Israel Matzav

IDF investigation of Mavi Marmara: No way to stop ship without boarding

The IDF investigation into the Mavi Marmara incident has been concluded, and the report by the investigative committee headed by Reserve Major General Giora Eiland was presented to IDF Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi on Monday.

In terms of the intelligence effort, the team concluded that not all possible intelligence gathering methods were fully implemented and that the coordination between Navy Intelligence and the Israel Defense Intelligence was insufficient. At the same time, the team emphasized that it is not certain that an optimal intelligence effort would create a complete intelligence picture. The team also pointed out that the anticipated level of violence used against the forces was underestimated.

In terms of situation assessments towards the flotilla, the team clarified that the operation relied excessively on a single course of action, albeit a probable one, while no alternative courses of action were prepared for the event of more dangerous scenarios.

Regarding technological alternatives, the team determined that on the day of the incident, decision makers were not presented with alternative operational courses of action other than a full boarding of the flotilla. The team emphasized the fact that as far as is currently known, no country in the world holds the ability to stop a vessel at sea in a non hostile manner. Therefore statements made on this matter following the incident are unfounded and irresponsible. At the same time, the team determined that alternative courses of action could have existed had the process of preparation begun enough time in advance, and recommended to accelerate the process of examining alternative methods.

So much for those of you who thought that the Navy could have just disabled the engines.

The expert team determined that regarding media relations, the preparations made in advance were good. However, the release of press statements and visual materials was delayed due to the need to maintain reliability, the obligation to notify the families of the critically injured soldiers and the long authorization process at the levels above the IDF Spokesperson Unit. The team noted with favor the work of the IDF spokesperson following the incident and emphasized the need for better coordination between the IDF, the foreign ministry and other foreign affairs institutions.

Glad to see Aliza get a boost.

The team determined that the Navy Commando soldiers operated properly, with professionalism, bravery and resourcefulness and that the commanders exhibited correct decision making. The report further determines that the use of live fire was justified and that the entire operation is estimable.

I'll have more on the use of live fire later in this post. First, I want to take a look at the JPost:

In a briefing to reporters, Eiland, the former head of the IDF’s Planning Division and Israel’s National Security Council, said that he did not find negligence in the planning and implementation of the operation. He also made a clear that there was a difference between “operational failures” and “operational mistakes” and that he only found mistakes, not failures.

...

Eiland slammed the Navy for not preparing a “Plan B” for the operation and should have reconsidered rappelling commandos onto the Mavi Marmara’s upper deck after noticing from sea and air that there were several dozen acitivsts on board prepared to violently resist.

Eiland said that once the Navy ships sailed alongside the Mavi Marmara and saw the preparations on board for conflict, the top Navy command should have reconsidered its options and possible even delay the boarding of the ship.

“Once they saw that there were dozens of people on the deck, the rapelling of commandos down to the upper deck could still have been avoided,” the report concluded, adding that the Navy should have, as a result, prepared a “Plan B” for how to take command of the ship, which it did not.

...

Eiland’s probe also found that shots were initially fired at the boarding commandos from weapons that the passengers likely had prepared before hand. The slug that was dislodged from the knee of one of the soldiers was of a different caliber than that which is used by the Navy.

He also detailed the events that led to the abduction of three commandos, who were thrown from the upper to the lower deck and were only recovered about 40 minutes later after they were spotted standing wounded on the ship’s bow and surrounded by a number of passengers. The Navy commandos opened fire from above, scared off the passengers enabling two of the wounded to jump into the water. The third, who was severely wounded, was then rescued by other commandos who jumped down to the bow from the upper deck.

According to Eiland, the Navy did not have technology that would have enabled it to stop the ship ahead of the operation without putting soldiers on board its upper deck to take control of the bridge.

“Such an option did not exist,” Eiland concluded in his report. During their work, members of Eiland’s panel met with a number of officials who offered ideas how to stop the ship without boarding it. According to the committee, it is possible to develop such a capability but it will take approximately two years.

Since the flotilla, the Navy has met with a number of companies and is pursuing technology that could be used to stop a ship in the future.

But here is what is perhaps the most curious conclusion of all:

Another mistake that Eiland found was that Military Intelligence did not designate Turkey or the Islamic organization IHH, which organized the flotilla, as a target for intelligence gathering. He said that this was justified up until 2010 at the time since Turkey was a friendly country to Israel and IHH, was like a dozen other radical Islamic organizations that provided financial support to Hamas.

In the beginning of the year though, Eiland claimed that MI and Israel’s other intelligence agencies should have designated Turkey and IHH as intelligence targets due to the deterioration in ties between the countries. He said that the Israeli intelligence community should have understood that it was dealing with an organization that was supported by the ruling political party in Turkey and prepared accordingly.

I would have put Turkey on the list (I had never heard of the IHH until this incident) the day after Erodgan stormed out of Davos in anger at Peres. That happened in January 2009.

A senior military source also made the following points:

• There were 4-6 confirmed incidents where IDF soldiers were fired upon by Mavi Marmara passengers. In at least one case, a soldier who was shot in the knee with a weapon which is not Israeli issue. There were also (as we have been told before) shell casings from non-Israeli weapons found on the ship.
• In all live ammunition incidents where soldiers shot their guns, the soldiers were in life threatening situations.
• The first IDF soldier who was shot was the second soldier to rappel down from the first helicopter. It is almost certain that this was the first incident of live fire on the ship. This soldier was shot with an Israeli weapon, however it is not known whether he was shot with his own weapon or with the weapon of the soldier who preceded him. This second soldier down was shot shortly after he landed on the Mavi Marmara's upper deck.
• Some of the passengers on the Mavi Marmara were equipped with effective and lethal cold weapons, which they fully intended to use. Some of these weapons were brought along from Turkey, while others were prepared on the ship itself.
• There were between 65-100 'militants', some of whom belonged to the IHH and others who belonged to other Islamic groups. As has been previously reported, the IHH essentially took control of the ship. Even when the captain objected to IHH members cutting the boat's rails for use as weapons, they ignored him and did so anyway.
• In situations such as these, when the passengers are committed to violence, the IDF is unable to totally prevent violence.

Bottom line: It could have been handled better, but the only way to stop the ship was to send IDF soldiers to board it.

I hope to have some video that went with the Eiland report later today. Right now it's only in Hebrew and is in the process of being translated.

posted by Carl in Jerusalem @ 9:13 AM