'Secret back channel' doomed 'peace talks'?
The New Republic reports that the failure of last summer's 'peace talks' was brought about by the use of a
secret back channel between Prime Minister Netanyahu's personal attorney, Yitzchak Molho, and an unnamed and apparently unauthorized confidante of 'm
oderate' '
Palestinian' President
Mahmoud Abbas Abu Mazen. This is from the first link.
The secret channel—reported here for the first time—created
substantial progress toward an agreement. But it also had one
fundamental flaw, which contributed to the collapse of Kerry's entire
process. Abbas’s supposed representative was in fact holding these talks
without a real mandate from the Palestinian President; the concessions
he discussed with Molho didn't represent the President's views. Parts of
this story remain unsolved—most importantly,
why this lack of a mandate was missed or ignored in real time. But what
can be told is enough to raise some hard questions about Kerry's effort,
and offer important lessons for future attempts at reaching an
agreement.
...
The extent of Abbas's detachment from the secret-channel's product
became clear in early 2014, when Kerry decided to merge the two
negotiation tracks. The understanding that had developed through the
secret channel was spilled into the discussions that Indyk's team was
holding with both sides over a "framework document.” Netanyahu was
willing to work with the fruits of the secret channel (although he
insisted on airing his reservations, and the negotiations his advisers
held with Indyk over the exact wording were endless). But Abbas
completely rejected what had already, supposedly, been accepted by his
own negotiator. He wasn't willing to show any flexibility on the Jewish
state issue, and the idea of excluding any clear reference to a
Palestinian capital in Jerusalem seemed like political suicide.
The anger Abbas expressed at the American framework caught Kerry by
surprise: After all, these were all ideas his supposed negotiator was
discussing with Molho. Realizing he had a problem with Abbas, Kerry
tried to convince Netanyahu to tilt some of the provisions in Abbas's
direction. But the Israeli Prime Minister was not having it. "We already
agreed on these issues in the secret channel," he told the Secretary,
according to a former senior U.S. official.
"Bibi is angry at Kerry for
opening up understandings that everybody considered a done deal, just
because Abbas had changed his mind,” an Israeli Minister told me in
February. But a Palestinian official rebuffed this criticism, saying
that Abbas never changed his mind on anything: "He was presented with
positions that no Palestinian leader could ever accept, and that he
personally had spoken out against many times."
For some, it was
always clear that the positions presented by the supposed "Palestinian
negotiator" in this secret channel were totally unacceptable for Abbas.
Officials involved in the process admit in retrospect that there was too
much wishful thinking regarding the backchannel.
A major reason
for the skepticism of some people involved in the negotiations toward
this backchannel, had to do with Abbas's ostensible confidante. A number
of Israeli, American, and Palestinian officials claimed that it was a
miscalculation to assume this person would have authority to make
concessions on delicate issues. One senior Palestinian official told me
that those in the American and Israeli camps who thought otherwise were
"fools."
A possibility that's not really considered here is that this was all an effort by the 'Palestinians' to see if Israel was bluffing. They never intended to make any concessions but they wanted to see if Israel would. Now, they will pocket the concessions made in the 'back channel' and insist that the 'negotiations' start from there the next time.
Sounds like a recipe for disaster.
Labels: Abu Mazen, Binyamin Netanyahu, Dennis Ross, John Kerry, Martin Indyk, Middle East peace process, Yitzchak Molho
Why the 'peace talks' failed
From an epic piece by Ben Birnbaum and Amir Tibon in
The New Republic, here are
just a few of the reasons why the 'peace talks' failed.
In his rush to announce the resumption
of talks before flying home, though, Kerry left the conversation with
two serious misunderstandings that would sow the seeds for later
surprises. Netanyahu’s 2,000-plus figure covered only homes that were
open for bidding. (In his mind, long-term building plans were a
different story.) Nor did it include East Jerusalem, a part of the West
Bank that Israel considered sovereign territory. Focused on the big
picture, Kerry hadn’t asked for such clarifications.
The
more consequential miscommunication concerned the prisoners. Netanyahu
told Kerry that he was prepared to release approximately 80 of them
(excluding those with Israeli identity cards). Kerry asked for—and thought he heard Netanyahu agree to—all
104. “Both of them like to talk for long periods of time,” said someone
who has dealt with both leaders. “And I’m not sure that when one of
them is lecturing the other at length, the other guy is really listening
very carefully.”
...
Two weeks later, the Israeli and
Palestinian negotiators met at a hotel west of Jerusalem. Both sides
showed up angry. Erekat and Shtayyeh were steaming at new Israeli
settlement plans that had been announced immediately after the second
prisoner release days earlier, and at Netanyahu’s (false) claim in an
interview that Abbas had accepted the new building in return for the
prisoners. Meanwhile, Livni and Molho, who had adhered rigorously to
Kerry’s gag order on the talks, were incensed by a slew of Palestinian
news stories that they believed their counterparts had leaked. Both
sides, excepting Molho, were frustrated at the lack of progress they’d
made over three months. And the claustrophobic setting—a small bedroom that had been converted into a conference room—didn’t help to calm nerves.
Erekat
stormed into the room and slammed his briefcase on the table. In recent
weeks, with the talks faltering, he had begun drafting a Palestinian
Plan B that would include ending Fatah's six-year-old rift with Hamas
and resuming the U.N. campaign—steps that would
doom the process. Pointing at the briefcase, he declared: “This case
contains our requests to join fifteen U.N. treaties and conventions, and
my president will get my suggestion that he should sign them
immediately if you say it was prisoners for settlements. And if he
doesn’t approve it, I will resign tonight.”
“You can’t do this,” Livni said, raising her voice. “This is not what we agreed on.”
“What we agreed on was prisoners for no-U.N., not prisoners for settlements,” he barked.
“Stop
shouting,” Livni said. “You’re being unfair.” But Erekat kept yelling
that the settlements were making him a pariah among his people.
As Livni listened to Erekat complain about his political problems, something inside her snapped.
“Do you think this is easy for me?”
she shouted. She recited a litany of some of the worst Palestinian
prisoners that Israel was releasing for the sake of the talks: one who
had murdered an elderly Holocaust survivor, another who had stabbed two
teenagers, yet another who had hurled a firebomb at a bus, killing a
mother and her children. “These are your heroes,” she said,
disdainfully. “I don’t know why they are your heroes, but I pushed to
release them to get these talks started so we could get a peace deal, so
if I can do it, you can accept a few houses. Houses can be demolished.
We can’t put those murderers back in jail, and I can’t get back three
lives that were just taken.”
Erekat shot back: “What should I tell all the Palestinians who were killed?”
Finally,
Indyk intervened, waving his arms like a baseball umpire making the
safe sign. “Time out!” he screamed. The Palestinian negotiators went out
to a nearby veranda, and minutes later, Indyk—whom Kerry had dubbed “the Saeb whisperer”—joined
them. “I can’t take it anymore,” Erekat told Indyk. “It’s time for me
to move on. Netanyahu is cheating us. He is not a man of peace.”
It
was a refrain Indyk had grown accustomed to hearing. “I can tell you
that he’s changing,” he said. “He’s moving.” After a few minutes, Indyk
and the Palestinians returned to the room, and the meeting resumed,
awkwardly. When they parted after three hours, the negotiators shook
hands, as they had always done. But it was clear something had changed.
That night, Erekat and Shtayyeh presented a joint letter of resignation
to Abbas, while Livni called her top aides to vent. “I was one hundred
percent sure it was over,” said one.
...
In early December, Kerry presented
Allen’s proposals to the Israelis. While they sidestepped the question
of when Israeli forces would leave the Jordan Valley, they sketched out
what the area—and the rest of the West Bank—might
look like after they did. The future Palestinian-Jordanian border would
include new early warning infrastructure, an invisible Israeli presence
(via cameras) at border crossings, and top-shelf American gadgetry.
Livni liked the package. So did most of Israel’s security brass. Even
hard-line Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman was making conciliatory
noises. “Israel will not get more than it is getting from Kerry,” he
said publicly. Netanyahu saw it as a basis for discussion.
Netanyahu’s hawkish defense minister—Likud’s Moshe Ya’alon—thought
it was worthless. “The Americans think we are natives who will be
impressed with their technology,” he told one confidant. “Don’t they
know that we are the masters of technology?” Unfortunately for everyone
involved, it was impossible to imagine the Israeli government approving
any deal without Ya'alon's support.
For months, the Americans had courted the crusty defense minister and concluded that he was—in the words of one senior official—“beyond
repair.” Ya’alon, meanwhile, railed about American naïveté in
off-the-record briefings with journalists. On January 14, an Israeli
newspaper published some of his remarks, including his diagnosis of
Kerry as “obsessive” and “messianic.” “The only thing that can save us,”
Ya’alon said, “is for John Kerry to win his Nobel Prize and leave us
alone.”
...
Abbas had always been more wary. From
the beginning, he felt as if Kerry was privileging Netanyahu’s needs
over his. And the numbers seemed to bear the Palestinian leader out:
Kerry had met with Netanyahu nearly twice as often as he had with him.
It was not lost on the Palestinians, either, that the secretary’s team—Indyk, Lowenstein, Makovsky, Schwartz, Yaffe, Goldenberg, Blumenthal—sounded
like a Bar Mitzvah guest list. To Abbas, the asymmetry of the
diplomatic triangle was best illustrated by a December meeting between
him and Kerry at the muqata. The meeting, devoted to security issues,
was supposed to have been attended also by General Allen. Kerry showed
up without him. When Abbas asked where he was, Kerry apologized and
explained that Allen needed to stay in Jerusalem and work more with
Netanyahu.
The depth of Palestinian
alienation became clear to Kerry and his team only on February 19, when
the two sides met for dinner at Le Maurice Hotel in Paris—the kickoff to a three-day parley. As the Palestinians walked in the door, each American was struck with the same thought: These guys do not look like they’re in a good mood.
Following dinner, Kerry met alone with Abbas while Erekat and Indyk
spoke in a separate room. Afterward, Kerry and Indyk got in the car that
would take them to their rooms at the Grande Hotel. The secretary
turned to his envoy: “That was really negative.” At around the same
time, Abbas, who was nursing a terrible cold, saw Erekat in the hall and
told him that he was going straight to sleep. “It was a difficult
meeting,” he said. “I’ll brief you tomorrow.”
The
next morning, at around 7:30, Indyk called Erekat. “The secretary wants
to see you,” he said. Erekat was surprised at the early time of the
summons. This must be important. He put on a
suit and took a cab to the Grande. When he and Indyk got to Kerry’s
Louis XIII-style suite, the secretary answered the door. He was dressed
casually: hotel slippers, no jacket or tie. He looked concerned. After a
moment of silence, the first words came out of Kerry’s mouth. “Why is
Abu Mazen so angry with me?”
Erekat responded that he hadn’t yet
been briefed on the meeting, so Kerry offered to get his notes. “I
barely said a word, and he started saying, ‘I cannot accept this,’”
Kerry grumbled, going through some of Abbas’s red lines.
“What do you want?” Erekat said. “These are his positions. We are sick and tired of Bibi the Great. He’s taking you for a ride.”
“No one takes me for a ride!”
“He is refusing to negotiate on a map or even say 1967.”
“I’ve moved him,” Kerry said, “I’ve moved him.”
“Where?” Erekat said, raising his voice. “Show me! This is just the impression he’s giving you.”
The next month, Abbas led a Palestinian
delegation to Washington. At a March 16 lunch at Kerry’s Georgetown
home, the secretary asked Abbas if he’d accept delaying the fourth
prisoner release by a few days. Kerry was worried that the Israelis were
wavering. “No,” Abbas said. “I cannot do this.” Abbas would later
describe that moment as a turning point. If the Americans can’t convince Israel to give me 26 prisoners, he thought then, how will they ever get them to give me East Jerusalem? At
the meal, Erekat noticed Abbas displaying some of his telltale signs of
discomfort. He was crossing his legs, looking over at him every two
minutes. The index cards on which he normally took notes had been placed
back in his suit pocket. Abbas was no longer interested in what was
being said.
The next day at the
White House, Obama tried his luck with the Palestinian leader. He
reviewed the latest American proposals, some of which had been tilted in
Abbas’s direction. (The document would now state categorically that
there would be a Palestinian capital in Jerusalem.) “Don’t quibble with
this detail or that detail,” Obama said. “The occupation will end. You
will get a Palestinian state. You will never have an administration as
committed to that as this one.” Abbas and Erekat were not impressed.
After the meeting, the Palestinian negotiator saw Susan Rice—Abbas’s favorite member of the Obama administration—in
the hall. “Susan,” he said, “I see we’ve yet to succeed in making it
clear to you that we Palestinians aren’t stupid.” Rice couldn’t believe
it. “You Palestinians,” she told him, “can never see the fucking big
picture.”
...
Like Kerry, Abbas felt that his
credibility was at stake. He had promised the Palestinian people that
the prisoners would be released on schedule, on March 29. But as the
date approached, that was looking less and less likely. So Abbas
continued working with Erekat on what he was calling “the Palestinian
nuclear option.” He even put a timer on it: If Israel didn’t vote to
release the fourth tranche by seven o’clock on the evening of April 1,
Abbas would formally resume the U.N. bid in a grand ceremony at the
muqata.
The night before that
deadline, Kerry was supposed to meet Abbas at nine o’clock in Ramallah,
but as of eleven, there was no sign of him. Erekat called the U.S.
consul-general, who told him that Kerry was meeting with Netanyahu, and
that it was running long. Abbas wanted to sleep, so he dispatched Erekat
and Faraj to meet Kerry after midnight in Jerusalem. In his suite at
the David Citadel, Kerry promised Erekat that the Israeli government
would vote on the fourth prisoner release the following day.
“When?” Erekat pressed.
Kerry was peeved that Erekat was insisting on a specific hour. “Before noon,” he said.
Noon
passed without a vote. Then one o’clock, then two, then three. Making
matters worse, Israel’s Housing Ministry approved 708 new homes for a
disputed neighborhood in East Jerusalem that afternoon. Abbas was
nearing the end of his patience.
Around seven o'clock, he sat in his office with Erekat and Faraj. “Have you heard any word from the Israelis?” he asked Erekat.
“No,” Erekat replied. “Not a word.”
“How about you?” he asked Faraj, who gave the same answer.
The U.N.-ceremony attendees were taking their seats down the hall. “Let’s give them another half-hour,” he said.
Livni
had no idea what was happening inside the muqata. She was sitting in
the hall outside Netanyahu’s office, along with many other people,
waiting for her turn to speak to the prime minister. But shortly before
eight, she got a bad feeling: Everyone around her started receiving text
messages, all at once. An aide turned on the television. There, beneath
the Jerusalem panorama at the same table from which he had first
lobbied his peers to resume talks nine months earlier, Abbas declared to
a roomful of officials and VIPs that “the Palestinian leadership has
unanimously approved a decision to seek membership of fifteen U.N.
conventions and international treaties.”
“This is our right,” he continued.“All
we get from the Israeli government is talk.” As Abbas took out his pen
to sign the U.N. conventions, with Erekat at his side, the room gave him
a standing ovation.
Earlier
that afternoon, while Abbas and Erekat were watching the clock at the
muqata, Netanyahu sat in his office, taking meeting after meeting.
First, he would invite in Livni and Kerry’s team to discuss the
coalescing Pollard-for-prisoners-for-talks deal. Then, he would bring in
a group of pro-settler politicians led by Housing Minister Uri Ariel to
calm their nerves about the impending settlement freeze. Wow, Ariel thought each time he passed Livni in the doorway, it’s like we’re doing shifts.
Livni
was pressing Netanyahu for an immediate vote on the deal. “Everything
is ready,” she said, “just get the ministers here.” Netanyahu, however,
was working with Kerry on an exchange of letters that would make
everything official. Kerry, meanwhile, was waiting on White House
approval of a single paragraph—the Pollard
paragraph. But Rice’s staff was still engaged in frantic negotiations
with Israeli officials over the particulars: when Pollard would go free,
where he could travel, what he could say. Though Netanyahu had promised
Kerry the night before that he would hold the vote today, he had told
Kerry and Indyk earlier that morning that he wanted to wait one more to
prepare Israeli public opinion. Indyk was incredulous. “Mr. Prime
Minister,” he said, “you are playing with fire.”
The
Israeli right was also in rebellion mode, with Likud officials vowing
to resign and Bennett again threatening to leave the government if the
fourth tranche was released. As Netanyahu pressed the merits of the
extension deal to Ariel and his hard-right allies during one of their
shifts, one of his aides entered the room: “Mr. Prime Minister, Abu
Mazen has just signed fifteen U.N. conventions.” Netanyahu froze. For
years, he had feared that the Palestinians might join the International
Criminal Court and lodge war-crimes charges against Israeli officials.
“Which conventions?” he asked. After several minutes of confusion, one
of the people in the room managed to locate a list. Chuckling, he told
the others that the Palestinians—the Palestinians—had signed the anti-corruption charter. The room burst into laughter.
Erekat,
who for months had been urging Abbas to blow up the talks, was as giddy
as the settlers. That night, Indyk summoned Erekat to the U.S.
Consul-General’s home in Jerusalem. The moment the Palestinian
negotiator walked in the door, Indyk began yelling. “Don’t act
surprised, Martin,” Erekat said, grinning. “You told me nine times in
four days that the prisoners were about to be released.” (The Americans
dispute Erekat’s number, claiming that they had told the Palestinians
the prisoner-release vote was imminent only three or four times.) Indyk
asked Erekat when the U.N. letters of accession would be submitted. He
replied that the local U.N. representative would receive them the
following morning at nine. “Please delay it,” Indyk said. “Just for
twenty-four hours, hold it back.”
While
Erekat and Indyk were going back and forth, Erekat’s phone rang. It was
Livni. “OK,” she said, “so you had your little show. Now hold back the
documents. We have a deal to extend the talks. The prisoners can go out
in forty-eight hours, and then we can get to substance. Don’t destroy
this.” Erekat told her that he was with the Americans and would have to
call back. The following morning, he sent her a text message. “It’s a
done deal,” he wrote. “We just handed in the documents.”
Over
the next three weeks, with April 29 approaching, Indyk would meet nine
times with Livni, Molho, Erekat, and Faraj in a bid to salvage the peace
talks. He was determined to get everything in writing this time. No
more misunderstandings. And by April 23, the sides seemed close to an
extension agreement. Indyk drove to Ben Gurion Airport that day to pick
up his wife, and while at the baggage claim, he got a call from Livni.
She’d heard that the Palestinians had just done something to ruin all
the progress they had made. Indyk immediately phoned Erekat, who said he
wasn’t aware of the development, but would investigate. Back at the
U.S. consulate, the Kerry team was combing over the details of the
emerging deal, with the secretary calling periodically to check in.
Soon, the news penetrated their office, too. Weeks earlier, they had
been surprised by the timing of Abu Mazen’s U.N. ceremony, but not by
the act. The Palestinians had put them on notice. But as the American
officials huddled around a desktop computer, hungry for actual details
about this rumor they were hearing, they couldn’t believe the headline
that now flashed across the screen: FATAH, HAMAS END YEARS OF DIVISON,
AGREE TO UNITY GOVERNMENT.The next day, the Israeli Cabinet had voted to suspend the talks. John Kerry’s peace process was over.
The only surprising things about this were (a) that the Americans apparently were willing to release Jonathan Pollard just for an extension of the talks (okay, yes that would have been sensible, but there hasn't been a lot of common sense in Pollard's case, only vindictiveness) and (b) how amateurish some of Kerry's behavior was.
But it's a good story....
Labels: Abu Mazen, Barack Hussein Obama, Binyamin Netanyahu, John Kerry, Jonathan Pollard, Martin Indyk, Middle East peace process, Saeb Erekat, Tzipi Livni, Yitzchak Molho
As usual, the Americans 'forgot' to press the 'Palestinians'
Barak Ravid's
authoritative summary of why the 'peace talks' failed is way too long to start excerpting. But the bottom line is that the Americans once again negotiated on behalf of the 'Palestinians' with the result that Netanyahu made many unanswered concessions that will move the starting point the next time, while the 'Palestinians' once again walked away.
What could go wrong?
Labels: Abu Mazen, Barack Hussein Obama, Binyamin Netanyahu, John Kerry, Martin Indyk, Middle East peace process, Saeb Erekat, Tzipi Livni, Yitzchak Molho
Abu Mazen denies 'secret back channel' with Netanyahu
The 'Palestinian Authority' is denying the existence of a '
secret back channel' for talks between Prime Minister Netanyahu and '
moderate' '
Palestinian' President
Mahmoud Abbas Abu Mazen. The channel's existence was first broken by Yedioth Aharonoth on Thursday. This is from the first link.
The reports, which elicited denials from Abbas's spokesman Nabil Abu Rdeina, according to Judea Samaria-based Arab Ma'an News Agency,
argue that Netanyahu's delegate Attorney Yitzhak Molcho has been
meeting with an associate of Abbas in London for secret talks.
"This back-channel diplomacy includes an exchange of messages and
ideas and is aimed at solving problems troubling both sides," according
to the report. "Both Netanyahu and Abbas kept the talks confidential in
order to avoid political pressure."
The report indicates that the resumption of peace talks under US
Secretary of State John Kerry made the secret channel of communication
superfluous, "likely prompting Netanyahu to inform some of the Israelis
and Americans involved in the talks about the back channel."
I'd bet on the back channel existing, particularly since Tzipi Livni was placed in charge of the 'peace talks' last year.
Labels: Abu Mazen, Binyamin Netanyahu, Middle East peace process, Tzipi Livni, Yitzchak Molho
Livni and Molcho in conflict over Jerusalem, 'isolated settlements'
Israel's Justice Minister and 'chief negotiator,' Tzipi Livni, is in
conflict with Prime Minister Netanyahu's representative to the 'peace talks,' Yitzchak Molcho, over Jerusalem and the 'isolated settlements.'
According to the [Israel Radio] report, Molcho asked to restrict the boundaries as much
as possible, bordering on east Jerusalem, while Livni showed a more
flexible stance.
Israel's opening position on the borders is the actual path of the
separation barrier rather than the pre-1967 lines as demanded by the
Palestinians, Israel Radio reported.
Israel wishes to retain not
only the settlement blocs, but also some isolated settlements beyond the
barrier, such as Psagot and Beit-El, the report added.
Israel has
also stated that it will keep its hold on the Jordan Valley and its
water resources, but Palestinians will be allowed to purchase water from
Israel.
...
Sources at the Prime Minister's Office
deny the issue concerning the borders, and added that it has been made
clear to the Palestinians that Jerusalem will remain under Israeli
sovereignty with its present borders.
Livni's office offered no
comment, but stated that the the report was unfounded and meant to harm
negotiations. The office added that Livni and Molcho were working in
full collaboration.
Of course, if we were a normal country, Netanyahu would just say 'do it my way' (which is likely Molcho's way) or resign. But Livni seems to have a spell over Netanyahu and he promised her that she could run the 'negotiations' despite heading a six-member faction in his coalition.
What could go wrong?
Labels: Binyamin Netanyahu, defensible borders, East Jerusalem, Middle East peace process, security fence, Tzipi Livni, Yitzchak Molho
Tzipi Livni converts to Islam?
Is Tzipi Livni converting to Islam? That's sure what it sounds like. She is
sharing the Iftar dinner (the meal at the end of each day's fast in Ramadamadan) with US Secretary of State John Kerry on Monday.
Secretary of State John Kerry will host "an Iftar dinner for Israeli
Justice Minister Tzipi Livni," according to a copy of his schedule
released by the State Department. The dinner will also be attended by
"Palestinian chief negotiator Saeb Erekat."
The event will be closed to the press.
Kerry's schedule for today reads:
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
PUBLIC SCHEDULE
MONDAY, JULY 29, 2013
SECRETARY JOHN KERRY
...
8:00 p.m. Secretary Kerry hosts an Iftar dinner for
Israeli Justice Minister Tzipi Livni and Palestinian chief negotiator
Saeb Erekat, at the Department of State.
(CLOSED PRESS COVERAGE)
Note that Prime Minister Netanyahu's confidante, Attorney Yitzchak Molcho, who is traveling with Livni, is apparently excluded from the event.
What could go wrong?
Labels: iftar dinner, John Kerry, Saeb Erekat, Tzipi Livni, Yitzchak Molho
Kerry spoke too soon?
US Secretary of State John Kerry may have spoken too soon when he announced on Friday night that 'negotiations' between Israel and the 'Palestinians' would be resuming. The 'Palestinians' say that they're not coming to the table until Israel agrees that the 'negotiations' will be 'based upon' the 1949 armistice lines, and Israel has
already rejected that demand.
Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat will not depart for preliminary
peace talks in Washington until his government receives assurances
regarding Israel’s readiness to negotiate a deal based on the 1967 lines
and a commitment to release prisoners who have been serving sentences
handed down before the signing of the Oslo Accords, the pan-Arab daily
newspaper Al-Hayat reported Tuesday.
Erekat,
the veteran negotiator, is due to meet with Justice Minister Tzipi
Livni and Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s envoy Yitzhak Molho early
next week in the American capital to discuss the terms for renewing
talks.
A spokesperson for Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas said
that Erekat would insist on establishing a framework for negotiations
that would eventually address key Palestinian demands before direct
talks with Israel resume, according to Israel Radio.
Do I hear a 7th John Kerry trip here next week?
Labels: Abu Mazen, Binyamin Netanyahu, John Kerry, Middle East peace process, negotiations without preconditions, Saeb Erekat, Tzipi Livni, Yitzchak Molho
Livni and Molcho met secretly with Kerry this morning
Anyone want to try a caption for the photo?
Haaretz's Barak Ravid tweets that Justice Minister and chief negotiator Tzipi Livni, and attorney Itzhak Molcho, the Prime Minister's special envoy,
met secretly on Monday morning in Jordan with US Secretary of State John FN Kerry
, amid frantic efforts to renew 'peace talks.'
In a
more detailed report in Hebrew, Ravid reports that the meeting started at 8:30 this morning and lasted for several hours. Its goal was to 'bridge the gaps' between Israel and the 'Palestinians.' The meeting was followed by a meeting between Kerry and '
moderate' '
Palestinian' President
Mahmoud Abbas Abu Mazen in the latter's Amman home.
Labels: final status negotiations, John Kerry, Middle East peace process, negotiations without preconditions, Tzipi Livni, Yitzchak Molho
Netanyahu and Abu Mazen have a 'channel of communications'
Haaretz reports that even though they're not really talking, Prime Minister Netanyahu and '
moderate' '
Palestinian' President
Mahmoud Abbas Abu Mazen have a '
channel of communications' open.
It is Molho and Erekat who are maintaining the line of communication between Jerusalem and Ramallah. Senior officials in Jerusalem and Western diplomats said that the two have met six or seven times in the past two months.
The talks between Erekat and Molho in recent months can't be characterized as peace talks. The Palestinians' preconditions for entering into negotiations have remained as they were – talks on the basis of the 1967 ceasefire lines and the freezing of construction in West Bank settlements. Netanyahu's announcement of the construction of 851 new housing units in the settlements is a sign that peace talks aren't expected to start anytime soon.
The line of communications between Netanyahu and Abbas has to do more with the mundane day-to-day problems between the two sides that need to be addressed at the highest levels. Erekat and Molho held four or five meetings concerning the exchange of communiqués between Netanyahu and Abbas during April and May. These meetings dealt mostly with coordinating the phrasing of the communiqués and several requests on the part of the Palestinians for gestures of good will by the Israelis.
Since Molho arrived at Ramallah on May 11 and delivered Netanyahu's communiqué to Abbas, he has had another two meetings with Erekat on the subject of the Palestinian prisoners' hunger strike, a Palestinian request for a permit to bring weapons and ammunition in from Jordan to supply the Palestinian Authority's security forces, and other issues.
In the last three weeks no meetings were held, after Erekat suffered two heart attacks and went on a prolonged vacation from which he will return on Sunday. "It's true we've been meeting regularly in the past few months as well as talking on the phone, but one shouldn't read too much into this," Erekat said Saturday. "We will continue meeting ant talking if need be, but the conditions for renewing the negotiations remain as they were."
Molho brought up the possibility of a meeting between Netanyahu and Abbas several times during his meetings with Erekat, even if these aren't characterized as renewed peace talks. The Palestinians didn't agree to this, but Abbas expressed some more openness to the idea over the weekend.
"For us to return to the negotiation table the construction in the settlements must be stopped," Abbas said in Paris on Friday. "But if Netanyahu agrees to free prisoners and allow our police force to receive a shipment of weapons, then we will sit down and talk, though this will not be peace talks. This is what he [Netanyahu] offered."
Of course, for the last three years, we didn't even have these communications. What could go wrong?
Labels: Abu Mazen, Binyamin Netanyahu, direct talks, Saeb Erekat, Yitzchak Molho
