How badly did Obama and Kerry lie?
At least Israel and Iran can agree on something. Obama and Kerry are unreliable liars.
For the last two weeks, the lame duck Obama administration has been trying to depict itself as
totally passive in allowing UN Security Council Resolution 2334, condemning Israeli 'settlements' in Jerusalem (among other things), to pass.
Last week, Israel Radio reported on an
Egyptian newspaper report that put out a transcript of what was said to be a White House meeting with 'Palestinian negotiators.' Now, MEMRI has
translated that report into English. It's devastating. Among other things not previously reported, the 'Palestinians' asked that Obama cancel the designation of the PLO as a terrorist organization, and insisted that the 'Palestinian leadership' be allowed to move freely in the United States. Look for Obama to issue executive orders on these issues in the next two weeks.
On December 27, the Egyptian daily Al-Youm Al-Sabi',
which is close to Egyptian intelligence services, published an exposé
of the minutes of the secret talks. According to the report, by Ahmed
Gomaa, the Palestinian delegation included PLO Executive Committee
secretary and negotiating team leader Saeb Erekat; Palestinian general
intelligence chief Majid Faraj; Husam Zomlot, strategic affairs advisor
to Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud 'Abbas; Palestinian Foreign
Ministry official Dr. Majed Bamya; Palestinian negotiations department
official Azem Bishara; Palestinian intelligence international relations
department chief Nasser 'Adwa; and head of the PLO delegation to
Washington Ma'an Erekat.
The report gave the details of the
Palestinian delegation's schedule during the visit, noting that "the
Palestinian side began its meetings on December 12, when Saeb Erekat and
Majid Faraj met with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry. The next day,
the two met with National Security Advisor Susan Rice. The entire
delegation met with an American team that included four representatives
of the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security, for a six-hour
political-strategic meeting. Majid Faraj concluded his visit with a
lengthy meeting with the CIA chief."
According to the report, the
minutes of the "top secret" meeting of Kerry, Rice, Erekat, and Faraj
reveals U.S.-Palestinian coordination leading up to the UN Security
Council vote on Resolution 2334 regarding Israel's settlements, which
was adopted December 23. It states that the sides "agreed to cooperate
in drafting a resolution on the settlements" and that the U.S.
representative in the Security Council was "empowered" to coordinate
with the Palestinian UN representative on the resolution.
The meeting also, according to the
report, was aimed at coordinating Kerry's attendance at the upcoming
international Paris Conference set for January 15, 2017, in order to
promote a further international move regarding the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. Kerry, it said, offered to propose his ideas for a permanent
arrangement "provided that they are supported by the Palestinian side."
At
the meeting, Rice pointed out the "danger" of the incoming Trump
administration's policies, the report stated, adding that both she and
Kerry had advised President 'Abbas to make no preliminary moves that
might provoke the new administration. Rice even offered to help arrange a
meeting between the Palestinian delegation and a representative from
the Trump team, by enlisting the help of World Jewish Congress president
Ronald Lauder.
Also at the meeting, Erekat warned
that if the U.S. Embassy was moved to Jerusalem, the Palestinians would
call to expel U.S. Embassies from Arab and Muslim capitals, the report
said.
The report added that Kerry and
Rice had fulsomely praised 'Abbas's policies and how he handled matters,
and harshly criticized Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu,
saying that he "aims to destroy the two-state solution."
...
U.S.
Representative To The Security Council Coordinated With Palestinian UN
Representative On The Issue Of The Resolution Condemning The Settlements
According to the Al-Youm Al-Sabi' report, "the minutes of the
meeting – which was attended by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and
National Security Advisor Susan Rice, and on the Palestinian side by PLO
Executive Committee Secretary and negotiations team leader Saeb Erekat,
and head of Palestinian general intelligence Maj,-Gen. Majid Faraj –
reveals that the sides agreed to collaborate regarding a resolution on
the settlements." According to the report, "during the meeting, the
American side focused on coordination of positions between Washington
and Ramallah regarding the resolution on the settlements, which was
brought to a vote in the Security Council and adopted several days
ago..."
The report stated that "the minutes of the meeting reveal
American-Palestinian coordination regarding the resolution on the
settlements" and that Kerry and Rice stressed that "they were willing to
cooperate with a balanced resolution, and that Washington's UN mission
was authorized to discuss this matter with the Palestinian
representative to the UN, Ambassador Riyad Mansour." It continued: "The
U.S.'s representative to the Security Council coordinated with the
Palestinian ambassador on the issue of the resolution condemning the
settlements."
Coordinating Kerry's Attendance At International Conference In France
The delegation also attempted to coordinate Kerry's attendance at the
Paris Conference, which will take place January 15, 2017, to promote a
further international move for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
according to the report. "As for the French initiative, U.S. Secretary
of State John Kerry said that he could not attend [the conference if it
were to be held] December 21-22, but stressed that he could [attend it
if it were to be held] after January 9. The Palestinian delegation
stressed that 'Abbas had contacted the French side, and that it had
expressed its willingness to postpone the international conference [in
Paris] so that the American secretary of state could attend."
Possibility Of Kerry Presenting His Ideas For Permanent Solution
According to the report, "Kerry raised the
possibility of presenting ideas for a permanent solution, provided that
they are supported by the Palestinian side... and this refers to
principles that have already been raised as part of the Framework
Agreement.[3]
He also proposed that the Palestinian delegation travel to Saudi Arabia
to discuss these points, but according to the minutes, he did not
contact the Saudis on this matter. [Additionally,] according to the
minutes of the meeting, National Security Advisor Susan Rice rejected,
and ridiculed, the offer to propose ideas, arguing that the [incoming]
administration of Republican President Donald Trump will completely
oppose them."
Rice "Stressed The Danger Posed By The Trump Administration"
Rice, the report stated, "stressed the
danger posed by the Trump administration, which could take a position
different from that of all American administrations since 1967 on the
issue of Palestine and Israel. She emphasized that she took seriously
statements about moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem and the Trump
administration's view of the settlements."
Kerry and Rice "advised Palestinian
President Mahmoud 'Abbas to not take any preliminary steps that could
provoke the Trump administration, such as dismantling the PA, turning to
the International Criminal Court, or ending security coordination with
Israel," said the report, adding: "They [also] stressed the need to
avoid military action or martyrdom [attacks], as these would greatly
jeopardize the Palestinian position.
"They praised the substantial efforts of
the Palestinian security apparatuses, specifically Palestinian [general]
intelligence, led by Majid Faraj, as part of what they called 'the
struggle against terrorism.' [The two] maintained that
Palestinian-American collaboration in this area is among the closest of
all the coordination between American apparatuses and security forces in
the region."
Rice Offered To Organize Meeting Between Ronald Lauder And Palestinian Delegation
"According to the minutes of the meeting,
Susan Rice asked whether the Palestinian delegation could meet with a
representative from Donald Trump's team. She clarified that she could
request intervention and could organize this by means of World Jewish
Congress President Ronald Lauder. Saeb Erekat responded that he had
already asked but that Lauder could not. He added: 'We were told that
they were still organizing the new administration, and that once they
were done, they would officially meet with the Palestinian side.'"
Erekat: If U.S. Embassy Is Moved To Jerusalem, We Will Call To Expel U.S. Embassies From Arab And Muslim Countries
"When Susan Rice asked what the
Palestinian response would be if the U.S. Embassy was moved to
Jerusalem, or if a new settlement bloc was annexed, Erekat responded:
'We will directly and immediately join 16 international organizations,
withdraw the PLO's recognition of Israel, and cut back our security,
political, and economic ties with the Israeli occupation regime, and we
will hold it fully responsible for the PA's collapse. Furthermore, we
will [call] on the Arab and Islamic peoples to expel U.S. Embassies from
their capitals.' Rice answered Erekat by saying: 'It seems that future
matters could be very complicated, and we are all apprehensive about
sitting down with Erekat because of his absolute knowledge of these
matters, and because of his memory and his sincerity.' She expressed the
American side's respect and friendship for Erekat, and apologized for
yelling at him in March 2014."
"The Palestinian Delegation Officially Demanded That The Law... Designating The PLO A Terrorist Organization Be Rescinded"
According to the report, "the Palestinian
side officially demanded that the 1987 U.S. law designating the PLO a
terrorist organization be rescinded.
[4]
Furthermore, both sides agreed to establish a bilateral commission to
examine visa requests from Palestinians and entry and movement visas for
Palestinian leadership in the U.S."
Read the whole thing.
Labels: American allies, Barack Hussein Obama, Binyamin Netanyahu, designated terror organization, Jerusalem Embassy Act, John Kerry, Ron Lauder, Saeb Erekat, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334
#CHANGE Time for an Israeli victory
It's the last day of Chanuka, so I couldn't resist the graphic.
Some 2,300 years after the Hasmonean's Chanuka military victory (caused by some miracles from God), Daniel Pipes argues it's time for
another Jewish victory.
I propose an Israeli victory and a Palestinian defeat. That is to
say, Washington should encourage Israelis to take steps that cause
Mahmoud Abbas, Khaled Mashal, Saed Erekat, Hanan Ashrawi, and the rest
of that crew to realize that the gig is up, that no matter how many U.N.
resolutions are passed, their foul dream of eliminating the Jewish
state is defunct, that Israel is permanent, strong, and tough. After the
leadership recognizes this reality, the Palestinian population at large
will follow, as will eventually other Arab and Muslim states, leading
to a resolution of the conflict. Palestinians will gain by finally being
released from a cult of death to focus instead on building their own
policy, society, economy, and culture.
While the incoming Trump administration’s Middle East policies remain
obscure, President-elect Trump himself vociferously opposed Resolution
2334 and has signaled (for example, by his choice of David M. Friedman
as ambassador to Israel) that he is open to a dramatically new approach
to the conflict, one far more favorable to Israel than Barack Obama’s.
With his lifelong pursuit of winning (“We will have so much winning if I
get elected that you may get bored with winning”), Trump would probably
be drawn to an approach that has our side win and the other side lose.
Victory also suits the current mood of Israel’s prime minister, Binyamin
Netanyahu. He’s not just furious at being abandoned in the United
Nations, he has an ambitious vision of Israel’s global importance.
Further, his being photographed recently carrying a copy of historian
John David Lewis’s Nothing Less than Victory: Decisive Wars and the
Lessons of History signals that he is explicitly thinking in terms of
victory in war: Lewis in his book looks at six case studies, concluding
that in each of them “the tide of war turned when one side tasted defeat
and its will to continue, rather than stiffening, collapsed.”
Finally, the moment is right in terms of the larger trends of
regional politics. That the Obama administration effectively became an
ally of the Islamic Republic of Iran scared Sunni Arab states, Saudi
Arabia at the fore, into being far more realistic than ever before;
needing Israel for the first time, the “Palestine” issue has lost some
of its salience, and Arab conceits about Israel as the arch enemy have
been to some extent abandoned, creating an unprecedented potential
flexibility.
Sounds like a plan.
Labels: Abu Mazen, Barack Hussein Obama, Binyamin Netanyahu, Chanuka, Donald Trump, Hanan Ashrawi, Khaled Meshaal, Saeb Erekat
Oh, what a tangled web we weave. When first we practise to deceive!
The Obama administration's effort to deny Prime Minister Netanyahu's charge that
Obama was behind the passage of a
UN resolution declaring the Western Wall to be 'Palestinian territory' has come apart under the weight of its own lies.
You will recall, if you follow the links above that the Obama administration denied the Netanyahu government's accusations that Obama-Kerry were behind and orchestrating the UN resolution. And if you keep reading below, you will find out that in fact, the Obama administration has been orchestrating this resolution since September, and that John Kerry's little post-election trip to New Zealand (and Antartica) is likely connected to it.
On Wednesday morning, Israel Radio reported on an Egyptian newspaper report that published a summary of a meeting among Kerry, Susan Rice and chief 'Palestinian'
negotiator bottle washer Saeb Erekat. That led to this denial from US National Security Council spokesman Ned Price:
To which CAMERA analyst Gidon Shaviv responded.
Price equivocated.
Price never responded to the question.
But in fact, on Tuesday, the State Department's Mark Toner admitted that the meeting did take place. And
much more (full transcript
here).
QUESTION: Yeah. I mean, tensions have been
increasing since the UN vote on Friday. I’m sure you’ve seen all the
reports and heard a lot of the words. The Israeli officials are now
being quoted as saying that they have evidence that they will lay out to
the Trump administration of – in which the U.S., specifically Kerry,
had discussions with the Palestinians before the vote, a few weeks
before, during a visit to Washington where Saeb Erekat was around, and
basically that he pushed them to go to Egypt and to move ahead with this
resolution. That’s one of the things.
MR TONER: Okay.
QUESTION: So the question is: Was the U.S. hiding behind this
other group of countries to submit the resolution? Were those
discussions ever taken place? Because the Israelis feel that they’ve got
evidence that there was meddling by the Americans.
MR TONER: Excuse me. Forgive me. (Coughs.) I picked up a cold over the weekend too, unfortunately, so I apologize.
So you’re right. We’ve obviously seen the same reports, an
amalgamation of different allegations that somehow this was U.S.-driven
and precooked. What I’ll say – excuse me – (coughs) – is that we reject
the notion that the United States was the driving force behind this
resolution. That’s just not true. The United States did not draft this
resolution, nor did it put it forward. It was drafted and initially
introduced, as we all know, by Egypt, in coordination with the
Palestinians and others. When it was clear that the Egyptians and the
Palestinians would insist on bringing this resolution to a vote and that
every other country on the council would, in fact, support it, we made
clear to others, including those on the Security Council, that further
changes were needed to make the text more balanced. And that’s a
standard practice on – with regard to resolutions at the Security
Council. So there’s nothing new to this.
Actually, it's
not 'standard practice' unless you're looking for an excuse not to veto it. If the United States had planned to veto the resolution - as happened many times in the past - it would not have bothered to pretend to make the text 'more balanced,' because it would not have mattered. And it certainly would not have sent Secretary Kerry gallivanting around the world to work on it.
You look like you’re pouncing on me, but go ahead.
QUESTION: No, we just —
MR TONER: No, we’ll continue. I can continue, but if you have a – do you have a follow up?
QUESTION: No, no. Let’s just keep going with this.
MR TONER: Okay, sure. And this is a really important point. We
also made clear at every conversation – in every conversation – that
the President would make the final decision and that he would have to
review the final text before making his final decision. So the idea that
this was, again, precooked or that we had agreed upon the text weeks in
advance is just not accurate. And in fact —
QUESTION: But we know that —
MR TONER: Go ahead. I’m sorry. Go ahead.
QUESTION: No, we know that the U.S. didn’t draft it or put it
forward. But was the U.S. in any way coaxing on any – another group of
countries to move ahead and go and move ahead with this resolution?
You mean like 'humiliated' Joe Biden
leaning on Ukraine to improve the 'optics' and make it 14-0? But Toner didn't bother to explain that.
MR TONER: Well, again, these are – I mean, again, I think it’s
important to have the proper context, in that all through the fall
there was talk about – and we often got the question here and of course
we replied that we’re never going to discuss hypotheticals in terms of
what resolutions or what is circulating out there – but of course, there
has been for some time in the fall talk about this resolution or that
resolution with regard to the Middle East peace and the
Israeli-Palestinian issue.
Yes, of course. Because without the need to worry any more about himself or his party, the true Jew-hating Obama was free to come out.
So of course, in the – of course, in the course of those
conversations, we’re always making clear what our parameters are, what
our beliefs are, what our – what we need to see or what we – in order to
even consider a resolution. That’s part of the give-and-take of the UN.
QUESTION: But surely these countries, before they would move
ahead, would want to get the view of an influential member of the
Security Council of the UN of who – of what their position would be on
this.
MR TONER: Well, again, I think we – of course, as the draft or
the text was circulated, we said to those on the Security Council that –
what further changes were needed to make the text more balanced. And in
fact, we ended up abstaining because we didn’t feel it was balanced
enough in the sense of it didn’t hit hard enough on the
incitement-to-violence side of the coin.
No. When you abstain and you could have vetoed, that's a vote in favor. Let's call a spade a spade.
Go ahead. You look perplexed. (Laughter.) Go ahead, Said.
QUESTION: At what stage did you intervene to try and balance? Was it after Egypt said they’d withdraw it?
MR TONER: I think it was once – yeah, I mean, once – I mean, I
don’t have a date certain. It was once the Egyptians and Palestinians
made it clear that they were going to advance this text or bring this
resolution to a vote and that, in fact, it would be supported by other
countries.
QUESTION: Does that date predate Mr. Erekat’s visit to the State Department?
MR TONER: I don’t know the date of his visit. But again, I’m
not – I’m not exactly – and I’m not necessarily excluding that when he
did visit to the State Department that they didn’t discuss possible
resolutions or anything like that in terms of draft language. But again,
there was no – nothing precooked. There was nothing – this was not some
move orchestrated by the United States.
Please.
Erekat 'visited' the State Department on December 12 - ten days before the Egyptians presented and withdrew the resolution, and eleven days before Malaysia, New Zealand, Senegal and Venezuela - with open support from the UK and behind the scenes support from the US - presented it again. Orchestrated? Bet on it.
QUESTION: Could you be clear what you just said? I heard a
double negative in there. You’re not precluding that they didn’t discuss
it. Are you saying they – that when the Palestinians were here —
MR TONER: I don’t have a readout. Yeah, I don’t have a readout
of that meeting in front of me. I just – but I said I can imagine that
they talked about Middle East peace broadly and efforts to reinvigorate
the process. I don’t know that they discussed the possible action at the
UN. But of course, as we – as I said in answer to Lesley’s question,
that was something that was in the mix for some months now in New York
at the UN that there might be some action taken there.
This wouldn't be anywhere near as suspicious had the meeting been publicly disclosed on December 12. But if had, Israel would not have been blindsided.
QUESTION: And what about New Zealand, when the Secretary was there before Antarctica?
MR TONER: Yeah.
Yeah indeed. Let's interrupt for a minute. Here's a
New Zealand Herald report from November 13, five days after the US election.
One of the closed-door discussions between United States Secretary of
State John Kerry and the New Zealand Government today was a potential
resolution by the United Nations Security Council on a two-state
solution for the Israel - Palestinian conflict.
After the talks, Foreign Minister Murray McCully even raised the possibility of the US or New Zealand sponsoring a resolution.
"It
is a conversation we are engaged in deeply and we've spent some time
talking to Secretary Kerry about where the US might go on this.
"It is something that is still in play," McCully told reporters after talks today in Wellington.
New Zealand's two-year term on the Security Council will end in ignominy on Saturday. But then, we should not have been as surprised by
their behavior as we were. Our bad.
Back to the State Department.
QUESTION: And also I believe he had a meeting here with Mr. Shoukry at some point in early December.
MR TONER: Mm-hmm.
QUESTION: Was the resolution discussed at either of those meetings with those diplomats?
MR TONER: Again, I can’t specifically say whether the
resolution – but certainly, if a resolution or action at the UN was
discussed, it wasn’t discussed in the level of detail where there was
some final text. We always reserved the right with any text that was put
forward, drafted and put forward, to veto it or to not take action or
abstain, which is what we ended up doing.
Like I said - when you have a veto and you don't use it, you're voting in favor.
QUESTION: But you advised them on how to put
together a motion that the United States would feel comfortable
abstaining or voting in favor of?
MR TONER: Well, I think what we said is – and this is not just
unique to this process, but once a text, a draft text is to the point
where it’s going to be put forward to a vote, of course we would provide
input on what we believed were – was language that didn’t pass or
didn’t allow us to vote for it or —
QUESTION: You see what I’m saying?
MR TONER: Yeah.
QUESTION: You didn’t just say bring whatever motion you like
up and we’ll vote however we feel about it. You were encouraging them to
bring forward a motion that you would feel comfortable not blocking.
Sounds like game, set and match right here.
MR TONER: Well, but we have to be really careful in how we’re talking about this because what the allegations —
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR TONER: No, I know and I understand that. But no, no, but
I’m saying that some of the allegations out there, frankly, are implying
that this was somehow some – as I said, some orchestrated action by the
U.S. to pass a resolution that was negative about settlement activity
in Israel, and the fact is that that’s just not the case. Of course, we
would always provide, when the final text was going up for a vote, our
opinion on where the red lines were. But I think that – I think this is
all a little bit of a sideshow, to be honest, that this was a resolution
that we could not in good conscience veto because it condemns violence,
it condemned incitement, it reiterates what has long been the
overwhelming consensus international view on settlements, and it calls
for the parties to take constructive steps to advance a two-state
solution on the ground. There was nothing in there that would prompt us
to veto that type of resolution.
Actually, no. The only party it calls on to do anything is
Israel.
QUESTION: But there was nothing in there —
MR TONER: And in fact —
QUESTION: — because you told them not to put anything in there that would cause you to veto it.
MR TONER: But that – but again, not at all. And I said we did
not take the lead in drafting this resolution. That was done by the
Egyptians with the Palestinians. But again, in any kind of resolution
process, of course there’s moments where – or I mean, it’s not like our
views regarding settlements or regarding resolutions with respect to
Israel aren’t well-known and well-vetted within the UN community.
There’s been many times in the past where we’ve not – or we vetoed
resolutions that we found to be biased towards Israel. But that’s
another point here is that there’s nothing – the other canard in all of
this is that this was somehow breaking with longstanding U.S. tradition
in the UN Security Council, when we all know that every administration
has vetoed – or rather has abstained or voted for similar resolutions.
Actually, no administration other than the Carter administration has ever called 'settlements' illegal. And no administration has ever called on 'all States'
to
distinguish, in their relevant dealings, between the territory of the
State of Israel and the territories occupied since 1967
That's right. In case you missed it, the Obama administration voted for a resolution that backs BDS.
QUESTION: But it’s true then that you had opportunities to ask them not to bring it forward at all and didn’t take them.
MR TONER: I’m not sure what you’re —
QUESTION: Well, instead of saying why not write the motion this way, you could have said please don’t bring a motion.
MR TONER: Well, again, I think when it was clear to us that
they were going to bring it to a vote and that every other council –
every other country on the council was going to support that resolution,
that draft text —
Since when does a country with veto power have to worry about what 'every other country on the council' is going to do, especially a week before ten of the council's 15 members are about to turn over? Funny that we never hear Russia or China worrying about what 'every other country on the council' is going to do.
But the effort to destroy Israel in the council
goes back much further than Kerry's trip to New Zealand in November. Here's Adam Kredo from the Washington Free Beacon.
Jonathan Schanzer, a Middle East expert and vice president for research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, told the Free Beacon
that he spoke with U.S. officials in September who admitted that “a
U.N. measure of some shape or form was actively considered,” a charge
that runs counter the White House’s official narrative.
“We know that this administration was at a minimum helping to shape a
final resolution at the United Nations and had been working on this for
months,” Schanzer said.
“This isn’t terribly dissimilar from the administration’s attempts to
spin the cash pallets they sent to Iran,” he added, referring to the
administration’s efforts to conceal the fact that it sent the Iranian
government some $1.7 billion in cash.
“The fact is, the administration has been flagged as being an active
participant in this U.N. resolution,” Schanzer said. “Now they wish to
try to spin this as inconsequential. This was an attempt by the
administration to lead from behind, as they have done countless times in
the past and which has failed countless times in the past.”
And if you're having any doubts whether to believe Schanzer or to believe the Obama-Kerry spin, please consider this.
One veteran foreign policy insider and former government official who
requested anonymity in order to speak freely described senior Obama
administration officials as “lying sacks of shit” who routinely feed the
press disinformation.
A senior congressional aide who is working on a package of repercussions aimed at the U.N. told the Free Beacon the administration is scrambling to provide excuses in response to the breakdown in its own narrative regarding the resolution.
“The administration got caught red handed, and now they’re talking
out of both sides of their mouth,” said the source, who was not
authorized to speak on record. “First they claimed the resolution was
simply not objectionable. Now they say it will actually help advance
peace. These denials only look more ridiculous with each passing day as
new evidence surfaces that the White House was behind this anti-Israel
resolution.”
The Obama administration has been caught several times misleading the
public about its campaign to discredit Israel, including the funding of
an organization that sought to unseat Netanyahu in the country’s last
election, according to one congressional adviser who works with
Republican and Democratic offices on Middle East issues.
All of which leads this Jew to believe that columnist and lawyer Kurt Schlichter is spot-on with this tweet.
Indeed.
Labels: American allies, Barack Hussein Obama, Binyamin Netanyahu, John Kerry, New Zealand, Saeb Erekat, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334
'Palestinian' flag banned from Eurovision
Eurovision is a song festival in Europe that is televised and voted upon internationally. Israel is a participant. The imaginary country of 'Palestine' is not. (They don't need to be - a couple of years ago, the Israeli entrants showed up
carrying Syrian flags).
Last week, Eurovision published a list of banned flags. The
banned flags included the 'Palestinian' flag, and 'Palestinian' chief
negotiator bottle washer Saeb Erekat
howled in protest.
Palestinian leaders are blasting the Eurovision Song Contest for
preventing their flag from being flown during the event this month.
Palestinian official Saeb Erekat voiced his dismay in a letter to
Jean-Paul Philippot, the head of the European Broadcasting Union which
oversees the yearly contest. In the letter, obtained by The Associated
Press Sunday, Erekat says the decision is "totally biased and
unacceptable." The Palestinians do not compete in the contest.
The EBU published a list of banned flags last week. Among them were
the flags of Northern Cyprus, Kosovo, Spain's Basque region and the
Islamic State group's flag.
In a Facebook post , the EBU apologized and said it removed the list of flags. An updated policy says flags of an "offensive, discriminatory, unsuitable, political or religious nature," are banned.
But the 'Palestinian' flag is certainly of an "offensive, discriminatory, unsuitable, political or religious nature." So they're still banned. Here's Eurovision's apology from Friday morning:
"On Thursday afternoon, a draft version of the flag policy for the
2016 Eurovision Song Contest was published on the website of the Globe
Arena and ticket agency AXS. The document included a non-exhaustive list
of examples of flags that under the flag policy are prohibited in the
venue. This document was not intended to be published.
The
organisers understand and acknowledge the sensitivities of presenting a
selection of flags of organisations and territories, each of them of
very different nature. The organisers apologise to everyone who feels
offended by the list.
The EBU has asked the Globe Arena and AXS
to immediately remove the document that includes the flag examples, and
to publish the official document, without the examples, instead.
The official and final flag policy document will be published on the
official website, Eurovision.tv, later today, along with a full
explanation."
So these are now the permitted flags:
Official national flags of the 42
participating countries, or from one of the
countries that have recently taken part
(e.g. Turkey, Portugal, Romania).
Official national flags of any of the other
United Nations Member States (see
http://www.un.org/en/member-states/ for
an updated list).
The European Union flag.
The rainbow flag, as a symbol of tolerance
and diversity.
And if you follow that list of United Nations Members States.... Israel is in. 'Palestine' is not.
BWAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!
Labels: Eurovision, Palestinian flag, Saeb Erekat
The war against the 'settlements' comes to TripAdvisor
Sorry for not posting for a couple of days - I've been swamped with work.
The war against the 'settlements' has come to AirBnB and to TripAdvisor. The Washington Post's William Booth reports that the 'Palestinians' are protesting the offering of rooms in 'settlements' on the popular Bed and Breakfast site, and that the result has been a
rush by 'settlers' to list more homes (Hat Tip:
Memeorandum).
The Airbnb host said that once his guests see the view, “nobody wants
to talk politics.” Igal Canaan, a Jewish settler, threw open the doors
of his designer apartment to reveal a jaw-dropping panorama of blue sky
and Judean wilderness.
“In the morning, you can see shepherds
with their flocks,” said Canaan, pointing out a distant village often
associated with the birth of the prophet Jeremiah. “The view is totally
biblical.”
All this, plus swimming pool, kitchenette, fast WiFi and maybe a “welcome” bottle of wine, just 20 minutes from Jerusalem, for about $80 per night.
The guest reviews call it awesome — but according to the Palestinians, it is also very wrong.
That's about what Mrs. Carl and I pay for the zimmer we occasionally rent in the Galilee (which includes a jacuzzi but not a swimming pool) and it's a heck of a lot closer to our Jerusalem home. Hmmm.
A few weeks ago, Saeb Erekat, secretary general of the Palestine
Liberation Organization, sent a terse letter to Airbnb chief executive
Brian Chesky in San Francisco, warning that his company was “effectively
promoting the illegal Israeli colonization of occupied land.”
Airbnb said in a statement to the Associated Press that it “follows law and regulations where it can do business.”
Indeed they do. And the government of Israel certainly has no problem with
'settlers' revenants renting out their homes. And perhaps Saeb - the 'Palestinians' perennial chief
negotiator bottle washer should have kept his mouth shut.
So what did some Jewish settlers with an extra bedroom do?
“Ever since the Palestinians started complaining, our people took this
as a challenge and have been rushing to Airbnb to list their
properties,” said Miri Maoz-Ovadia, a spokeswoman for the Binyamin
Regional Council.
BWAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!
Read the whole thing.
Labels: BDS, Israeli tourism, Judea and Samaria, Saeb Erekat
Shalom and Erekat meet in Jordan, Europeans sponsor, US not informed
Interior Minister Sylvan Shalom and 'Palestinian' chief
negotiator bottle washer Saeb Erekat had a get-acquainted meeting in Amman on Thursday. Jordan knew of and sponsored the meeting alongside the European Union. In a reflection of just how important Obama and Kerry are to the 'process,'
the United States was not even told.
A private individual who holds no official position in the Israeli
government acted as a middleman in preparing for last Thursday’s meeting
between Interior Minister Silvan Shalom and chief Palestinian
negotiator Saeb Erekat, Haaretz has learned.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian
President Mahmoud Abbas were aware of the talks about holding the
meeting and approved it. Senior officials in the Jordanian government
and the European Union were also involved. The United States, however,
was kept in the dark and Israel did not update the Americans before or
after the meeting took place.
...
At a certain stage European Union envoy Fernando
Gentilini tried to coordinate between the sides and even suggested the
meeting be held in Brussels, however Erekat asked that it be held in
Amman, Jordan, which brought the Jordanian government into the secret.
Erekat did not present preconditions for the meeting, beyond that it be
held at a neutral venue.
The two-hour meeting was mainly intended for the two
to get acquainted. Both Erekat and Shalom presented initial suggestions
on how to restart the peace process, but did not enter into a detailed
discussion. They agreed to report back to Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, and to meet
again in the near future.
The Amman meeting began in the presence of Jordanian
Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh, and later Erekat and Shalom continued in
private.
I don't really expect this to go anywhere. The 'Palestinians' are hoping the United Nations will do their dirty work by passing a resolution in September mandating a 'Palestinian state.' But the big story here is the non-existent American influence. #ThanksObama.
Labels: Abu Mazen, Barack Hussein Obama, Binyamin Netanyahu, European Union, Jordan, Middle East peace process, Saeb Erekat, Sylvan Shalom
Even Livni admits it: It was Abu Bluff's fault
Even Tzipi Livni admits that it was '
moderate' '
Palestinian' President
Mahmoud Abbas Abu Mazen who
brought about the failure of last year's 'peace talks.' She did it in an interview with anti-Israel New York Times columnist Roger Cohen.
Livni
acknowledged that dealing with Netanyahu on the talks had always been
difficult, but from her perspective the Palestinians caused their
failure at a critical moment.
On
March 17, in a meeting in Washington, President Obama presented Mahmoud
Abbas, the Palestinian leader, with a long-awaited American framework
for an agreement that set out the administration’s views on major
issues, including borders, security, settlements, Palestinian refugees
and Jerusalem.
Livni
considered it a fair framework, and Netanyahu had indicated willingness
to proceed on the basis of it while saying he had reservations. But
Abbas declined to give an answer in what his senior negotiator, Saeb
Erekat, later described as a “difficult” meeting with Obama. Abbas
remained evasive on the framework, which was never made public.
...
Still,
prodded by Secretary of State John Kerry, talks went on. On April 1,
things had advanced far enough for the Israeli government to prepare a
draft statement saying that a last tranche of several hundred
Palestinian prisoners would be released; the United States would free
Jonathan Pollard, an American convicted of spying for Israel more than
25 years ago; and the negotiations would continue beyond the April 29
deadline with a slowdown or freeze of Jewish settlements in the West
Bank.
Then,
Livni said, she looked up at a television as she awaited a cabinet
meeting and saw Abbas signing letters as part of a process to join 15
international agencies — something he had said he would not do before
the deadline.
She
called Erekat and told him to stop the Palestinian move. He texted her
the next day to say he couldn’t. They met on April 3. Livni asked why
Abbas had done it. Erekat said the Palestinians thought Israel was
stalling. A top Livni aide, Tal Becker, wrote a single word on a piece
of paper and pushed it across the table to her: “Tragedy.”
...
Talks
limped on around the idea of a settlement freeze and other
confidence-building measures. Then, on April 23, a reconciliation was
announced between Hamas and Abbas’s Fatah — something since proved
empty. That, for Netanyahu and Livni, was the end: They were not
prepared to engage, even indirectly, with Hamas. A long season of
negotiation gave way to recrimination and, soon enough, the Gaza war,
with nearly 2,200 Palestinians dead and about 70 Israelis.
Livni
met Abbas in London on May 15. “I said to him, the choice is not
between everything and nothing. And your choice in the end was to get
nothing.”
What's missing here is the acknowledgment that the 'Palestinians' don't want peace on any terms - they only want to destroy the Jewish state and murder its Jewish inhabitants. When will that acknowledgement be forthcoming? I'd say it's about as likely as the 'Palestinians' ever agreeing to real peace. In other words, never.
Labels: Abu Mazen, John Kerry, Middle East peace process, Saeb Erekat, settlement freeze, Tzipi Livni
Gaza airport not a new issue - concrete from runways was used to construct terror tunnels
Supporting the claim that Israel, Egypt and the 'Palestinian Authority' are
pressuring Hamas to accept the Egyptian cease fire proposal Haaretz reports on the
pressure coming out of Ramallah.
A senior Palestinian official told Haaretz that Ramallah is pushing
for acceptance of the Egyptian initiative even if it does not
immediately answer Palestinian demands. The official said any
international resolution would be weak and Israel would evade it, as has
happened with UN resolutions.
“Only an agreement mediated by
Egypt that has international support can achieve positive results in the
short term,” the official said, adding that Israel’s proposals did not
come close to the Palestinians’ minimum demands.
Under Egypt’s
proposal, Israel and the Palestinians in Gaza commit not to take any
action against the other by “sea, air or land,” while the Palestinians
promise not to dig tunnels into Israel, Egyptian newspaper Al-Shorouk
reported Friday.
Haaretz also reports that the 'Palestinians' don't think that Israel should be making such a big deal out of Gaza having an airport and seaport.
According to Palestinian officials, Israel is depicting the airport and
safe-passage issues as if they were new. An airport operated in Gaza
from 1998 to 2001.
Not exactly
until 2001....
The airline was grounded in October 2000 following the start of
the Al-Aqsa Intifada and was forced to move to El Arish
International Airport in December 2001, after destruction by
Israeli military forces. of the runway at its previous base,
Yasser Arafat International Airport, where it operated limited
services.
...
On December 12th 2001 GZA was bombed by the Israeli army, which
warplanes hit the control tower. In January 10th 2002, the 60
million USD runway was competely destroyed by the Israeli army,
shattering hopes for the resumption of flights to the airport in
the forseeable future.
Umm....
Not exactly....
ONE ISRAELI KILLED, ONE INJURED BY PALESTINIAN GUNFIRE IN GAZA
Noa Dahan, 25, of Mivtachim, was killed and her Nephew, Oz
Parishta, 18, was wounded, when Palestinian gunmen opened fire on
their vehicle near the town of Rafah in the Gaza Strip,
YEDIOT
AHARONOT ON-LINE reported.
The two were driving from the Kerem Shalom checkpoint to the
Rafiah border passage when they were ambushed by at least three Palestinian gunmen. Dahan, who was hit in the head, died
instantly. In response to the attack, the Israel Defense Forces
closed the Rafiah crossing terminal to Egypt. The Palestinian
airport in Dahaniya was also shut down. The airport was reopened
on Tuesday under an agreement with the Palestinians, after having
been closed last month as a result of a Palestinian ambush attack
on an Israeli bus, wounding ten people.
I have a vague memory that Dahan actually worked at the airport, but I haven't been able to confirm that. Maybe what I'm remembering is that the bus in that story was carrying airport workers? (The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs site only lists incidents in which people were killed.
And then there's the little matter of how the 'Palestinians' used the airport. This is from the same link.
IDF Chief-of-Staff
Maj.-Gen. Shaul Mofaz told the Knesset’s Committee on Security
and Diplomatic Affairs on Tuesday that the Palestinians are using
Arafat’s private plane to smuggle weapons into the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip.
And of course that's exactly why the 'Palestinians' are pushing to
have the airport reopened.
One of the main sticking points is the
Hamas terrorist group’s demands to be allowed to build a seaport and
airport, in their words, to offer “more freedom for the Palestinian
people who are stuck in Gaza.”
But Israel and the west knows that any type of port of this nature,
controlled by terrorists whose charter calls for the destruction of the
state of Israel and its inhabitants, would be nothing more than a way to
import weapons to use in its armed struggle against the Jewish State.
Oh - and one other thing the media is forgetting to tell you about the airport. Here's an al-Jazeera English video from August 2010.
Hey - you don't think they used all that concrete to construct terror tunnels - do you? That would be another reason not to rebuild the airport, wouldn't it? 'Scavengers,' eh?
Labels: Egypt, Gaza, Gaza Airport, Hamas, Khaled Meshaal, Palestinian Authority, Saeb Erekat, weapons acquisition
Why the 'peace talks' failed
From an epic piece by Ben Birnbaum and Amir Tibon in
The New Republic, here are
just a few of the reasons why the 'peace talks' failed.
In his rush to announce the resumption
of talks before flying home, though, Kerry left the conversation with
two serious misunderstandings that would sow the seeds for later
surprises. Netanyahu’s 2,000-plus figure covered only homes that were
open for bidding. (In his mind, long-term building plans were a
different story.) Nor did it include East Jerusalem, a part of the West
Bank that Israel considered sovereign territory. Focused on the big
picture, Kerry hadn’t asked for such clarifications.
The
more consequential miscommunication concerned the prisoners. Netanyahu
told Kerry that he was prepared to release approximately 80 of them
(excluding those with Israeli identity cards). Kerry asked for—and thought he heard Netanyahu agree to—all
104. “Both of them like to talk for long periods of time,” said someone
who has dealt with both leaders. “And I’m not sure that when one of
them is lecturing the other at length, the other guy is really listening
very carefully.”
...
Two weeks later, the Israeli and
Palestinian negotiators met at a hotel west of Jerusalem. Both sides
showed up angry. Erekat and Shtayyeh were steaming at new Israeli
settlement plans that had been announced immediately after the second
prisoner release days earlier, and at Netanyahu’s (false) claim in an
interview that Abbas had accepted the new building in return for the
prisoners. Meanwhile, Livni and Molho, who had adhered rigorously to
Kerry’s gag order on the talks, were incensed by a slew of Palestinian
news stories that they believed their counterparts had leaked. Both
sides, excepting Molho, were frustrated at the lack of progress they’d
made over three months. And the claustrophobic setting—a small bedroom that had been converted into a conference room—didn’t help to calm nerves.
Erekat
stormed into the room and slammed his briefcase on the table. In recent
weeks, with the talks faltering, he had begun drafting a Palestinian
Plan B that would include ending Fatah's six-year-old rift with Hamas
and resuming the U.N. campaign—steps that would
doom the process. Pointing at the briefcase, he declared: “This case
contains our requests to join fifteen U.N. treaties and conventions, and
my president will get my suggestion that he should sign them
immediately if you say it was prisoners for settlements. And if he
doesn’t approve it, I will resign tonight.”
“You can’t do this,” Livni said, raising her voice. “This is not what we agreed on.”
“What we agreed on was prisoners for no-U.N., not prisoners for settlements,” he barked.
“Stop
shouting,” Livni said. “You’re being unfair.” But Erekat kept yelling
that the settlements were making him a pariah among his people.
As Livni listened to Erekat complain about his political problems, something inside her snapped.
“Do you think this is easy for me?”
she shouted. She recited a litany of some of the worst Palestinian
prisoners that Israel was releasing for the sake of the talks: one who
had murdered an elderly Holocaust survivor, another who had stabbed two
teenagers, yet another who had hurled a firebomb at a bus, killing a
mother and her children. “These are your heroes,” she said,
disdainfully. “I don’t know why they are your heroes, but I pushed to
release them to get these talks started so we could get a peace deal, so
if I can do it, you can accept a few houses. Houses can be demolished.
We can’t put those murderers back in jail, and I can’t get back three
lives that were just taken.”
Erekat shot back: “What should I tell all the Palestinians who were killed?”
Finally,
Indyk intervened, waving his arms like a baseball umpire making the
safe sign. “Time out!” he screamed. The Palestinian negotiators went out
to a nearby veranda, and minutes later, Indyk—whom Kerry had dubbed “the Saeb whisperer”—joined
them. “I can’t take it anymore,” Erekat told Indyk. “It’s time for me
to move on. Netanyahu is cheating us. He is not a man of peace.”
It
was a refrain Indyk had grown accustomed to hearing. “I can tell you
that he’s changing,” he said. “He’s moving.” After a few minutes, Indyk
and the Palestinians returned to the room, and the meeting resumed,
awkwardly. When they parted after three hours, the negotiators shook
hands, as they had always done. But it was clear something had changed.
That night, Erekat and Shtayyeh presented a joint letter of resignation
to Abbas, while Livni called her top aides to vent. “I was one hundred
percent sure it was over,” said one.
...
In early December, Kerry presented
Allen’s proposals to the Israelis. While they sidestepped the question
of when Israeli forces would leave the Jordan Valley, they sketched out
what the area—and the rest of the West Bank—might
look like after they did. The future Palestinian-Jordanian border would
include new early warning infrastructure, an invisible Israeli presence
(via cameras) at border crossings, and top-shelf American gadgetry.
Livni liked the package. So did most of Israel’s security brass. Even
hard-line Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman was making conciliatory
noises. “Israel will not get more than it is getting from Kerry,” he
said publicly. Netanyahu saw it as a basis for discussion.
Netanyahu’s hawkish defense minister—Likud’s Moshe Ya’alon—thought
it was worthless. “The Americans think we are natives who will be
impressed with their technology,” he told one confidant. “Don’t they
know that we are the masters of technology?” Unfortunately for everyone
involved, it was impossible to imagine the Israeli government approving
any deal without Ya'alon's support.
For months, the Americans had courted the crusty defense minister and concluded that he was—in the words of one senior official—“beyond
repair.” Ya’alon, meanwhile, railed about American naïveté in
off-the-record briefings with journalists. On January 14, an Israeli
newspaper published some of his remarks, including his diagnosis of
Kerry as “obsessive” and “messianic.” “The only thing that can save us,”
Ya’alon said, “is for John Kerry to win his Nobel Prize and leave us
alone.”
...
Abbas had always been more wary. From
the beginning, he felt as if Kerry was privileging Netanyahu’s needs
over his. And the numbers seemed to bear the Palestinian leader out:
Kerry had met with Netanyahu nearly twice as often as he had with him.
It was not lost on the Palestinians, either, that the secretary’s team—Indyk, Lowenstein, Makovsky, Schwartz, Yaffe, Goldenberg, Blumenthal—sounded
like a Bar Mitzvah guest list. To Abbas, the asymmetry of the
diplomatic triangle was best illustrated by a December meeting between
him and Kerry at the muqata. The meeting, devoted to security issues,
was supposed to have been attended also by General Allen. Kerry showed
up without him. When Abbas asked where he was, Kerry apologized and
explained that Allen needed to stay in Jerusalem and work more with
Netanyahu.
The depth of Palestinian
alienation became clear to Kerry and his team only on February 19, when
the two sides met for dinner at Le Maurice Hotel in Paris—the kickoff to a three-day parley. As the Palestinians walked in the door, each American was struck with the same thought: These guys do not look like they’re in a good mood.
Following dinner, Kerry met alone with Abbas while Erekat and Indyk
spoke in a separate room. Afterward, Kerry and Indyk got in the car that
would take them to their rooms at the Grande Hotel. The secretary
turned to his envoy: “That was really negative.” At around the same
time, Abbas, who was nursing a terrible cold, saw Erekat in the hall and
told him that he was going straight to sleep. “It was a difficult
meeting,” he said. “I’ll brief you tomorrow.”
The
next morning, at around 7:30, Indyk called Erekat. “The secretary wants
to see you,” he said. Erekat was surprised at the early time of the
summons. This must be important. He put on a
suit and took a cab to the Grande. When he and Indyk got to Kerry’s
Louis XIII-style suite, the secretary answered the door. He was dressed
casually: hotel slippers, no jacket or tie. He looked concerned. After a
moment of silence, the first words came out of Kerry’s mouth. “Why is
Abu Mazen so angry with me?”
Erekat responded that he hadn’t yet
been briefed on the meeting, so Kerry offered to get his notes. “I
barely said a word, and he started saying, ‘I cannot accept this,’”
Kerry grumbled, going through some of Abbas’s red lines.
“What do you want?” Erekat said. “These are his positions. We are sick and tired of Bibi the Great. He’s taking you for a ride.”
“No one takes me for a ride!”
“He is refusing to negotiate on a map or even say 1967.”
“I’ve moved him,” Kerry said, “I’ve moved him.”
“Where?” Erekat said, raising his voice. “Show me! This is just the impression he’s giving you.”
The next month, Abbas led a Palestinian
delegation to Washington. At a March 16 lunch at Kerry’s Georgetown
home, the secretary asked Abbas if he’d accept delaying the fourth
prisoner release by a few days. Kerry was worried that the Israelis were
wavering. “No,” Abbas said. “I cannot do this.” Abbas would later
describe that moment as a turning point. If the Americans can’t convince Israel to give me 26 prisoners, he thought then, how will they ever get them to give me East Jerusalem? At
the meal, Erekat noticed Abbas displaying some of his telltale signs of
discomfort. He was crossing his legs, looking over at him every two
minutes. The index cards on which he normally took notes had been placed
back in his suit pocket. Abbas was no longer interested in what was
being said.
The next day at the
White House, Obama tried his luck with the Palestinian leader. He
reviewed the latest American proposals, some of which had been tilted in
Abbas’s direction. (The document would now state categorically that
there would be a Palestinian capital in Jerusalem.) “Don’t quibble with
this detail or that detail,” Obama said. “The occupation will end. You
will get a Palestinian state. You will never have an administration as
committed to that as this one.” Abbas and Erekat were not impressed.
After the meeting, the Palestinian negotiator saw Susan Rice—Abbas’s favorite member of the Obama administration—in
the hall. “Susan,” he said, “I see we’ve yet to succeed in making it
clear to you that we Palestinians aren’t stupid.” Rice couldn’t believe
it. “You Palestinians,” she told him, “can never see the fucking big
picture.”
...
Like Kerry, Abbas felt that his
credibility was at stake. He had promised the Palestinian people that
the prisoners would be released on schedule, on March 29. But as the
date approached, that was looking less and less likely. So Abbas
continued working with Erekat on what he was calling “the Palestinian
nuclear option.” He even put a timer on it: If Israel didn’t vote to
release the fourth tranche by seven o’clock on the evening of April 1,
Abbas would formally resume the U.N. bid in a grand ceremony at the
muqata.
The night before that
deadline, Kerry was supposed to meet Abbas at nine o’clock in Ramallah,
but as of eleven, there was no sign of him. Erekat called the U.S.
consul-general, who told him that Kerry was meeting with Netanyahu, and
that it was running long. Abbas wanted to sleep, so he dispatched Erekat
and Faraj to meet Kerry after midnight in Jerusalem. In his suite at
the David Citadel, Kerry promised Erekat that the Israeli government
would vote on the fourth prisoner release the following day.
“When?” Erekat pressed.
Kerry was peeved that Erekat was insisting on a specific hour. “Before noon,” he said.
Noon
passed without a vote. Then one o’clock, then two, then three. Making
matters worse, Israel’s Housing Ministry approved 708 new homes for a
disputed neighborhood in East Jerusalem that afternoon. Abbas was
nearing the end of his patience.
Around seven o'clock, he sat in his office with Erekat and Faraj. “Have you heard any word from the Israelis?” he asked Erekat.
“No,” Erekat replied. “Not a word.”
“How about you?” he asked Faraj, who gave the same answer.
The U.N.-ceremony attendees were taking their seats down the hall. “Let’s give them another half-hour,” he said.
Livni
had no idea what was happening inside the muqata. She was sitting in
the hall outside Netanyahu’s office, along with many other people,
waiting for her turn to speak to the prime minister. But shortly before
eight, she got a bad feeling: Everyone around her started receiving text
messages, all at once. An aide turned on the television. There, beneath
the Jerusalem panorama at the same table from which he had first
lobbied his peers to resume talks nine months earlier, Abbas declared to
a roomful of officials and VIPs that “the Palestinian leadership has
unanimously approved a decision to seek membership of fifteen U.N.
conventions and international treaties.”
“This is our right,” he continued.“All
we get from the Israeli government is talk.” As Abbas took out his pen
to sign the U.N. conventions, with Erekat at his side, the room gave him
a standing ovation.
Earlier
that afternoon, while Abbas and Erekat were watching the clock at the
muqata, Netanyahu sat in his office, taking meeting after meeting.
First, he would invite in Livni and Kerry’s team to discuss the
coalescing Pollard-for-prisoners-for-talks deal. Then, he would bring in
a group of pro-settler politicians led by Housing Minister Uri Ariel to
calm their nerves about the impending settlement freeze. Wow, Ariel thought each time he passed Livni in the doorway, it’s like we’re doing shifts.
Livni
was pressing Netanyahu for an immediate vote on the deal. “Everything
is ready,” she said, “just get the ministers here.” Netanyahu, however,
was working with Kerry on an exchange of letters that would make
everything official. Kerry, meanwhile, was waiting on White House
approval of a single paragraph—the Pollard
paragraph. But Rice’s staff was still engaged in frantic negotiations
with Israeli officials over the particulars: when Pollard would go free,
where he could travel, what he could say. Though Netanyahu had promised
Kerry the night before that he would hold the vote today, he had told
Kerry and Indyk earlier that morning that he wanted to wait one more to
prepare Israeli public opinion. Indyk was incredulous. “Mr. Prime
Minister,” he said, “you are playing with fire.”
The
Israeli right was also in rebellion mode, with Likud officials vowing
to resign and Bennett again threatening to leave the government if the
fourth tranche was released. As Netanyahu pressed the merits of the
extension deal to Ariel and his hard-right allies during one of their
shifts, one of his aides entered the room: “Mr. Prime Minister, Abu
Mazen has just signed fifteen U.N. conventions.” Netanyahu froze. For
years, he had feared that the Palestinians might join the International
Criminal Court and lodge war-crimes charges against Israeli officials.
“Which conventions?” he asked. After several minutes of confusion, one
of the people in the room managed to locate a list. Chuckling, he told
the others that the Palestinians—the Palestinians—had signed the anti-corruption charter. The room burst into laughter.
Erekat,
who for months had been urging Abbas to blow up the talks, was as giddy
as the settlers. That night, Indyk summoned Erekat to the U.S.
Consul-General’s home in Jerusalem. The moment the Palestinian
negotiator walked in the door, Indyk began yelling. “Don’t act
surprised, Martin,” Erekat said, grinning. “You told me nine times in
four days that the prisoners were about to be released.” (The Americans
dispute Erekat’s number, claiming that they had told the Palestinians
the prisoner-release vote was imminent only three or four times.) Indyk
asked Erekat when the U.N. letters of accession would be submitted. He
replied that the local U.N. representative would receive them the
following morning at nine. “Please delay it,” Indyk said. “Just for
twenty-four hours, hold it back.”
While
Erekat and Indyk were going back and forth, Erekat’s phone rang. It was
Livni. “OK,” she said, “so you had your little show. Now hold back the
documents. We have a deal to extend the talks. The prisoners can go out
in forty-eight hours, and then we can get to substance. Don’t destroy
this.” Erekat told her that he was with the Americans and would have to
call back. The following morning, he sent her a text message. “It’s a
done deal,” he wrote. “We just handed in the documents.”
Over
the next three weeks, with April 29 approaching, Indyk would meet nine
times with Livni, Molho, Erekat, and Faraj in a bid to salvage the peace
talks. He was determined to get everything in writing this time. No
more misunderstandings. And by April 23, the sides seemed close to an
extension agreement. Indyk drove to Ben Gurion Airport that day to pick
up his wife, and while at the baggage claim, he got a call from Livni.
She’d heard that the Palestinians had just done something to ruin all
the progress they had made. Indyk immediately phoned Erekat, who said he
wasn’t aware of the development, but would investigate. Back at the
U.S. consulate, the Kerry team was combing over the details of the
emerging deal, with the secretary calling periodically to check in.
Soon, the news penetrated their office, too. Weeks earlier, they had
been surprised by the timing of Abu Mazen’s U.N. ceremony, but not by
the act. The Palestinians had put them on notice. But as the American
officials huddled around a desktop computer, hungry for actual details
about this rumor they were hearing, they couldn’t believe the headline
that now flashed across the screen: FATAH, HAMAS END YEARS OF DIVISON,
AGREE TO UNITY GOVERNMENT.The next day, the Israeli Cabinet had voted to suspend the talks. John Kerry’s peace process was over.
The only surprising things about this were (a) that the Americans apparently were willing to release Jonathan Pollard just for an extension of the talks (okay, yes that would have been sensible, but there hasn't been a lot of common sense in Pollard's case, only vindictiveness) and (b) how amateurish some of Kerry's behavior was.
But it's a good story....
Labels: Abu Mazen, Barack Hussein Obama, Binyamin Netanyahu, John Kerry, Jonathan Pollard, Martin Indyk, Middle East peace process, Saeb Erekat, Tzipi Livni, Yitzchak Molho
As usual, the Americans 'forgot' to press the 'Palestinians'
Barak Ravid's
authoritative summary of why the 'peace talks' failed is way too long to start excerpting. But the bottom line is that the Americans once again negotiated on behalf of the 'Palestinians' with the result that Netanyahu made many unanswered concessions that will move the starting point the next time, while the 'Palestinians' once again walked away.
What could go wrong?
Labels: Abu Mazen, Barack Hussein Obama, Binyamin Netanyahu, John Kerry, Martin Indyk, Middle East peace process, Saeb Erekat, Tzipi Livni, Yitzchak Molho
'Palestinians' seeking Arab League and Islamic Conference review of Australia
Former 'Palestinian' chief
negotiator bottle washer Saeb Erekat has written a letter to the Australian government saying that the 'Palestinians' will
seek a review of relations with Australia by the Arab League and the Islamic conference.
“Palestine will request that the Arab League and the Islamic Conference
[Organization of Islamic Cooperation] review the relations of the Arab
and Islamic world with Australia in light of Australia’s unlawful
recognition of the illegal settlement regime in occupied Palestine,”
Saeb Erekat wrote in the letter, dated June 5.
...
In the letter, Erekat responded to Brandis’
statement, saying it showed that Australia “does not intend to comply
with its duty under international law not to recognize Israeli
sovereignty over any part of the Palestinian territory occupied by
Israel in 1967, including East Jerusalem.”
He added that the term “occupation” reflects a “legal fact” based on UN resolutions.
...
In May, Australia’s ambassador to Israel, Dave
Sharma, drew fire after meeting with Housing Minister Uri Ariel in the
latter’s East Jerusalem office.
“It should be noted that diplomatic
recognition of the situation created by the attempted annexation of our
capital is a flagrant violation of international law,” Erekat wrote to
Canberra after that meeting.
Hey Saeb! If it's illegal, why don't you just take them to court? BWAHAHAHAHAHAHA!
Background
here.
Labels: Arab League, Australia, East Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria, Julie Bishop, occupation, Organization of Islamic Countries, Saeb Erekat
It's about time: Israel responds to Hamas-Fatah pact
This could be the start of something big. Israel is finally responding in an effective way to the Hamas-Fatah unity government: It has announced
3,000 housing starts in Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria.
The units, which were originally to be approved with release of a
fourth batch of Palestinian prisoners at the end of March that was
never carried out, will include 400 units in Ramat Shlomo in Jerusalem,
and another 1,100 to be divided between the settlements of Efrat,
Beitar Ilit, Adam and Givat Ze’ev. In addition, another 1,500 will be
approved for construction in other settlements throughout the West
Bank.
...
The announcement of further construction comes amid a serious policy
disagreement with the US over its approach to the new Palestinian
unity government. US Secretary of State John Kerry pledged continued
allegiance on Wednesday to strong security ties with Israel, even as he
reiterated the US would engage the new government backed by Hamas.
Speaking
at a press conference in Beirut, Kerry – asked why the US felt it had
to “recognize the unity Palestinian government immediately” – stressed
that Washington does not recognize a “government with respect to
Palestine, because that would recognize a state, and there is not a
state.”
Kerry said he has had daily conversations with Prime
Minister Binyamin Netanyahu on this matter as “a friend, as well as the
prime minister of the country.” He stressed that Palestinian Authority
President Mahmoud Abbas assured him “this new technocratic government
is committed to the principles of nonviolence, negotiations,
recognizing the State of Israel, acceptance of the previous agreements
and the Quartet principles, and that they will continue their
previously agreed upon security cooperation with Israel.”
...
The secretary of state reiterated the US position that Hamas is a
terrorist organization, which has not accepted the Quartet principles
and continues to call for the destruction of Israel, “even as it moves
into this new posture.”
“Israel is our friend, our strong ally”
Kerry said, adding that the US-Israeli security relationship has never
been as strong as it is now under President Barack Obama.
“We are
deeply committed. We’ve said again and again the bonds of our
relationship extend way beyond security,” he said. “They are
time-honored and as close, I think, as any country in the world. We
will stand by Israel, as we have in the past. There is nothing that is
changing our security relationship. That is ironclad.”
Be that as
it may, Israel did nothing to hide its deep disappointment with the US
policy, with Netanyahu saying Tuesday he was “deeply troubled by the
announcement that Washington will work with the Palestinian government
backed by Hamas.
Meanwhile, 'Palestinian' chief
negotiator bottle washer Saeb Erekat is threatening to take Israel to court. .
Let's go to the videotape.
Here's
more:
“We urge the Israeli government to refrain from any punitive
actions,” Erekat told a small group of journalists and diplomats who
traveled with him Tuesday to the outskirts of a small Beduin encampment
in Area C of the West Bank, just outside of Jerusalem.
“If they [Israelis] go ahead in the line of escalation, we will react,” Erekat said.
...
“We want to give them [Israelis] a heads-up that we are planning to pursue our case internationally.”
He
explained the Palestinians would write letters to the member states of
the four Geneva Conventions, which among other topics, deal with the
issue of war crimes.
“We’ll ask them [member states] to shoulder
their responsibility vis-a-vis the occupying power [Israel], vis-a-vis
the atrocities and the crimes that are being committed against the
Palestinian population in the West Bank, east Jerusalem and Gaza,”
Erekat said. “We think Israelis and their legal [experts] know what
this means.”
The Palestinians also plan to pursue Israel through
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, which deals with acts of Apartheid, he said.
In 2014, the international community should “not stomach” the use of an apartheid system, Erekat said.
“Instead of recognizing Israel as a Jewish state we should recognize Israel as the apartheid state.”
He
explained he had chosen to visit the Jabal Al-Baba Beduin camp because
it is located in an area called E1, where Israel plans to build 3,500
new homes, for the Ma’aleh Adumim settlement.
Under that plan,
this particular hilltop would have a commercial center and an army
post. While plans for E1 are frozen, Erekat and members of the PLO
Negotiations Affairs Department that led the tour, believe they will be
carried out.
They said Israel would forcibly relocate the Beduin from the hilltop to make way for Jewish building.
Forced
displacement is a war crime, Erekat said, as is the Israeli demolition
of Beduin structures that has already taken place in the encampment.
“We
are preparing ourselves for the defense of our people including the
option of signing the Rome Statute,” Erekat said. While the
Palestinians are prepared to turn to the international court, they are
first focused on using the legal instruments afforded them under the 15
conventions they have already signed, he said.
Israel, in turn,
has warned the Palestinians that their signatures on these conventions
means they are liable for acts of violence against Israel by Hamas,
especially rockets launched from Gaza to Israel’s southern cities.
Read the whole thing. I wonder whether this would be brought up with the court at the same time....
Labels: Binyamin Netanyahu, E-1, East Jerusalem, Hamas-Fatah reconciliation, human shields, Jerusalem construction, Judea and Samaria construction, Middle East peace process, Saeb Erekat
And again: Abu Bluff threatens to dissolve 'Palestinian Authority'
'
Moderate' '
Palestinian' President
Mahmoud Abbas Abu Mazen says he's ready to meet Prime Minister Netanyahu anytime, anywhere. But he has also set a whole slew of preconditions for extending the 'talks' deadline. And he apparently missed the decision to
walk back the threat to
dissolve the 'Palestinian Authority.' In a Tuesday conversation with Israeli reporters, he
threatened dissolution once again.
Abbas said that Israel would have to assume authority over the
Palestinians if it were to continue its current policy toward the
Palestinian Authority.
Abbas seemed to be reiterating his reported
threat to dissolve the Palestinian Authority in the event that peace
talks fail, even as chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat was quoted
Tuesday as saying that the PA leadership had no intention of dismantling
the Ramallah government.
The comments came as Israeli and
Palestinian negotiating teams were meeting in Jerusalem Tuesday
afternoon in an effort to come up with a package that would extend the
negotiations beyond next week's deadline.
Good guy and bad guy?
Labels: Abu Mazen, Middle East peace process, negotiations without preconditions, Palestinian Authority, Saeb Erekat, US foreign aid