA assurances read a little bit like a
hostage note: lawmakers, experts, and journalists know that the
arrangement is unprecedented and that inspectors need to be on the
ground, so the IAEA statements may be read as evidence that the agency
has bent to political pressure.
What could go wrong?
Labels: IAEA, inspection, Iran Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran sanctions regime, Iranian nuclear threat, nuclear weapons, Parchin, Possible Military Dimensions (PMD), uranium enrichment
Iran to pay for its own 'nuclear inspections'?
With the IAEA looking for money to pay for inspections of Iran's nuclear facilities, the US State Department suggested on Wednesday another source of payment aside from
the American taxpayer:
Iran itself.
John Kirby, a spokesman for the Department of State, declined to
answer multiple questions about how international inspections of Iran’s
nuclear sites would be paid for by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), which is requesting at least $10 million to carry out the
work.
The United States will likely fund some portion of the cost, and
Kirby left open the possibility that Iran could also foot some of the
bill.
The matter has been the subject of much speculation in recent days
after it came to light that Iran would be permitted to inspect its own
nuclear sites, raising the possibility that Iran could continue to hide
nuclear weapons work.
“I don’t have any specific funding contributions to speak to today in
terms of amount,” Kirby told reporters. “We’re still working our way
through that. I do want to add that we have every intention to continue
to contribute to the IAEA for the purpose of this—doing this very
important work of the verification of Iran’s nuclear-related
commitments.”
“I won’t speak for Iran,” Kirby added. “I don’t know what, if any,
commitments Iran has or will engender under this, but we’ve—as we noted
in the statement, we’re committed to working with all the member states
to ensure that the IAEA has the resources that it needs.”
When pressed to explain whether the United States would pay for Iran
to inspect its own nuclear sites or press the Iranian government to foot
the bill, Kirby demurred.
“Honestly don’t have a specific answer for you in that regard,” Kirby
told reporters. “I mean, again, we’re going to contribute—continue to
contribute to the IAEA and their funding needs specifically as it
relates to this deal. And it’s not just us; we want other member states
to do it as well.”
“I’ll let Iran speak for itself in terms of what, if any,
contributions it plans to make,” he added.
“But I don’t know that I
would characterize the funding resources applied to IAEA and their need
to do this work as sort of then paying for any efforts done by Iranian
officials to meet compliance.”
Matthew Lee, a reporter for the Associated Press, continued to question Kirby on the issue.
“Well, I mean, someone’s got to pay for it,” Lee said. “They’re not
going to work for free, whoever they are, whether they’re Iranians or
they’re from Djibouti.”
“Well, I’m assuming many of them are government—work for the government of Iran,” Kirby responded.
What could go wrong?
Labels: Barack Hussein Obama, IAEA, inspection, Iran Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran sanctions regime, Iranian nuclear threat
Passed Inspection!
From my friends at Legal Insurrection:
Shabbat Shalom everyone!
Labels: Barack Hussein Obama, inspection, Iranian nuclear threat, National Democratic Party
Amano's deficient damage control
I don't know when on Thursday
this press release from IAEA director Yukia Amano was posted - it only has a date, but no time on it. But as I've reported already, the IAEA's agreement with Iran has been
posted by AP despite Amano. Here's what the IAEA director had to say (Hat Tip:
Memeorandum).
I am disturbed by statements suggesting that the IAEA has given
responsibility for nuclear inspections to Iran. Such statements
misrepresent the way in which we will undertake this important
verification work.
The separate arrangements under the Road-map agreed between the IAEA
and Iran in July are confidential and I have a legal obligation not to
make them public – the same obligation I have for hundreds of such
arrangements made with other IAEA Member States.
However, I can state that the arrangements are technically sound and
consistent with our long-established practices. They do not compromise
our safeguards standards in any way.
The Road-map between Iran and the IAEA is a very robust agreement,
with strict timelines, which will help us to clarify past and present
outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.
If I were sitting in a press conference with Mr. Amano, here's what I would ask:
Mr. Amano, can you name another country aside from Iran in which the IAEA relies solely on photos, videos and soil samples provided by the country under inspection?
Can you name any other country in which an IAEA inspection is merely a 'courtesy visit'?
If Olympic athletes were allowed to provide urine samples without anyone ensuring that they were their own, would you consider that reliable? How could you ensure their authenticity?
How can you ensure the authenticity of a soil sample that you did not watch being taken?
Unbelievable. This whole 'inspection' is a farce. And Amano has been caught with his pants down (I will assume he released that statement before AP released the agreement).
Labels: Barack Hussein Obama, IAEA, inspection, Iran Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran sanctions regime, Iranian nuclear threat, nuclear weapons, Parchin, United States Congress, uranium enrichment, Yukia Amano
AP gets text of 'secret' Iran-IAEA deal, makes White House look like idiots
Just yesterday, I posted a
Wall Street Journal editorial discussing an
AP report that Iran was going to be allowed to carry out
its own inspections at Parchin, the Tehran facility where Iran was likely
developing nuclear weapons a couple of years ago.
When I went to sleep last night, a Max Fisher piece
attacking that report was trending. Fisher's report was largely based on conversations with Jeffrey Lewis, a guy known on Twitter as @ArmsControlWonk.
"If true" turns out to be a major issue here, as upon closer
examination the inflammatory headline, as it has been widely
interpreted, appears to largely not be true.
In fact, the text of the article said something much more modest. It
said that in a one-time set of inspections at one military facility
known as Parchin, Iranians, rather than nuclear inspectors, would take
"environmental samples" (such as soil samples). It said that nuclear
inspectors would not be permitted to visit, and that Iran would not
provide photos or videos of the site. But still, it was concerning.
"The story was the Iranians would take the samples under some kind of
IAEA monitoring," Jeffrey Lewis, the arms control expert, told me. "The
details of that monitoring were not provided, so it's hard to say how
weird that is. Some IAEA officials say that it's not unusual to let a
country physically take the samples if there's an IAEA inspector
present."
The sourcing in the story, though, seemed to water it down a bit
more. The report was not based not on an actual agreement, but rather on
a copy of a draft agreement. The anonymous source who showed AP the
document said there was a final version that is similar, but
conspicuously refused to show AP the final version or go into specifics.
"The oldest Washington game is being played in Vienna," Lewis said.
"And that is leaking what appears to be a prejudicial and one-sided
account of a confidential document to a friendly reporter, and using
that to advance a particular policy agenda."
The White House was so pleased that at 6:00 pm Eastern last night, they were still
passing the Fisher piece around to reporters. Just one problem:
AP posted the
actual agreement at 4:35 Eastern.
1. Iran will provide to the Agency photos of the locations, including
those identified in paragraph 3 below, which would be mutually agreed
between Iran and the Agency, taking into account military concerns.
2. Iran will provide to the Agency videos of the locations, including
those identified in paragraph 3 below, which would be mutually agreed
between Iran and the Agency, taking into account military concerns.
3. Iran will provide to the Agency 7 environmental samples taken from
points inside one building already identified by the Agency and agreed
by Iran, and 2 points outside of the Parchin complex which would be
agreed between Iran and the Agency.
4. The Agency will ensure the technical authenticity of the
activities referred to in paragraphs 1-3 above. Activities will be
carried out using Iran's authenticated equipment, consistent with
technical specifications provided by the Agency, and the Agency's
containers and seals.
5. The above mentioned measures would be followed, as a courtesy by
Iran, by a public visit of the Director General, as a dignitary guest of
the Government of Iran, accompanied by his deputy for safeguards.
6. Iran and the Agency will organize a one-day technical roundtable on issues relevant to Parchin.
For the International Atomic Energy Agency: Tero Varjoranta, Deputy Director General for Safeguards
For the Islamic Republic of Iran: Ali Hoseini Tash, Deputy Secretary of Supreme National Security Council for Strategic Affairs
What I want to know is, why can the AP get this stuff when
Congress couldn't?
Hmmm.
Labels: Barack Hussein Obama, IAEA, inspection, Iran Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran sanctions regime, Iranian nuclear threat, nuclear weapons, Parchin, United States Congress, uranium enrichment, Yukia Amano
Iran: Nuclear weapon site won't be inspected, Amano didn't disclose agreement to Congress
An Iranian spokesman said on Monday that IAEA Director General Yukia Amano was warned not to disclose Iran's agreement with his agency to the US Congress when he testified there. The spokesman also said that the agreement abides by Iran's red lines, which include no inspection of military facilities. That would include Parchin where the
Iranians worked on nuclear weapons.
"In a letter to Yukiya Amano, we underlined that
if the secrets of the agreement (roadmap between Iran and the IAEA) are
revealed, we will lose our trust in the Agency; and despite the US
Congress's pressures, he didn’t give any information to them," Spokesman
of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Behrouz Kamalvandi
said in a meeting with the Iranian lawmakers in Tehran on Monday.
"Had he done so, he himself would have been harmed," he added.
In relevant remarks early this month, Iran's Envoy
to the International Atomic Energy Agency Reza Najafi warned the UN
nuclear watchdog to avoid disclosing its secret agreements with Tehran.
"The agreements signed between a member country
and the IAEA are definitely secret and cannot be presented to any other
country at all," Najafi said.
Referring to the discussions at the US Congress
during which the US officials elaborated on the nuclear agreement
between Iran and the Group 5+1 (the US, Russia, China, Britain and
France plus Germany), he said, "The discussions revealed that the secret
texts between Iran and the Agency have not even been provided to the US
administration."
"For the very same reason, they cannot be presented to the Senate members either," Najafi added.
...
Amano and Head of the AEOI Ali Akbar Salehi signed a roadmap of cooperation in Vienna on July 14.
The roadmap contains secret arrangements stated in
one or two documents entailing on the methods to be used by the two
sides in their cooperation.
Senior Iranian nuclear officials have said that
all IAEA member states have such secret agreements and the UN nuclear
watchdog is duty bound to keep them secret to any third party individual
or state.
After the roadmap was signed, Salehi announced
that the new agreement would fully settle all unresolved issues
pertaining to Tehran's nuclear activities in the past.
"All past issues will be resolved completely after
Iran and the Agency adopt some measures," Salehi told reporters after
signing an agreement called the Iran-IAEA Cooperation 'Roadmap'.
He said that all agreements, including the
measures decided for Parchin military site, will be implemented with
full respect to Iran's redlines.
Iran had earlier announced that inspection of the country's military sites are one of its redlines.
#ThanksObama. What could go wrong?
Labels: Ali Akbar Salehi, Barack Hussein Obama, IAEA, inspection, Iran Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran sanctions regime, Iranian nuclear threat, nuclear weapons, Parchin, uranium enrichment, Yukia Amano
Jackie Mason: New York restaurants subject to tougher inspections than Iran
In case you missed it, under Hussein Obama's nuclear sellout, Iran has 24 days to respond to a demand for an inspection (and then another 50 to have it heard by an arbitrator). Jackie Mason points out that
New York City restaurants are subject to tougher inspection standards.
Speaking during an interview to air Sunday night on "Aaron Klein
Investigative Radio" on New York's AM 970 The Answer and Philadelphia's
NewsTalk 990 AM, Mason, an outspoken advocate of Israel, quipped that US
Secretary of State John Kerry should pay the American people back for
the cost of his airfare to and from the Iran talks.
"This
secretary of state, Kerry, negotiated with them for a year-and-a-half
and accomplished nothing. He ought to give us back for all the trips he
made. He cost us millions of dollars in airplane fares and he came back
with nothing except a bad foot."
...
"The real agreement he made, I’m sure he (Obama) said to them, 'Listen,
could you keep the bomb quiet for a year and a half. Because if you
don’t bomb us for a year and a half, I’ll be the big winner. Everyone
will see I made a fantastic agreement. If you bomb us after I leave I
could always say it’s the other guy’s fault. Because if it’s not for
him, this never would have happened," Mason said.
...
"First Obama said we can inspect them any time, any place, whenever we
please. Now it turns out ‘whenever we please’ except when they don’t
allow it. If they don’t want it it’s up to them. So then we have to
wait 28 days [sic] to inspect, as if to say for the 28 days we can trust
them completely, because they’ll do nothing. They’ll just hold the bomb
in front of us waiting for us to come so they can show it to us. That’s
how stupid this negotiation is to us," he said.
"Do you know
that in the restaurants of New York, they have an inspection system. You
can surprise any restaurant without notice that you can walk in and
inspect them… So we are protected in this city from a bad tuna fish.
We’re not protected from a bomb but we’re protected from a bad quality
of a tuna fish," Mason joked.
Indeed.
Labels: Barack Hussein Obama, inspection, Iran Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iranian nuclear threat, Jackie Mason, John Kerry
'If you like your nuclear weapons program, you can keep your nuclear weapons program'
Jennifer Rubin reports on some of the reaction to the
breathtaking collapse of the United States' position in the P 5+1 talks with Iran.
The American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) has
traditionally worked with both parties. But we are in an unprecedented
time of peril for Israel and for the U.S.-Israel relationship, creating
new challenges for a group that has always tried to maintain
bipartisanship, sometimes to the frustration of conservatives who see
AIPAC as too reluctant to take on liberal opponents of the Jewish state.
AIPAC
is becoming increasingly more vocal and engaging in more public
education than it has in recent memory. On Wednesday, for example, it
put out a statement slamming
Secretary of State John Kerry’s remarks: “Last March, International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Yukiya Amano stated that
his agency “needs to clarify issues” concerning past Iranian behavior if
it will ever be able to certify that Iran’s nuclear program is
peaceful. On June 16, Secretary of State John Kerry asserted for the
first time that the U.S. was ‘not fixated’ on Iran accounting for its
past nuclear weaponization efforts. According to Secretary Kerry, the
U.S. already ‘knows what Iran did.’ The secretary’s statement indicates
the U.S. may be backtracking from previous demands that Iran respond
fully to the IAEA’s questions – raising the disturbing prospect that the
anticipated agreement will be fundamentally flawed.”
The
statement went on to explain, “The IAEA must understand the entire scope
of Iran’s weaponization activities if it is to establish a baseline of
Tehran’s nuclear program – including breakout time – against which to
measure future actions. The IAEA requires access to all suspect sites,
scientists, and documents. . . Iran must comply with prior commitments
to the IAEA; allowing Iran to shirk them will only tempt it to defy
commitments made in a new deal.”
Even more tersely, it said Kerry was
flat out wrong on our knowledge of past Iranian activities.
This follows a similar public statement only
a few days before that rapped the administration for reported
concessions on go-anywhere/anytime inspections. AIPAC is also reminding
Congress of the baseline for a “good deal,” drawing on Congress’s past resolutions and legislation as well as existing United Nations resolutions.
Meanwhile,
Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) — who as one foreign policy expert puts it
“defines ‘moderate Republican'” and for example, declined to sign onto
Sen. Tom Cotton’s letter addressed to the mullahs — on Wednesday went on
Fox News to blast the administration. He told the audience:
[I]f
we can negotiate a strong deal that keeps Iran from getting a nuclear
weapon, that’s the best for us and for the world. But what’s happening
right now…is John Kerry and his team are letting this deal erode away as
they try to close it. Two of the issues that from day one have been so
important are…anytime, anywhere inspections and also understanding what
were the possible military dimensions of their [nuclear] program prior
to 2003. . . .
[Go-anywhere/anytime inspection] is a deal breaker
based on what the administration has said from day one. Again, what we
are beginning to hear is that the administration is weakening. They are
caving to these demands. So these few remaining red lines are very
important, and the one that I think people on both sides of the aisle
will be concerned about is if we don’t end up having anytime, anywhere
inspections. As you’ve mentioned, the Ayatollah has said that’s not
going to be the case. So again, I’m just pushing to try to make sure
that they [the negotiators] hold where they have been.
Reacting to Kerry’s remarks, former CIA director Michael Hayden writes,
“It may be that things like knowing the history of PMDs or having the
ability to conduct ‘anytime, anywhere’ inspections have been judged
non-essential to a final agreement or at least that it is worth the
risk. If that is true we should say so and debate that. But we shouldn’t
say things we know are not true.” And if the administration is saying
things that are demonstrably not true about its own past positions and
statements, we should acknowledge they are trying to snookering us with a
bad deal dressed up as an historic success. That means it must be
rejected.
Meanwhile, Senator Chuck Schumer (D-NY), a crucial vote in the Senate, is busy trying to fight the (admittedly justified) battle to prevent the airlines from
shrinking your carry-on bags and is seeking to limit sales of
copper and scrap metal. He's had little to say about Iran.
What could go wrong?
Labels: AIPAC, Barack Hussein Obama, Charles Schumer, inspection, Iranian nuclear threat, John Kerry, nuclear weapons, P 5+1
Kerry to reject P 5+1 deal?
Does US Secretary of State John Kerry really believe that @Khameni.ir will
ever agree to this?
US Secretary of State John Kerry said a final nuclear accord with Iran
will require that Tehran disclose its past military-related nuclear
activities.
“It will be part of a final agreement. It has to be,” Kerry said
Wednesday during an interview with PBS NewsHour. The secretary of state
insisted: “They have to do it. It will be done. If there’s going to be a
deal, it will be done.”
...
Iran has repeatedly stonewalled the United Nations’ nuclear monitoring
agency from fully investigating the scope of its nuclear ambitions.
However, according to Kerry, that will change under the terms of any
June agreement, which would include “a very robust inspection system.”
It doesn't sound like there's going to be an agreement. Except that Obama-Kerry are so desperate for an agreement that they will concede anything - anything - for a deal to get done.
What could go wrong? (More follows).
Tonight is the 7th night of Passover, which is a holiday day, and which will be followed by the Sabbath. Therefore, this is the last post until Saturday night or Sunday morning (when I already have lots of work awaiting me...).
Chag Sameyach and Shabbat Shalom everyone!
Labels: Barack Hussein Obama, inspection, Iran sanctions regime, Iranian nuclear threat, John Kerry, nuclear weapons, P 5+1, plutonium, uranium enrichment
Khameni to reject P 5+1 deal?
I would bet on Khameni rejecting the deal over the inspections... and Obama and Kerry conceding that point too. Here's a hint.
What could go wrong?
Labels: Ayatollah Ali Khameni, Barack Hussein Obama, IAEA, inspection, Iran sanctions regime, Iranian nuclear threat, John Kerry, P 5+1, plutonium, uranium enrichment
Assad attacks his countrymen with chemical weapons
In an incredibly brazen attack (which the Syrian government is now denying), troops loyal to Bashar al-Assad shot a number of nerve gas-tipped missiles this morning at civilians in a suburb of Damascus. The reason why I call the attack Brazen? UN chemical weapons inspectors are currently in Syria....
570 is way too low for the death count....
You can find a series of videos of alleged victims of the attack
here.
Reuters reports that this is by far the worst use of chemical weapons in Syria's two-year civil war.
Reuters was not able to verify the accounts independently and they were
denied by Syrian state television, which said they were disseminated
deliberately to distract a team of United Nations chemical weapons
experts which arrived three days ago.
The UN team is in Syria investigating allegations that both rebels
and army forces used poison gas in the past, one of the main disputes in
international diplomacy over Syria.
Activists said rockets with chemical agents hit the Damascus suburbs of Ain Tarma, Zamalka and Jobar before dawn.
A
nurse at Douma Emergency Collection facility, Bayan Baker, said the
death toll, as collated from medical centers in the suburbs east of
Damascus, was 213.
"Many of the casualties are women and children. They arrived with
their pupil dilated, cold limbs and foam in their mouths. The doctors
say these are typical symptoms of nerve gas victims," the nurse said.
Extensive
amateur video and photographs purporting to show victims appeared on
the Internet.
A video purportedly shot in the Kafr Batna neighborhood
showed a room filled with more than 90 bodies, many of them children and
a few women and elderly men. Most of the bodies appeared ashen or pale
but with no visible injuries. About a dozen were wrapped in blankets.
What the west doesn't get is that this sort of behavior isn't shocking coming from the Arab world... That's how they fight.
Labels: Bashar al-Assad, chemical weapons, Damascus, Free Syrian Army, inspection, Nusra Front, Syrian army, Syrian uprising, weapons of mass destruction
IAEA to refer Syria to Security Council?
The United States has warned Syria that its failure to cooperate with IAEA inspectors may yet result in Syria being
referred to the UN Security Council. Syria has denied inspectors access to the site of the al-Kibar nuclear facility - allegedly destroyed by Israel in 2007 - for more than two years.
The United States warned Syria on Friday that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) may take actions against it if it does not allow IAEA inspectors to tour Deir al-Zur and other sites, where Damascus is suspected of having operated a nuclear reactor program, Israel Radio reported.
The IAEA's US representative, Glenn Davis, said it was crucial for Syria to accept the inspectors' requests to tour the sites in question, and to study their findings.
Syria has blocked inspectors from touring Deir al-Zur for over two years. In September, a US envoy suggested time was running out for Syria to cooperate with the UN atomic agency probe of alleged secret nuclear activities before the agency invokes its seldom-used authority to call for a special inspection — a possible prelude to UN Security Council involvement.
Three years ago, IAF warplanes reportedly bombed what the US said was a nearly finished nuclear reactor, launching an agency investigation. After an initial visit to the site, agency inspectors have not been allowed to return — or visit other suspect sites — and the agency's chief, Yukiya Amano, says Syria's lack of cooperation could mean that information sought by the agency could be lost with the passage of time.
Syria denies hiding nuclear activities.
Martin Peretz argues that the Syrians constitute
as big a danger as the Iranians.
There is much evidence of Syrian violations of the treaty which--remember!--it has signed. Olli Heinonen, former deputy director of the I.A.E.A. and head of its department of safeguards, makes the case for an "immediate special inspection" of Syria's violations. A key option for inspectors of the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the world body charged with stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, is a "special inspection" an intrusive visit made when the IAEA judges the information provided by a state to be inadequate. But The IAEA is reluctant to use such inspections, even though, in the case of Syria, circumstances cry out for one. This reluctance challenges the authority and credibility of the agency, its board of governors (made up of the representatives of thirty-five of its member states), and the ultimate guardian of the world nuclear order, the United Nations Security Council.
Of course, up to the day before yesterday, President Obama was snuggling up to Bashar Assad. But Assad kicked him in the groin. Maybe the U.S. will be less indifferent to what Syria now does. But, then, how much influence does America have with U.N. agencies? Not much.
My sense is that the US has a lot more influence in the IAEA than it does in the 'softer' UN agencies like the 'human rights council' and UNESCO. The problem is that I don't see Obama using that influence.
Labels: al-Kibar, IAEA, inspection, nuclear weapons, Syria
