US 'fact sheet' on Iran omits uranium enriched between 3.67% and 20%
The non-partisan Institute for Science and International Security reports that the United States' 'fact sheet' on the recently concluded 'deal' with Iran undercounts Iran's stock of low enriched uranium.
With about 6,000 IR-1 centrifuges and a stock of 300 kilograms of 3.5 percent LEU hexafluoride and no available near 20 percent LEU hexafluoride, our breakout estimate would have a mean of about 15 months, where the minimum breakout time would be 12 months. We have used the mean as the best indicator of breakout time and interpret the minimum time as a worst case. Thus, our estimate of breakout would confirm the United States’ assessment that these limitations satisfy a 12 month breakout criterion.
However, breakout estimates depend critically on Iran’s usable stock of near 20 percent LEU. For example, if Iran also has an inventory of about 50 kilograms of near 20 percent LEU hexafluoride that it can start inserting into the cascades within the first six months of breaking out, and we assume the same conditions as above, the mean breakout time becomes somewhat more than ten months, with a minimal time of nine months. As a result, minimizing or ensuring that the near 20 percent LEU stock is unusable in a breakout is a high priority. How these goals would be achieved in a deal is not explained in the Fact Sheet, nor was it discussed in detail in the briefings.
In fact, it appears from the Fact Sheets and briefings that Iran’s stock of near 20 percent LEU is not included in the 300 kilogram limit on LEU mentioned above. This limit appears to be applied only to the 3.67 percent LEU. Given the size of Iran’s stock of near 20 percent LEU, the lack of discussion about the fate of the near 20 percent LEU is problematic in determining breakout estimates. The near 20 percent LEU stock, unless largely eliminated or rendered unusable in a breakout, could be an important reserve in reducing the time to produce the first significant quantity of weapon-grade uranium (WGU) and rapidly producing a second significant quantity of WGU.
Despite the fact that Iran no longer has a stock of near 20 percent LEU in hexafluoride form (UF6), it continues to retain a significant portion of this material in the form of oxide (U3O8) and in scrap and waste. In total, Iran has a stock of about 228 kilograms (uranium mass) of near 20 percent LEU in various forms. If all of this material were converted back to hexafluoride form, it would possess the equivalent of about 337 kilograms of near 20 percent LEU hexafluoride. All of this LEU has been fed into the conversion lines to produce oxide. Of this original amount, about 162 kilograms (uranium mass) ended up as pure LEU oxide powder. The rest, or about 65 kilograms (uranium mass) of this LEU, ended up in scrap and waste.
As of February 2015, of the 162 kilograms of near 20 percent LEU oxide (uranium mass), only 42 kilograms of this enriched material were actually present in Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) fuel plates. About 72 kilograms near 20 percent LEU (uranium mass) were still in oxide form and slated for production of TRR fuel elements.
The amount in scrap, waste, and in-process was in total as of February 2015 about 113 kilograms of near 20 percent LEU. Much of this material is in forms where the LEU could be recovered in a straightforward manner. .
One point is clear, if left in Iran, these near 20 percent LEU stocks could significantly affect breakout times, lowering them substantially below 12 months. To help understand its importance, a rule of thumb is that 50 kilograms of near 20 percent LEU hexafluoride (or about 33 kilograms uranium mass) is equivalent in terms of shortening breakout time to 500 kilograms of 3.5 percent LEU hexafluoride. So, instead of having just 300 kilograms of 3.5 percent LEU, the additional 50 kilograms of near 20 percent would be equivalent to having a total of 800 kilograms of 3.5 percent LEU hexafluoride.
Based on the briefings, the United States removes the near 20 percent LEU from its breakout estimates once this material is mixed with aluminum and put into TRR fuel elements. Its assessment is apparently that recovery of the near 20 percent LEU at that point and its subsequent conversion to uranium hexafluoride would take so long that this LEU could not contribute significantly to a breakout, or at least not to the first significant quantity of weapon-grade uranium. However, recovery of near 20 percent LEU from fresh fuel can be straightforward and the U.S. evaluation requires greater scrutiny.
In Iraq’s crash program to a nuclear weapon in 1990-1991, it put in place a capability to recover about 33 kilograms (uranium mass) of safeguarded unirradiated and slightly irradiated highly enriched uranium (HEU) from research reactor fuel. Based on Iraqi declarations and IAEA Action Team evaluations, which we possess, Iraq covertly installed the necessary equipment at the Tuwaitha nuclear site in four months. It would have needed about a month to test the equipment with dummy fuel and another five months to recover the HEU from the fuel. This effort was stopped at the point of testing dummy fuel elements by the Gulf War bombing campaign which started in January 1991.
Because of its far greater experience with uranium conversion, Iran is likely able to recover unirradiated near 20 percent LEU at a similar or faster rate from TRR fuel elements than Iraq. If Iran were to break out, it would undoubtedly secretly install and test the recovery equipment prior to breakout. Thus, the Iraqi experience suggests that Iran could be recovering near 20 percent LEU from fresh TRR fuel soon after starting its breakout and recover tens of kilograms within several months. This recovered LEU could be converted quickly into hexafluoride form in facilities also prepared in secret prior to breakout.
Iran would not
necessarily have to ship its stockpile of highly enriched uranium abroad
under a nuclear pact with major powers, U.S. State Department
spokeswoman Marie Harf said on Monday.
"You don't have to ship it out
of the country to get to a year breakout time," she said in a conference
call, referring to the goal of stretching the amount of time it would
take Iran to acquire enough fissile material to make one atomic bomb.
"You can have some other dispositions for it that get us where we need to be in terms of our bottom line," Harf said.
Hmm.
P5+1 foreign ministers meeting at #Iran talks in Lausanne has broken up - after only 18 minutes.
(Removes extraneous word)
— Matt Lee (@APDiploWriter) March 30, 2015
For months, Irantentatively agreed that it would send a large portion of its stockpile of uranium to Russia,
where it would not be accessible for use in any future weapons program.
But on Sunday Iran’s deputy foreign minister made a surprise comment to
Iranian reporters, ruling out an agreement that involved giving up a
stockpile that Iran has spent years and billions of dollars to amass.
“The
export of stocks of enriched uranium is not in our program, and we do
not intend sending them abroad,” the official, Abbas Araqchi, told the
Iranian media, according to Agence France-Presse. “There is no question
of sending the stocks abroad.”
On Saturday, former IAEA chief inspector Ollie Heinonen published a paper that concluded that based upon leaks about what is in the current deal, Iran could have a nuclear breakout in 7-8 months.
What is Iran's current breakout time?
Natural uranium has only 0.7 percent of the isotope U-235, and the
effort required to enrich it to one SQ of WGU is about 5,000 Separative
Work Units (SWUs). Iran currently has about 9,000 functioning
first-generation IR-1 centrifuges, with another 9,000 not in operation.
The IR-1s installed in the Natanz and Fordow facilities have been
performing at an average per unit rate of 0.75 to 1 SWU per year. Using
the 1 SWU/year performance of the latest IR-1 model, the breakout time
with 9,000 machines using a natural uranium feed would be six to seven
months. However, Iran also has substantial stocks of 3.5 percent
enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF6) that can be used as an alternative
feed, shrinking the breakout time to three months.
If Iran brought online its other nearly 9,000 IR-1s, breakout time
would be about three months with natural uranium feedstock and four to
six weeks with 3.5 percent UF6 feedstock. Iran has also developed the
more advanced IR-2m centrifuge, rated at 5 SWU/year. If the 1,000 IR-2ms
installed at Natanz were used in conjunction with all 18,000 IR-1s, the
respective breakout times would be cut by a third.
According to media accounts, the proposed nuclear agreement
would lower the number of operating centrifuges to around 6,500. In that
circumstance, what would Iran's breakout time be?
Using IR-1s with natural uranium as a feed, the breakout time for 6,500
centrifuges would be about nine months. A crucial question will be how
much 3.5 percent enriched UF6 will remain in Iran. Yet even if UF6
stocks are reduced from their current 7.5-8 tons to 500 kg, a breakout
time of between seven and eight months would still be possible given the
program's enrichment capabilities with natural uranium feed. Since
these breakout times are less than the goals set by the U.S.
administration, it is important to know what parameters Washington used
for its estimates.
So everyone other than the Obama administration has figured out that this is a bad deal? What could go wrong?
Obama: 'Once I sign the agreement, you can read the agreement'
On Monday, nearly 50 Republican Senators sent a letter to Iran, informing that country's regime that once President Obama leaves office in January 2017, no President who succeeds him will continue to abide by any agreement that he enters into with Iran, unless that agreement first passes the Congress (Hat Tip: Memeorandum).
“It has come to our attention while observing your nuclear negotiations
with our government that you may not fully understand our constitutional
system … Anything not approved by Congress is a mere executive
agreement,” the senators wrote. “The next president could revoke such an
executive agreement with the stroke of a pen and future Congresses
could modify the terms of the agreement at any time.”
...
Many inside the Republican caucus, however, hope that by pointing out
the long-term fragility of a deal with no congressional approval --
something Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has also noted -- the
Iranian regime might be convinced to think twice. "Iran's ayatollahs
need to know before agreeing to any nuclear deal that … any unilateral
executive agreement is one they accept at their own peril,” Cotton told
me.
...
The new letter is the latest piece of an effort by Senators in both
parties to ensure that Congress will have some say if and when a deal is
signed. Senators Bob Corker, Lindsey Graham, Tim Kaine and the embattled Bob Menendez have a bill pending that would mandate a Congressional review
of the Iran deal, but Republicans and Democrats have been bickering
over how to proceed in the face of a threatened presidential veto.
The White House reacted furiously, arguing that the bill 'undermines' the President's ability 'to conduct foreign policy.' No kidding. Wasn't that the whole point of the letter (Hat Tip: Memeorandum)?
White House press secretary Josh Earnest was unusually
blunt in ripping the Senate GOP, saying “it’s surprising to me there are
some Republican senators who are seeking to establish a backchannel
with hardliners in Iran to undermine an agreement with Iran and the
international community.”
Earnest said Republicans have a
“long and rather sordid history" of putting military options ahead of
diplomatic ones, and called the letter, signed by 47 GOP lawmakers, “the continuation of a partisan strategy to undermine the president’s authority."
...
Congressional Democrats joined the White House in
denouncing the letter, with Sen. Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) calling it “a
cynical effort by Republican Senators to undermine sensitive
international negotiations — it weakens America’s hand and highlights
our political divisions to the rest of the world.”
“Understand
that if these negotiations fail, a military response to Iran developing
their nuclear capability becomes more likely,” added Durbin, the
second-ranking Senate Democrat.
Senate Republicans
“should think twice about whether their political stunt is worth the
threat of another war in the Middle East,” he added.
...
The White House and Democrats appeared to be coordinating
their response, with Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.)
assailing Republicans on the Senate floor as “undermining our commander
in chief while empowering the ayatollahs."
"Republicans need to find a way to get over their animosity of President Obama,” Reid said.
"It's
unprecedented for one political party to directly intervene in an
international negotiation with a sole goal of embarrassing the president
of the United States."
The letter is just the latest
instance of Republicans using control of Congress to challenge Obama on
foreign policy, in part by going over his head.
A member of the press asked Obama, "Can you comment on the Republican letter to Iran? Can you comment on that?"
"I think it's somewhat ironic to see some members of Congress wanting
to make common cause with the hardliners in Iran. It's an unusual
coalition," Obama told the reporter.
"I think what we’re going to focus on right now is actually seeing
whether we can get a deal or not. And once we do -- if we do -- then
we’ll be able to make the case to the American people, and I'm confident
we’ll be able to implement it."
That reminded me of this from then-Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi.
The Iranians surprised the representatives of the six powers when
they presented their own alternative proposal, the diplomats said.
That proposal included, for the first time,
concessions regarding their stockpile of enriched uranium, as well as a
bid to cut the number of old-generation centrifuges by one third.
The Iranians proposed they keep 6,000 centrifuges
out of the 9,400 for the first 10 years of the agreement, and keep 500
kilograms of their low-enriched uranium, or, alternatively, to operate
6,500 centrifuges and only retain 300 kilograms of their low-enriched
uranium, the diplomats said. After 10 years, with only five years left
on the agreement, the Iranian proposal would gradually increase the
number of centrifuges to the number they have today, the diplomats
added.
But proponents of a deal should not be celebrating just yet.
However, among the unresolved issues is the Iranian demand that all
sanctions be lifted immediately upon signing the agreement, whereas the
United States and the other powers want the sanctions lifted gradually
if Iran is seen to be meeting its obligations.
Another stumbling block is Iran’s continuing
refusal of the world powers’ demand to fully open all aspects of its
military nuclear program to inspection by the International Atomic
Energy Commission.
The diplomats say that, considering the issues
still in dispute, it is difficult to imagine the parties coming to an
agreement by March 30. If such an agreement does emerge, because of an
Iranian and American need to show progress, it will be a general
document of principles only and will not include details on the
outstanding bones of contention.
Iran's Revolutionary Guard on Friday
announced it has test fired a "new strategic weapon" in the final day of
a large-scale naval and air defense drill, saying the system would play
a key role in any future battle against the United States.
The claim was a new show of force by Iran just weeks ahead of a
deadline for reaching a deal over its nuclear program with the U.S. and
other global powers.
Iran announced the test on the final day of military drills it is
calling "Great Prophet 9." The exercises are being held near the Strait
of Hormuz, a strategic waterway through which about a fifth of the
world's oil passes.
Iran often holds live-fire war games and frequently boasts of
advances in its weaponry that cannot be independently verified. The
latest drill, which included a simulated attack on an American aircraft
carrier, appears to be aimed at sending a message that Iran has no
intention of backing down to the U.S. in the nuclear talks.
Adm. Ali Fadavi, the Republican Guard's naval chief, said the new
weapon would be critical in any future naval war against the U.S.
Of course, strategic weapons aren't part of the P 5+1 negotiations.
I want to go back and address Barak Ravid's last line:
“The challenge is for those who oppose the agreement like Netanyahu.
They must present an alternative that will produce better results,” a
senior U.S. official said over the weekend.
Olli Heinonen,
who headed the IAEA’s safeguards section during the 2003-2005 talks
between Iran and three European powers (United Kingdom, France and
Germany), said “it is true that 20-percent enriched uranium stocks have
decreased, but Iran is still producing uranium enriched up to 5-percent
uranium. The latter stocks have actually increased when you talk about
stocks of UF6 [uranium hexafluoride] and other chemical compounds.”
Moreover,
while there has been no installation of new centrifuges, “it appears
that the production of centrifuge components continues. Same with the
Arak reactor. No new nuclear components have been installed, but it does
not mean that the production of those came to halt.”
As Heinonen
put it, “the JPOA is just a step to create negotiation space; nothing
more. It is not a viable longer term situation. The nuclear caravan of
Iran continues and sets a step after a step another fait accompli.”
David Albright,
who heads Institute for Science and International Security, said the
president’s language was “a little bit odd.” He said that the halt in
Iran’s program from 2003 to 2005 was a more substantial suspension of
enrichment activities. (At the Senate hearing, Blinken acknowledged the
United States and its negotiating partners had abandoned United Nations
Security Council demands that Iran halt enrichment as it was clear “Iran
was not going to give up as a practical matter some very limited forms
of enrichment in the event of an agreement.”)
Moreover, Albright
said it was not correct that the 3.5-percent enriched stock had been
reduced; instead it has been converted from one form (“hexafluoride”) to
another (“oxide”), a step that he said was taken largely for cosmetic
(political) purposes. A significant portion of 20-percent enriched
material has also been retained as scrap, rather than converted into
fuel for a research reactor. A key aspect of the talks is to extend the
“break out” period under which Iran could manufacture a nuclear weapon,
but he said as a practical matter the conversion of 3.5 percent to oxide
form would only add about two weeks to the break-out period, since Iran
could reconvert it back into hexafluoride. (Here’s his report on this issue; this paragraph was updated for clarity.)
In effect, the amount of nuclear material available to Iran has gone up “about a bomb’s worth during the JPOA,” Albright said.
This
is where Obama’s speechwriters went awry. Iran’s stock of low enriched
uranium — a “nuclear material” by the IAEA’s definition — has gone up
during the negotiations, largely as a consequence of the dilution of the
near 20-percent material.
Israeli experts have estimated that Tehran's schedule for nuclear
enrichment has only been delayed for up to two weeks, according to the
report, less than one week after a deal has been reached between Western
powers and the Iranian government regarding the nuclear program.
The estimate may confirm Netanyahu's condemnation of the deal - which
is an interim agreement which lifts economic sanctions for a slowing,
but not stopping, of Iran's nuclear production - as a "historic
mistake."
The concern in Israel is that Iran will wait for an international
crisis, or an internal crisis in the United States, as a prime
opportunity to drop a nuclear bomb on its enemies. The deal provides
international support for Iran's nuclear program by allowing it to
continue in any capacity - thus making the global community powerless to
stop a nuclear Iran on legal grounds.
The report states that Iran is likely to fire up their 18,000
centrifuges and produce a nuclear bomb in the event that the Islamic
Republic sees the golden opportunity to use nuclear warfare - deal or no
deal. A nuclear warhead would then be ready in as little as 36 days.
...
Meanwhile, the US has declared their support for the Iranian to
"continue building" their nuclear reactor in Arak. The support is based
on terms which prevent Tehran from producing nuclear fuel, or using the
heavy water reactor; however, these cannot be constantly monitored,
experts claim.
The report also says that Iran does not have the capability of reducing the enrichment level of its already enriched uranium.
Emergency Committee for Israel slams Iran nuclear deal
Statement by Noah Pollak, Executive Director of the Emergency Committee for Israel, on the agreement with Iran just concluded in Geneva:
"The Geneva Agreement is a defeat for the United States and the West. It fails to uphold even the minimum demand of repeated U.N. Security Council resolutions that Iran must stop enriching uranium. For the next six months, the centrifuges will not be dismantled and will continue to spin, uranium will be enriched, the 20 percent enriched uranium will stay in Iran, and a reactor designed to produce bomb-ready plutonium will remain just months away from completion. Iran will continue its march to nuclear weapons, with perhaps a brief pause in some parts of the program -- but it will be a pause that refreshes, since Iran will be rewarded right away with significant sanctions relief, with the additional likelihood that the rest of the sanctions regime will begin to crumble.
"Congress should make clear that it does not support this deal. Congress should make clear that just because the Obama administration seems to have taken all our options off the table, our allies need not follow us down this futile path of accommodating the Iranian regime's nuclear ambitions. In particular, Congress should make clear the United States will support Israel if Israel decides she must act to prevent a regime dedicated to her destruction from acquiring the means to do so."
The statement is online at the following link: http://goo.gl/GGszTB.
Iranian foreign minister: 'Right to enrichment' recognized in deal
Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif has told Iran's Press TV that the agreement between Iran and the P 5+1 recognizes Iran's 'right of enrichment.'
When Israel Radio reported on the agreement in its 5:00 am newscast this morning, it said that the 'right of enrichment' was recognized for 'civilian purposes.'
How can you tell whether an enriched kilo of uranium is for civilian or military purposes? Is it labeled? What could go wrong?
Haaretz's Barak Ravid reports that Israel has been pushing three points through ongoing contacts with negotiators at the P 5+1 talks in Geneva.
1. Israel asked that the agreement also address
suspected Iranian research and development of nuclear warheads and
detonators. Steinitz made clear that the agreement must not give Iran
legitimacy to continue to develop other aspects of its nuclear program
under the definition of "scientific research," which could disguise
military dimensions of the nuclear program. Israel suggested adding a
clause stating that the agreement "does not detract from Iran's
commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or to the decisions of the International Atomic Energy Agency."
2.
Israel asked that world powers do not relinquish their demand that Iran
halt all activity at the Arak heavy water reactor. Israel is concerned
that without such a clause in the agreement, Iran will continue to
develop the reactor, which it could later use to produce plutonium for a
nuclear bomb.
3. Israel
asked that world powers insist the agreement committed Iran to convert
all of its 190 kilograms of 20-percent enriched uranium into oxide,
which cannot be used to develop nuclear weapons. Steinitz stressed that
leaving even a small amount of 20-percent enriched uranium in Iran's
hands would give the Iranians future legitimacy to reengage in uranium
enrichment to this level.
The senior official said that when the
talks end, senior diplomats from some of the countries taking part in
the talks will visit Israel to brief officials on the results of the
negotiations and on future plans.
Bottom line: If these talks end in an agreement, the sanctions are over.
So much for 'negotiations': As Obama pushes to delay sanctions, experts say Iran could build a nuke within a month
Greetings from 39,000 feet above the eastern seaboard of the United States. Isn't technology great?
I am currently flying from Miami (to which I drove at 5:00 am) to Newark, where I will be spending the Sabbath in the town in which I lived for my last eight years in the US....
USA Today reported on Thursday that the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) estimates that Iran could produce enough enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon within a month. Meanwhile, the Obama administration is pushing the US Senate to delay further sanctions against Iran in the hope of 'improving the atmosphere' for 'negotiations.'
"Shortening breakout times have implications for any negotiation with
Iran," stated the report by the Institute for Science and International
Security. "An essential finding is that they are currently too short
and shortening further."
David Albright, president of the
institute and a former inspector for the U.N. International Atomic
Energy Agency, said the estimate means that Iran would have to eliminate
more than half of its 19,000 centrifuges to extend the time it would
take to build a bomb to six months.
But the Obama administration - as usual - believes that it knows better than the experts.
The Obama administration has said Iran is probably a year away from having enough enriched uranium to make a bomb.
Bernadette
Meehan, an NSC spokeswoman for President Obama's National Security
Council, said the intelligence community maintains "a number of
assessments" regarding potential time frames for Iran to produce enough
weapons-grade uranium for one weapon or a testable nuclear device.
"We continue to closely monitor the Iranian nuclear program and its stockpile of enriched uranium," Meehan said.
Meanwhile, Iran continues to hide its activities from UN inspectors, refusing to grant them access to suspected nuclear facilities. Shouldn't that be a reason to assume the worst?
However, Iran has blocked international inspectors from some
suspected nuclear facilities to verify they are being used for peaceful
purposes, access required under international agreements it has signed.
United
Nations inspectors have found evidence of a weapons program in
violation of Iran's commitment under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty. The USA and the U.N. Security Council have implemented crippling
economic sanctions on Iran to sway it to take steps to assure the world
it is not developing a bomb.
And Iran doesn't really need a whole lot of centrifuges to produce a bomb either.
If Iran moves ahead with installation of its more efficient, second
generation centrifuges, it would be able to produce enough nuclear fuel
for a bomb with so few of them, between 2,000 and 3,300 centrifuges,
that they could fit in a small warehouse, Albright said.
Take your pick, either the Obama administration is complicit in Iran's efforts to produce nuclear weapons, or it's indifferent, or it's burying its head in the sand. And Israel is supposed to trust them?
Netanyahu: Iran needs 80 kilos of 20% enriched uranium to make a nuclear bomb
Prime Minister Netanyahu had another interview with the BBC on Thursday afternoon, in which he warned that Iran is only 80 kilos of 20% enriched uranium from a nuclear weapon, that Israel has the right to defend itself, and that only military force will stop Iran. (The full interview video is available at the link). Draw your own conclusions.
A summary of the interview is here. Here are some highlights.
“It takes 250 kilos of 20% enriched uranium to manufacture a nuclear
bomb. They [Iran] have gone up from 110 to 170 kilos,” Netanyahu said.
“They have sort of crept up, but not crossed it,” he said.
The
IDF has the right to safeguard its citizens should Iran cross that
line, he said and added that the United States has never questioned that
right.
“Israel’s right to defend its existence is not subject to a
traffic light. We do not need anyone to give us the right to prevent a
new holocaust,” he said.
“It is a right that we exercise if we need to,” he told the BBC.
...
The threat of a North Korean nuclear strike has underscored the danger of Iran’s nuclear program, Netanyahu said.
“The
entire world is paralyzed, shattered, destabilized by this rogue state
[North Korea] that has nuclear weapons,” Netanyahu said.
“Iran is
many times fold stronger than North Korea both in GDP and aggressive
tendencies and the world wide web of terror that they have,” Netanyahu
said.
Tehran has armed terrorists with rockets and has the ability
to shut down the world’s oil supply, he said. If they have a nuclear
weapons, it would spark a nuclear arms race in the region.
“The
Middle East will become a tinderbox. The threat of Iran’s getting
nuclear weapons is a direct threat to the existence of Israel, but I
think that it is a supreme pivot of history. It threatens the peace of
the world,” Netanyahu said.
According to the sources, Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi was responsible for the
development of a warhead "small enough to fit on to one of the ballistic
missiles developed by Iran from North Korean prototypes," the report
stated.
North Korea said its test on Tuesday had "greater explosive force"
than the 2006 and 2009 tests, which were widely seen as small-scale.
The
report echoes comments made earlier in the week by a security expert
that the nuclear test may have also been carried out on behalf of Iran,
and in the presence of Iranian atomic scientists.
North Korea is
making progress both in its nuclear weapons capabilities and its ICBM
missile research, Dr. Alon Levkowitz, coordinator of Bar-Ilan
University’s Asian Studies Program and a member of the BESA Center for
Strategic Studies, told The Jerusalem Post.
“The
most disturbing question is whether the Iranians are using North Korea
as a backdoor plan for their own nuclear program. The Iranians didn’t
carry out a nuclear test in Iran, but they may have done so in North
Korea,” Levkowitz said. “There is no official information on this... but
Iran may have bypassed inspections via North Korea. If true, this is a
very worrying development.”
There is some doubt as to whether the missile that North Korea tested was based on plutonium or enriched uranium. What is known about Iran's program is that it is based on enriched uranium, but....
The North’s nuclear weapons program is mainly based on plutonium, while
Iran is mostly relying on uranium in its efforts to build a bomb. Yet
some analysts believe that Tehran may be pursuing a parallel, secret
plutonium nuclear program. Similarly, North Korea is also known to have
enriched uranium through spinning centrifuges, a process Pyongyang has
recently made much progress in, Levkowitz said.
As Iran increases uranium enrichment, 'Israeli officials' slam Obama's 'wretched' red line
You may recall that last week Prime Minister Netanyahu put US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta in an uncomfortable position by stating that sanctions are not working to stop Iran's pursuit of a nuclear weapon. Now, 'senior Israeli officials' are slamming the Obama administration for its 'wretched' red line on Iran.
"The US' stance is pushing the Iranians to become a country at the brink (of nuclear capability)," explained sources well versed in the nuclear issue. "The Americans are de facto allowing the Iranians to continue to enrich uranium and become a country at the brink. We are not prepared to allow that (to happen)."
As reported in Yedioth Ahronoth last week, the US would only be prepared to carry out a strike against Iran in 18 month, when a "critical threshold" was crossed, and was resolutely against an Israeli strike.
During his recent visit to Israel, Panetta made it clear that the US would not allow Iran to develop nuclear weapons.
Now Israeli officials are trying to change Washington's stance on the Iranian issue. "The Americans say that the ayatollahs' decision to construct a bomb is the red line," the officials noted, adding: "It's a wretched red line. Who knows when they'll decide and what they'll decide.
"The centrifuges are spinning and the uranium enrichment level is growing significantly over the past few months. The Iranians are not impressed with the threats and continue on their path in spite of the heavy sanctions."
The part that I highlighted all but confirms this story from DEBKA.
1. While Saeed Jalili communed at leisure with Catherine Ashton in world capitals, uranium enrichment levels in Iran crept past 20 percent in expanded quantities. The six powers are understandably reluctant to admit that in the time bought by negotiations, Iran was able to refine uranium up to 30-percent grade or even a higher and go into advanced preparations for 65 percent grade enrichment. Now the Iranians are well on the way to an 80-90 percent weapons grade.
The talk in Tehran about the need for nuclear-powered ships and submarines offered a fictitious pretext for crossing that threshold. Iran is not about to build those vessels or engines for lack of technology, materials and infrastructure. But nuclear-powered ships’ engines require the same highly-enriched uranium (90 percent) as bombs.
2. Iran has launched a crash mega-fortification program for sheathing in steel and concrete nuclear facilities whose transfer to underground “immune zones” for escaping bombardment would be too costly, cumbersome and time consuming.
If the US and Israel leaves Iran alone to complete this project, they will have forfeited the opportunity of pre-empting Iran’s nuclear program – only inflicting partial and temporary damage at best.
3. President Barack Obama is under very heavy pressure from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf oil states to waste no more time and destroy that program without further shilly-shallying.
4. Riyadh, Doha and Abu Dhabi tried to achieve that objective indirectly by massively backing the Syrian revolt against Tehran’s best friend Bashar Assad in the hope that his fall would stop the Iranians in their tracks. They never came close: Assad is still fighting tenaciously and his army is in intact after 17 months.
5. Instead of capitulating to the odds against the Syrian ruler, Tehran increased its military stake in Assad’s battles.
debkafile’s military sources say that without Iran’s lavish and timely air and ground supply corridors, the Syrian army would have long since run out of arms for defending the Assad regime against revolt.
The Gulf governments are therefore forced to accept that their plans to weaken Iran by toppling Assad have backfired in more ways than one.
6. Turkey and Iraq, each for its own reasons, are letting Iranian arms pass through their territories to Damascus, a move which is counter-productive to Gulf interests on the Middle East keyboard. Ankara, in particular, hosts rebel command centers and training camps with one hand, while, with the other, lets arms shipments through to Assad’s army for destroying those same rebels the moment the cross into Syria.
7. UN, American and European sanctions have failed to drive Tehran into giving up its nuclear program, as even the White House admitted Wednesday, Aug. 1, or slowed down its development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads.
8. US and Israeli intelligence experts agree that Iran will be able to produce dirty bomb within three months, ready to hand out to the terrorist networks run by the Revolutionary Guards external clandestine arm, the Al Quds Brigades. They are designed for use in time of war against Israelis abroad and Americans in the Persian Gulf and Middle East. Israel fears the radioactive bombs will find their way to Tehran’s surrogates, the Lebanese Hizballah or the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
Analysis of the International Atomic Energy Agency report on Iran’s nuclear program by the Institute for Science and International Security found that Tehran has 6,197 kg of light enriched (3.5 percent) uranium. That amount could yield five nuclear weapons if enriched to 95% purity.
The report noted that Iran’s average monthly enrichment of uranium has accelerated drastically since its last investigation in February, and that Iran is continuing to enrich its nuclear stock to 20% purity. The IAEA estimated that Iran has produced a total of 145.6 kg of 20% enriched uranium.
The IAEA experts also found particles enriched up to 27% at the Fordo nuclear facility. That is higher than the 20% declared by Iran and closer to the weapons-grade material used in nuclear missiles.
The findings showed Iran is pressing ahead with its uranium enrichment despite UN resolutions calling on it to suspend the activity.
Yet the Obama administration continues its game of Chicken over an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities.
The IAEA claims to have found uranium that was enriched to 27% - a higher grade than previously seen - near Iran's Fordow underground nuclear facility near the 'holy city' of Qom. As of Friday, the IAEA was attributing the higher grade uranium to a 'production error,' but has asked for clarification.
Nuclear bombs require uranium enriched to 90 percent, but much of the effort required to get there is already achieved once it reaches 20 percent concentration, shortening the time needed for any nuclear weapons "break-out."
One source said the higher level detected was believed to be within variation of the usual activity at the Fordow facility - where Iran is refining uranium to a fissile concentration of 20 percent - making clear it was not a big difference.
"It is not up there... towards nuclear weapons capability," the diplomat said. It could simply be a "production error" but the UN nuclear watchdog had asked Iran to clarify the issue.
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Another diplomatic source said he had also heard of the find but it was unclear whether it would be included in an IAEA report due to be released to member states later on Friday. IAEA regularly inspects Fordow and other Iranian nuclear sites.
What if it was an error in the other direction and the concentration was actually supposed to be higher? What could go wrong?
P 5+1 to offer Iran a package and time but no sanctions relief
Laura Rozen reports that the P 5+1 (the five veto-wielding Security Council members plus German) plan to offer Iran a package deal during their meeting in Baghdad on Wednesday. The package will not include sanctions relief. For now.
While the details of the proposed package have not been made public, Western officials told Al Monitor that the package does not include sanctions relief at this stage.
Instead, the United States and its P5+1 partners will offer fuel for Tehran’s Research Reactor (TRR) plus safety upgrades to the plant, which is of 1960s vintage. Also potentially on the table: new research reactors that use lower level 3.5 percent enriched uranium, safety upgrades for Iran’s one functioning nuclear power plant at Bushehr and spare parts for its accident-plagued fleet of civilian airliners.
In return, Iran must stop producing uranium enriched to 20 percent and halt activities at Fordow, an enrichment facility built into a mountain near Qom. It is not clear whether Iran would also have to send out its stockpile of more than 100 kg of the fuel.
They're also planning to offer Iran what it needs most: Time.
“Expectations are guarded,” a second western official told Al Monitor Tuesday. “If we talk substantively on elements of a deal and agree to meet again in three weeks, Baghdad will have been a success.”
Iran vastly expanding centrifuges at Fordo; can be reconfigured to make weapons grade uranium in days
Al-Arabiya reports that ahead of the arrival of nuclear inspectors on Sunday, Iran is greatly expanding the number of centrifuges at its Fordo underground facility near the 'holy' city of Qom. According to the report, the centrifuges can be upgraded to allow them to make weapons grade uranium in a matter of days (Hat Tip: MFS - The Other News).
While saying that the electrical circuitry, piping and supporting equipment for the new centrifuges was now in place, the diplomats emphasized that Tehran had not started installing the new machines at its Fordo facility and could not say whether it was planning to.
Still, the senior diplomats - who asked for anonymity because their information was privileged - suggested that Tehran would have little reason to prepare the ground for the better centrifuges unless it planned to operate them. They spoke in recent interviews - the last one Saturday.
The reported work at Fordo appeared to reflect Iran’s determination to forge ahead with nuclear activity that could be used to make atomic arms despite rapidly escalating international sanctions and the latent threat of an Israeli military strike on its nuclear facilities.
Fordo could be used to make fissile warhead material even without such an upgrade, the diplomats said.
They said that although older than Iran’s new generation machines, the centrifuges now operating there can be reconfigured within days to make such material because they already are enriching to 20 percent - a level that can be boosted quickly to weapons-grade quality.
Their comments appeared to represent the first time anyone had quantified the time it would take to reconfigure the Fordo centrifuges into machines making weapons-grade material.
In contrast, Iran’s older enrichment site at Natanz is producing uranium at 3.4 percent, a level normally used to power reactors. While that too could be turned into weapons-grade uranium, reassembling from low to weapons-grade production is complex, and retooling the thousands of centrifuges at Natanz would likely take weeks.
And Obama wants to start negotiating with Iran again now? What could go wrong?
London's Daily Telegraph has gotten a pretty good idea of what's in that IAEA report to be released later this month. If they have the report, they're not saying, but they cite 'western diplomats' who have apparently seen it. And it doesn't really allow for any conclusion other than the fact that Iran is developing nuclear weapons.
Yukiya Amano, the organisation’s director-general, is unlikely to draw a definitive conclusion that Iran is making nuclear weapons, but according to Western diplomats the facts will make any other conclusion implausible.
They believe the IAEA has substantiated evidence from intelligence reports, interviews with Iranian scientists and on-the-ground inspections that Iran is carrying out a nuclear weapons programme in parallel to its civilian energy goals.
The agency will sound the alarm over Iranian scientists’ work to develop a ballistic missile warhead capable of carrying a nuclear device. It has already uncovered evidence that Iran has been carrying out research into triggers for nuclear weapons.
Inspectors have also questioned Iranian scientists on simulation programmes that they believe are designed to design and test a potential weapon.
“This is the product of a vast amount of work by the IAEA which will show the level of evidence they’ve accumulated and make clear a number of supplementary indications they have uncovered,” said a Western diplomat. “It makes an inescapable case that Iran has ambitions to militarise the uranium it has been enriching at its production facilities.”
Another official said: “The Iranians have been very evasive, and quite clever about it at times. It’s been difficult to discover the smoking gun. But this will be more detailed than before. The director-general will point to black holes in the Iranians’ explanations. It will undoubtedly increase the pressure.”
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The IAEA will provide indications that enriched uranium production is moving from the long-established Natanz facility to Fordow, an underground plant that is regarded by Iran as bomb-proof near the holy city of Qom. Iran has produced more than 70kg of 20 per cent enriched uranium and would easily increase its output if production shifts to the mountain plant. Scientists say that 20 per cent enriched uranium can be refined to the 90 per cent weapons grade level without design changes in the production lines.
The report is likely to provide further ammunition to the case of Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, for pre-emptive military action.
I just want to point out that when Obama took office, Iran had 1,000 kilos of low enriched uranium - they now have four times that. And as recently as June, I reported that they had 38.3 kilo of medium enriched (20%) uranium. The number cited above is nearly double what I reported in June.
The Telegraph also adds a couple of things that were only hinted at in the Israeli media yesterday (until last night) and that were couched in terms of being 'scheduled long in advance.' The Telegraph says otherwise.
The dramatic disclosures came as the Israeli defence ministry confirmed that it had fired “a rocket propulsion system” from its Palmach airbase after a white streak was spotted in the skies above the centre of the country early yesterday.
The ministry, which insisted that the launch had been long planned, censored further details. But Western experts concluded that Israel had fired a Jericho-3 ballistic missile, which is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead and could form a component of any attack on Iran.
It also emerged that Israel’s air force simulated a long-range attack at a Nato base in Sardinia last week.
The exercise, which was not initially disclosed in Israel, included an air-to-air refuelling component. Potential targets in Iran lie between 950 and 1,400 miles from Israel’s borders. Any mission to destroy them would would require aerial refuelling.
I think Israel is telling Obama that if he doesn't take action, Israel will. Obama isn't as big a fool as we sometimes think he is, and he knows that Israel attacks Iran, US interests will not be spared by Iran's response.
I am an Orthodox Jew - some would even call me 'ultra-Orthodox.' Born in Boston, I was a corporate and securities attorney in New York City for seven years before making aliya to Israel in 1991 (I don't look it but I really am that old :-). I have been happily married to the same woman for thirty-five years, and we have eight children (bli ayin hara) ranging in age from 13 to 33 years and nine grandchildren. Four of our children are married! Before I started blogging I was a heavy contributor on a number of email lists and ran an email list called the Matzav from 2000-2004. You can contact me at: IsraelMatzav at gmail dot com
