Israel Matzav

The effects of an American decline on the Middle East

Shmuel Bar has a lengthy and important piece on the consequences of the decline of American power in the Middle East. Declining American power - which Bar hints is largely the result of choices made by the Obama administration - is leading the exact opposite of the results that the Obami wanted.

I have reproduced some excerpts below, but I suggest that you read the whole thing.

The revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya were the result of developments within the countries themselves: deep economic and social malaise and the perception of the loss of domestic deterrence by ossified regimes led by aging leaders. However, the popular perception that the United States had abandoned its erstwhile allies to support those revolutions facilitated their spread to other theaters. This turnabout in American policy is not seen in the region as reflecting American power though intervention, but rather the decline of American power, manifested in a policy of “bandwagoning” after years of proactive American policy. Clearly, the decline of American projection of power in the region will have as profound an effect as the projection of American power had at its height.

The policies of the United States under the Obama administration have given rise to a broad perception in the region that the United States is no longer willing to play the role of guarantor of the security of its allies there; America is indeed “speaking softly” but has neither the present intention nor the future willpower to wield “a big stick” if push comes to shove. This perception is reflected in seven, key interrelated regional issues: (1) Islam and jihadi terrorism; (2) revolution and democratization in the region; (3) nuclear proliferation; (4) Iran; (5) the Israeli-Arab peace process; (6) Iraq; and (7) Af-Pak. In all these issues, the U.S. is perceived as searching for the path of least resistance, lowering its strategic profile, and attempting to accommodate the de facto powers in the region. In all these areas, the United States is projecting an aversion to proactive action, disinclination to project power, and lack of resolve to support its allies. Remaining American allies in the region realize that they cannot rely on the United States and must adapt themselves to pressures of the masses, predominance of radical ideologies, and Iranian strategic hegemony.

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The focus on nuclear disarmament in a world that seems rushing toward an era of hyper-proliferation seems somewhat inconsistent with reality. It is unrealistic to believe that the countries of the Middle East may forgo acquisition of their own nuclear weapons in return for American-extended assurances — particularly when the confidence in American support has been so drastically shaken by the abandoning of its erstwhile allies in Tunisia and Egypt. The potential for availability of nuclear know-how and materials from Pakistan and North Korea is likely to increase. There is no doubt that under such conditions supply will breed demand and vice versa. The administrations counter-proliferation policy has no remedy for this scenario.

Iran. Meanwhile, the perceived democratic uprisings in the Arab Middle East should not create the impression that the “Green Revolution” option in Iran is still on the table. Ironically, had the U.S. supported the “Green Revolution” in Iran, at least to the extent it did for the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, it may have been able to keep that movement viable. The conventional wisdom that Western support for the Iranian opposition is counterproductive will probably restrain the administration from expressing the type of support it expressed vis-à-vis the Arab rebellions. It is, however, this stark contrast between the American response to the unrest in Iran as opposed to the Tunisian and Egyptian (and, mutatis mutandis, Libyan) cases that reinforces the perception in the region that the U.S. has adopted an active policy not only of abandoning its old allies, but also of courting the Iranian regime and its proxies. The transfer of American support to the Iranian supported Maleki in Iraq and the lukewarm response to Hezbollah’s takeover of Lebanon are seen as further proof of this policy. The retraction of the military option by senior American officials has led to a perception that the U.S. has already reconciled itself to a nuclear Iran (at best) or even is realigning its interest in the region to accommodate Iranian predominance.5 The outcome of the administration’s engagement policy to date has been to encourage Iran to make more strident and provocative moves toward a nuclear capability. The sanctions regime creates an illusion of action in consensus, but few truly believe that it will achieve the necessary effect.6 While the U.S. can claim success of its engagement policy as a holding tactic, delaying Iran’s crossing the threshold, however, does not delay the process of decline in the willingness to rely on the United States. The cumulative impression of American reluctance to confront Iran out of fear of Iranian reprisal exacerbates the concerns in the region that the pro-Western countries will not be able to rely, when the chips are down, on the United States.

The case for continuing this policy is primarily the absence of alternatives and particularly the potential consequences of an Iranian retaliation to a military strike. The argument against military action (or even threat of military action or perceived support for an Israeli strike) is based on the assessment that such action would lead to severe reactions in the Muslim world, would damage friendly regimes, and inspire terrorist activities against the U.S., and it will be met with a broad Iranian military response, ignite a war between Iran and the Gulf States, cause a steep rise in energy prices, endanger American troops in Iran and Afghanistan, and give the Iranian regime the opportunity to make short shrift of the “Green Revolution” opposition. However, behind this assessment lies the political truth that the United States does not have the willpower for another military adventure in the Middle East.7 The administration also seems to believe that Iran does not really intend to break out with a military nuclear capability but will suffice with being a “threshold nuclear power” along the lines of the Japanese model. This assessment leads it to redefine its objectives regarding the Iranian threat: from the complete prevention of a “nuclear” Iran to the acceptance of Iran as a nuclear threshold state, while convincing Tehran not to cross the threshold.

However, these assessments are not shared by most of the parties in the region. There is broad anticipation in the region that Iran will not stop at the threshold and that the consequences of military action are far less catastrophic than those of a nuclear Iran. Nevertheless, there is little or no challenge within the U.S. administration to these assumptions. This also contributes to the perception in the region that the administration has reconciled itself to a nuclear Iran, believing that it can be contained.

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By distancing itself from Israel and by lowering its profile in the Middle East in general, the administration also distances itself from influence on the peace process. The image of American power in the region is an important component of Israel’s own deterrent image. This is expressed in the very image of American capacity to act in the region to support its allies and in the assumption of a strategic alliance and special relationship between the U.S. and Israel. The erosion of the image of American power is not due to the perception of American capabilities per se, but to the perception of willingness of the U.S. to act in the region to support its allies, buttressed by a perceived decline in U.S. economic preeminence. Erosion of the image of support for allies in general and for Israel in particular will have a detrimental effect on Israel’s deterrence. The erosion of Israel’s deterrence will have, in turn, a detrimental effect on that of the United States.

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If Iran is perceived as having crossed the nuclear threshold it will have “won” against the pressures of the international community. It will become a model for radical movements throughout the Muslim world and will be on its way to achieving its desired hegemony in the region. A prime example may be renewing its call for “leaving the security of the Gulf in the hands of the Gulf countries themselves” — a euphemism for Iranian hegemony without American or British presence. In this demand, Iran will be able to leverage the very failure of the U.S. to prevent Iran from going nuclear, and the regional image of the Obama administration as conciliatory towards Iran will diminish any faith that the countries of the region may have in American guarantees. The Iranian ability to employ subversion will also make it difficult for those regimes to continue to rely on the “infidel” to defend them against (Muslim) Iran. Other consequences will be felt in the heart of the Middle East; the chances of weaning Syria from the Iranian orbit and promoting stability in Lebanon, where Iran’s surrogate — Hezbollah — has already become the key power broker, will become even slimmer. Hamas, Iran’s Palestinian proxy, will feel that it has a longer leash. The chances that the Palestinian Authority will be willing to take bold steps towards a peace agreement with Israel will also wane.

What else could go wrong? Read the whole thing.

Labels: Barack Obama, Egyptian regime change, Hezbullah, Iranian nuclear program, Israel, Lebanon, Libyan regime change, Middle East peace process, Tunisian regime change, Yemen

posted by Carl in Jerusalem @ 10:22 AM