Why use force?
Shavua tov, a good week to everyone.One of the reasons that the United States and Israel may differ on the use of force against Iran is a result of their differing perceptions of what the use of force is supposed to accomplish. This is from the Atlantic's Patrick Clawson.
The other factor, arguably as important, is the differing perception about military force. Americans tend to like and embrace the Powell Doctrine: the overwhelming use of force to achieve decisive results. The view of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) is encapsulated in the unfortunate expression "mow the grass": you cannot stop the grass from growing, you will have to mow it repeatedly, but each mowing brings a temporary respite. For the IDF, the December 2008-January 2009 Operation Cast Lead in Gaza was a success because it brought many months of relative quiet, whereas U.S. commentators assessed it as a failure because it did not achieve what they assumed was Israel's real goal: destroying Hamas. When Americans say to Israelis that attacking Iran's nuclear facilities will only set Iran back temporarily, Israelis respond that this is all they ever expect from the use of military force -- and that this is good enough.I'm not sure that's a differing perception so much as it's differing capabilities. I am sure Israel would be happy to adopt the Powell doctrine - if only we had the firepower to do so. But since we don't, and since Iran is in our backyard, if the US will not act (and we'd prefer that they would) we may have no choice but to do what we can to slow Iran down, if not stop them.
It worked with Iraq. A lot of people assumed they'd rebuild. But they didn't.
And by the way, Mr. Obama had something to do with our not finishing off Hamas during Operation Cast Lead, so much as I don't believe Olmert would have gone for the kill anyway, it's more than a little disingenuous for the US to blame us for that one.
posted by Carl in Jerusalem @ 9:02 PM
1 Comments:
Was there any evidence that Olmert intended to take out Hamas as a regime and/or strategically reoccupy corridors or choke points in Gaza? There was an infantry component but the war strategy still is heavily dependent on air/rocket/drone attrition of accumulated target lists--modified operationally during combat but not with a conclusive end game of "victory" on the horizon.
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