Iran's nuclear map - much more than you knew about
There's a great map of Iran's nuclear facilities that's been posted
here.
It's by Olli Heinonen, a senior fellow with the Belfer Center at Harvard
University's Kennedy School and a former deputy director-general for
safeguards at the IAEA, and by Simon Henderson is the Baker fellow and director of the Gulf and Energy
Policy Program at The Washington Institute, specializing in energy
matters and the conservative Arab states of the Persian Gulf.
If you click the link, you can even download a pdf version (which I did). I had no idea that there were this many facilities and I suspect that most of you didn't know either (I thought there were four or five facilities). Most of these facilities will remain intact if President Obama's agreement with Iran goes through and is implemented.
What could go wrong?
Labels: Arak heavy water production plant, Barack Hussein Obama, Bushehr, Fordow nuclear plant, Iran sanctions regime, Iranian nuclear threat, Natanz, P 5+1, plutonium, uranium, uranium enrichment
Change: Obama keeps his word
President Obama promised that he would not sign a bad deal with Iran over its nuclear weapons capability. And for once, he has kept his word. But, writes David Horovitz,
leaving a bad deal unsigned could be even worse than signing it.
They didn’t sign a bad framework deal in
Lausanne, Switzerland, last week. They just agreed on one in principle,
and left it unsigned, allowing for multiple conflicting interpretations.
It was immediately plain that the US-led
negotiators had mislaid their moral compass, and indeed any clear sight
of their own self-interest, when they agreed to conduct the negotiations
as scheduled even as Iran’s ruthless, arrogant leader Ali Khamenei was
intoning his “Death to America” mantra, and one of his military chiefs
was declaring that Israel’s destruction is “nonnegotiable.”
What is becoming increasingly plain is the
extent to which the Obama team and their colleagues were played for
fools by the Iranians in the talks themselves.
Iran was dragged to the negotiating table by
the accumulated impact of a painstakingly constructed sanctions regime.
It was allowed to leave the table with much of its nuclear weapons
program intact, and with the promise of those sanctions being removed.
Unsurprisingly, Iran was not required to
acknowledge its nuclear weaponization efforts to date.
Unsurprisingly,
it was not required to halt its missile development program.
Unsurprisingly, sanctions removal was not conditioned on its abandonment
of terrorism, a halt to its financing and arming of Hezbollah, Hamas
and other Islamic extremist groups, or an end to its relentless
incitement against Israel. Nobody who had followed the Obama
administration’s abject handling of the negotiations prior to Lausanne
had expected anything in these areas.
But the deal is far worse than even our
relentlessly lowered expectations had given us reason to anticipate. The
Arak heavy water plant is not to be dismantled. Why not? Because this
was the best deal we could get. The Fordo enrichment facility, built
secretly into a mountain, is not to be shuttered. Why not? Because this
was the best deal we could get. Thousands of centrifuges are to be
allowed to keep on spinning. Thousands more will remain intact. For
heaven’s sake, why? Because this was the best deal we could get.
All this according to the — so far — undisputed elements of the unsigned agreement.
Less than a week after those sickening scenes
of back-slapping in Lausanne, however, more and more of the central
elements of the framework are being disputed.
And to bring this back to Israel, am I the only one who can envision such a vague, unsigned agreement with the 'Palestinians' if this administration gets its way?
Labels: Arak heavy water production plant, Barack Hussein Obama, breakout capacity, centrifuges, Fordow nuclear plant, Hamas, Hezbullah, Iran sanctions regime, Iranian nuclear threat, Natanz, P 5+1, uranium enrichment
Nuke deal signed, Obama to threaten Netanyahu later today
An
agreement has been signed between Iran and the P 5+1, and President Hussein Obama is calling Prime Minister Netanyahu later today to make sure that Netanyahu will not take matters into his own hands (see the tweet above - what else could it mean? Obama detests Netanyahu...). Except that it's not much of an agreement, and Iran is laughing all the way to the bank.
After failing to meet a March 31 deadline for the announcement of a
firm political agreement, Secretary of State John Kerry and Javad Zarif,
his Iranian counterpart, said that the sides had agreed in principle to
let Iran continue running major portions of its nuclear program.
Despite threats from Obama administration officials that the United
States would abandon talks if Iran continued to demand greater
concessions, Kerry extended his trip and conducted a series of meetings
aimed at hashing out a statement of progress—a far cry from the detailed
document officials vowed would be finalized by now.
The sides continue to disagree over Iranian demands that it be
permitted to continue key nuclear research and granted the ability to
ramp its program up to industrial capacity after a decade.
However, Zarif said many of these issues are closer to being resolved.
“None of those measures” that will move to scale back Iran’s program
“include closing any of our facilities,” Zarif said. “We will continue
enriching; we will continue research and development.”
“Our heavy water reactor will be modernized and we will continue the
Fordow facility,” Zarif said. “We will have centrifuges installed in
Fordow, but not enriching.”
...
Zarif said that once a final agreement is made, “all U.S. nuclear
related secondary sanctions will be terminated,” he said. “This, I
think, would be a major step forward.”
Zarif also revealed that Iran will be allowed to sell “enriched
uranium” in the international market place and will be “hopefully making
some money” from it.
...
The United Nations also will move to endorse the ongoing Joint Plan of
Action interim deal and terminate all of its previous security council
resolutions on Iran.
...
Zarif told
reporters late Wednesday amid extensive meetings with the United
States and other P5+1 one nations that he was “all smiles” after days of
intensive talks in which Tehran has given little ground on American
efforts to reduce the size of its nuclear program and uranium
stockpiles.
Zarif emphasized that no progress could be made in the talks due to continued United States “pressure” and lack of respect.
Iran in recent days went
back on earlier promises that it would export its stockpiles of
enriched uranium, the key component in a nuclear weapon. This
requirement continues to remain one of the key sticking points to
progress.
With the talks slated to continue through June, a majority of Americans say Congress “should be required” to approve the agreement, something the Obama administration has opposed.
Around 55 percent of those surveyed by Fox News said the United
States cannot “trust anything” Iran promises on the nuclear front.
What could go wrong?
Labels: Arak heavy water production plant, Barack Hussein Obama, Fordow nuclear plant, Iranian nuclear threat, John Kerry, Mohammad Javad Zarif, P 5+1, plutonium, uranium enrichment
WaPo gives Obama three Pinocchios for claiming that Iran's nuclear program has been halted
The Washington Post's fact checker has give President Hussein Obama three Pinocchio's (out of a possible four) for
lying in his State of the Union message by claiming that Iran's nuclear program has been halted. Three Pinocchio's mean that there is '
significant factual error and/or obvious contradictions' in the claim made.This is from the first link.
Olli Heinonen,
who headed the IAEA’s safeguards section during the 2003-2005 talks
between Iran and three European powers (United Kingdom, France and
Germany), said “it is true that 20-percent enriched uranium stocks have
decreased, but Iran is still producing uranium enriched up to 5-percent
uranium. The latter stocks have actually increased when you talk about
stocks of UF6 [uranium hexafluoride] and other chemical compounds.”
Moreover,
while there has been no installation of new centrifuges, “it appears
that the production of centrifuge components continues. Same with the
Arak reactor. No new nuclear components have been installed, but it does
not mean that the production of those came to halt.”
As Heinonen
put it, “the JPOA is just a step to create negotiation space; nothing
more. It is not a viable longer term situation. The nuclear caravan of
Iran continues and sets a step after a step another fait accompli.”
David Albright,
who heads Institute for Science and International Security, said the
president’s language was “a little bit odd.” He said that the halt in
Iran’s program from 2003 to 2005 was a more substantial suspension of
enrichment activities. (At the Senate hearing, Blinken acknowledged the
United States and its negotiating partners had abandoned United Nations
Security Council demands that Iran halt enrichment as it was clear “Iran
was not going to give up as a practical matter some very limited forms
of enrichment in the event of an agreement.”)
Moreover, Albright
said it was not correct that the 3.5-percent enriched stock had been
reduced; instead it has been converted from one form (“hexafluoride”) to
another (“oxide”), a step that he said was taken largely for cosmetic
(political) purposes. A significant portion of 20-percent enriched
material has also been retained as scrap, rather than converted into
fuel for a research reactor. A key aspect of the talks is to extend the
“break out” period under which Iran could manufacture a nuclear weapon,
but he said as a practical matter the conversion of 3.5 percent to oxide
form would only add about two weeks to the break-out period, since Iran
could reconvert it back into hexafluoride. (Here’s his report on this issue; this paragraph was updated for clarity.)
In effect, the amount of nuclear material available to Iran has gone up “about a bomb’s worth during the JPOA,” Albright said.
This
is where Obama’s speechwriters went awry. Iran’s stock of low enriched
uranium — a “nuclear material” by the IAEA’s definition — has gone up
during the negotiations, largely as a consequence of the dilution of the
near 20-percent material.
Read the whole thing.
Labels: Arak heavy water production plant, Barack Hussein Obama, enriched uranium, Iranian nuclear threat, ISIS, lies, plutonium
State Dept: Iranian construction of light water nuclear reactors allowed
The State Department says that
Iranian construction of light water nuclear reactors is allowed under both the UN resolutions and the JPOA (the interim agreement). This is from Adam Kredo.
“We are aware of the announcement and are reviewing the details,”
said the official, who was not authorized to speak on record. However,
“in general, the construction of light water nuclear reactors is not
prohibited by U.N. Security Council resolutions, nor does it violate the
JPOA,” the official said.
The United States remains committed to ensuring the “peaceful” nature
of Iran’s nuclear program, which continues to progress in part as talks
continue through July 1.
“We have been clear in saying that the purpose of the negotiations
with Iran is to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program remains exclusively
for civilian, peaceful purposes,” the official said. “The talks that we
have been engaged in for months involve a specific set of issues
relative to closing off all possible pathways to Iran acquiring a
nuclear bomb. That remains our focus.”
In an email, the Israel Project points out that the JPOA is a total failure:
Diplomatically, new infrastructure gives the Iranians more leverage in negotiations. The more they have, the more they have to bargain with. The JPOA was supposed to freeze the Iranian program to prevent them from improving their position as talks proceeded. It failed. Instead the Iranians spent the last year building up their nuclear program - and their leverage - across all areas:
* Uranium - The JPOA allows unlimited enrichment from 0% to 3.5%, which is about 60% of the effort needed to get to weapons grade levels. Every day they've got 9,000 centrifuges spilling and building up their stockpile. The only caveat is they have to convert the newly enriched gas into oxide, a process that would take them a couple of weeks to reverse.
* Plutonium - The JPOA allows unlimited work on Iran's Arak plutonium factory as long as the Iranians don't touch the reactor at the site, and unlimited work on reactor parts off-site.
* Ballistic missiles - The JPOA allows unlimited work on ballistic missiles.
And now...
* Physical infrastructure - The JPOA allows allowed unlimited construction of full-blown nuclear reactors.
Kredo points out that Iran has now admitted that it is working on ballistic missiles.
Iran also has admitted to building advanced missile sites in Syria—where
it is fighting on behalf of embattled Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad—and has been accused in recent days of also building a
clandestine nuclear facility there.
That story would be
here.
Kredo goes on to add that Rohani is just embarrassing the Obama administration.
“Rouhani went out of his way to humiliate the Obama administration,”
said one senior foreign policy hand who works on the issue. “He picked
the day when negotiations were starting again and his declaration is the
literal definition of building new nuclear technology.”
“And instead of fighting back, the White House is again rolling over
and letting themselves be slapped around,” the source said. “They’ll do
anything—anything—to get a deal with Iran.”
What could go wrong?
Labels: Arak heavy water production plant, Barack Hussein Obama, Bushehr, Iranian nuclear threat, P 5+1, plutonium, Syrian nuclear program
P 5+1 allowing Iran to do whatever it pleases with its nuclear program
This is way too long to excerpt but Omri Ceren reviews the history of the P 5+1 'negotiations' with Iran and concludes that the Obama administration has
given away the store.
Labels: Arak heavy water production plant, Barack Hussein Obama, Iranian nuclear threat, John Kerry, Mark Kirk, P 5+1, plutonium, Robert Menendez, uranium enrichment, Wendy Sherman
US secretly accuses Iran of secretly violating nuclear interim agreement
Foreign Policy reports that the United States has secretly accused Iran of secretly violating the secret interim agreement between Iran and the P 5+1... by
secretly seeking fuel for its Arak nuclear reactor.
A U.S. delegation informed a U.N. Security Council panel of experts
monitoring Iranian sanctions in recent months that Iranian procurement
agents have been increasing their efforts to illicitly obtain equipment
for the IR-40 research reactor at the Arak nuclear complex.
The American allegations, which have never before been reported, come
more than a year after the Iranian government pledged as part of an
interim agreement with the United States and other big powers to scale
back Iran’s most controversial nuclear-related activities, including the
enrichment of high-grade uranium, in exchange for billions of dollars
in sanctions relief. They stand in stark contrast to recent remarks by
Secretary of State John Kerry, who has repeatedly credited Tehran with
abiding by the terms of the November 2013 pact, which bound Tehran to
suspend some of its work at Arak. “Iran has held up its end of the
bargain,” Kerry said last month in Vienna as he announced a seven-month
extension of the timetable for big-power talks.
The allegation is also sure to add to the mounting congressional
unease over the administration’s ongoing talks with Tehran. Many
lawmakers from both parties believe that the White House is making too
many concessions to Tehran to cement a deal that it sees as central to
the president’s legacy. With the GOP slated to take over the Senate next
month, Iran hawks like Arizona Republican John McCain and Illinois
Republican Mark Kirk are already promising to push through a new package
of economic sanctions, a move that the White House believes would
scupper the delicate talks with Tehran. Both men are likely to see the
new U.N. allegations as proof that Tehran simply can’t be trusted to
abide by the terms of a future deal.
As part of its pact with the United States and other big powers, Iran
has halted some critical construction work at the IR-40 research
reactor, which is already being monitored by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), and in December provided the agency’s inspectors
with “managed” access to a heavy-water production plant at Arak that had
not been subject to IAEA monitoring. Iran is currently in discussions
with the IAEA on establishing a protocol for future monitoring of the
reactor.
The U.S. allegations were detailed in a confidential Nov. 7 report by
an eight-member panel of experts that advises a U.N. Security Council
committee that oversees international compliance with U.N. sanctions on
Iran. The report, which cites an unnamed state as the source of the
allegation, doesn’t identify the United States by name. But diplomatic
sources confirmed that the United States presented the briefing.
The confidential report, portions of which were made available to Foreign Policy,
notes that “one member state highlighted during consultations with the
panel a number of developments regarding proliferation-sensitive
procurement by Iran.” The delegation, the report continued, “informed
the panel that it had observed no recent downturn in procurement” in
recent months. It did cite a “relative decrease in centrifuge enrichment
related-procurement” in recent months. But it added that it had
detected “an increase in procurement on behalf of the IR-40 Heavy Water
Research Reactor at Arak.”
The United States indicated that foreign businesses and purchasing
agents interested in doing business with Iran have been taking advantage
of the improved diplomatic atmosphere to broker new deals with Iran. At
the same time, they say there is overwhelming evidence that Tehran
continues to transfer huge amounts of weapons to its proxies and allies,
including Syria and Iraq. In June, the U.N. panel of experts asserted
that an Iranian shipment of rockets, mortars and other arms seized in
March by the Israeli navy while en route to Sudan violated the U.N. arms
embargo. Only last week, U.S. and Iranian officials confirmed that
Iranian warplanes had launched airstrikes on Islamic State targets in
Iraq, making Tehran and Washington unofficial allies in the fight
against the Islamist group.
The President of the United States seems to believe that if you wish upon a star, your dreams will come true. There might eventually be an agreement reached between Iran and the P 5+1, but if there is, you can bet that Iran will violate it.
The Obama administration has promised over and over again that if Iran violates the interim deal, it would support sanctions. Examples are
here,
here and
here (and there are several more). But instead of taking the lead on additional sanctions, the Obama administration is trying to hide the violations and to enact more 'sanctions relief.'
What could go wrong?
Labels: Arak heavy water production plant, Barack Hussein Obama, Iran sanctions regime, Iranian nuclear threat, John Kerry, P 5+1, plutonium
Iran does whatever it pleases
A security expert has criticized the White House for
failing to challenge Iranian interpretations of the P 5+1 agreement.
Dr. Emily Landau, who heads the Arms Control and Regional
Security Program at the Institute for National Security Studies, expressed concern
over the White House’s ongoing silence in the face of Iranian attempts to
redefine the Geneva agreement after its signing.
Landau cited recent
examples of Iranian interpretations of the agreement that contradict claims put
forward by the US, including the “immediate Iranian rejection of the White House
fact sheet [on the Geneva interim accord].”
According to Iran’s
publication of its own interpretation of what was achieved in Geneva and an
announcement by Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, within days of
the agreement, Iran will continue construction work at Arak.
On Monday,
Landau noted, Iran announced that it is testing its advanced new-generation
centrifuges.
All the while, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei is
continuing to air “horrific rhetoric,” Landau said.
Well, yeah, unless the Iranian interpretation is the real one and Obama and Kerry are just lying. Where have I heard that possibility before?
Read the whole thing.
Labels: Arak heavy water production plant, Barack Hussein Obama, Iran sanctions regime, Iranian nuclear threat, John Kerry, P 5+1, Parchin
US okays Iran continuing to build Arak plutonium reactor
The Hebrew-language daily Maariv reports that even after 'downgrading' its nuclear capabilities (if that ever happens) as required by the P 5+1 agreement, Iran will be 36 days from a nuclear weapon, AND that the
United States has okayed Iran continuing to build the plutonium reactor at Arak.
Israeli experts have estimated that Tehran's schedule for nuclear
enrichment has only been delayed for up to two weeks, according to the
report, less than one week after a deal has been reached between Western
powers and the Iranian government regarding the nuclear program.
The estimate may confirm Netanyahu's condemnation of the deal - which
is an interim agreement which lifts economic sanctions for a slowing,
but not stopping, of Iran's nuclear production - as a "historic
mistake."
The concern in Israel is that Iran will wait for an international
crisis, or an internal crisis in the United States, as a prime
opportunity to drop a nuclear bomb on its enemies. The deal provides
international support for Iran's nuclear program by allowing it to
continue in any capacity - thus making the global community powerless to
stop a nuclear Iran on legal grounds.
The report states that Iran is likely to fire up their 18,000
centrifuges and produce a nuclear bomb in the event that the Islamic
Republic sees the golden opportunity to use nuclear warfare - deal or no
deal. A nuclear warhead would then be ready in as little as 36 days.
...
Meanwhile, the US has declared their support for the Iranian to
"continue building" their nuclear reactor in Arak. The support is based
on terms which prevent Tehran from producing nuclear fuel, or using the
heavy water reactor; however, these cannot be constantly monitored,
experts claim.
The report also says that Iran does not have the capability of reducing the enrichment level of its already enriched uranium.
What could go wrong?
Labels: Arak heavy water production plant, Barack Hussein Obama, enriched uranium, Iran sanctions regime, Iranian nuclear threat, P 5+1, plutonium
Why is the P 5+1 agreement with Iran like Obamacare?
Why is the P 5+1 agreement with Iran like Obamacare? Because
no one read it until after it was signed. And that's the benign reading....
Iran said it would not make "any further advances of its activities" on the Arak reactor, according to text of the agreement.
"The
capacity at the Arak site is not going to increase. It means no new
nuclear fuel will be produced and no new installations will be
installed, but construction will continue there," Zarif told parliament
in translated comments broadcast on Iran's Press TV.
But experts have said an apparent gap in the text
could allow Tehran to build components off-site to install later in the
nuclear reactor. It was not immediately clear if Zarif was referring to
this or other construction activity.
Just like when the Obama administration couldn't wait for a vote for long enough to have Congress read the bill.
'Just pass the damn bill.'
'Just sign the damn agreement.'
What could go wrong?
Labels: Arak heavy water production plant, Iran sanctions regime, Iranian nuclear threat, Obamacare, P 5+1, plutonium
The devil's in the details: Iran can keep building plutonium reactor after all
Remember how we were promised that Iran couldn't make progress on the plutonium reactor in Arak during the next six months? Well,
not quite....
Sunday's agreement
to curb Iran's nuclear program contains an apparent gap that could
allow Tehran to build components off-site to install later in a nuclear
reactor where it has promised to halt work, experts said.
They
said any impact of the omission is likely to be small if Iran follows
other undertakings in the interim accord, which is designed to restrain
Tehran's nuclear program for six months in return for limited sanctions
relief.
But the gap, which one diplomat described as a potential "loophole",
could provide a test of Iran's intentions, and demonstrates how
difficult it will be to reach a final deal to resolve Iran's nuclear
standoff with the West once and for all.
...
In the deal, Iran agreed that it will "not make any further advances
of its activities" at Arak, language that also covers its two big
uranium enrichment plants, Fordow and Natanz.
Footnotes hammered
out in the final hours of the talks set out a range of activities that
would be forbidden at the reactor. For the half year covered by the
agreement, Iran is barred from starting the reactor up, bringing fuel or
heavy water to it, testing or producing more fuel for it, or installing
any remaining components.
But no language explicitly prevents it from making components elsewhere, which could then be installed later.
Former
chief UN nuclear inspector Olli Heinonen, now at Harvard university,
said the measures were good, but could have been better: "I would have
also included the manufacturing of key components," he told Reuters in
an e-mail.
And I'm sure that Iran has only the best of intentions.... /sarc.
Oh, and by the way, the agreement only covers the Iranian nuclear facilities that the West has discovered. If Iran has any secret facilities, they're not covered by this agreement either.
What could go wrong?
Labels: Arak heavy water production plant, Iran sanctions regime, Iranian nuclear threat, P 5+1, plutonium, uranium enrichment
Breaking: Is this the deal with Iran?
There's been a leak from the nuclear negotiations in Geneva and this is apparently the
latest deal on the table.
according to the draft received by Nasim the US will accept to release $8.5-10 billion of Iranian assets.
The P5+1 also agreed with some sanction reliefs on exporting auto
parts, gold and precious metals and aircraft spare parts to Iran. A few
banks are also will be excluded form the financial sanctions to handle
certain transactions to the country.
in return Iran will accepts suspending 20% uranium enrichment for a
period of six months and agrees to neutralize its stockpile and uranium
enrichment in Iran will be limited to 5%. Iran has enough fuel to inject
in the Tehran research reactor to produce medicine for more than
800,000 cancer patient for next 6 months.
during the period Iran will refrain from production, installation and
activation of new centrifuges and construction activities in Arak
reactor will be suspended.
Iran will provide IAEI access to its nuclear facilities beyond
Nuclear Proliferation Safeguards and is committed to resolve the
remaining issues in the talks with the IAEA.
The source who spoke to Nasim on condition
of anonymity, the prolongation of the talks is due to the hard debates
for choosing proper phrases of “suspending enrichment” and “pacing Arak
progress”. the two phrases are point of most important differences
between Iran and two member of the P5+1 to finalize the blueprint of the
draft.
According to the source Iran trying to include
phrases which endorse Iran’s right of enrichment ‘in a way, either
explicit or implicit’
There's a lot that's wrong with this deal. Perhaps the biggest thing that's wrong is that it will open up the sanctions regime while not ending Iran's nuclear enrichment. Arak is the plutonium reactor, and not enough attention is being paid to it. And what happens if after all that money is released, Iran violates the deal?
Labels: Arak heavy water production plant, Iran sanctions regime, Iranian nuclear threat, P 5+1, plutonium, uranium enrichment
Mixed signals
Politico concludes that
Israel has plenty to complain about Obama's and Kerry's behavior with respect to the negotiations with Iran.
These are weighty concerns and serious accusations. They deserve a
full accounting. It is shameful to suggest that anyone who raises these
questions prefers war to diplomacy. That is especially because each of
these charges appears to have merit.
One would be hard-pressed, for example, to find a senior administration official saying that securing Iran’s full implementation
of U.N. Security Council resolutions remains the goal of these
negotiations, let alone an American “red line.” Instead, officials have
termed the pursuit of suspension a “maximalist” position and prefer to
cite the president’s commitment to prevent Iran from developing a
nuclear weapon, a far looser formulation that could allow Iran a
breakout capacity. Rejecting the Iranians’ claim to a “right to enrich,”
as the administration apparently did in Geneva, is important, but it is
not the same as demanding that they suspend enrichment.
In terms
of the details of the “first step” agreement, administration officials
argue that early sanctions relief for Iran will be marginal and limited,
and that the core oil and banking sanctions will remain in place until a
comprehensive accord is reached. This, however, is a promise that no
administration can guarantee since sanctions are only as strong as their
weakest link. No one can predict how other countries, some greedy for
trade with Iran, will react to the imagery of a “first step” deal, but
it is not fanciful to suggest that the sanctions regime may begin to
erode once the interim agreement is reached. That underscores the wisdom
of demanding the maximum possible concessions in the “first step”—i.e.,
a stoppage at Arak—and of countering the image of fraying sanctions by
giving Iran tangible evidence that they will become tighter and more
painful.
As for whether Israel was kept in the dark about Geneva,
an inconsistency in Kerry’s comments suggests there is something to it.
After all, he and other officials have said that Israeli leaders have
been continually and fully briefed and that Israel’s critiques
were unwarranted, since the Israelis didn’t know the details of what
actually was on the table in the talks. Both statements cannot be true.
Moreover, it is patently disingenuous to ask Israel or domestic
detractors of a “first step” deal to withhold their criticism until
after the agreement is signed, which is the administration’s position,
since there would then be zero chance to affect an outcome already
reached.
It didn’t help matters that Washington and Jerusalem had a parallel
crisis of confidence on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process amid the
Iran imbroglio. Kerry—who has justly earned praise for his persistence
and creativity in pursuing this Sisyphean diplomacy—inexplicably lost
his cool when Israel announced construction approval for 1,900 new
apartments in disputed territory, itself a political response to
Palestinian jubilation at Israel’s release from prison of 26 hardened
terrorists. One doesn’t have to support Israeli settlement policy to
note that 90 percent of those apartments are to be built either in
existing Jewish neighborhoods within Israel’s capital, or on land on the
“Israeli side” of the West Bank security barrier that is likely to end
up in Israel’s control in any agreement.
Kerry’s surprisingly ferocious reaction was to lump all
construction together and denounce it, publicly question Israel’s
commitment to peace, rhetorically ask whether Israel prefers a third
intifada and wonder aloud whether Israel will ever get its troops out of
the West Bank—troops that have worked with Palestinian security forces
to fight terrorism and prevent the spread of Hamas influence. If the
Obama administration wanted to raise the blood pressure of even the
least paranoid Israelis, the combination of the rush to a deal in Geneva
and an attack on Israel’s peacemaking credentials was a sure way to do
it.
You're not being paranoid when they really are after you. Israel is not being paranoid.
Read the whole thing.
Labels: Arak heavy water production plant, Binyamin Netanyahu, Iran sanctions regime, Iranian nuclear threat, John Kerry, Judea and Samaria construction, Palestinian terrorists, uranium enrichment
If this reactor goes online, Iran will be immune to strikes
This is from a daily mailing called the Daily Tip that I receive from the Israel Project.
A heavy-water plutonium reactor that Iran has committed to
bringing online would become "invulnerable to military attack" once
Iranian scientists activated it, according to analysis conveyed today by TIME, inasmuch as any such attack would release radioactivity that might be "catastrophic." Work toward activating the reactor, which is part of the Arak facility that also includes a heavy water production plant, has been described as
part of Iran's "Plan B" for developing a nuclear weapon. Material
produced by the reactor could be used to make a plutonium-based bomb,
alongside the uranium-based bomb that the international community fears
Iran is seeking to construct with material produced via enrichment
facilities. Former IAEA Deputy Director Dr. Olli Heinonen, speaking Monday on
a conference call organized by The Israel Project, noted that Iran's
construction at Arak "appears to be an alternative, at least for a rainy
day, to have fissionable material, which could be, for example used for
nuclear weapons." There are also fears, according to TIME,
that Iran will attempt to surreptitiously activate the reactor under the
ruse of conducting a test run, avoiding Western intervention. In May,
Iranian officials filed paperwork with the U.N.’s nuclear watchdog to
conduct a test run . U.S. lawmakers have demanded that
Iran halt work on the reactor as a condition for lifting sanctions, but
Iran has thus far shown no willingness to do so. Iranian President
Hassan Rouhani in fact recently boasted that
a diplomatic charm offensive conducted by his government had left
Tehran "consolidating its nuclear rights step by step, and removing
hurdles from the path of the nation's progress."
This is from the first link.
Because it is not yet up and running, the Arak heavy-water reactor
has remained in the background of the nuclear controversy. But it looms
larger every day. The reason: once Arak goes online, the option of
destroying Iran’s nuclear program with air strikes becomes moot. The
reactor is essentially invulnerable to military attack, because bombing
one risks a catastrophic release of radioactivity. In the words of
Israel’s last chief of military intelligence, Amos Yadlin, who piloted
one of the F-16A’s that cratered Iraq’s Osirak heavy-water reactor in
1981 before it was due to become operational: “Whoever considers
attacking an active reactor is willing to invite another Chernobyl, and
no one wants to do that.”
That reality is the reason why some experts are drawing attention to a
peculiar notice filed by Iran’s nuclear agency to the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in May. Iran told the U.N. agency
that, as it readies the Arak plant for operation, it intends to do a
practice run: instead of inserting real fuel rods filled with uranium
into the reactor’s core, where nuclear fission occurs, they would insert
inert “dummy” fuel rods. And instead of pumping heavy water into the
reactor to moderate the nuclear reaction and absorb the thermal energy
being released, Iran said it plans to use “light water,” just ordinary H2O.
The plan mystifies experts, who take particular issue with testing
the system using light water. The facility would be contaminated by
ordinary H2O, which if mixed with heavy water would render the latter unusable, because in order to work heavy water must be 99.75% pure.
“Anything above that is hard to achieve and testing the system with light water would leave a residual atmosphere of H2O
that would degrade the heavy water when it is added,” writes one U.S.
specialist of heavy-water reactors, who has worked with the Institute
for Science and International Security (ISIS), a Washington, D.C.–based
think tank, and who shared his assessment on condition he not be
identified further. In other words, rather than save time, using
ordinary water would delay the project for the weeks required to clean
the system thoroughly enough to assure no trace of H2O remained; it wouldn’t take much to dilute the heavy water below 99.75%.
Iran’s stated intentions are unlikely enough that an Israeli nuclear
specialist suggests that they might be a ruse. Ephraim Asculai, a
scientist retired from the Israel Atomic Energy Commission, warns that
Iran may have no intention of carrying out a dry run at all. It may be a
cover story, he posits, for a plan to rush the installation of live
fuel rods and heavy water instead — essentially getting the Arak
facility “hot” before the outside world expects, at which point it
becomes invulnerable to military attack. There might then be no way to
stop Iran’s nuclear program short of invasion.
“At that point, they are in the ‘zone of immunity’ as it’s called,” says Asculai, who has also worked at ISIS; he is currently a senior research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies, a think tank at Tel Aviv University.
Labels: Arak heavy water production plant, Iranian nuclear threat, Israeli attack on Iran, plutonium
Iran may have weapons grade plutonium by next summer
The bad news is that US and European officials believe that Iran will be able to produce weapons grade plutonium by next summer. The good news is that the Arak reactor, where it will be produced, is
easier to attack than the uranium enrichment facilities like Qom and Natanz.
In recent months, U.S. and European officials say, the Tehran regime
has made significant advances on the construction of a heavy water
reactor in the northwestern city of Arak. A reactor like the one under
construction is capable of using the uranium fuel to produce 40
megawatts of power. Spent fuel from it contains plutonium—which, like
enriched uranium, can serve as the raw material for an explosive device.
India and Pakistan have built plutonium-based bombs, as has North
Korea.
The Arak facility, when completed,
will be capable of producing two nuclear bombs' worth of plutonium a
year, said U.S. and U.N. officials.
Iran has notified the International
Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N.'s nuclear watchdog, that it plans to make
the reactor operational by the second half of 2014 and could begin
testing it later this year.
The IAEA has been monitoring Arak since its construction began. But
following Iran's latest timeline, the site's importance has vastly shot
up for Washington and Brussels, said U.S. and European officials. "It
really crept up on us," said an official based at the IAEA's Vienna
headquarters.
...
Israel has twice destroyed reactors in neighboring Middle East
countries before they could produce plutonium, believing they were part
of covert nuclear-weapons programs. The Arak plant is viewed as a much
easier facility for the Israeli military to strike than Iran's
enrichment facilities in the cities of Natanz and Qom.
"There's no question that the reactor
and its heavy water are more vulnerable targets than the enrichment
plants," said Gary Samore, who served as President Barack Obama's top
adviser on nuclear issues during his first term. "This could be another
factor in Netanyahu's calculations in deciding how long to wait before
launching military operations."
Any Israeli strike on the reactor
complex, said current and former U.S. officials, would likely have to
take place before Tehran introduces nuclear materials into the facility,
because of the potential for a vast environmental disaster a strike
could cause.
The Obama administration continues to pretend that nothing is happening in Iran, and that they will be able to 'engage' with the 'moderate' Rohani. That most certainly does not appear to be the case right now.
Labels: Arak heavy water production plant, Iranian nuclear threat, Israeli attack on Iran
Iraq warns Israel: This is not the way to Iran
With Iran within a year of bringing a
plutonium-based nuclear reactor online - in addition to its efforts to use uranium to develop nuclear weapons - Iraq is warning Israel that
the road to Iran does not pass through Iraqi airspace.
"The (Americans) have assured us that they will never violate Iraqi
airspace or Iraqi sovereignty by using our airspace to attack any of our
neighbors," [Hussein al-] Shahristani [Iraq's deputy prime minister responsible for energy affairs] told AFP.
"We have also warned Israel that if they violate Iraqi airspace, they will have to bear the consequences," he added.
Shahrishtani
said that Iraq, which does not have diplomatic relations with Israel,
passed the warning to the Jewish state through a third country. He
failed to elaborate on what the Iraqi response to an Israeli incursion
of its airspace would be, saying, "Obviously, Iraq wouldn't be
disclosing its reaction, to allow Israel to take that into account."
The
comments marked the first instance in which Iraq has issued a public
warning to Israel over a potential attack against Iran. Iraqi Prime
Minister Nuri al-Maliki is a Shi'ite who has increased economic ties and
cooperation with Iran in recent years.
The New York Times reported in August that Iraq had been helping Iran skirt financial sanctions imposed because of its nuclear program.
4,000 American soldiers died so that Iraq could have solidarity with Iran, and the United States could meekly promise never to violate Iraqi airspace to attack its enemies. Aren't you glad Bush isn't President anymore? Oh wait... it wasn't Bush who gave up all the US gains in Iraq, was it?
Labels: Arak heavy water production plant, Barack Hussein Obama, George W. Bush, Iranian nuclear threat, Iraq, Israeli attack on Iran
Iran's Plan B for nuclear weapons exposed
London's Daily Telegraph published the photo above, which proves that Iran has a Plan B to obtain a nuclear weapon. The photo, which shows vapor coming out of Iran's Arak heavy water production plant, shows that Iran is now
operating a plant that can produce plutonium, which is exactly how its ally North Korea is trying to develop
nuclear weapons.
Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency have been unable to
visit the facility since August 2011 and Iran has refused repeated requests
for information about the site, which is 150 miles south-west of the
capital, Tehran.
Western governments and the IAEA have held information about activity at Arak
for some time.
But today’s exclusive images are the first to put evidence of that activity
into the public domain.
The details of Iran’s plutonium programme emerged as the world’s leading
nations resumed talks with Tehran aimed at allaying fears over the country’s
nuclear ambitions.
The new images also show details of the Fordow complex, which is concealed
hundreds of feet beneath a mountain near the holy city of Qom. At talks in
Kazakhstan yesterday, world leaders offered to relax sanctions on Iran in
exchange for concessions over Fordow, which is heavily protected from aerial
attack.
...
Previously, international talks on Iran’s nuclear programme have focused on
the Islamic Republic’s attempts to enrich uranium at plants including
Fordow.
But the new images of Arak highlight the progress Iran has made on facilities
that could allow it to produce plutonium, potentially giving the country a
second option in developing a nuclear weapon.
...
Other images of the area around Arak show that numerous anti-aircraft missile
and artillery sites protect the plant, more than are deployed around any
other known nuclear site in the country.
The missile defences are most heavily concentrated to the west of the plant,
which would be the most direct line of approach for any aircraft delivering
a long-range strike from Israel.
The Arak complex has two parts: the heavy-water plant and a nuclear reactor.
Unlike the heavy-water plant, the reactor has been opened to examination by
inspectors from the IAEA. During a visit earlier this month, the inspectors
noted that cooling and “moderator circuit” pipes at the reactor were “almost
complete”.
Let's go to the videotape.
Read the whole thing.
There's another possibility: That Arak is meant to replace or back-up Fordow, assuming that one gives credibility to reports last month about an
explosion in Fordow.
Labels: Arak heavy water production plant, Fordow nuclear plant, Iranian nuclear threat, North Korea, plutonium, uranium enrichment