Indyk under fire for anti-Semitic tropes
It's been just five days since I reported that Martin Indyk attacked the Washington Free Beacon's Adam Kredo for
using anonymous sources after having been one so often himself. Now, there's a much more serious and well-substantiated charge against Indyk:
He's a Jewish anti-Semite.
Martin Indyk — who served as President Bill Clinton’s ambassador to
Israel and assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs, followed
by a stint as the Obama administration’s envoy for Israeli-Palestinian
negotiations — is being urged to clarify comments he made in
a tape-recorded private conversation from 1989, in which he
reportedly said Israelis are “paranoid,” “arrogant” and “think the rules
of society do not apply [to them]” because “they are the goy’s rules.”
Indyk, who is Jewish himself, also reportedly applied this assessment
to the character of Jews generally, saying that Jewish people “would do
whatever they can to avoid paying taxes,” and believe it is justified
to “find a way to ignore the law or get around it.” He added, “In my own
family, my grandfather used to stay up nights to figure out how to
avoid paying taxes.”
Professor Eunice G. Pollack, an historian of antisemitism and co-editor of the Encyclopedia of American Jewish History, told JNS.org that Indyk’s reported statements “echo three of the most infamous centuries-old tropes of antisemites.”
“You have an updated version of the classic ‘Jewish swindler,’
combined with the ‘disloyal Jew’ who evades his patriotic duty to pay
taxes, and the millennia-old ‘arrogant Jew’ who, in a more religious
era, was accused of deriving his arrogance from his partner, Satan,”
said Pollack.
...
Indyk’s alleged comments were made while he was executive director of
the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and were brought to
light in 1995 by Amcha-the Coalition for Jewish Concerns, after Indyk
was nominated as ambassador to Israel. At that time, neither the news
media nor senators involved in his confirmation hearing gave the
allegations any attention.
Indyk has not responded to multiple requests for comment by JNS.org.
This is not the first time Indyk’s remarks about Israel have drawn criticism.
Adam Kredo, a senior foreign policy writer for the Washington Free Beacon, told JNS.org
that Indyk “is known among reporters for anonymously criticizing Israel
in the press, for planting stories meant to pressure the Jewish state
into making concessions [and for] leading the Obama administration’s
efforts over the years to discredit Israel and blame it for the failure
in peace talks.”
I'm sure that Indyk would say much worse about Israel and Jews today (I once watched him have a
shouting match with several participants at the President's Conference in 2011). And I'm sure that $14 million donation from Qatar to the Brookings Institute, which Indyk heads, would have nothing to do with that. Of course not. It's why Qatar gave him the money in the first place.
Labels: Jewish anti-Semitism, Martin Indyk
This is rich: Frequently anonymous source blasts Beacon's Kredo for using anonymous sources
On Monday, Martin Indyk took to Twitter (which is not just a tool of the Trump campaign) to blast the Washington Free Beacon's Adam Kredo for using
anonymous sources to attack Vice President Joe Biden for
pressuring Ukraine to vote against Israel in last Friday's Security Council vote on 'settlements.'
Typical 'liberal' that he is, Indyk maintains a double standard: When he's the anonymous source, he wants to be protected, but when someone else uses an anonymous source, that's not okay.
Here are a couple of the instances in which it's come out over the last few years that Martin Indyk, now head of the Brookings Institution, which
took $14 million from Qatar, and formerly US ambassador to Israel, has been caught being an anonymous source.
April 2014: Indyk orchestrates campaign to collapse peace talks
Meanwhile, the Washington Free Beacon's Adam Kredo blames it on the
Americans, saying that the White House has had a secret campaign to scapegoat Israel for the 'talks' failure.
Multiple sources told the Washington Free Beacon that top
Obama administration officials have worked for the past several days to
manufacture a crisis over the reissuing of housing permits in a
Jerusalem neighborhood widely acknowledged as Israeli territory.
Senior State Department officials based in Israel have sought to lay
the groundwork for Israel to take the blame for talks collapsing by
peddling a narrative to the Israeli press claiming that the Palestinians
were outraged over Israeli settlements, the Free Beacon has learned.
These administration officials have planted several stories in
Israeli and U.S. newspapers blaming Israel for the collapse of peace
talks and have additionally provided reporters with anonymous quotes
slamming the Israeli government.
The primary source of these multiple reports has been identified as
Middle East envoy Martin Indyk and his staff, according to these
insiders, who said that the secret media campaign against Israel paved
the way for Secretary of State John Kerry to go before Congress on
Tuesday and publicly blame Israel for tanking the talks.
“The Palestinians didn’t even know they were supposed to be
abandoning negotiations because of these housing permits, which are
actually old, reissued permits for areas everyone assumes will end up on
the Israelis’ side of the border anyway,” said one senior official at a
U.S. based pro-Israel organization who asked to remain anonymous
because the Obama administration has in the past retaliated against
critics from inside the pro-Israel world.
“Then Martin Indyk started telling anyone who would listen that in
fact the Palestinians were angry over the housing issue,” the source
said. “Eventually, the Palestinians figured out it was in their interest
to echo what the Americans were saying.”
We've known for a long time what a shmuck Indyk is, haven't we? He's also a member of the board of the New Israel Fund. Back to Kredo.
One former Israeli diplomat familiar with Indyk’s tactics said that
he is a crass political player who has a history of planting negative
stories about Israel in order to undermine the Netanyahu government and
bolster his hand in the talks.
“I’ve seen this before and see his fingerprints,” said the source,
who referenced a separate story two weeks ago in which U.S. government
sources implied that newly installed Israeli Ambassador Ron Dermer was
not performing his job effectively.
“It’s certainly in Indyk’s interest now [to undermine the Israelis],
but this was a game he also used to play when he was ambassador twice,”
said the former diplomat. “This is part of Indyk’s playbook.”
“There was only one person who would do this kind of thing and it’s Martin Indyk and his staff,” the former diplomat added.
Another Washington-based source familiar with the talks said that
Kerry’s peace team has a track record of trashing Israel anonymously.
“It’s one of the worst-kept secrets in Jerusalem that Kerry’s team
leaks anti-Netanyahu quotes and claims to the Israeli press—not that is
should be a mystery why Israeli reporters based in Israel keep producing
anti-Bibi quotes from ‘American officials,’” the source said.
“But just imagine the outrage if the roles were reversed and Bibi had a team on the ground in D.C. trashing Obama to the Washington Post on background,” the source said.
May 2014: Indyk forced to resign after being pegged as anonymous source blaming Israel for collapse of peace talks
Martin Indyk is going to resign from the leadership of the Obama-Kerry
State Department's 'negotiating team' for the 'peace process' after
being exposed as the source for Nachum Barnea's YNet story blaming Israel for the failure of the 'peace talks.'
The Israeli daily Haaretz reported that Indyk
is considering resigning in light of President Barack Obama’s intention
to suspend US involvement in seeking a negotiated end to the conflict,
citing unnamed Israeli officials “who are close to the matter.” Indyk
has informed the Brookings Institute that he will soon return to his
vice president post, from which he took a leave of absence during the
negotiations, Haaretz reported.
It also said Indyk is being identified in Jerusalem as the anonymous source in a report by Yedioth Aharonoth columnist Nahum Barnea on Friday in which unnamed American officials primarily blamed Israel for the failure of the peace talks.
“There are a lot of reasons for the peace
effort’s failure, but people in Israel shouldn’t ignore the bitter truth
– the primary sabotage came from the settlements,” the official told
Barnea.
He's a bitter old man, isn't he?
In May 2014, Indyk went on a
drunken tirade blaming Israel for the talks' collapse.
US chief Middle East negotiator bottle washer
Martin Indyk went on a 30-minute anti-Israel rant at a Washington bar on
Thursday night just before meeting with former Defense Minister and
Prime Minister Ehud Barak.
Indyk—who has been identified by the Washington Free Beacon as the
source of a recent series of anonymous quotes in the press condemning
Israel—was caught openly lashing out at Israel over drinks with several
members of his staff and wife, Gahl Burt.
The conversation took place in the hotel bar at the Ritz-Carlton on
Thursday night, shortly after Indyk finished delivering remarks at the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy’s (WINEP) annual gala.
While Indyk was critical of Israel in his public remarks, he and his
staff are said to have let loose on the Jewish state over drinks before
Indyk was scheduled to meet with former Israeli Defense Minister Ehud
Barak.
“The tone was nasty,” according to the source who overheard the conversation.
Indyk and his staff “openly blamed” conservative Israeli politician
Naftali Bennett and others for “sabotaging the [peace] negotiations” by
issuing permits for new Israeli housing blocks in Jerusalem.
“In the 30 minute conversation, no one at the table mentioned a single
wrong thing the Palestinians had done,” according to the source who
overheard the conversation. “There was no self-criticism whatsoever.”
Indyk’s staff also weighed in on the peace process, saying that while
the press may believe that peace negotiations broke down over
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas’ unilateral bid for
statehood at the United Nations, “they knew the truth and that [talks
had broken down] way before that due to settlements,” according to the
source.
“The staff relished how critical Indyk was of Israel in public speech,” the source said. “They laughed about it.”
Indyk also took aim at WINEP executive director Rob Satloff, who had
moderated a question-and-answer session with Indyk earlier in the
evening.
Indyk “was incredulous” that Satloff had offered an alternate
explanation of the settlement issue, one that applied less blame to
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Indyk told his crew that
Satloff’s explanation “was just false” and that no one he knows believes
it.
The conversation then turned to Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians,
according to the source, who additionally provided a hand-drawn map of
the bar area pinpointing Indyk’s location.
Indyk did not respond to emails requesting comments, and the State
Department is denying that the conversation took place. But there are
far too many details in this story.
Oh, by the way, in his younger days, Indyk was known as
Arafat's yes-man, and the 'Palestinians' continually
sought his participation in the last round of talks against
Israeli opposition.
Thankfully, he is unlikely to play any role in a Trump administration. Good riddance.
Labels: Martin Indyk, Middle East peace process, two-state solution
Martin Indyk, Barak Ravid and Haaretz (and NPR) campaign to pin Rabin assassination on Netanyahu continues
Israel's Left, together with certain career 'diplomats' in the US State Department, have never relented in their efforts to pin the assassination of Yitzchak Rabin on Prime Minister (and then opposition leader) Binyamin Netanyahu. The latest assault comes from the publication by Barak Ravid and Haaretz of a 'secret' cable (published by uber-Leftist NPR) ostensibly sent by then-US Ambassador Martin Indyk to the State Department on the morning after the assassination more than 20 years ago. But before we even look at the cable, look at the inflammatory Haaretz English edition (
the only edition that's read and it's read mostly outside Israel) headline:
Indyk: At Funeral, Netanyahu Lamented That Assassination Made Rabin a Hero.
Indyk made the remarks in a Frontline documentary broadcast on PBS on Tuesday. Netanyahu was opposition leader at the time.
"Netanyahu sat next to me when I was ambassador in Israel at the time of Rabin’s funeral," Indyk says in the film. " … I remember Netanyahu saying to me: 'Look, look at this. He’s a hero now, but if he had not been assassinated, I would have beaten him in the elections, and then he would have gone into history as a failed politician.”
Indyk said that he had the impression that "even at that moment of tremendous support, a tragic moment of support for Rabin, Netanyahu was thinking, well, politically he was on the ropes before he was assassinated."
Indyk's comments are reinforced by a telegram sent from the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv on the morning after Rabin's assassination, a message that was exposed by Wikileaks a few years back. In the classified telegram that Indyk sent on November 5, 1995 at 10:15 A.M. to the White House and the State Department, he reported on a conversation that had taken place a few hours earlier between the State Department adviser at the embassy and Netanyahu. The Rabin assassination, Netanyahu is quoted as saying, is "a disaster for the Jewish people, a disaster for Israel and a disaster for the right, which will be decimated if elections are called soon."
Netanyahu's office denies that the conversation ever took place and says that
Indyk fabricated it.
The Prime Minister's Office issued a “blanket denial,” saying that what Indyk said “never happened.”
The
Likud issued a response to Indyk's statement saying that “this is
another blatant lie by Indyk, who never stops discrediting and defaming”
Netanyahu.
True that.
But what's also true is that the comments attributed to Netanyahu do reflect what the conventional wisdom here in Israel was shortly after the assassination: That it would turn Rabin into an icon (indeed, it has made criticizing the very premises of the Oslo Accords into heresy) and would decimate the Right the next time there were elections.
But instead of calling elections immediately as many in the Left
urged Shimon Peres to do (link in Hebrew and discussed below), Peres waited three and a half months to call elections, by which time the 'Palestinians' had committed two
massive terror attacks here in Jerusalem against the number 18 bus on consecutive Sunday mornings followed by a massive
terror attack on the eve of Purim at Dizengoff Square in Tel Aviv.
The elections took place in late May, and shortly after Uzi Baram of the Labor party
publicly thanked Arab voters for putting his party and the Left over the top, around 6:00 am on the morning after the elections, Netanyahu and the Likud suddenly and inexplicably pulled ahead and went on to victory.
Much of that is in - or is alluded to - in the
Hebrew version of Ravid's article, which has far more than the English version. The Hebrew version reports that on the morning of Rabin's funeral, the Left was behaving every bit as politically expediently as the Right, urging Peres to call elections. And the Hebrew version reports that Yasser Arafat was decimated by Rabin's assassination (no other event shook him as much except for the 1988 assassination of his top aide -
Abu Jihad - allegedly by Israeli commandos led by
Ehud Barak in Tunis), believing correctly that Peres would not be strong enough or have close enough connections to the IDF to give the 'Palestinians' their reichlet.
The Hebrew version of Haaretz also reports that Arafat gave orders to the 'Palestinians' to 'minimize' celebrations of Rabin's assassination and shooting in the air (an order that
Arafat did not give on 9/11 by the way).
Not the first time that Haaretz has
told a lot more in Hebrew than it did in English. For those who read Hebrew,
read the whole thing. I don't have time to translate it.
Labels: 9/11, Binyamin Netanyahu, Martin Indyk, Middle East peace process, Palestinian terrorism, Shimon Peres, Wikileaks, Yitzchak Rabin
Surprise: Top Clinton advisers contemptuous of Netanyahu
A review of Hillary Clinton's emails shows that three of her top advisers - Martin Indyk, Sandy Berger and Sidney Blumenthal - have
contempt bordering on the pathological for Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu.
The "self-defeating" Netanyahu, according to Indyk, believes "that he
is a great negotiator, and that he is operating in the Middle East
bazaar, he inflates his requirements well beyond anything reasonable in
the belief that this is the best way to secure the highest price." As a
result, Indyk wrote, the Israel-Palestine peace process ends up getting
dominated by Netanyahu's ego and insecurity issues:
The process of bringing him down to a reasonable price uses up a lot
of energy, uses up a lot of goodwill, humiliates his Palestinian
negotiating partner, and raises doubts about his seriousness. In the
end, under great pressure from all quarters, he will make the final
concession, but only after wasting a lot of time, making everybody
furious with him, and thereby securing no credit either with his
supporters or negotiating partners. At heart, he seems to lack a
generosity of spirit. This combines with his legendary fear of being
seen as a "freier" (sucker) in front of his people to create a real
problem in the negotiations, especially because he holds most of the
cards.
One does not get the sense that Indyk thinks very highly of the Israeli leader.
But I thought the most interesting section was his assessment of
Netanyahu's and Israel's future if they failed to take the necessary
steps toward peace:
The reason for dwelling on Bibi's psychology rather than his politics
is that the latter all point in the direction of making a deal: the
Israeli public is ready to get on with it; if Israel doesn't make a
serious move, it will further delegitimize its standing internationally
(something Bibi [Netanyahu] is deeply concerned about); Bibi needs
President Obama in his corner to deal with the threat from Iran and to
avoid punishment by the voters for mishandling relations with the U.S.;
and if he doesn't make the deal with [Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas]
now, he will have helped to advance the future he is most concerned
about — a Hamas takeover of the Palestinian leadership.
Obama is doing a great job of 'helping' us deal with Iran, isn't he? /sarc
And then there's Sandy "Socks" Berger....
Like Indyk, Berger seems to see Netanyahu — not Israel, but Netanyahu
specifically — as the primary challenge for peace, and spends most of
his memo discussing ways to bring him around.
"I am persuaded the most important factor is and is likely to remain what Netanyahu is prepared to do," Berger writes.
He acknowledges that the Palestinians can be difficult as well, but
says that at least they "have a relatively clear sense of their
positions on the core issues." Netanyahu, though, is someone who "either
does not know himself or is not prepared to share [his positions on
core issues] and who, until now, has neither felt the urgency to reach a
deal nor the discomfort of the status quo."
And yet Berger concludes that Clinton should solve this problem by
assuring Netanyahu that the US will help him meet Israeli security needs
as well as his own personal political needs. The picture he paints is
one in which Netanyahu is in charge and the US role is to provide him
with concessions, personal assurances, and political support until the
Israeli leader feels like making peace:
Rather, [a peace deal] will happen only if [Netanyahu] feels that (1)
it is under the leadership of a U.S. administration he genuinely
trusts; (2) he is convinced that the combination of the agreement and
U.S. assurances meets his core needs in terms of Israeli security and
international recognition of its Jewish character; and (3) he feels
that, again with U.S. help, he can sell it to his people and survive --
or even thrive -- politically.
(1) and (2) sure explain this administration's total failure in the 'peace process,' don't they?
And then there's this one from Clinton loyalist
Sidney Blumenthal.
A number of the latest emails from 2010 center on the Gaza flotilla
raid. Israeli commandos boarded the “Freedom Flotilla” to force the
ships to port for inspection. A few dozen of the hundreds on board
fought the commandos; 10 activists were killed and 10 of the Israeli
commandos were wounded.
In an email to Clinton that day — May 31, 2010 — Blumenthal called the incident “Bibi’s Entebbe in reverse.”
“The father, Benzion Netanyahu; 100 years old, secretary to
Jabotinsky, and denounced as too radical by Begin, adored his son Yoni,
heroically killed at Entebbe. Benyamin has never measured up,”
Blumenthal wrote. “Benzion has constantly criticized him in public for
his deviations from the doctrine of Greater Israel. Bibi desperately
seeks his father’s approbation and can never equal his dead brother. See
Benzion’s most recent scathing undermining of his son Bibi and Bibi’s
tearful tribute to his brother just last month.”
“The raid on the ship to Gaza resembles the raid on Entebbe, except
that there are no hostages, no guns, it’s not in Africa, and it’s a
fiasco; otherwise, it’s Entebbe. (Then, there’s Ehud Barak reliving his
youth as a raider killing Palestinians in Lebanon, a feat memorialized
in Spielberg’s film, Munich. Ultimately, it didn’t work out well that
time either. The film captures the moral quandaries, which appear to
have escaped the participants.)”
Blumenthal goes on to write, “The international press will inquire
whether the Obama administration gave a wink or nod as the Bush
administration did for the Lebanon and Gaza incursions. Be prepared.”
“Further: Of course, the consequences for US foreign policy and
national security are negative across the board: from the analogy of the
North Korean ship sinking and the Chinese posture to support for
Iranian sanctions, etc., etc. Did the Israelis not hear Petraeus’s
testimony?”
Blumenthal added that “of course, whatever the outcome of such a
raid, one of the inevitable ones would be the death of the peace
process, such as it is, on the very eve of Bibi’s scheduled visit to
Obama, which would have been, under any circumstance, in light of the
raid, profoundly humiliating for the president. Or are the Israelis bone
stupid? I don’t think so.”
Hillary forwarded the email 35 minutes later to Jake Sullivan, her
deputy chief of staff at the State Department and director of policy
planning. He is believed to be Clinton’s pick for national security
advisor.
“Fyi and itys,” Clinton tells Sullivan. The latter is Internet slang for “I told you so.”
Blumenthal sent other messages to Clinton after the flotilla raid,
including a Max Blumenthal column on “deconstruction of propaganda” by
Israel, a Center for Strategic and International Studies piece titled
“Israel as a Strategic Liability?” and “leaked” Netanyahu poll numbers.
Note what Indyk, Berger and Blumenthal all have in common - other than their love for the Clinton's.... Hint: It's a certain religion. No one matches the Jews at undermining the Jews.
Labels: Binyamin Netanyahu, Hillary Clinton, Martin Indyk, Sandy Berger
Barack Obama must be wondering what hit him
President Hussein Obama must be wondering what hit him. Former Israeli Ambassador to the United States Michael Oren continues to hammer away at the President, publishing two more op-ed pieces in the US media on Friday, one of which
really gets into Obama's kishkes.
In Foreign Policy, Oren took Obama to task for not joining the
solidarity march in France after the attack on Charlie Hebdo or the
kosher supermarket earlier this year, nor for sending two senior
officials who were in Paris at the time to the march. He also took the
president to task for not admitting that the attack on the kosher
market was directed a Jews, but rather an act perpetrated by “vicious
zealots who... randomly shoot a bunch of folks in a deli.”
“Obama’s
boycotting of the memorial in Paris, like his refusal to acknowledge
the identity of the perpetrators, the victims, or even the location of
the market massacre, provides a broad window into his thinking on Islam
and the Middle East. Simply put: The president could not participate
in a protest against Muslim radicals whose motivations he sees as a
distortion, rather than a radical interpretation, of Islam,” he wrote.
“And if there are no terrorists spurred by Islam, there can be no
purposely selected Jewish shop or intended Jewish victims, only a deli
and randomly present folks."
During his first year in office,
Obama, Oren argued, offered in essence “a new deal in which the United
States would respect popularly chosen Muslim leaders who were
authentically rooted in their traditions and willing to engage with the
West.”
...
Oren
attributed this orientation to the intellectual milieu in which Obama
grew up, as well as his personal history. “I could imagine how a child
raised by a Christian mother might see himself as a natural bridge
between her two Muslim husbands. I could also speculate how that
child’s abandonment by those men could lead him, many years later, to
seek acceptance by their co-religionists.”
The tragedy, he said, was that Obama’s outreach to the Muslim world was rejected.
“Historians
will likely look back at Obama’s policy toward Islam with a
combination of curiosity and incredulousness,” he wrote. “While some
may credit the president for his good intentions, others might fault him
for being naïve and detached from a complex and increasingly lethal
reality.”
In the LA Times piece, headlined “Why Obama is
wrong about Iran being 'rational' on nukes,” Oren quoted Obama’s
comment in a recent interview that being anti-Semitic, or racist,
doesn't preclude one from from being interested in survival, and that
just because Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei is anti-Semitic
“doesn't mean that this overrides all of his other considerations.”
Oren
wrote that the dispute whether Iran was a rational or irrational actor
was “ever-present” in the discussions between the US and Israel when
he was ambassador. While the American view the Iranians as logical
actors, Israel could not rule out the idea that “the Iranians would be
willing to sacrifice half of their people as martyrs in a war intended
to ‘wipe Israel off the map.’”
“Obama would never say that
anti-black racists are rational,” Oren argued. “And he would certainly
not trust them with the means – however monitored – to reach their
racist goals. That was the message Israeli officials and I conveyed in
our discreet talks with the administration. The response was not, to
our mind, reasonable."
Oren, while he served in Washington, was
considered very cautious and diplomatic, and rarely caught flack for
comments deemed “undiplomatic.”
Oren has been blasted by opposition MK's Tzipi Livni (goes without saying), Avigdor Liberman and Yair Lapid (the latter also goes without saying). But
Lee Smith wrote some similar things in Tablet Magazine last week, but from a slightly different angle.
Whether Obama is an honorary Jew or not, the evidence suggests that
he keenly understands certain peculiarities of the Jewish communal
psyche—survival strategies that distinguish the Jews from other American
minority groups. The president’s use of Jewish aides and organizations
to advance his policies with the Jewish community shows that Obama is
correct in believing that Jewish politics are often motivated by fear,
which can range from the existential fear of mass extermination to the
more prosaic fear of looking shabby in front of the goyim. And Obama
isn’t using his energy and inspiring leadership skills to help these
people rise above their fear; he is instead capitalizing on
it—masterfully, ruthlessly—by manipulating American Jews in ways that
other minority groups would find unbelievably insulting.
Consider recent statements from Jewish aides to the president.
Netanyahu is the kind of politician, said David Axelrod, “who run[s] for
public office because they want to be somebody.” Israel doesn’t know
what’s best for it, Obama’s former envoy to the Palestinian-Israeli
peace process Martin Indyk told Israeli media last week. “You are an
emotional nation, not a rational nation,” he sniffed. “You work from
your gut and not your mind.”
It’s very hard to imagine Catholic policymakers helping a U.S.
president undermine and insult the Vatican and then defending the
president when he says that he understands what the church stands for
better than the pope does. During the darkest moments of the AIDS
crisis, there were no gay organizations that encouraged U.S.
policymakers to cut funding for a cure. There are no transgender
activists who argue that the real threat to the community comes not from
people who fear and hate transgendered people, but from within the
transgender community itself. Eric Holder doesn’t scold people of color
that they’re an emotional, not a rational, people, or imply that black
officeholders get into politics because they “want to be somebody.”
The issue in America today is clearly not that pro-Obama people or
organizations are leading the American Jewish community to destruction.
Yet at the same time, it is also clear that two millennia of diasporic
dependence and insecurity have left a deep and probably permanent
imprint on the Jewish communal psyche. Even in America, a free country
in which Jews have never been subject to European-style mass oppression
or persecutions, the role performed by “court Jews’ still makes
structural and emotional sense to people who like to think of themselves
as independent thinkers. Otherwise, it would be hard to explain why
Obama still has the support of the majority of the Jewish community for
policies that from any rational perspective—the perspective of any other
minority group—cannot be seen as anything other than detrimental to the
Jewish state.
In other words, Oren is right about Obama's bad treatment of Jews as compared with any other ethnic group. Obama isn't playing any other ethnic group - only Jews. And according to Smith, Obama is playing the Jews like a master.
But what about the Jews who speak for the administration? None of
several former high-ranking Jewish officials was willing to speak on the
record on this subject, but every single one of them agreed that this
moment was an extraordinary one. “No administration will always do what
the Jewish community wants or what Jews think best for Israel, just as
none will ever always do what Catholics want or Greek Americans or
farmers,” said a former Jewish American policymaker who served in
high-level positions in several administrations. “When you are in an
administration you know this is coming. If the variance is in the
particular area you cover, it can be painful. If it gets repeated, you
need to change jobs or leave the government. That’s normal.”
But: “The Obama situation is not normal,” he continued, “due to the
length and depth of the confrontation with Israel and the harm that’s
being done. It should give rise to soul searching by Jewish appointees.
In my view they’ve become enablers, in the worst sense of that word.
That not one single Jew has left in protest is remarkable considering
that relations have not been worse in a long, long time.”
By not resigning in protest, Obama’s Jewish aides have arguably not
only harmed their community; they weakened their own position—which was,
in a sense, ultimately far more detrimental. In a town where the
appearance of power is power, Obama’s Jewish defenders had no idea which
way the president was actually going. They got played, and now everyone
knows it. Treasury Secretary Jack Lew wasn’t in the room when Obama was
making Iran policy with Ben Rhodes and Valerie Jarrett. Martin Indyk
didn’t know that a central part of Obama’s Middle East policy—without
which the Iran deal would be impossible—was to weaken AIPAC,
the cornerstone of the pro-Israel community. AIPAC, in turn, didn’t see
itself as a target of the Obama Administration. Instead, it kept
telling itself that bipartisan support for Israel was the very premise
of its power. Had these actors actually participated in helping the
president pull a fast one on the Jewish community, at least they’d have
showed they had connections to power. The biggest problem with the Jews
around Obama is not that they spoke up on behalf of policies that may
very well turn out to be harmful to the Jewish state; it’s that they
were so clearly out of the loop—a status quo they will now bequeath to
future administrations.
In this regard, even AIPAC’s ostensible rival J Street got played. As
one senior official in the pro-Israel community told me, he believes
that “their standing has diminished a lot. The administration used J
Street and included them, and went to their conferences, because they
believed they would be a useful tool.” But J Street is weakened not, as
the pro-Israel official believes, because it plowed its own field
recklessly. If you describe yourself as a pro-Israel organization then
your power is directly proportional to how important a role Israel plays
in American foreign policy. If your actions, like J Street’s,
contribute to making Israel about as important to American foreign
policy as Malaysia is, then you aren’t very important either.
Read the whole thing.
What Smith is describing is what I have called the
Poritz Syndrome.
Oren is an historian and he has an historian's perspective. I'm sure he sees everything that Smith sees and has many more facts and data points to prove what Smith is saying. Unfortunately, Oren is getting no support here in Israel, other than Netanyahu's refusal to disown him.... Yet Oren disowned Netanyahu by running for the Knesset with Kahlon's party. Perhaps there's a lesson there for the historian too.
In the meantime, my copy of Oren's book is on order. Can't wait to read this one.
Labels: Avigdor Lieberman, Barack Hussein Obama, Binyamin Netanyahu, court Jew, Jack Lew, Martin Indyk, Michael Oren, Moshe Kahlon, poritz syndrome, Tzipi Livni, Yair Lapid
Obama: 'I am the closest thing to a Jew that has ever sat in this office'
I'm sure you'll all be shocked that the headlines have gone to his head. Yes,
he really said that (Hat Tip:
Memeorandum).
Obama’s close advisor David Axelrod was more critical of Netanyahu.
“The world of politics everywhere is
divided into two categories: the first and more common is the people who
run for public office because they want to be somebody,” he explained.
“A smaller group is made of respectable people who run for public office
because they want to do something – something positive. Shape the
future in a positive way. I think Benjamin Netanyahu completely falls in
the first category. He is a great politician. He knows what he needs to
do to get through the next election. But it seems to me that Israel has
to think about what they need to do to get through the next
generation.”
He also recalled Obama venting in a
moment of contemplation, telling him, ‘You know, I think I am the
closest thing to a Jew that has ever sat in this office. For people to
say that I am anti-Israel, or, even worse, anti-Semitic, it hurts.’
Boo. Hoo. If you don't expect any appreciation, you'll never be disappointed. Obama seems to be disappointed all the time.
But he's far from being a Jew. And what he thinks being a Jew means comes from
all the wrong places.
Bret Stephens reports that Obama supporter Peter Beinart says that we
have it all wrong. Obama's views on Israel came from a group of far Left
Chicago Jews, who “bred in Obama a specific, and subversive, vision of American Jewish identity and of the Jewish state” (Hat Tip: Herb G). (For those who - like me - do not have online access to the Wall Street Journal, you can find the full article here).
At
the center of this coterie, Mr. Beinart explains, was a Chicago rabbi
named Arnold Jacob Wolf. In 1969, Wolf staged a synagogue protest in
favor of Black Panther Bobby Seale. In the early 1970s, he founded an
organization that met with Yasser Arafat’s Palestine Liberation
Organization—this being some 20 years before Arafat officially renounced
terrorism. In the early 1990s, Wolf denounced the construction of the
Holocaust Museum in Washington.
And, in 1996, the rabbi “was one
of [Mr. Obama's] earliest and most prominent supporters” when he ran for
the Illinois state Senate. Wolf later described Mr. Obama’s views on
Israel as “on the line of Peace Now”—an organization with a long history
of blaming Israel for the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Mr. Obama had
other Jewish mentors, too, according to Mr. Beinart. One was Bettylu
Saltzman, whose father, developer Philip Klutznick, had joined Wolf in
“his break with the Israeli government in the 1970s.” Ms. Saltzman,
writes Mr. Beinart, “still seethes with hostility toward the mainstream
Jewish groups” and later became active in left-wing Jewish political
groups like J Street. Among other things, it was she who “organized the
rally against the Iraq War where Obama proclaimed his opposition to an
American invasion.”
Ms. Saltzman also introduced Mr. Obama to
David Axelrod, himself a longtime donor to a group called the New Israel
Fund. For a flavor of the NIF’s world view, a WikiLeaks cable from 2010
noted that an NIF associate director told U.S. embassy officials in Tel
Aviv that “the disappearance of a Jewish state would not be the tragedy
that Israelis fear since it would become more democratic.”
What I have to wonder about is the source for the David Axelrod quote and the others (Martin Indyk, Dan Shapiro). This is Eliyahu Berkowitz's opener to the article:
In advance of an exclusive interview with President Barack Obama,
Channel 2’s Ilana Dayan interviewed the people who were most close to
the president in the past years, finding out what happened to the
US-Israel relationship and what was really said behind closed doors.
And then she went around discussing it? This wasn't on background or off the record? You don't think that the White House planted some things it wanted to get out there with the
generally sympathetic Yonit Levy and asked her to make sure they made the news in Israel, do you?
Here's Levy's
2010 interview with King Hussein. And here's a
summary of her 2013 interview with him. Hmmm. It sounds like she's a little beholden to The One.
Labels: Barack Hussein Obama, Channel 2, Dan Shapiro, Martin Indyk, Yonit Levy
Most land tenders announced during 'peace talks' were approved by Abu Mazen
David Makovsky, a member of Martin Indyk's 'negotiating' team, told an audience at the Begin-Sadat Center two weeks ago that most of the contentious land tenders announced during the 'peace talks' were actually
approved in advance by '
moderate' '
Palestinian' President
Mahmoud Abbas Abu Mazen . This is from the first link.
During the nine months of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations that ended
in failure in 2014, 62 percent of Israel’s publicly announced tenders
for housing beyond the Green Line were earmarked for the 1.9% of West
Bank land that Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas had once
consented would remain in Israel’s hands.
David Makovsky, who
was a member of US Secretary of State John Kerry’s negotiating team
during this period, pointed out this little-known fact during a speech
Tuesday at a conference on US-Israel relations that took place at Bar-
Ilan University’s Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.
Makovsky,
a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said that
Israel was more “geographically cautious” with settlement announcements
during the negotiating period than many realize.
“It would have
been helpful if that could have been made public,” Makovsky said,
explaining that for political reasons that was not a possibility.
This geographic caution was not stated publicly but was the policy.
Announcements
of settlement plans during this period were a huge bone of contention,
with former US Mideast envoy Martin Indyk, who headed the team
Makovsky was a member of, placing much of the blame for the breakdown
of the talks on Israel’s settlement policies. He said during a speech
last year that “rampant settlement activity – especially in the midst
of negotiations – doesn’t just undermine Palestinian trust in the
purpose of the negotiations, it can undermine Israel’s Jewish future.”
In
2008 Abbas reportedly turned down an offer by thenprime minister Ehud
Olmert for Israel to annex 6.3% of the West Bank to incorporate the
major settlement blocs into Israel in exchange for 5.8% of land within
Israel and the corridor from the West Bank to Gaza. Abbas reportedly
countered with a proposal for a 1.9% land swap, apparently the area
where most of the housing tenders were announced during the 2013- 2014
negotiations.
Isn't it amazing that the Israeli government chose not to deflect John Kerry's pressure by pointing this out at the time?
Labels: Barack Hussein Obama, David Makovsky, John Kerry, Martin Indyk, Middle East peace process
Martin Indyk, are you listening?
A couple of years ago, '
moderate' '
Palestinian' President
Mahmoud Abbas Abu Mazen told an Israeli interviewer that he had
no intention of returning to Tzfat (Safed), a town that is located within the Israeli side of the 1949 armistice lines. Of course, he immediately walked back that statement.
His spokesman, Nabil Abu
Rudaineh, tried to explain that the interview with Channel 2 was mainly intended
to “affect Israeli public opinion.”
In other words, the spokesman is
telling Palestinians and Arabs that Abbas is telling Israelis what they like to
hear – namely that Palestinian refugees would not return to their former homes
inside Israel.
Which statement is the truth? Obviously,
the second one.
Palestinian Authority
President Mahmoud Abbas said in an interview with Egyptian newspaper
Akhbar el-Yom over the weekend that there are 6 million Palestinian
refugees waiting to return to their homes and that he was one of them.
The Middle East Media Research Institute
reviewed the statements made by Abbas in the Arabic daily, and found
that Abbas said he would not recognize Israel as a Jewish state because
he believes it would undermine the national interests of Israeli Arabs,
and prevent millions of Palestinian refugees from returning to their
homes. "We cannot recognize a Jewish state," he said, adding, "We cannot
close the door to those who wish to return."
He further said that if the U.N. Security
Council rejects the Palestinian proposal for a two-year deadline for an
Israeli withdrawal to 1967 lines, he may end Palestinian security
cooperation with Israel and even step down and transfer responsibility
for the Palestinian Authority to Israel.
He said that if Israel continues to prevent
the Palestinians from forming an independent state, then it should "take
responsibility for the occupation," including the health and education
sectors as well as all internal affairs.
Martin Indyk, are you listening?
Labels: Abu Mazen, Martin Indyk, right of return, Tzfat
Saturday night at the movies: Naftali Bennett kicks Martin Indyk's a**
This video is a bit long. It's a lengthy conversation that took place at the Saban Forum of the Brookings Institute on Saturday night between Jewish Home party leader Naftali Bennett and former 'mediator' Martin Indyk. Indyk opens by saying that Bennett promised to 'kick his a**." Bennett delivers.
Let's go to the videotape.
For those who don't have time to sit through the entire video, there's a summary
here.
Labels: Martin Indyk, Middle East peace process, Naftali Bennett, two-state solution
'Secret back channel' doomed 'peace talks'?
The New Republic reports that the failure of last summer's 'peace talks' was brought about by the use of a
secret back channel between Prime Minister Netanyahu's personal attorney, Yitzchak Molho, and an unnamed and apparently unauthorized confidante of 'm
oderate' '
Palestinian' President
Mahmoud Abbas Abu Mazen. This is from the first link.
The secret channel—reported here for the first time—created
substantial progress toward an agreement. But it also had one
fundamental flaw, which contributed to the collapse of Kerry's entire
process. Abbas’s supposed representative was in fact holding these talks
without a real mandate from the Palestinian President; the concessions
he discussed with Molho didn't represent the President's views. Parts of
this story remain unsolved—most importantly,
why this lack of a mandate was missed or ignored in real time. But what
can be told is enough to raise some hard questions about Kerry's effort,
and offer important lessons for future attempts at reaching an
agreement.
...
The extent of Abbas's detachment from the secret-channel's product
became clear in early 2014, when Kerry decided to merge the two
negotiation tracks. The understanding that had developed through the
secret channel was spilled into the discussions that Indyk's team was
holding with both sides over a "framework document.” Netanyahu was
willing to work with the fruits of the secret channel (although he
insisted on airing his reservations, and the negotiations his advisers
held with Indyk over the exact wording were endless). But Abbas
completely rejected what had already, supposedly, been accepted by his
own negotiator. He wasn't willing to show any flexibility on the Jewish
state issue, and the idea of excluding any clear reference to a
Palestinian capital in Jerusalem seemed like political suicide.
The anger Abbas expressed at the American framework caught Kerry by
surprise: After all, these were all ideas his supposed negotiator was
discussing with Molho. Realizing he had a problem with Abbas, Kerry
tried to convince Netanyahu to tilt some of the provisions in Abbas's
direction. But the Israeli Prime Minister was not having it. "We already
agreed on these issues in the secret channel," he told the Secretary,
according to a former senior U.S. official.
"Bibi is angry at Kerry for
opening up understandings that everybody considered a done deal, just
because Abbas had changed his mind,” an Israeli Minister told me in
February. But a Palestinian official rebuffed this criticism, saying
that Abbas never changed his mind on anything: "He was presented with
positions that no Palestinian leader could ever accept, and that he
personally had spoken out against many times."
For some, it was
always clear that the positions presented by the supposed "Palestinian
negotiator" in this secret channel were totally unacceptable for Abbas.
Officials involved in the process admit in retrospect that there was too
much wishful thinking regarding the backchannel.
A major reason
for the skepticism of some people involved in the negotiations toward
this backchannel, had to do with Abbas's ostensible confidante. A number
of Israeli, American, and Palestinian officials claimed that it was a
miscalculation to assume this person would have authority to make
concessions on delicate issues. One senior Palestinian official told me
that those in the American and Israeli camps who thought otherwise were
"fools."
A possibility that's not really considered here is that this was all an effort by the 'Palestinians' to see if Israel was bluffing. They never intended to make any concessions but they wanted to see if Israel would. Now, they will pocket the concessions made in the 'back channel' and insist that the 'negotiations' start from there the next time.
Sounds like a recipe for disaster.
Labels: Abu Mazen, Binyamin Netanyahu, Dennis Ross, John Kerry, Martin Indyk, Middle East peace process, Yitzchak Molho
Too bad Netanyahu's too chickensh*t to do this
Mark Levin got it right three and a half years ago, and he has it right today (Hat Tip:
Sunlight).
The problem is that there is something to labeling Netanyahu 'chickensh*t.' But it's not, as Obama, Kerry and Indyk would claim, because he's afraid to make 'peace.'
It's because he's afraid to tell Obama and Co. where to get off.
Labels: Barack Hussein Obama, Binyamin Netanyahu, John Kerry, Mark Levin, Martin Indyk
It's come to this: Obama-Kerry 'peace talks' envoy paid by Qatar (and Norway)
The New York Times reported at length on Sunday on the
financing of US think tanks by foreign governments (see also
Memeorandum). Among the US think tanks who receive significant financing from foreign governments is the Brookings Institute.
The arrangements involve Washington’s most influential think tanks, including the Brookings Institution, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the Atlantic Council.
Each is a major recipient of overseas funds, producing policy papers,
hosting forums and organizing private briefings for senior United States
government officials that typically align with the foreign governments’
agendas.
Most
of the money comes from countries in Europe, the Middle East and
elsewhere in Asia, particularly the oil-producing nations of the United
Arab Emirates, Qatar
and Norway, and takes many forms. The United Arab Emirates, a major
supporter of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, quietly
provided a donation of more than $1 million to help build the center’s
gleaming new glass and steel headquarters not far from the White House.
Qatar, the small but wealthy Middle East nation, agreed last year to
make a $14.8 million, four-year donation to Brookings, which has helped
fund a Brookings affiliate in Qatar and a project on United States
relations with the Islamic world.
Some
scholars say the donations have led to implicit agreements that the
research groups would refrain from criticizing the donor governments.
“If
a member of Congress is using the Brookings reports, they should be
aware — they are not getting the full story,” said Saleem Ali, who
served as a visiting fellow at the Brookings Doha Center
in Qatar and who said he had been told during his job interview that he
could not take positions critical of the Qatari government in papers.
“They may not be getting a false story, but they are not getting the
full story.”
The directors of the institutions claim that all that money doesn't blind them and doesn't make them execute the donors' wishes.
In interviews, top executives at the think tanks strongly defended the
arrangements, saying the money never compromised the integrity of their
organizations’ research. Where their scholars’ views overlapped with
those of donors, they said, was coincidence.
Here's the reaction of one director whose name should be familiar to those who follow the goings on in Israel.
“Our business is to influence policy with scholarly, independent
research, based on objective criteria, and to be policy-relevant, we
need to engage policy makers,” said Martin S. Indyk, vice president and
director of the Foreign Policy Program at Brookings, one of the oldest
and most prestigious think tanks in Washington.
Do any of you think Indyk is telling the truth? If yes, consider this:
In
their contracts and internal documents, however, foreign governments
are often explicit about what they expect from the research groups they
finance.
“In Washington, it is difficult for a small country to gain access to powerful politicians, bureaucrats and experts,” states an internal report
commissioned by the Norwegian Foreign Affairs Ministry assessing its
grant making. “Funding powerful think tanks is one way to gain such
access, and some think tanks in Washington are openly conveying that
they can service only those foreign governments that provide funding.”
...
The Brookings Institution,
which also accepted grants from Norway, has sought to help the country
gain access to American officials, documents show. One Brookings senior
fellow, Bruce Jones, offered in 2010 to reach out to State Department
officials to help arrange a meeting with a senior Norway official,
according to a government email. The Norway official wished to discuss his country’s role as a “middle power” and vital partner of the United States.
Brookings organized another event in April 2013,
in which one of Norway’s top officials on Arctic issues was seated next
to the State Department’s senior official on the topic and reiterated
the country’s priorities for expanding oil exploration in the Arctic.
William
J. Antholis, the managing director at Brookings, said that if his
scholars help Norway pursue its foreign policy agenda in Washington, it
is only because their rigorous, independent research led them to this
position. “The scholars are their own agents,” he said. “They are not
agents of these foreign governments.”
But
three lawyers who specialize in the law governing Americans’ activities
on behalf of foreign governments said that the Center for Global
Development and Brookings, in particular, appeared to have taken actions
that merited registration as foreign agents of Norway. The activities
by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Atlantic
Council, they added, at least raised questions.
“The Department of Justice needs to be looking at this,” said Joshua Rosenstein, a lawyer at Sandler Reiff.
Ona
Dosunmu, Brookings’s general counsel, examining the same documents,
said she remained convinced that was a misreading of the law.
Norway,
at least, is grateful for the work Brookings has done. During a speech
at Brookings in June, Norway’s foreign minister, Borge Brende, noted
that his country’s relationship with the think tank “has been mutually
beneficial for moving a lot of important topics.” Just before the
speech, in fact, Norway signed an agreement to contribute an additional
$4 million to the group.
Norway's ruling party is not exactly a
friend of
Israel either....
Read the whole thing.
Here in Israel, the government now believes it knows why the latest 'peace talks' were so biased against Israel. His name is
Martin Indyk and he's the director of Brookings and, as noted above, on the payroll (indirectly) of Qatar and Norway (and other countries).
“Qatar has been a major bankroller for Hamas and other terrorist organizations,” one government official said. “The fact that the same Qatari government is also a major provider of funds for a respectable Washington think tank raises a whole series of questions about that think tank’s relationships and impartiality.”
Among the questions this has raised in Jerusalem is the degree to which the institute can impartially draw up papers relating to Qatar, such as its role in the Middle East and the financing of terror organizations.
Qatar is Hamas’s main financial backer.
...
Indyk, who took leave from Brookings to serve as the US special Middle East envoy during the nine months of unsuccessful Israeli-Palestinian negotiations that ended in April, returned to the think tank after the negotiations failed and is currently its vice president and director of the Foreign Policy Program.
...
In a recent interview with Foreign Policy magazine about the Gaza conflict, Indyk said US President Barack Obama became “enraged” with Israeli criticism of US Secretary of State John Kerry.
Indyk said Gaza has had a “very negative” impact on the US-Israel relationship.
“There’s a lot of strain in the relationship now. The personal relationship between the president and the prime minister has been fraught for some time and it’s become more complicated by recent events.”
The Qatar connection might also explain why US Secretary of State John
FN Kerry was so anxious to do Qatar's (and Turkey's) bidding during
Operation Protective Edge.
Arutz Sheva
adds:
Indyk, who served as US negotiator in the failed peace talks, has had his impartiality put into question before due
to his position on the executive board of the radical-left New Israel
Fund, which funds numerous anti-Israel NGOs. In May, Indyk was accused of engaging in a "nasty" anti-Israel tirade at a bar following an address to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Qatar has not only funded Hamas, but according to reports pushed the group to reject
a ceasefire in the recent Operation Protective Edge and return to its
terror war on Israeli citizens, threatening to expel Hamas politburo
chief Khaled Mashaal if it didn't do so.
The position of Qatar led Israel's Ambassador to the UN Ron Prosor in August to label the oil-state "a Club Med for terrorists,"
adding that the "hundreds of millions of dollars" Qatar gave Hamas
meant "every one of Hamas's tunnels and rockets might as well have had a
sign that said 'Made possible through a kind donation of the emir of
Qatar.'"
A few more take-aways from this story:
1. Maybe you all now understand why Israel has tried to control or stop foreign government funding of NGO's.
2. The Obama administration touted itself as the 'most transparent administration evah.' Is this what they had in mind?
3. With all the bellyaching by the likes of Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer about a supposed 'Israel lobby,' Israel does not appear on the list of countries that have donated money to US think tanks. But nine Arab countries do appear on the list. I'm sure you're all shocked.
Kudos to the New York Times (for a change) for actually letting this story come out.
Labels: Barack Hussein Obama, Brookings Institution, Hamas, John Kerry, Martin Indyk, Middle East peace process, NGO funding, Norway, Qatar, Think Tanks
'In a neighborhood featuring Hamas, ISIS, Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran, just to name a few of the actors, President Obama was “enraged” at … Israel'
Peter Wehner
picks up on this quote from the Foreign Policy interview with
Martin Indyk that I
blogged on Wednesday. First the quote, then Wehner.
Well, it started with Defense Minister Moshe
Ya'alon attacking [Kerry] publicly during the peace process, which I attribute
to two things. One, the defense minister had a very clear sense of what
Israel's security needs are and they do not include withdrawing the Israeli
army from the Jordan River, which would have to be addressed in the peace
negotiations if there was to be a deal. So I think there was a substantive
disagreement, but the lack of respect was truly disturbing, specifically given
the importance of American security assistance for the well-being of Israel's
defense, for which the defense minister is responsible.
But it got
completely out of control during the Gaza crisis, where the secretary was
assailed for supposedly betraying Israel because he was trying to work with the
prime minister on a cease-fire, and he engaged with Qatar and Turkey to test
whether they could influence Hamas to stop firing the rockets. And that
criticism came not just from the right but from pundits on the left as well -- Haaretz published three articles by
their journalists attacking Kerry. I think that's a product of a particular
circumstance in which Israelis felt very much isolated, on their own -- that
the world didn't understand them. In that defensive crouch, I think they were
waiting for a betrayal by the United States even though the secretary and the president
repeatedly supported their right to defend themselves. So they interpreted the secretary's
actions as being designed to undermine Israel in favor of Hamas and undermine
its burgeoning alignment with Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
In fact,
nothing could have been further from the truth but that was the perception and,
unfortunately, it was a line fed by some unnamed Israeli officials, one of whom
described Kerry as launching "a strategic terror attack." That was
just outrageous and it enraged the president.
Wehner:
Think about this for a moment. In a neighborhood featuring Hamas,
ISIS, Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran, just to name a few of the actors,
President Obama was “enraged” at … Israel. That’s right, Israel–our
stalwart ally, a lighthouse of liberty, lawfulness, and human rights in a
region characterized by despotism, and a nation filled with people who
long for peace and have done so much for so long to sacrifice for it
(including repeatedly returning and offering to return its land in
exchange for peace).
Yet Mr. Obama–a man renowned for his lack of strong feelings, his
emotional equanimity, his disengagement and distance from events, who New York Times columnist Maureen Dowd refers to as “Spock” for his Vulcan-like detachment–is not just upset but “enraged” at Israel.
Add to this the fact that the conflict with Hamas in Gaza–a conflict
started and escalated by Hamas, and in which Hamas used innocent
Palestinians as human shields–had a very negative impact on America’s
relationship with Israel. To show you just how absurd this has
become, other Arab nations were siding with Israel in its conflict with
Hamas. But not America under Obama. He was constantly applying pressure
on Israel. Apparently if you’re a nation defending yourself and, in
doing so, you wage a war with exquisite care in order to prevent
civilian death, it is reason to earn the fury of Mr. Obama.
It’s clear to me, and by now it should be to others, that there is
something sinister in Barack Obama’s constant anger aimed at Israel.
Most pro-Israel President evah? Don't believe it for a minute.
Labels: Barack Hussein Obama, Binyamin Netanyahu, Gaza, Hamas, IDF, John Kerry, Martin Indyk, Middle East peace process, Obama's obsession with Israel, Obama's obsession with Palestinians, Operation Protective Edge
Indyk's obsession
Here's a lengthy interview with
Martin Indyk about the US-Israel relationship in the aftermath of Operation Protective Edge.
There is much with which to disagree.... Suffice it to say that he is still obsessed with the 'two-state solution.'
Labels: Barack Hussein Obama, Binyamin Netanyahu, John Kerry, Martin Indyk, Middle East peace process, Moshe Yaalon, Operation Protective Edge, two-state solution, US-Israel relationship
Martin Indyk, wrong again
When are people going to stop taking Indyk seriously?
Labels: cease fire, Gaza, Hamas, IDF, Martin Indyk, Operation Protective Edge
Why the 'peace talks' failed
From an epic piece by Ben Birnbaum and Amir Tibon in
The New Republic, here are
just a few of the reasons why the 'peace talks' failed.
In his rush to announce the resumption
of talks before flying home, though, Kerry left the conversation with
two serious misunderstandings that would sow the seeds for later
surprises. Netanyahu’s 2,000-plus figure covered only homes that were
open for bidding. (In his mind, long-term building plans were a
different story.) Nor did it include East Jerusalem, a part of the West
Bank that Israel considered sovereign territory. Focused on the big
picture, Kerry hadn’t asked for such clarifications.
The
more consequential miscommunication concerned the prisoners. Netanyahu
told Kerry that he was prepared to release approximately 80 of them
(excluding those with Israeli identity cards). Kerry asked for—and thought he heard Netanyahu agree to—all
104. “Both of them like to talk for long periods of time,” said someone
who has dealt with both leaders. “And I’m not sure that when one of
them is lecturing the other at length, the other guy is really listening
very carefully.”
...
Two weeks later, the Israeli and
Palestinian negotiators met at a hotel west of Jerusalem. Both sides
showed up angry. Erekat and Shtayyeh were steaming at new Israeli
settlement plans that had been announced immediately after the second
prisoner release days earlier, and at Netanyahu’s (false) claim in an
interview that Abbas had accepted the new building in return for the
prisoners. Meanwhile, Livni and Molho, who had adhered rigorously to
Kerry’s gag order on the talks, were incensed by a slew of Palestinian
news stories that they believed their counterparts had leaked. Both
sides, excepting Molho, were frustrated at the lack of progress they’d
made over three months. And the claustrophobic setting—a small bedroom that had been converted into a conference room—didn’t help to calm nerves.
Erekat
stormed into the room and slammed his briefcase on the table. In recent
weeks, with the talks faltering, he had begun drafting a Palestinian
Plan B that would include ending Fatah's six-year-old rift with Hamas
and resuming the U.N. campaign—steps that would
doom the process. Pointing at the briefcase, he declared: “This case
contains our requests to join fifteen U.N. treaties and conventions, and
my president will get my suggestion that he should sign them
immediately if you say it was prisoners for settlements. And if he
doesn’t approve it, I will resign tonight.”
“You can’t do this,” Livni said, raising her voice. “This is not what we agreed on.”
“What we agreed on was prisoners for no-U.N., not prisoners for settlements,” he barked.
“Stop
shouting,” Livni said. “You’re being unfair.” But Erekat kept yelling
that the settlements were making him a pariah among his people.
As Livni listened to Erekat complain about his political problems, something inside her snapped.
“Do you think this is easy for me?”
she shouted. She recited a litany of some of the worst Palestinian
prisoners that Israel was releasing for the sake of the talks: one who
had murdered an elderly Holocaust survivor, another who had stabbed two
teenagers, yet another who had hurled a firebomb at a bus, killing a
mother and her children. “These are your heroes,” she said,
disdainfully. “I don’t know why they are your heroes, but I pushed to
release them to get these talks started so we could get a peace deal, so
if I can do it, you can accept a few houses. Houses can be demolished.
We can’t put those murderers back in jail, and I can’t get back three
lives that were just taken.”
Erekat shot back: “What should I tell all the Palestinians who were killed?”
Finally,
Indyk intervened, waving his arms like a baseball umpire making the
safe sign. “Time out!” he screamed. The Palestinian negotiators went out
to a nearby veranda, and minutes later, Indyk—whom Kerry had dubbed “the Saeb whisperer”—joined
them. “I can’t take it anymore,” Erekat told Indyk. “It’s time for me
to move on. Netanyahu is cheating us. He is not a man of peace.”
It
was a refrain Indyk had grown accustomed to hearing. “I can tell you
that he’s changing,” he said. “He’s moving.” After a few minutes, Indyk
and the Palestinians returned to the room, and the meeting resumed,
awkwardly. When they parted after three hours, the negotiators shook
hands, as they had always done. But it was clear something had changed.
That night, Erekat and Shtayyeh presented a joint letter of resignation
to Abbas, while Livni called her top aides to vent. “I was one hundred
percent sure it was over,” said one.
...
In early December, Kerry presented
Allen’s proposals to the Israelis. While they sidestepped the question
of when Israeli forces would leave the Jordan Valley, they sketched out
what the area—and the rest of the West Bank—might
look like after they did. The future Palestinian-Jordanian border would
include new early warning infrastructure, an invisible Israeli presence
(via cameras) at border crossings, and top-shelf American gadgetry.
Livni liked the package. So did most of Israel’s security brass. Even
hard-line Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman was making conciliatory
noises. “Israel will not get more than it is getting from Kerry,” he
said publicly. Netanyahu saw it as a basis for discussion.
Netanyahu’s hawkish defense minister—Likud’s Moshe Ya’alon—thought
it was worthless. “The Americans think we are natives who will be
impressed with their technology,” he told one confidant. “Don’t they
know that we are the masters of technology?” Unfortunately for everyone
involved, it was impossible to imagine the Israeli government approving
any deal without Ya'alon's support.
For months, the Americans had courted the crusty defense minister and concluded that he was—in the words of one senior official—“beyond
repair.” Ya’alon, meanwhile, railed about American naïveté in
off-the-record briefings with journalists. On January 14, an Israeli
newspaper published some of his remarks, including his diagnosis of
Kerry as “obsessive” and “messianic.” “The only thing that can save us,”
Ya’alon said, “is for John Kerry to win his Nobel Prize and leave us
alone.”
...
Abbas had always been more wary. From
the beginning, he felt as if Kerry was privileging Netanyahu’s needs
over his. And the numbers seemed to bear the Palestinian leader out:
Kerry had met with Netanyahu nearly twice as often as he had with him.
It was not lost on the Palestinians, either, that the secretary’s team—Indyk, Lowenstein, Makovsky, Schwartz, Yaffe, Goldenberg, Blumenthal—sounded
like a Bar Mitzvah guest list. To Abbas, the asymmetry of the
diplomatic triangle was best illustrated by a December meeting between
him and Kerry at the muqata. The meeting, devoted to security issues,
was supposed to have been attended also by General Allen. Kerry showed
up without him. When Abbas asked where he was, Kerry apologized and
explained that Allen needed to stay in Jerusalem and work more with
Netanyahu.
The depth of Palestinian
alienation became clear to Kerry and his team only on February 19, when
the two sides met for dinner at Le Maurice Hotel in Paris—the kickoff to a three-day parley. As the Palestinians walked in the door, each American was struck with the same thought: These guys do not look like they’re in a good mood.
Following dinner, Kerry met alone with Abbas while Erekat and Indyk
spoke in a separate room. Afterward, Kerry and Indyk got in the car that
would take them to their rooms at the Grande Hotel. The secretary
turned to his envoy: “That was really negative.” At around the same
time, Abbas, who was nursing a terrible cold, saw Erekat in the hall and
told him that he was going straight to sleep. “It was a difficult
meeting,” he said. “I’ll brief you tomorrow.”
The
next morning, at around 7:30, Indyk called Erekat. “The secretary wants
to see you,” he said. Erekat was surprised at the early time of the
summons. This must be important. He put on a
suit and took a cab to the Grande. When he and Indyk got to Kerry’s
Louis XIII-style suite, the secretary answered the door. He was dressed
casually: hotel slippers, no jacket or tie. He looked concerned. After a
moment of silence, the first words came out of Kerry’s mouth. “Why is
Abu Mazen so angry with me?”
Erekat responded that he hadn’t yet
been briefed on the meeting, so Kerry offered to get his notes. “I
barely said a word, and he started saying, ‘I cannot accept this,’”
Kerry grumbled, going through some of Abbas’s red lines.
“What do you want?” Erekat said. “These are his positions. We are sick and tired of Bibi the Great. He’s taking you for a ride.”
“No one takes me for a ride!”
“He is refusing to negotiate on a map or even say 1967.”
“I’ve moved him,” Kerry said, “I’ve moved him.”
“Where?” Erekat said, raising his voice. “Show me! This is just the impression he’s giving you.”
The next month, Abbas led a Palestinian
delegation to Washington. At a March 16 lunch at Kerry’s Georgetown
home, the secretary asked Abbas if he’d accept delaying the fourth
prisoner release by a few days. Kerry was worried that the Israelis were
wavering. “No,” Abbas said. “I cannot do this.” Abbas would later
describe that moment as a turning point. If the Americans can’t convince Israel to give me 26 prisoners, he thought then, how will they ever get them to give me East Jerusalem? At
the meal, Erekat noticed Abbas displaying some of his telltale signs of
discomfort. He was crossing his legs, looking over at him every two
minutes. The index cards on which he normally took notes had been placed
back in his suit pocket. Abbas was no longer interested in what was
being said.
The next day at the
White House, Obama tried his luck with the Palestinian leader. He
reviewed the latest American proposals, some of which had been tilted in
Abbas’s direction. (The document would now state categorically that
there would be a Palestinian capital in Jerusalem.) “Don’t quibble with
this detail or that detail,” Obama said. “The occupation will end. You
will get a Palestinian state. You will never have an administration as
committed to that as this one.” Abbas and Erekat were not impressed.
After the meeting, the Palestinian negotiator saw Susan Rice—Abbas’s favorite member of the Obama administration—in
the hall. “Susan,” he said, “I see we’ve yet to succeed in making it
clear to you that we Palestinians aren’t stupid.” Rice couldn’t believe
it. “You Palestinians,” she told him, “can never see the fucking big
picture.”
...
Like Kerry, Abbas felt that his
credibility was at stake. He had promised the Palestinian people that
the prisoners would be released on schedule, on March 29. But as the
date approached, that was looking less and less likely. So Abbas
continued working with Erekat on what he was calling “the Palestinian
nuclear option.” He even put a timer on it: If Israel didn’t vote to
release the fourth tranche by seven o’clock on the evening of April 1,
Abbas would formally resume the U.N. bid in a grand ceremony at the
muqata.
The night before that
deadline, Kerry was supposed to meet Abbas at nine o’clock in Ramallah,
but as of eleven, there was no sign of him. Erekat called the U.S.
consul-general, who told him that Kerry was meeting with Netanyahu, and
that it was running long. Abbas wanted to sleep, so he dispatched Erekat
and Faraj to meet Kerry after midnight in Jerusalem. In his suite at
the David Citadel, Kerry promised Erekat that the Israeli government
would vote on the fourth prisoner release the following day.
“When?” Erekat pressed.
Kerry was peeved that Erekat was insisting on a specific hour. “Before noon,” he said.
Noon
passed without a vote. Then one o’clock, then two, then three. Making
matters worse, Israel’s Housing Ministry approved 708 new homes for a
disputed neighborhood in East Jerusalem that afternoon. Abbas was
nearing the end of his patience.
Around seven o'clock, he sat in his office with Erekat and Faraj. “Have you heard any word from the Israelis?” he asked Erekat.
“No,” Erekat replied. “Not a word.”
“How about you?” he asked Faraj, who gave the same answer.
The U.N.-ceremony attendees were taking their seats down the hall. “Let’s give them another half-hour,” he said.
Livni
had no idea what was happening inside the muqata. She was sitting in
the hall outside Netanyahu’s office, along with many other people,
waiting for her turn to speak to the prime minister. But shortly before
eight, she got a bad feeling: Everyone around her started receiving text
messages, all at once. An aide turned on the television. There, beneath
the Jerusalem panorama at the same table from which he had first
lobbied his peers to resume talks nine months earlier, Abbas declared to
a roomful of officials and VIPs that “the Palestinian leadership has
unanimously approved a decision to seek membership of fifteen U.N.
conventions and international treaties.”
“This is our right,” he continued.“All
we get from the Israeli government is talk.” As Abbas took out his pen
to sign the U.N. conventions, with Erekat at his side, the room gave him
a standing ovation.
Earlier
that afternoon, while Abbas and Erekat were watching the clock at the
muqata, Netanyahu sat in his office, taking meeting after meeting.
First, he would invite in Livni and Kerry’s team to discuss the
coalescing Pollard-for-prisoners-for-talks deal. Then, he would bring in
a group of pro-settler politicians led by Housing Minister Uri Ariel to
calm their nerves about the impending settlement freeze. Wow, Ariel thought each time he passed Livni in the doorway, it’s like we’re doing shifts.
Livni
was pressing Netanyahu for an immediate vote on the deal. “Everything
is ready,” she said, “just get the ministers here.” Netanyahu, however,
was working with Kerry on an exchange of letters that would make
everything official. Kerry, meanwhile, was waiting on White House
approval of a single paragraph—the Pollard
paragraph. But Rice’s staff was still engaged in frantic negotiations
with Israeli officials over the particulars: when Pollard would go free,
where he could travel, what he could say. Though Netanyahu had promised
Kerry the night before that he would hold the vote today, he had told
Kerry and Indyk earlier that morning that he wanted to wait one more to
prepare Israeli public opinion. Indyk was incredulous. “Mr. Prime
Minister,” he said, “you are playing with fire.”
The
Israeli right was also in rebellion mode, with Likud officials vowing
to resign and Bennett again threatening to leave the government if the
fourth tranche was released. As Netanyahu pressed the merits of the
extension deal to Ariel and his hard-right allies during one of their
shifts, one of his aides entered the room: “Mr. Prime Minister, Abu
Mazen has just signed fifteen U.N. conventions.” Netanyahu froze. For
years, he had feared that the Palestinians might join the International
Criminal Court and lodge war-crimes charges against Israeli officials.
“Which conventions?” he asked. After several minutes of confusion, one
of the people in the room managed to locate a list. Chuckling, he told
the others that the Palestinians—the Palestinians—had signed the anti-corruption charter. The room burst into laughter.
Erekat,
who for months had been urging Abbas to blow up the talks, was as giddy
as the settlers. That night, Indyk summoned Erekat to the U.S.
Consul-General’s home in Jerusalem. The moment the Palestinian
negotiator walked in the door, Indyk began yelling. “Don’t act
surprised, Martin,” Erekat said, grinning. “You told me nine times in
four days that the prisoners were about to be released.” (The Americans
dispute Erekat’s number, claiming that they had told the Palestinians
the prisoner-release vote was imminent only three or four times.) Indyk
asked Erekat when the U.N. letters of accession would be submitted. He
replied that the local U.N. representative would receive them the
following morning at nine. “Please delay it,” Indyk said. “Just for
twenty-four hours, hold it back.”
While
Erekat and Indyk were going back and forth, Erekat’s phone rang. It was
Livni. “OK,” she said, “so you had your little show. Now hold back the
documents. We have a deal to extend the talks. The prisoners can go out
in forty-eight hours, and then we can get to substance. Don’t destroy
this.” Erekat told her that he was with the Americans and would have to
call back. The following morning, he sent her a text message. “It’s a
done deal,” he wrote. “We just handed in the documents.”
Over
the next three weeks, with April 29 approaching, Indyk would meet nine
times with Livni, Molho, Erekat, and Faraj in a bid to salvage the peace
talks. He was determined to get everything in writing this time. No
more misunderstandings. And by April 23, the sides seemed close to an
extension agreement. Indyk drove to Ben Gurion Airport that day to pick
up his wife, and while at the baggage claim, he got a call from Livni.
She’d heard that the Palestinians had just done something to ruin all
the progress they had made. Indyk immediately phoned Erekat, who said he
wasn’t aware of the development, but would investigate. Back at the
U.S. consulate, the Kerry team was combing over the details of the
emerging deal, with the secretary calling periodically to check in.
Soon, the news penetrated their office, too. Weeks earlier, they had
been surprised by the timing of Abu Mazen’s U.N. ceremony, but not by
the act. The Palestinians had put them on notice. But as the American
officials huddled around a desktop computer, hungry for actual details
about this rumor they were hearing, they couldn’t believe the headline
that now flashed across the screen: FATAH, HAMAS END YEARS OF DIVISON,
AGREE TO UNITY GOVERNMENT.The next day, the Israeli Cabinet had voted to suspend the talks. John Kerry’s peace process was over.
The only surprising things about this were (a) that the Americans apparently were willing to release Jonathan Pollard just for an extension of the talks (okay, yes that would have been sensible, but there hasn't been a lot of common sense in Pollard's case, only vindictiveness) and (b) how amateurish some of Kerry's behavior was.
But it's a good story....
Labels: Abu Mazen, Barack Hussein Obama, Binyamin Netanyahu, John Kerry, Jonathan Pollard, Martin Indyk, Middle East peace process, Saeb Erekat, Tzipi Livni, Yitzchak Molho