Israel Matzav

What Abu Bluff really wants

It's not without reason that he's called Abu Bluff. This time he's bluffed everyone. Think he wants a treaty? Of course not, but not - as you probably thought - because he won't sign an end of conflict statement. Don't go there yet.

Think he wants real progress on the substantive issues? No. What would he do with it?

Think he wants aid money? Maybe. But the key then would be "what would he do with it?"

So what DOES Abu Bluff want? Here's his game. President Obama won't be pleased.

When Abbas arrives in Washington, he and his retinue will be focused on exclusively three issues – making sure that the settlement freeze continues, that aid which covers over 70 per cent of the Palestinian Authority budget will continue to flow into its coffers, and that there will be sufficient "momentum" in the peace process to placate the "Arab street." Any meaningful progress towards peace is simply beyond these West Bankers’ hopes or capabilities. Oddly enough, this very low threshold of expectations is supported by the only states that matter to the West Bankers – the United States, Egypt (and far less importantly, the other moderate Arab states) and of course Israel. The fanfare of appearances in Washington, then, is calculated to make up for the absence of
substance.

Substantive progress in negotiating peace is hardly what Abbas and the West Bankers want, let alone feel they can get. The real reason for their reticence in making such progress since 2007 is related to the danger Hamas poses to the West Bank leadership. Though the number of West Bankers arrested by Israeli forces declined from 8,000 in 2006 to 5,000 in 2009, their sheer numbers still indicate that Hamas, and to a much lesser extent, Islamic Jihad, remain a substantial threat to Abbas, and that the threat of a Hamas takeover in Judea and Samaria has yet to dissipate.

Dealing with this threat entails good security cooperation between Abbas and Israeli
security forces – an arrangement in which Israel deals with the Hamas terrorist
infrastructure by night while Abbas’ security forces harass Hamas terrorists Israel
releases by day – as well as the dismantling of social infrastructure that Hamas has
created painstakingly over the years.

Abbas is essentially using the IDF to gain the kind of political and security foothold Arab leaders recognize as being essential to the art of ruling. He is also assuming the role of the traditional Arab ruler – controlling all the funds, avoiding elections (which will only be held if the outcome is a foregone conclusion), reducing the regime’s party to an arm of the executive, allowing no opposition, and making sure that his picture appears daily on the front page of the media. Only such a ruler qualifies as a member of the quintessential Arab leaders’ club.

Such security cooperation can hardly take place once any kind of peace arrangement is achieved. At that point, Israeli security presence in Judea and Samaria, a daily feature of West Bank life since the Defensive Shield operation in April 2002, would have to cease. This would leave Abbas’ security forces to face Hamas alone. So, Abbas prefers not to make progress in the peace talks until the terrorist swamp is more effectively dried up. He is treading on that path but has not gotten far enough to make the kind of progress in the peace process that would make Israeli security forays politically impossible.

Read the whole thing. It sounds like walking out would suit that strategy just fine.

posted by Carl in Jerusalem @ 2:33 AM