Dimona nuke plant in range?
On Thursday, I noted that Israel Radio now reports that Hamas has rockets that can reach sixty kilometers from Gaza, putting
Tel Aviv in range. There's a more strategic location that's within 60 kilometers of Gaza: Dimona, home of Israel's purported
nuclear power plant (Hat Tip:
Gateway Pundit and
Memeorandum).
Israeli officials say that Hamas has also acquired dozens of Iranian-made Fajr-3 missiles with an even longer range. Many fear that as the group acquires ever more sophisticated weaponry it is only a matter of time before the nuclear installation at Dimona, 20 miles east of Beersheba, falls within its sights. Dimona houses Israel’s only nuclear reactor and is believed to be where nuclear warheads are stored.
Israel’s worst nightmare is that soon all its cities will be within range either of the Hezbollah Katyushas arrayed on the Lebanese border to the north or the increasingly sophisticated missiles stockpiled by Hamas to the south. Both groups have links to Israel’s archenemy Iran.
Obviously, the Gaza situation is something that Israel should have dealt with long ago before these types of missiles were ever imported into the Strip. Israel's political 'leaders' have placed us in a worse position through their inability to take decisive action.
But what does this mean for the future? It means that Israel should undertake the ground operation in Gaza as soon as possible. At this point, why are they waiting?
In an interview in Friday's JPost, former director of IDF planning and operations Giora Eiland
asks the same question. Eiland, who was critical of the
lack of planning in connection with the expulsion of Jews from Gaza, says that the problem is that the government cannot make up its mind.
"If the idea is to deter attacks, then you don't need a ground operation," said Eiland. "If, however, you want to destroy Hamas's ability to fire rockets, then you need to invade Gaza," he said. "The problem here is that the political establishment has not decided which course it wants to follow."
"You can reach a situation where Hamas is sufficiently deterred. Or you can invade Gaza, with greater risks and casualties. But there's really nothing in between. And it's hard for the political echelon to accept that."
Eiland said an agreement that binds Hamas "could be reached tomorrow" and would hold for months, and probably much longer, since the Arab states and Turkey would be pressing Hamas to honor it. But Prime Minister Ehud Olmert "doesn't want this, because it would legitimize Hamas," said Eiland.
Eiland added that far too much attention had been paid by the political leadership to the "relatively straightforward" military aspect of the operation, and far too little to the diplomatic side.
"The military aspect is much easier - it involves us and them, that's all, and the IDF can take care of that. The diplomatic field is far more complex, with all kinds of players - Egypt, the Palestinian Authority, the UN, the US, Turkey, the EU and others - all with something to say.
"The political echelon needed to decide on Saturday afternoon what [arrangement] it wanted [at the end of this operation] and how to get it. Who to initiate it? Not us, obviously. Whether to involve the UN Security Council, and so on.
"That was the task of the prime minister, the foreign minister, the defense minister. But they only started on Tuesday. That was long overdue."
The impression being created, Eiland said, is of uncertainty. "If you want Hamas incapable of firing, then why are you waiting for the ground operation? If you want a deal, then why the delay? There's a sense of treading water."
I disagree with Eiland on how long a truce will hold, and that is far more important than whether we are giving legitimacy to Hamas by entering into another truce with them.
If they are not postponed, this country is 39 days from elections. The people want Hamas routed decisively. (Of course, many of them might prefer to rout Hamas without a ground operation, but it's doubtful that can be done, even if we flattened the entire Strip - there is too much weaponry and too many terrorists hiding underground). Israelis don't want an Islamic caliphate sitting on our southern border. Olmert, Barak and Livni all know this. But they're afraid to let the IDF deliver that decisive blow because if - God forbid - the IDF cannot score a decisive victory, it will hurt them in the elections, and because if the IDF defeats Hamas, Olmert, Livni and Barak have no plan for what happens the morning after. Olmert, Barak and Livni will not accept the notion that the only way for there to be quiet in Gaza is for the IDF to remain in Gaza - and not to turn Gaza over to Abu Bluff. That's why they're dilly-dallying.
And as long as they continue to delay, it's less likely that there will actually be an election on February 10. That works for their benefit. They remain in power.
On the other hand, a poll out this morning shows
Likud and Labor gaining in the Knesset race at Kadima's expense. In other words, Barak and Netanyahu are gaining at Livni's expense.
The survey found that the Likud had risen from 27 seats to 29, Labor had gone up from 14 to 15, and Kadima had fallen from 27 to 23 since the previous Post poll was published on October 31. Likud and Kadima, which were tied then, are now six seats apart, and the Right bloc's advantage over the Left remains a hefty eight mandates, 64 to 56.
While the survey's 500 respondents were undoubtedly influenced by the Gaza fighting that raged as the poll was conducted on Monday and Tuesday, many other events, including the drafting of the parties' Knesset lists, have occurred over the past two months to influence voter opinion.
A consensus of other polls taken more regularly has found that Likud's and Kadima's support has remained steady since the air offensive began on Saturday, while Labor has gained substantially due to the battle led by its chairman, Defense Minister Ehud Barak. In other polls, Labor fell from 15 to as few as eight seats and has since gone back up.
And Barak is winning in other ways too.
Other polls published this week found that 81% of Israelis supported the war in Gaza, but only 63% believed it would succeed in stopping rocket fire on the South. The surveys were divided on whether there should be a ground offensive in the Strip or whether Israel should seek a cease-fire.
A Ma'agar Mohot poll broadcast Wednesday night on Channel 2 found that Barak's rating as defense minister had skyrocketed since the war began, from 23% to 60%.
So from Barak's perspective, the best thing to do is continue to pound Gaza from the air and hope that Hamas isn't able to get those Fajr-3's working. And Olmert and Livni don't mind that strategy because it means they don't have to make a decision.
But it's a risky strategy as the report about Dimona indicates. Once again, our indecisive leaders may force us to pay a price. A horrible price.
Former NSC Chief Eiland: Obama nixed Netanyahu's attack on Iran
Former National Security Council Chief Giora Eiland says that Prime Minister Netanyahu had decided to attack Iran, but
called it off due to pressure from President Hussein Obama (Hat Tip:
Sunlight).
The Mida website quoted statements reportedly made by Eiland, the
former head of the National Security Council, in a closed conference on
defense.
According to Eiland, “The Prime Minister thought that we had reached
the point where a decision had to be made on Iran, and he planned an
attack.”
“In principle, Israel does not need American authorization for
military action, unless the Americans demand unequivocally that we
refrain from an action,” he continued.
That is what happened in this case, he said. Netanyahu presented his
plan to American leaders, and was told that it was not acceptable to
them. This led him to shelve the plan.
According to the report, Eiland threw his support behind Netanyahu’s
original plan. Israel still must decide how to deal with Iran, he said,
“now with less time, when the decision is between bad and worse.”
Mida reported that Eiland confirmed his statements in an interview
with the site. In the interview, Eiland clarified what he said regarding
American vetoes on Israeli missions.
“Israel can act for itself regarding many, many issues. [When it
comes to] building in Jerusalem, or strikes in Gaza, or other issues
pertaining to our region, we don’t need to ask the Americans, even if
they don’t like it,” he explained.
“However, if the matter pertains to American interests, we cannot go against their opinions,” he stated.
Eiland claims that Israel is capable of destroying Iran's nuclear program. We ought to do it sooner rather than later.
Labels: Barack Hussein Obama, Binyamin Netanyahu, Giora Eiland, Iranian nuclear threat, Israeli attack on Iran
Ahmadinadinnerjacket would sacrifice half of Iran to wipe out Israel
In an interview with the Jerusalem Post, former national security advisor Giora Eiland said that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinadinnerjacket would
sacrifice half the population of Iran in order to wipe out Israel. But he isn't the country's decision maker. Yet.
At present, Eiland stressed, the ultimate decision maker in Iran was Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, 67, whom he said was "more reasonable." But, Eiland went on, "if Ahmadinejad were to succeed him - and he has a reasonable chance of doing so - then we'd be in a highly dangerous situation."
The 49-year-old Iranian president, he said, "has a religious conviction that Israel's demise is essential to the restoration of Muslim glory, that the Zionist thorn in the heart of the Islamic nations must be removed. And he will pay almost any price to right the perceived historic wrong. If he becomes the supreme leader and has a nuclear capability, that's a real threat."
In facing up to Iran's nuclear ambitions, Eiland said the United States had three possible courses of action, "all of them bad," and that a decision could not be postponed for too long, "since delay, too, is a decision of sorts."
The first option was "to give up" - to accept that Iran was going nuclear and try to make the best of it. By "making the best of it," Eiland said, he meant "isolating Iran economically, politically and internationally in the hope that this will eventually prompt an internal push for regime change."
This might also give other nations the sense that the political price of going nuclear was too high for them to contemplate, and might thus deter nations such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Algeria and others from seeking to emulate Iran and spelling the full collapse of the nuclear nonproliferation era.
Washington's second option was to launch a last-ditch effort at diplomatic action, he said. At this stage, a mixture of sanctions and bonuses would not be sufficient to deter Iran altogether, but it might seek to persuade Teheran to suspend progress for two or three years.
"In return, the US would have to open direct engagement with Teheran, with full recognition of the regime. This would boost the regime's credibility and standing at home and allow it to say it was voluntarily suspending the program for a while," he said.
The advantage for the Bush administration was that "Bush could then say, 'They didn't go nuclear on my watch, and it's up to my successors to keep things that way.'"
The third option, said Eiland, was a military operation - born of the sense that the diplomatic process would not work and that there could be no compromise with an axis-of-evil power. However, internal political realities and public opinion in the US were not conducive to this, he said, nor was international support readily available. Furthermore, said Eiland, "this would be action that would have to be taken within months.
If not, and if Iran continues enrichment, it will complete the research and development stage and have a proven ability which it can then duplicate at numerous sites. And at that point it could not be stopped by military action. Six months or 12 months from now would be too late, he said.
Tellingly, Eiland noted, it seemed to him that the difficulties facing the administration over that third course were growing.
...
As for Israel's military options, these sources spoke of an immense dilemma for the government. Declining to go into detail, they noted only that Israel was not as potent militarily as the US and mused about what might happen if a military action proved unsuccessful in thwarting the nuclear program. Iran might then complete its nuclear drive and, branding Israel a preemptive aggressor, claim legitimacy for a strike of its own at Israel.
Read the whole thing.
IDF investigation of Mavi Marmara: No way to stop ship without boarding
The IDF investigation into the Mavi Marmara incident has been concluded, and the report by the investigative committee headed by Reserve Major General Giora Eiland was
presented to IDF Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi on Monday.
In terms of the intelligence effort, the team concluded that not all possible intelligence gathering methods were fully implemented and that the coordination between Navy Intelligence and the Israel Defense Intelligence was insufficient. At the same time, the team emphasized that it is not certain that an optimal intelligence effort would create a complete intelligence picture. The team also pointed out that the anticipated level of violence used against the forces was underestimated.
In terms of situation assessments towards the flotilla, the team clarified that the operation relied excessively on a single course of action, albeit a probable one, while no alternative courses of action were prepared for the event of more dangerous scenarios.
Regarding technological alternatives, the team determined that on the day of the incident, decision makers were not presented with alternative operational courses of action other than a full boarding of the flotilla. The team emphasized the fact that as far as is currently known, no country in the world holds the ability to stop a vessel at sea in a non hostile manner. Therefore statements made on this matter following the incident are unfounded and irresponsible. At the same time, the team determined that alternative courses of action could have existed had the process of preparation begun enough time in advance, and recommended to accelerate the process of examining alternative methods.
So much for those of you who thought that the Navy could have just disabled the engines.
The expert team determined that regarding media relations, the preparations made in advance were good. However, the release of press statements and visual materials was delayed due to the need to maintain reliability, the obligation to notify the families of the critically injured soldiers and the long authorization process at the levels above the IDF Spokesperson Unit. The team noted with favor the work of the IDF spokesperson following the incident and emphasized the need for better coordination between the IDF, the foreign ministry and other foreign affairs institutions.
Glad to see
Aliza get a boost.
The team determined that the Navy Commando soldiers operated properly, with professionalism, bravery and resourcefulness and that the commanders exhibited correct decision making. The report further determines that the use of live fire was justified and that the entire operation is estimable.
I'll have more on the use of live fire later in this post. First, I want to take a look at the
JPost:
In a briefing to reporters, Eiland, the former head of the IDF’s Planning Division and Israel’s National Security Council, said that he did not find negligence in the planning and implementation of the operation. He also made a clear that there was a difference between “operational failures” and “operational mistakes” and that he only found mistakes, not failures.
...
Eiland slammed the Navy for not preparing a “Plan B” for the operation and should have reconsidered rappelling commandos onto the Mavi Marmara’s upper deck after noticing from sea and air that there were several dozen acitivsts on board prepared to violently resist.
Eiland said that once the Navy ships sailed alongside the Mavi Marmara and saw the preparations on board for conflict, the top Navy command should have reconsidered its options and possible even delay the boarding of the ship.
“Once they saw that there were dozens of people on the deck, the rapelling of commandos down to the upper deck could still have been avoided,” the report concluded, adding that the Navy should have, as a result, prepared a “Plan B” for how to take command of the ship, which it did not.
...
Eiland’s probe also found that shots were initially fired at the boarding commandos from weapons that the passengers likely had prepared before hand. The slug that was dislodged from the knee of one of the soldiers was of a different caliber than that which is used by the Navy.
He also detailed the events that led to the abduction of three commandos, who were thrown from the upper to the lower deck and were only recovered about 40 minutes later after they were spotted standing wounded on the ship’s bow and surrounded by a number of passengers. The Navy commandos opened fire from above, scared off the passengers enabling two of the wounded to jump into the water. The third, who was severely wounded, was then rescued by other commandos who jumped down to the bow from the upper deck.
According to Eiland, the Navy did not have technology that would have enabled it to stop the ship ahead of the operation without putting soldiers on board its upper deck to take control of the bridge.
“Such an option did not exist,” Eiland concluded in his report. During their work, members of Eiland’s panel met with a number of officials who offered ideas how to stop the ship without boarding it. According to the committee, it is possible to develop such a capability but it will take approximately two years.
Since the flotilla, the Navy has met with a number of companies and is pursuing technology that could be used to stop a ship in the future.
But here is what is perhaps the most curious conclusion of all:
Another mistake that Eiland found was that Military Intelligence did not designate Turkey or the Islamic organization IHH, which organized the flotilla, as a target for intelligence gathering. He said that this was justified up until 2010 at the time since Turkey was a friendly country to Israel and IHH, was like a dozen other radical Islamic organizations that provided financial support to Hamas.
In the beginning of the year though, Eiland claimed that MI and Israel’s other intelligence agencies should have designated Turkey and IHH as intelligence targets due to the deterioration in ties between the countries. He said that the Israeli intelligence community should have understood that it was dealing with an organization that was supported by the ruling political party in Turkey and prepared accordingly.
I would have put Turkey on the list (I had never heard of the IHH until this incident) the day after Erodgan stormed out of Davos in anger at Peres. That happened in January 2009.
A senior military source also made the following points:
- There were 4-6 confirmed incidents where IDF soldiers were fired upon by Mavi Marmara passengers. In at least one case, a soldier who was shot in the knee with a weapon which is not Israeli issue. There were also (as we have been told before) shell casings from non-Israeli weapons found on the ship.
- In all live ammunition incidents where soldiers shot their guns, the soldiers were in life threatening situations.
- The first IDF soldier who was shot was the second soldier to rappel down from the first helicopter. It is almost certain that this was the first incident of live fire on the ship. This soldier was shot with an Israeli weapon, however it is not known whether he was shot with his own weapon or with the weapon of the soldier who preceded him. This second soldier down was shot shortly after he landed on the Mavi Marmara's upper deck.
- Some of the passengers on the Mavi Marmara were equipped with effective and lethal cold weapons, which they fully intended to use. Some of these weapons were brought along from Turkey, while others were prepared on the ship itself.
- There were between 65-100 'militants', some of whom belonged to the IHH and others who belonged to other Islamic groups. As has been previously reported, the IHH essentially took control of the ship. Even when the captain objected to IHH members cutting the boat's rails for use as weapons, they ignored him and did so anyway.
- In situations such as these, when the passengers are committed to violence, the IDF is unable to totally prevent violence.
Bottom line: It could have been handled better, but the only way to stop the ship was to send IDF soldiers to board it.
I hope to have some video that went with the Eiland report later today. Right now it's only in Hebrew and is in the process of being translated.
Eiland: Gaza pullout was missed chance of historic proportions
In
an interview published in HaAretz this morning, the outgoing head of the National Security Council Giora Eiland called the
unilateral withdrawal surrender and expulsion plan from Gaza a "missed chance of historic proportions."
According to Eiland, "
The disengagement contributed nothing to the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict."
Here are the key portions of the interview:
And this is the crux of the missed opportunity in your view?
"Yes. The disengagement was a missed opportunity of historical proportions because at the end of 2003 both Israel and the world had reached the conclusion that on the one hand it was important to end the conflict quickly, and on the other hand, in the existing paradigm it is impossible to solve it.
"Why is it impossible to solve? Because the maximum that Israel can give is less than the minimum that the Palestinians must accept. I think that was a rare opportunity to offer a new paradigm. But the disengagement simply said the occupation was bad, that there is no chance for an agreement so long as there is occupation, and therefore, let us narrow the occupation.
"The same is said by the convergence. There is logic in the thinking, but it does not lead to long-term stability. The move along a unilateral path leads us to the classic solution of two states for two peoples, and I think this is an impossible solution."
Explain it to me.
"When we talk of a solution of two states for two peoples we make two assumptions: that it is possible to solve the conflict in the area between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River, and that the reference for a border between the two states are the 1967 lines with minor changes. I reject these two assumptions. I think that between the sea and the river there is not enough area to contain two states, and I think that in order to maintain a defensible border, Israel needs at least 12 percent of the West Bank. The 1967 lines, even the Clinton Plan, do not give Israel defensible borders."
And a Palestinian state in only 88 percent of the West Bank territory is a viable state?
"That is the second mistake. I argue that even a Palestinian state with 100 percent of the Gaza Strip and 97 percent of the West Bank is not viable. Such a country will be poor, radical, restive, where the demographic pressures will be unbearable. In 2020 there will be 2.5 million people in the Gaza Strip, in area of 365 square kilometers. This will inevitably lead to pressure against the fences."
Read the entire interview.
HaAretz is now reporting that MK's from both the right and the left have called for hearings by the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee to discuss Eiland's views. Eiland believes that Olmert's convergence consolidation realignment surrender and expulsion plan for Judea and Samaria repeats the Gaza mistake on a larger scale.
IAF jets (to) continue to pound South Beirut, Tyre (for another week)
IAF jets continued to pound the Hezbullah stronghold in South Beirut during the night, with at least five loud explosions being heard. Shortly after midnight there were two loud blasts and around 3:00 AM there were three more.
The IAF also hit targets in Beirut's southern and eastern suburbs, particularly Chuweifat - a coastal town where several factories are located, just south of the capital, near the airport - and Hadath, a mainly Christian town just east of Beirut, according to local television.
IAF jets also struck a bridge in the southern city of Sidon and
houses in two other southern villages, according to local media. There was no immediate word on casualties in any of the airstrikes.
Earlier Tuesday night, IAF planes dropped flyers in Southern Lebanon mocking Hizbullah head Hassan Nasrallah and calling on him to come out of hiding.
"Where are you hiding?" asked the flyers. I guess that someone in the intelligence division had some fun yesterday.
As I noted yesterday, the IDF believes that it needs another week in order to devastate Hezbullah's infrastructure. It looks like that week will be coming. The New York Times is reporting this morning on the 'outlines of an American-Israeli consensus' in which Israel would "continue to bombard Lebanon for about another week to degrade the capabilities of the Hezbollah militia."
According to the Times, "Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice would go to the region and seek to establish a buffer zone in southern Lebanon and perhaps an international force to monitor Lebanon’s borders to prevent Hezbollah from obtaining more rockets with which to bombard Israel."
You will note that the Times said "international force" and did not mention the United Nations. That becomes even more explicit later in the article:
American officials said Washington was discussing with its Arab allies and Israel how to beef up Lebanon’s borders, a central Israeli demand. Israel has been lukewarm to the idea of an international force in Lebanon, but is willing to consider such a deployment if it includes troops from major powers and is used to prevent Hezbollah from supplementing its arsenal.
The Times could have added "and if it does not include UN troops or troops under UN command." The reason for the hostility to a UN force is, as I noted
in an earlier post, that UN forces were
complicit in the kidnapping and eventual murder of three Israeli soldiers by Hezbullah in 2000:
On October 7, 2000, Hezbollah guerillas crossed the border and kidnapped three Israeli soldiers (including one Israeli Arab), all of whom they subsequently killed. Observers from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon videotaped the scene of the kidnapping, including the getaway cars, and some guerillas.
Inexplicably, they then hid the videotape. Questioned by Israeli officials, Terje Roed- Larsen, the U.N. Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, chided Israel for "questioning the good faith of senior United Nations officials." When after eight months the U.N. finally admitted to possessing the tape, officials baulked at showing it to the Israeli government since that might "undermine U.N. neutrality." The fact that U.N. observers protected and defended guerillas who crossed a U.N.-certified border, using cars with U.N. license plates while under the cover of U.N. flags, was apparently of no consequence to UNIFIL. Pronouncements aside, U.N. moral equivalency in practice dictates that terrorists are equal to states. Fighting terror compromises U.N. neutrality.
Former Israeli National Security Council Chief Giora Eiland made clear what Israel requires if it agrees to a multinational force:
Giora Eiland, until recently Israel’s national security adviser, said an international force is not in Israel’s interest if it acts just as a buffer. It can only be effective, he said, “if the other side does not want any provocation and wants to maintain quiet” and “if there’s a credible address on the other side” with control over Lebanon.
Israel should, he said, insist that any international force “make it possible for Lebanon to do what it has to do and not be a buffer between us and them, which would reduce the Lebanese government’s responsibility.”
The problem with this is that there is also a 'history' of 'international forces' in Lebanon, and it is also not pretty. You will recall that the Hezbullah attacks on the American embassy in Lebanon, and on American and French troops in 1983 were a response to the stationing of a multi-national force in Lebanon after the 1982 "Peace for Galilee" operation, in which Israel expelled the PLO from Lebanon. Thus, if Americans and other nations are going to be asked to provide an 'international force' in the months ahead, it is in their best interest for Israel to pulverize Hezbullah. That should work in our favor.
However, there is another note in the Times article which is not good news for Israel: American and Israeli officials are also contemplating a 12-mile buffer zone in southern Lebanon to keep Hezbollah away from the Israeli border. While disarming Hezbollah entirely remains Israel’s goal, it is no longer demanding that as a condition of a cease-fire, officials said.
I don't understand this. First, we already know that Hezbullah has rockets that can reach well over twelve miles. Second, why are we suddenly willing to let Hezbullah live to fight another day? Third, what happened to getting our soldiers released? Are we now going to start negotiating a 'prisoner exchange'?
What's worse is that pronouncements like the one above are making the likes of Lebanese President Fouad Siniora, who has been crying for a cease fire at every turn, and who would likely be dead by now if his country was being invaded by anyone other than the Israelis, thinks that he has the power to dictate terms for a 'cease fire.'
On Thursday, I noted that Israel Radio now reports that Hamas has rockets that can reach sixty kilometers from Gaza, putting Tel Aviv in range. There's a more strategic location that's within 60 kilometers of Gaza: Dimona, home of Israel's purported nuclear power plant (Hat Tip: Gateway Pundit and Memeorandum). 
