I left the US 22 years ago, and I really no longer watch television at all, so this was enlightening to me. How many of you are familiar with the Costanza doctrine from the popular television hit Seinfeld?
Let's go to the videotape (Hat Tip: Shy Guy).
So what does the Costanza doctrine have to do with Israel and the Middle East? Adam Turner suggests that the Obama administration should adopt the Costanza doctrine as its Middle East policy.
The Middle East is aflame. In Egypt, the undemocratic, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic Muslim Brotherhood regime was ousted, and this has resulted in hundreds of deaths and mobs of Egyptians protesting and rioting in the streets. In Syria, a brutal civil war continues, with Sunni Islamists (including al-Qaeda groups) fighting Shiite Islamists (including terror giant Hezbollah) with over a 100,000 civilian casualties so far, and the documented use of chemical weapons. In Libya, the nation where a U.S. ambassador was killed just one year ago, there has been a wave of slayings of politicians and government officials, and a pro-America regime is barely able to control the country. In Tunisia, non-Islamist secular politicians are being assassinated, while the ruling Ennhada party continues to try to implement its Islamist agenda. In Turkey, protests by non-Islamists are brutally being crushed by the Erdogan's Islamist regime, while members of the Turkish press continue to be imprisoned at record rates for criticizing the government.
Yet, the Obama Administration, led by Secretary of State John Kerry, has decided to focus its attention on the Palestinian Arab -- Israeli "Crisis." The U.S. apparently pressured the Israeli government to release 104 Palestinian terrorists -- some of whom have American blood on their hands -- for the mere privilege of speaking to the Palestinian Authority about a future "peace." This despite the fact that the PA controls only part of "Palestine," has broken its prior agreements time and time again, and has shown no real interest in curbing PA-sponsored incitement against Israel, Jews, Christians, and the West. The administration clearly still believes that the Palestinian Arab-Israeli "Crisis" is at the center of all problems in the Middle East, even though post-"Arab Spring" few other knowledgeable observers subscribe to this largely discredited theory.
Unfortunately, this is nothing new. We have now had five years of an administration whose defective instincts have resulted in consistently flawed U.S. foreign policy behavior.
I do not believe we can afford another three more years of this. President Obama and his team need to develop a new approach for dealing with foreign policy matters.
My humble suggestion is as follows -- it is time for President Obama, and his administration, to adopt the Costanza Doctrine. It comes from the television comedy show Seinfeld. The salient principle of the Costanza Doctrine is the statement -- "(i)f every instinct you have is wrong, then the opposite would have to be right."
Some of you may recall the discussions in March 2011 about a 'new' doctrine of humanitarian intervention called Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which was used to justify NATO intervention in Libya. Michael Ignatieff argues that the current standoff over big power intervention in Syria shows that the doctrine is dead, although one of the causes of that death is the West's unwillingness to stand behind it.
At the end of the Cold War in 1989, we told ourselves history had a libretto—a story about liberty—set to a happy tune. Once regimes like Russia and China allowed market reforms, political reforms would follow, since peoples with economic freedom were bound to demand democracy too. The people have done so repeatedly since 1989 and both regimes have shut them down.
Our idea that history had a libretto of freedom led the West to misread Russia and China’s strategic intentions. We brushed aside signs that they were refusing to embrace our view of the world. Russia resisted NATO expansion to its border and refused to give the alliance a green light over Kosovo, but we thought their need for foreign capital would soften their intransigence over time. Chinese leaders dug in when asked to devalue their currency and they continued to imprison dissidents. But we assumed they would cooperate with us on other issues because they sought integration into the global economy. For too long we believed they were behind us on the march to freedom but were heading in the same direction.
Syria marks the end of these illusions and the post-Cold War period that went with them. A vast swathe of the globe, from the Russian border to the Pacific, including the tributary states of the Russian near-abroad, is now in the hands of venal, ruthless, deeply corrupt, single-party elites. These elites—Russian and Chinese—will draw closer together, as they understand that they have made the same strategic choice. Both are using capitalism to consolidate political despotism. They both see the world as a battle between elites like themselves with unlimited power and Western elites whose power is limited by democratic liberty.
When they look at the world this way, the Russian and Chinese regimes mock our view of history. They believe history is on their side. The economic crisis now entering its fifth year confirms their view that democracies are divided, incompetent, venal, hypocritical, and above all, weak. As Putin himself said in a speech in Moscow on July 9, our economic malaise is “weakening the dominant role of the so-called historical West.” Where the US and the West intervene, as in Iraq or Afghanistan, and try to impose what Putin called “missile-bomb diplomacy” we do not stay the course, and where we fail to back words with actions, as in Syria, we confirm the Russian and Chinese instinct that we are weak.
Syria tells us that the era of humanitarian intervention, “responsibility to protect,” is over, because it assumed a historical progression that has turned out to be false. The idea that the “international community” should shoulder together the responsibility to protect people from murderous regimes made sense only on the assumption that we all wanted people to live in tolerably decent ones. Neither Russia nor China takes this view. They are perfectly content with a world of Mugabes and Assads and they suspect, with more than just cynicism, that the West, for all its protestations, is too. For we are tired and worried about our economies back home and responsibility for other people’s freedom has turned out to be a costly and dirty business.
The anatomy of a Brotherhood election march is easy to understand. Candidates meet residents and shake hundreds of hands. Volunteers pass out flyers and sign up supporters. But to do this on a national level and cover Egypt's more than 40 million eligible voters requires thousands of organizers, tens of thousands of members and supporters, and considerable funding. Almost no parties -- perhaps save the hardline Salafi ones -- have these kinds of resources, and, for their part, many Salafis, after decades of shunning democratic elections as un-Islamic, are still uncomfortable with election marches. In Ard al-Liwa, the Brotherhood must have had around 30 designated "coordinators" -- all volunteers -- each of whom had a laminated FJP card hanging around their neck. So, when people ask why liberal and leftist parties don't do something similar, it comes down, at least in part, numbers. It is unclear how effective these marches are. If nothing else, they offer residents a show of strength -- everybody likes a winner -- and reinforce the Brotherhood's street presence. The Brotherhood did this sort of thing for decades during Egypt's long, dark period of consistently rigged elections. Sometimes the Brotherhood would still manage to win seats; sometimes they wouldn't. But, in trying to win despite the odds, they were able to develop an organizational and electoral machinery few here could hope to challenge. Whether that machinery works as intended is something Egyptians -- and everyone else watching Egypt's landmark elections -- are about to find out.
In Foreign Policy Lauren Bohn explains how the Brotherhood became part of the Facebook (or Twitter) revolution. (h/t Tweet from Draddee)
Other critics point to worrying discrepancies and mismatched opaque strings of policy that blur just what those interests really are. Perhaps most notable is the Brotherhood's stance toward women and Copts (the minority Christian population that makes up 5-10 percent of Egyptian society) in leadership roles. @Ikhwanweb recently tweeted, to much confusion, that the Brotherhood would accept and be open to nominating a Copt or female prime minister "if it was necessary." Just an hour before they tweeted they would "accept a woman, whether Muslim or Copt, if she's elected by the people to be president." "The president is different than the Prime Minister position," Malky clarifies in a fit of mental calisthenics over Twitter. "The Muslim Brotherhood is OK with woman or copt as prez IF elected by the people although, we won't nominate either on a FJP ticket. Nominating is one thing and accepting if elected by majority or another party ticket is another," Malky direct-messages in a split-second. "Fahemtee? LOL." (Do you understand?) That's the thing. Not many do. Such confusion in laying out a complicated political program in 140-character snippets has led many tweeps to chide the group for not only failing to put forth a unified stance but instead producing a disingenuous Ikhwanonline ‘lite' version for a Western audience.
Worries about the fate of Christians in the Middle East are often thrust uncomfortably into the conflict between the West and the Muslim world; in the American presidential campaign, Newt Gingrich regularly warns of an “anti-Christian Spring,” as he did in a Republican debate last weekend. But focusing on that conflict, and the bigotries that beset it, misses the nuances of what Christians represent to the region, and the lessons that their history in other times of tumult might offer the future. In the 19th century, they ushered in a renaissance of Arab culture. Just generations ago, they helped articulate the ideologies that seized the Arab world’s imagination. The fate of Arab Christians today will help define the unresolved struggle within the Arab world about its own identity — how universal, fair, just and equal its societies turn out to be.
Throughout Iraq, churches canceled or toned down Christmas observances this year, both in response to threats of violence and in honor of the nearly 60 Christians killed in October, when militants stormed a Syrian Catholic church and blew themselves up. Since the massacre, more than 1,000 Christian families have fled Baghdad for the Kurdistan region in northern Iraq, with others going to Jordan or Syria or Turkey. Though the exact size of Iraq’s Christian population is unclear, by some estimates it has fallen to about 500,000 from a high of 1.4 million before the American-led invasion of 2003. Iraq’s total population is about 30 million.
Maybe it's easier to acknowledge the numbers, because in this case the flight of the Christians can be blamed on America. But if nearly two thirds of Iraq''s Christians fled in seven years, what "nuance" would tell us more about their role in Arab history than about the inhospitability of Islamic regimes to religious minorities? Why is this nuance even important? In fact as CAMERA notes, the only country in the Middle East with a growing Christian population is Israel. Looking for nuance where there is none is simply a way of ignoring the obvious.
Militia leaders based in Zintan, a western mountain town and stronghold of resistance to Colonel Qaddafi’s regime, said they captured Seif al-Islam early Saturday in the southwestern desert near Awbari, along with a small entourage. But while transitional government leaders in the capital, Tripoli, promised that Mr. Qaddafi would be closely guarded and turned over to the International Criminal Court to be tried on war crimes charges, leaders in Zintan insisted that they would not hand him over until a formal national government was formed — a process that is in the works but at least a day or two away. Such insistence on factional power is at the heart of international concerns about Libya’s future. And after Colonel Qaddafi’s capture and killing at the hands of militiamen a month ago, his son’s case will be an important test of Libya’s commitment to the rule of law.
Yes it will be an important test in terms of telling us what sort of government will be in charge. But does it really matter how the new rulers of Libya succeed? Regardless of their record so far and the Islamist orientation of the interim government, the UN General Assembly has voted to reinstate Libya to the Human Rights Council apparently because Qaddafi is now gone.
The General Assembly suspended Libya from the U.N.'s top human rights body on March 1 as part of the international effort to halt Moammar Gadhafi's violent crackdown on protesters. It accused Gadhafi's regime of committing "gross and systematic violations of human rights." With Gadhafi's death and a new interim Libyan government in place, the assembly adopted a resolution by a vote of 123-4 with six abstentions to restore Libya's rights on the council. The four countries voting "no" were Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Ecuador. Before the vote, Libya's deputy U.N. ambassador Ibrahim Dabbashi told the 193-member world body that the "new Libya" deserved to return to full membership on the Geneva-based council after Gadhafi's 42-year rule which saw massive violations of human rights.
It's interesting that the New York Times talks about a test of Libya's interim government. There's a test that the New York Times failed in year's past: acknowledging that Saif al-Islam was part of his father's regime. In 2007 the New York Times, in an embarrassingly flattering profile of Saif al-Islam called him "part scholar, part monk, part model, part policy wonk;" a description belied by his proclamation a few months ago that his family would fight to the last drop of blood. If that wasn't bad enough, the New York Times allowed the younger Qaddafi to bear false witness on behalf of Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi on its op-ed page. The New York Times was not alone in glamorizing the tyrant's son; Esquire named him one of the world's most influential people in 2008.
Covering for tyrants - past and present - simply strengthens them.
4) 1948 in "real" time
I don't know who's behind it but there's a fascinating new Twitter account, 1948war. It's a regular update of the events 64 years ago that led to Israel's War of Independence. There was one item last week that caught my eye.
UN GA calls on orgs not to assist Jewish immigration to Palestine, by a vote of 46-0. Russia abstained. [Nov. 17, 1947]
With "settlements" now regarded by the UN and many others as the primary obstacle to peace, it's fascinating to be reminded that it wasn't what Jews did or didn't do that causes Arab hatred; it's that they were in the Middle East at all.
For the record, al-Megrahi is still alive, and two weeks ago, the United States began proceedings to extradite him. The new Libyan government has said that it has no interest in what happens to al-Megrahi.
Hamas has largely maintained the fragile cease-fire that went into effect after Israel ended its three-week military offensive in Gaza in early 2009. The smaller factions in Gaza are less committed, but are under pressure from Hamas to comply.
Earlier we learn:
The Israeli military fired on what it said was a terrorist squad in southern Gaza preparing to fire rockets at Israel on Sunday afternoon. Gaza security officials said one Palestinian militant was killed and another was seriously wounded. Both, it said, were members of the armed wing of the leftist Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
Notice the qualification of the Israeli claim, "what it said." But Gaza security officials essentially confirm the Israeli account with "armed wing." The care the reporters take to make sure that Israeli statements are properly qualified but will throw in the "Hamas mostly keeping ceasefire" with no authority but their own. PM Netanyahu for his part, insists that there is no ceasefire.
In Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said he was not seeking an escalation, but emphasized that anyone trying to attack Israel was taking their life in their hands. “There is no cease-fire,” Mr. Netanyahu said Sunday, adding that the military “protects the residents of the south and wipes out the rocket launchers.” “I promise that the other side will pay an even heavier price than it has up to now, until it stops firing,” he warned.
In the past few days, Israeli defense officials have been speaking in terms of cost: yes, it’s heartbreaking that an Israeli was killed, but the Islamic Jihad paid a heavy price, with 10 of its militants killed, said Ehud Barak. “They’re paying a much heavier price in Gaza,” says his deputy Matan Vilnai. Israel seems to need to change the equation regarding rocket violence: every rocket fired by a Palestinian group at Israel will cost them severely in terms of blood and damaged infrastructure. It’s not enough to chase rocket squads all day and all night [although this should obviously still be done]. Deterrence must be restored, and this can’t be done with defense, which costs a lot more than offense. In a climate of serious defense budget cuts, expect the IDF to drop heavier bombs, and drop some heavier terror chiefs. Also, all talk of a major ground offensive to take down Hamas in Gaza is now passe.
2) Turning himself in?
The Qaddafi family is apparently thinking of suing NATO. At the same time "part scholar, part monk, part model, part policy wonk" and international fugitive Saif al-Islam Qaddafi has apparently contacted the International Criminal Court about turning himself in.
“Through intermediaries, we have informal contact with Seif,” Mr. Moreno-Ocampo said. “He said he is innocent and he will prove to the judges he is innocent,” he said in a brief interview with Reuters. “And then he is more concerned about what will happen after, if he is considered innocent by the court.” “We are making no deal, though we have a case against him,” Mr. Moreno-Ocampo added. “But we are explaining the legal system and his right to defend himself.”
Though he maintains his innocence, if Saif turns himself in, it should make that lawsuit a lot more difficult to succeed.
Perhaps the most significant surprise for liberal forces here and around the region was the abrupt collapse of the party that until recently had been their standard-bearer and Ennahda’s principal rival, the Progressive Democratic Party, or P.D.P. While Ennahda had emphasized its commitment to Western-style individual rights and pledged to collaborate with secularists, the P.D.P. had concluded its campaign with blistering accusations that Ennahda was manipulating voters into supporting a hidden theocratic agenda. The attacks apparently angered voters, because the two liberal parties that succeeded had chosen to say only nice things about Ennahda. The Congress for the Republic and the ideologically similar Democratic Forum for Labor and Liberties, known here by the Arabic shorthand Ettakatol, are now in talks to form a unity government.
Who will they have to work with in the mean time? The Congress for the Republic (CPR) won 30 seats and the Ettakatol won 21 seats. (I cannot resist the temptation to remark that when the Islamists are through with it, Tunisia will definitely need CPR!) These are leftist parties and Ennahda’s coalition partners.What does this tell us? On social issues, the Islamists will have to be careful but they can find more common ground with the leftists on economic and foreign policy issues. By building the power of the state and weakening the business sector—which the leftists want—Ennahda lays the basis for its future domination of the society through controlling a strong state.On foreign policy, the left shares the Islamists’ desire to take a tougher line toward the West and against Israel. In the shorter run, they will not want to antagonize Europe or the United States. But this lays a foundation for a longer-term turn of public opinion against the West and toward other Islamist states. As we saw in Turkey, a stealth Islamist government can turn around public opinion with surprising speed using patriotism and religious fervor.
Some Tunisians -- mainly among the better off urban middle-class -- don't believe Ennahda's professed moderation. A series of videos released online ahead of the election (and paid for by wealthy business interests) imagines a Tunisia without tourists, where women are made to wear the veil and are scared out of the workplace, should Islamists take power. Some point to Iran's first post-revolutionary elections back in 1980 and Ayatollah Khomenei's promise that in the Islamic Republic the Majlis would not be a rubber-stamp parliament.
The "wealthy business interests" was unnecessary, but it shows that those most likely to help the Tunisian economy - real liberals - remain suspicious of the Islamists.
Video: Gadhafi is dead; UPDATE Gadhafi was executed
Former Libyan leader Muammar Gadhafi was killed today near his hometown of Sirte, Libya. Israel Radio reported two different versions of how he died - one of which says that he was captured alive and subsequently killed by Libyan troops. Hmmm.
Here's footage from al-Jazeera of Gadhafi's body being dragged through the streets of Serte (should we call it a Gadhafi swarm?). Here's what al-Jazeera has to say about it:
Al Jazeera has acquired exclusive footage of the body of Muammar Gaddafi after he was killed in his hometown, Sirte.
Abdul Hafiz Ghoga, vice chairman of Libya's National Transitional Council, confirmed that the ousted leader had been killed on October 20, 2011 near Sirte.
"We announce to the world that Muammar Gaddafi has been killed at the hands of the revolutionaries," Ghoga told a news conference in Benghazi.
The news came shortly after the NTC captured Sirte after weeks of fighting.
Let's go to the videotape.
I heard a statement from a Pan Am 103 widow that said that justice has been served. I disagree. Justice would have been served had he died a slow and painful death. His justice will come elsewhere.
UPDATE 7:30 PM
The version that Gadhafi was captured alive and executed is apparently correct. Here's video that shows him being captured alive.
You will recall the story of David Gerbi, the Libyan-born Italian Jew who so loved his homeland that in the aftermath of Gadhafi's fall he wanted to return to Libya and re-establish the Jewish community there.
Gerbi may love Libya, but Libya - or at least its current residents - do not love him or any other Jew. And so, after an angry protest calling for his deportation, Gerbi will voluntarily return to Italy.
A few hundred angry protesters gathered in central Tripoli on the eve of Yom Kippur on Friday, calling for the deportation of a Libyan Jew who has been trying to reopen a synagogue sealed since ousted Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi expelled the country’s Jewish community in 1967.
The protesters carried signs reading, “There is no place for the Jews in Libya,” and “We don’t have a place for Zionism.”
The crowds tried to storm Italian Libyan Jewish psychoanalyst David Gerbi’s Corinthia Hotel in central Tripoli. There was also a demonstration in Benghazi in the east of the country.
According to Gerbi, the crowd wanted to forcibly remove him from the hotel.
“They were impeded by hotel and Libyan security and government officials,” he said.
Gerbi said that National Security Adviser Abdel Karim Bazama, rebel leader Mustafa Saghezli, Interior Minister Ahmed Dharat and Justice Minister Muhammad Allaghi were among the government officials present at the hotel.
“The Tripoli crowd dispersed after Allaghi warned that any use of force on the part of the protesters would immediately result in strong international condemnation,” Gerbi said.
“He [Allaghi] reassured them the ‘problem’ would be resolved within 48 hours.”
Gerbi (at least says he) blames Gadhafi for his former countrymen's anti-Semitism.
“I want to contribute to, not obstruct, the building of a new democratic and pluralistic Libya. It is sad and absurd that my mere presence in Libya, should set off so much hostility and I regret this,” Gerbi said.
“However,” he continued, “what happened reveals the extent of Gaddafi’s anti-Semitic conditioning of an entire generation, those in their forties and fifties. Forty-two years of lies, of hate propaganda falsely accusing Jews of having been paid off to abandon the country in 1967, of having robbed Palestinians of their homes and of planning to colonize Libya.”
“Fortunately, the older generation still recalls warm friendships with former Jewish neighbors,” Gerbi said, “and I will continue to work to restore a 2,300-year-old coexistence and advocate active roles in the NTC for Libyan Jews, for the Libyan Amazigh population, for women and all ethnic and religious minorities.”
On Sunday, after a personal meeting with Libyan and Italian diplomatic representatives, he agreed to return to Rome on Tuesday by military plane in order to ease the tension.
Gerbi said the Italian ambassador in Tripoli claimed that the controversy over his actions was strengthening the extremist wing of Islam in the current internal war in Libya between extremist and more moderate, liberal Muslim forces.
Gerbi had been told he was “complicating matters,” that “the time is not ripe for such actions” and that his security was endangered. In addition, his attempt to clean out the garbage littering the synagogue was defined as “breaking into an archaeological site without permission,” for which he received a police summons.
Whether it's Gadhafi's or Mubarak's or Assad's or Ben Ali's doing, the fact remains that most of the people of Libya and Egypt and Syria and Tunisia are deeply anti-Semitic, and there is little or no prospect of their changing anytime soon. In some respects, Jews and Israel might have been better off with the former, strongman rulers, who would keep the anti-Semitic impulses at least somewhat in check. The Arab spring is not for us.
Americans of Libyan descent: Pro-Sharia, anti-Israel
This video ought to upset both the Americans and the Israelis. Americans of Libyan descent talk about the Libyan uprising. Guess what: They support Sharia law and hate Israel.
Let's go to the videotape.
A few comments:
Obviously, there was no 'Palestinian state that was occupied by Britain' in 1948.
Israel did not bring in any mercenaries at the beginning of the Libyan uprising.
Alex Jofee writes that we may yet long for the days when Muammar Gadhafi was in power in Libya.
Qaddafi was, to the end, the picture of a cartoon villain, with the wild hair, the flamboyant uniforms, the Amazonian guards, and the endless monologues. The astonishing thing was that this very model of a megalomaniacal, narcissistic tin-pot dictator was regarded as anything but. Such are the power of oil, the threat of terrorism, the marvel of theatricality, and the fascination of educated Westerners with the strange ways of the East.
With his regime all but gone, hopes are running high that the new government will create a democratic Libya. There have been reports of Libyan Jewish businessmen sounding out the rebels about recognizing Israel. But the prominent role of Islamists in the rebellion is not a promising sign, and there is little evidence that Libya's new leaders will be any more inclined towards Jews or Israel than Qaddafi was. One small harbinger is the changing narrative surrounding the rich crazy uncle of the Arab world: As Qaddafi's regime began to falter, stories began to circulate that his grandmother was Jewish.
And so Libya enters a new era. For months Qaddafi's weapons and stolen Libyan cars have filtered into Egypt, Sinai, and Gaza. What will become of his heavy and unconventional weapons is unknown. Other signs portend ill. The Egyptian military sounds more Islamist by the day. The Muslim Brotherhood and other groups are growing bolder in their demands. Islamists are surging in Tunisia, birthplace of the Arab Spring, and waiting in the wings in Algeria, Morocco, and Jordan. A sad, realpolitik view is that this second Arab Spring is quickly leading to a cold, bitter winter. It would be especially bitter if Qaddafi ended by being missed as the devil that we knew.
Given that the rebels are apparently al-Qaeda and other Islamists, hated for Jews and Israel is expected. But that won't stop anyone else from establishing friendly relations with them.
Here's Soccer Dad's Middle East Media Sampler for Friday, September 2:
1) Darth Friedman
Lando: Lord Vader, what about Leia and the Wookiee?
Darth Vader : They must never again leave this city.
Lando : [outraged] That was never a condition of our agreement, nor was giving Han to this bounty hunter!
Darth Vader : Perhaps you think you're being treated unfairly?
Lando : [after a pause; nervous tone] No.
Darth Vader : Good. You know it would be unfortunate if I had to leave a garrison here.
Lando : [to himself] This deal is getting worse all the time!
Darth Vader: Calrissian. Take the princess and the Wookie to my ship.
Lando: You said they'd be left at the city under my supervision!
Darth Vader: I am altering the deal. Pray I don't alter it any further
For the last 30 years, Israel enjoyed peace with Egypt wholesale — by having peace with just one man, Hosni Mubarak. That sale is over. Today, post-Mubarak, to sustain the peace treaty with Egypt in any kind of stable manner, Israel is going to have to pay retail. It is going to have to make peace with 85 million Egyptians. The days in which one phone call by Israel to Mubarak could shut down any crisis in relations are over.
It was an outrageous judgment then; the recent terror attacks from Egypt exposed the perniciousness of this viewpoint. Just as Darth Vader expected Lando Calrissian to accept his changing circumstances with equanimity, so does Thomas Friedman expect Israel to act. By Friedman's logic, Israel must keep Egypt happy, but Egypt need not reciprocate.
While Israel paid with hard, irreversible currency when it handed over land to the Arab side, the Arabs paid with soft, completely reversible currency - that is, words and agreements. Now we are hearing claims that these deals were made with the regimes rather than with the “people”; that is, they lack any legitimacy.
In Egypt there are many voices, including among presidential candidates, declaring that the Camp David Accord with Israel must be annulled or at least changed. That is, change the aspects that pertain to “peace” with Israel. Yet if the Egyptians wish to annul the Camp David Accord, will they return the Sinai desert to Israel? After all, they received this territory through the peace treaty between the two states, after failing to secure it through war. Yet for some reason, this is unthinkable for them.
Why is Israel responsible to make everyone else happy for there to be peace?
Syria will be his real test. The arguments for supporting Syrian protesters are easily as strong as those mustered to save the people of Benghazi. After months facing the regime snipers’ machine guns, tanks and torture, demonstrators are openly calling for foreign intervention. And the regime’s strategic sins against the United States are far greater than those committed by the Libyan Nero. Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah — the two terrorist powerhouses of the Middle East — are Damascus’s closest friends. Almost every Arab terrorist group, spawned in the hothouses of Islamic militancy and Arab nationalism, has had a presence in Damascus. The ruling Assad family has been the great enabler of terrorism against the United States — from the 1983 Beirut bombings to the 1996 attack on Khobar Towers, and quite possibly to Sept. 11 via the operational carte blanche given to Imad Mughniya and Hezbollah. Mughniya, Iran’s dark Arab prince who served as Tehran’s liaison with Arab terrorists, and Hezbollah likely aided al-Qaeda in the 1990s. More so than any Sunni-led Arab state, the Assad regime has reveled in its “front-line” hostility toward Israel.
For decades foreign policy “realists” dreamed of severing the Assads and Syria’s ruling Shiite Alawite clan from Iran and marrying them to the peace process. This delusional aspiration — it ignored the sectarian and religious reality of Syrian politics — appears dead. Addicted to viewing the region through a Palestinian-Israeli lens, Obama may finally look strategically at Syria.
Gerecht clearly believes that the United States needs to get involved because the Syrian government isn't just turning its guns against its own people but has been an enemy in war to the United States and its allies.
After six weeks of tent encampments and rallies featuring popular singers that drew as many as 300,000 people into the streets on the first Saturday in August, the Sept. 3 rally has been described by its promoters as a million-person march.
But for now the movement is in a kind of hiatus, with nagging questions about where it will go. The mid-August attack by Palestinian militants that killed eight Israelis near the southern city of Eilat, close to the Egyptian border, followed by Israeli airstrikes on Gaza and Palestinian rocket attacks from Gaza, proved to be a major interruption, abruptly changing the public discourse back to the more familiar mode of Israeli security in hostile surroundings.
In addition, disagreements have emerged among the groups that make up the leadership of the protest movement, along with increasing grumbling about some of the higher-profile leaders themselves. The giddy festival atmosphere that first enveloped the social protest has dissipated. The rows of tents at the flagship encampment lining Rothschild Boulevard in Tel Aviv are gradually emptying.
I wish that Kershner had provided more details about the dissatisfaction with the leadership of the protests. Of course the emptying of the tents may just be a sign that summer's over and that protesters no longer have the time.
Despite Kershner's generally positive portrayal of the protests, Challah Hu Akbar pointed out that a feeder demonstration did not go well.
Some 20 activists from southern Israel marched to Jerusalem from the south and are protesting against the cost of living in front of the prime minister's residence.
The new editor of the Jerusalem Post, Steven Linde defends his decision to fire Larry Derfner:
By trying to rationalize the murder of his fellow Jews by terrorists, Derfner – who has always been the consummate journalist for the Post – went beyond the pale. Consequently we terminated his employment.
The move, I stress, had nothing to do with threats to cancel subscriptions or advertisements; it was an editorial decision taken on moral grounds. While politically independent, the Post is a quintessentially Zionist newspaper priding itself on its patriotism and credibility, as well as its balanced reporting and diverse commentaries.
If I'm understanding Linde he's arguing that Derfner's post was similar to yelling "fire" in crowded movie theater. So he, in turn said, "you're fired." A rabbi was recently arrested for incitement, so I wonder if there may have been a legal concern too.
5) Followup
Yesterday I wrote that Ehud Olmert was Netanyahu's successor, which is technically correct, since Netanyahu served as PM from 1996-1999 (I didn't write "immediate"), given the context, I meant "predecessor." Thank to Carl for pointing it out!
Libyan rebels are refusing to extradite Pan Am 103 bomber Abdelbasset Megrahi. Once again, it's claimed that he's dying.
With the recent overthrow of longtime Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi, politicians on both sides of the Atlantic have called for al-Megrahi to be sent back to prison.
But the National Transitional Council, the rebel movement that toppled Gadhafi, announced Sunday that it won't allow the dying al-Megrahi to be extradited.
"We will not give any Libyan citizen to the West," NTC Justice Minister Mohammed al-Alagi said.
Al-Megrahi lived far longer than expected. He made a public appearance with now-fugitive Libyan strongman Moammar Gadhafi in July, confined to a wheelchair. He always maintained his innocence.
With the fall of Tripoli to the rebels, his care has been left up to his son and his mother.
"There is no doctor. There is nobody to ask. We don't have any phone line to call anybody," Elmegarhi said.
After the last time, why should anyone believe this?
Remember that report that the Libyan rebels were supplying weapons to Hamas in Gaza? In a totally bizarre turn of events, now that they are in power, the rebels are claiming that almost-deposed dictator Muammar Gadhafi was the one supplying weapons to Hamas, and that they, the rebels, would like Israel's support (and presumably friendship).
"We are seeking Israel's support and influence around the world in order to bring to an end Gaddafi's despotic rule," Ahmad Shabani, the founder of Libya's Democratic and a spokesperson on behalf of the rebels was quoted as saying.
According to the unconfirmed reports, Shabani, whose family fled Libya after the king was deposed in 1969, said they were seeking the Jewish State's help because "Libya needs all the international support they can get, including Israel's."
Responding to Gaddafi's allegations, according to which al Qaeda was aiding the rebels to smuggle weapons into the Gaza Strip, Shabani said the deposed dictator was himself cooperating with the terrorist group, adding that the opposition group aims to stop the alleged arms smuggling.
Okay, guys. Let's assume you're accepted as the legitimate government of Libya at the UN in September. I have two questions for you: How are you voting on 'Palestinian statehood'? And are you attending the Durban III conference? And yes, those are serious questions. If the rebels have learned anything from their experience under and fighting Gadhafi, they should know that supporting Israel is just. And support ought to be reciprocal and reciprocated.
By the way, there are some awesome pictures of Gadhafi's palace here.
Sky's special correspondent Alex Crawford, accompanying the rebels, said the opposition fighters were greeted with scenes of jubilation as they made their way through the outskirts of the capital.
As they entered the city, their cars gridlocked the roads, she said, and hundreds of people came out onto the streets to greet them.
The rebels responded with celebratory gunfire, she said.
"We are now just a very short distance from the centre, with more and more people coming onto the streets.
"They (the rebels) had been expecting much more resistance but there has been very little."
"There is absolutely no question in their minds that they have beaten Gaddafi and it is just a question of how he will go," she added.
The quick advance came after the fighters captured the base of the Khamis Brigade, 16 miles west of the capital.
It is said to be one of the best-trained and equipped units in the Libyan military and is commanded by Col Gaddafi's 27-year-old son Khamis.
Aside from the main rebel movement from the west of the city, fighting also broke out in the city's Mitiga airbase, while the suburb of Tajoura reportedly also fell under rebel control.
Gunfire was also heard near the hotel where foreign media are staying.
As the rebel movement came closer to the capital, Col Gaddafi broadcast a message on state television calling on Libyan people to come from all regions and liberate Tripoli.
He said he was "afraid Tripoli will burn" but that he will remain in the city until the end.
The Libyan government also earlier appealed for an immediate ceasefire and an end to Nato's "aggression".
Spokesman for Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's regime, Moussa Ibrahim, told reporters the rebels were nothing without Nato and they would never be able to take Libya.
Maybe. But Gadhafi is now gone.
Let's go to the videotape.
Hmmm.
UPDATE 12:06 AM
Israel Radio reports that Gadhafi's personal security detail surrendered, that Seif al-Islam Gadhafi has been arrested and that Muammar Gadhafi himself is believed to have fled to Chad or Algeria. Gadhafi's last speech, in which he promised to fight to the last drop of blood, was apparently given via phone from his hiding place.
UPDATE 12:13 AM
Another Gadhafi son (Khamis?) also arrested.
Gadhafi spokesman has just told CNN that they will continue to fight.
Troops acting on behalf of the man whom Hillary Clinton called a 'reformer' and 'capable of change' four months ago massacred at least 121 people in Hama on Sunday (ignore the number in the video).
Let's go to the videotape.
Notice that in Syria. when they start firing, everyone ducks for cover.
Here's another one. Let's go to the videotape.
Were they firing from the minaret of a holy mosque? Can you imagine what would happen in the 'Muslim street' if American or Israeli troops used a mosque as a base from which to fire? Can anyone translate the Arabic?
Syrian forces killed at least 121 civilians and wounded hundreds in major tank assaults on Hama and other cities that began at dawn on Sunday to crush pro-democracy demonstrations.
Tanks stormed Hama after besieging it for nearly a month in response to some of the biggest protests against President Bashar Al Assad’s rule.
Several observers wondered if Mr. Assad was truly in charge of the situation. Some suggested that his brother, Maher, may be leading the assault against pro-democracy protesters. Maher is known for her personal brutality and intolerance of dissent.
WHO were these 'observers'? How many of them work for the US State Department?
One of the residents, a doctor, said there were 51 people wounded at Badr hospital alone, which was running short of blood for transfusions. He said tanks had surrounded another main hospital, Al Horani.
“Tanks are attacking from four directions. They are firing their heavy machineguns randomly and overrunning makeshift road blocks erected by the inhabitants,” he said by phone, the sound of machinegun fire crackling in the background.
Another resident said snipers had climbed onto the roofs of the state-owned electricity company and the main prison, and that electricity had been cut in eastern neighborhoods.
You'd think they were fighting against a military target that could fight back or something. Here's another video.
Let's go to the videotape.
And here's another one. Let's go to the videotape.
The only changes from Hafez al-Assad to Bashar al-Assad are the first names, and the use of guns and tanks instead of the 'cleaner' poisonous gas.'
Meanwhile, in Libya, the Obama administration is backing a group that is smuggling arms to Hamas.
In an earlier post, I reported that Seif al-Arab Gadhafi and his three sons, a son and three of the grandsons of Libyan leader Muammar Gadhafi, were killed on Saturday night in a NATO attack on one of the Gadhafi family compounds. On Sunday, the Libyan leader exacted his revenge, letting his supporters loose on various NATO countries' embassies in Tripoli. Among the embassies attacked was Britain's. The destruction may be seen in the pictures above and below, which I screen-captured from a BBC video which can be viewed here. The Brits, who didn't seem too phased when they discovered that they had been duped into releasing Pan Am 103 hijacker Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, finally decided enough was enough. They have given the Libyan ambassador to the UK, Omar Jelban (pictured below), 24 hours to leave the country.
"I condemn the attacks on the British embassy premises in Tripoli as well as the diplomatic missions of other countries," said the foreign secretary, William Hague. "The Vienna convention requires the Gaddafi regime to protect diplomatic missions in Tripoli. By failing to do so that regime has once again breached its international responsibilities and obligations. I take the failure to protect such premises very seriously indeed."
The statement went on: "As a result, I have taken the decision to expel the Libyan ambassador. He is persona non grata pursuant to article 9 of the Vienna convention on diplomatic relations and has 24 hours to leave the country."
...
The Gaddafi regime appears to have mounted a symbolic attack on empty diplomatic residences and embassies in Tripoli. There are no British diplomats in the Libyan capital.
Other foreign residences were also targeted, as the UN announced it was taking all its remaining international staff out of Tripoli.
The Italian foreign ministry said its embassy and several others in Tripoli were damaged by vandals and accused the Gaddafi regime of failing to take measures to protect foreign missions.
Here's a report from al-Jazeera on the expulsion of Libya's ambassador to the UK. Let's go to the videotape.
Let's see if anyone thinks twice about sending an ambassador back when things die down.
Gadhafi son and three grandsons killed - will those responsible be prosecuted for 'war crimes'?
During the night, Muammar Gadhafi's youngest son, Seif al-Arab Gadhafi (who was not his more famous brother Seif al-Islam Gadhafi) was killed along with three of his children who were under the age of 12. Muammar Gadhafi and one of his wives were in the son's house when the NATO planes attacked.
Let's go to the videotape.
The house in Tripoli was destroyed by the strike, with a massive crater where the house used to be. At least one unexploded bomb could be seen.
The building was in a residential area of Tripoli, according to Ibrahim, who insisted that Saif al-Arab Gadhafi was a student in Germany who was not deeply involved in Libya's military and government. The 29-year-old was the sixth of Gadhafi's eight biological children.
Ibrahim railed against NATO after the fatal strike, calling it an illegal act and a "war crime." He vowed revenge.
Speaking at a rally, Ibrahim told fellow Libyans, "Every one of you are Saif al-Arab."
Lt. Gen. Charles Bouchard, commander of NATO's military operations, said in a statement he was "aware of unconfirmed media reports that some of Gadhafi's family members may have been killed.
"We regret all loss of life, especially the innocent civilians being harmed as a result of this ongoing conflict," Bouchard said. "NATO is fulfilling its U.N. mandate to stop and prevent attacks against civilians with precision and care -- unlike Gadhafi's forces, which are causing so much suffering."
The NATO commander stated that all targets "are military in nature and have been clearly linked to the Gadhafi regime's systemic attacks on the Libyan population ... We do not target individuals."
A senior official in President Barack Obama's administration said the U.S. government is "very aware" of the reports, but cannot confirm who, if anyone, died in a strike until they see the evidence.
Might I remind you that several European countries, many of whom are NATO members who are involved in the fighting in Libya (e.g. Britain), have attempted to prosecute Israeli officials for 'war crimes' in connection with the killing of Hamas terror chieftain Salah Shehadeh in 2002. In that case, Shehadeh had gathered family members around him as human shielfs, and many of those family members were killed along with him.. Unlike Seif al-Arab Gadhafi, Salah Shehadeh was very much involved in planning terror attacks.
So does this mean that those NATO countries will attempt to prosecute those responsible for the deaths of Seif al-Arab Gadhafi's children? Don't hold your breaths. No one cares when Arabs are killed unless they are killed by Jews.
You can't be half pregnant. And you can't be half at war. Either you are or you aren't. If you aren't, and you behave like you are, you're asking for trouble.
One would have thought that the United States would have learned that lesson in Vietnam (and for that matter, that Israel would have learned it in southern Lebanon). But one of the goals of the Obama administration seems to be to re-test every lesson the United States has ever learned, and that includes going to war with one hand tied behind its back. Of course, I am speaking about Libya.
But now, several weeks later, that neat package is coming undone. The war rages on. The rebels, disorganized and underequipped, are neither winning nor losing; Kadafi is neither firmly entrenched nor on his way out, as far as anyone knows. NATO, its members still squabbling among themselves, has no formal mandate to oust the Libyan leader but is unwilling to walk away either. Hundreds have died, while the diplomatic and economic squeeze has so far proved unsuccessful. In this frustrating situation, unsurprisingly, there's a natural tendency toward "mission creep," as the U.S. and other NATO nations try to figure out how to break the stalemate. Britain, France and Italy say they will send military advisors to help the rebels (in a move that can't help but remind Americans of the gradual start of the Vietnam War). On Thursday, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said that Obama had authorized the deployment of armed Predator drones to target Kadafi's forces, deepening the United States' role in a conflict that increasingly seems to be about more than protecting civilians.
What a mess. And not a totally unfamiliar one. Proponents of stronger action against Kadafi say the problem is that the United States is not fully committed, that it is half-in and half-out, unwilling to risk dollars or lives to achieve its aims. There's some truth to that analysis. As Richard N. Haass, the president of the Council on Foreign Relations (and not a supporter of stronger action), has noted, there's a gap between the ambitious goal of ousting Kadafi and the tremendous limits the U.S. has put on the means.
For our part, we'd rather see the ambitions narrowed than the means expanded. We don't see the upside in getting more deeply involved in a third distant war on behalf of rebels we know little about, even against the repugnant Kadafi government. The United States not only doesn't have any vital national security interests at stake, but it already has 100,000 troops on the ground in Afghanistan, 50,000 in Iraq and 18,000 more assisting Japan after the earthquake and tsunami. The U.S. and the international community have an important role to play in protecting populations from humanitarian crisis or genocide, but no one has proved that Libya is an especially compelling example of either, distinguishable from all the other tragic cases of brutality and war around the world. If there was intelligence evidence of the "violence on a horrific scale" that Obama warned of, what was it? The United States can't possibly fight all the dictators who raise weapons against their own people, no matter how much it might wish to.
This is a war in which the US should never have gotten involved. The problem is that at this point, backing out would be yet another US defeat, further degrading the American reputation in this region. Maybe that's what Obama wanted all along: A half-hearted commitment that would not be enough to win but which would have a deleterious effect on the United States' prestige and honor.
The effects of an American decline on the Middle East
Shmuel Bar has a lengthy and important piece on the consequences of the decline of American power in the Middle East. Declining American power - which Bar hints is largely the result of choices made by the Obama administration - is leading the exact opposite of the results that the Obami wanted.
I have reproduced some excerpts below, but I suggest that you read the whole thing.
The revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya were the result of developments within the countries themselves: deep economic and social malaise and the perception of the loss of domestic deterrence by ossified regimes led by aging leaders. However, the popular perception that the United States had abandoned its erstwhile allies to support those revolutions facilitated their spread to other theaters. This turnabout in American policy is not seen in the region as reflecting American power though intervention, but rather the decline of American power, manifested in a policy of “bandwagoning” after years of proactive American policy. Clearly, the decline of American projection of power in the region will have as profound an effect as the projection of American power had at its height.
The policies of the United States under the Obama administration have given rise to a broad perception in the region that the United States is no longer willing to play the role of guarantor of the security of its allies there; America is indeed “speaking softly” but has neither the present intention nor the future willpower to wield “a big stick” if push comes to shove. This perception is reflected in seven, key interrelated regional issues: (1) Islam and jihadi terrorism; (2) revolution and democratization in the region; (3) nuclear proliferation; (4) Iran; (5) the Israeli-Arab peace process; (6) Iraq; and (7) Af-Pak. In all these issues, the U.S. is perceived as searching for the path of least resistance, lowering its strategic profile, and attempting to accommodate the de facto powers in the region. In all these areas, the United States is projecting an aversion to proactive action, disinclination to project power, and lack of resolve to support its allies. Remaining American allies in the region realize that they cannot rely on the United States and must adapt themselves to pressures of the masses, predominance of radical ideologies, and Iranian strategic hegemony.
...
The focus on nuclear disarmament in a world that seems rushing toward an era of hyper-proliferation seems somewhat inconsistent with reality. It is unrealistic to believe that the countries of the Middle East may forgo acquisition of their own nuclear weapons in return for American-extended assurances — particularly when the confidence in American support has been so drastically shaken by the abandoning of its erstwhile allies in Tunisia and Egypt. The potential for availability of nuclear know-how and materials from Pakistan and North Korea is likely to increase. There is no doubt that under such conditions supply will breed demand and vice versa. The administrations counter-proliferation policy has no remedy for this scenario.
Iran. Meanwhile, the perceived democratic uprisings in the Arab Middle East should not create the impression that the “Green Revolution” option in Iran is still on the table. Ironically, had the U.S. supported the “Green Revolution” in Iran, at least to the extent it did for the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, it may have been able to keep that movement viable. The conventional wisdom that Western support for the Iranian opposition is counterproductive will probably restrain the administration from expressing the type of support it expressed vis-à-vis the Arab rebellions. It is, however, this stark contrast between the American response to the unrest in Iran as opposed to the Tunisian and Egyptian (and, mutatis mutandis, Libyan) cases that reinforces the perception in the region that the U.S. has adopted an active policy not only of abandoning its old allies, but also of courting the Iranian regime and its proxies. The transfer of American support to the Iranian supported Maleki in Iraq and the lukewarm response to Hezbollah’s takeover of Lebanon are seen as further proof of this policy. The retraction of the military option by senior American officials has led to a perception that the U.S. has already reconciled itself to a nuclear Iran (at best) or even is realigning its interest in the region to accommodate Iranian predominance.5 The outcome of the administration’s engagement policy to date has been to encourage Iran to make more strident and provocative moves toward a nuclear capability. The sanctions regime creates an illusion of action in consensus, but few truly believe that it will achieve the necessary effect.6 While the U.S. can claim success of its engagement policy as a holding tactic, delaying Iran’s crossing the threshold, however, does not delay the process of decline in the willingness to rely on the United States. The cumulative impression of American reluctance to confront Iran out of fear of Iranian reprisal exacerbates the concerns in the region that the pro-Western countries will not be able to rely, when the chips are down, on the United States.
The case for continuing this policy is primarily the absence of alternatives and particularly the potential consequences of an Iranian retaliation to a military strike. The argument against military action (or even threat of military action or perceived support for an Israeli strike) is based on the assessment that such action would lead to severe reactions in the Muslim world, would damage friendly regimes, and inspire terrorist activities against the U.S., and it will be met with a broad Iranian military response, ignite a war between Iran and the Gulf States, cause a steep rise in energy prices, endanger American troops in Iran and Afghanistan, and give the Iranian regime the opportunity to make short shrift of the “Green Revolution” opposition. However, behind this assessment lies the political truth that the United States does not have the willpower for another military adventure in the Middle East.7 The administration also seems to believe that Iran does not really intend to break out with a military nuclear capability but will suffice with being a “threshold nuclear power” along the lines of the Japanese model. This assessment leads it to redefine its objectives regarding the Iranian threat: from the complete prevention of a “nuclear” Iran to the acceptance of Iran as a nuclear threshold state, while convincing Tehran not to cross the threshold.
However, these assessments are not shared by most of the parties in the region. There is broad anticipation in the region that Iran will not stop at the threshold and that the consequences of military action are far less catastrophic than those of a nuclear Iran. Nevertheless, there is little or no challenge within the U.S. administration to these assumptions. This also contributes to the perception in the region that the administration has reconciled itself to a nuclear Iran, believing that it can be contained.
...
By distancing itself from Israel and by lowering its profile in the Middle East in general, the administration also distances itself from influence on the peace process. The image of American power in the region is an important component of Israel’s own deterrent image. This is expressed in the very image of American capacity to act in the region to support its allies and in the assumption of a strategic alliance and special relationship between the U.S. and Israel. The erosion of the image of American power is not due to the perception of American capabilities per se, but to the perception of willingness of the U.S. to act in the region to support its allies, buttressed by a perceived decline in U.S. economic preeminence. Erosion of the image of support for allies in general and for Israel in particular will have a detrimental effect on Israel’s deterrence. The erosion of Israel’s deterrence will have, in turn, a detrimental effect on that of the United States.
...
If Iran is perceived as having crossed the nuclear threshold it will have “won” against the pressures of the international community. It will become a model for radical movements throughout the Muslim world and will be on its way to achieving its desired hegemony in the region. A prime example may be renewing its call for “leaving the security of the Gulf in the hands of the Gulf countries themselves” — a euphemism for Iranian hegemony without American or British presence. In this demand, Iran will be able to leverage the very failure of the U.S. to prevent Iran from going nuclear, and the regional image of the Obama administration as conciliatory towards Iran will diminish any faith that the countries of the region may have in American guarantees. The Iranian ability to employ subversion will also make it difficult for those regimes to continue to rely on the “infidel” to defend them against (Muslim) Iran. Other consequences will be felt in the heart of the Middle East; the chances of weaning Syria from the Iranian orbit and promoting stability in Lebanon, where Iran’s surrogate — Hezbollah — has already become the key power broker, will become even slimmer. Hamas, Iran’s Palestinian proxy, will feel that it has a longer leash. The chances that the Palestinian Authority will be willing to take bold steps towards a peace agreement with Israel will also wane.
I am an Orthodox Jew - some would even call me 'ultra-Orthodox.' Born in Boston, I was a corporate and securities attorney in New York City for seven years before making aliya to Israel in 1991 (I don't look it but I really am that old :-). I have been happily married to the same woman for thirty-five years, and we have eight children (bli ayin hara) ranging in age from 13 to 33 years and nine grandchildren. Four of our children are married! Before I started blogging I was a heavy contributor on a number of email lists and ran an email list called the Matzav from 2000-2004. You can contact me at: IsraelMatzav at gmail dot com
