'Palestinians' whine to pollsters over Sunni Arabs preferring their own interests
There's a very detailed
poll of 'Palestinian' public opinion out ('Palestinian' public opinion tends to be more measurable than in other places in the Arab Islamic world - they learned from Israel). While I may come back to this poll eventually, I'd like to focus on this part for a minute. Keep in mind that this is 'Palestinian' public opinion and not Sunni Arab or other Arabs or Muslims.
(7) The Arab World, war in Syria, ISIS, and US elections:
78% say the Arab World is too preoccupied with its own concerns, internal
conflicts, and the conflict with Iran and that Palestine is no longer the
Arab’s principal or primary issue or cause. Only 20% think Palestine remains
the Arab’s principle cause.
They finally are starting to understand that the Arab world is tired of them. It's the anti-Semitic Europeans who have been carrying the ball for the 'Palestinians' for many years now. While the Arab world has not made peace with us, there is a de facto detente, and this a result of shared interests and not love. But the bottom line is that the Arab world has abandoned the 'Palestinians' even more so than it did previously.
59% believe that there is an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran
despite the continued Israeli occupation of Arab land while 30% believe that
the Arabs would not ally themselves with Israel until it ends its occupation
and allows the creation of a Palestinian state.
I'm with the majority. Just from what we know, there is an alliance, and I'd estimate that it's even stronger behind the scenes. The 30% who think that the Arabs wouldn't ally themselves with Israel to save their own necks is simply unrealistic.
In light of the escalating conflict in Syria and the emergence of three main
parties to the conflict, we asked the public for its view on the party it
views as the more preferable or the one it views as the least harmful. The
largest percentage (40%) chose the Free Syrian army, 18% chose Bashar Asad
and his army, and 5% chose the extreme religious opposition, such as ISIS.
23% said they do not like any of the three parties.
The Syrian Free Army will go down in history as one of the biggest (of many) foreign policy mistakes by the Obama administration. The FSA could have become a 'moderate' (in relative terms) group had Obama and Clinton chosen to aid it in 2011-12. They did not. Now, it's nearly as Islamist as ISIS. Why Trump isn't pounding Clinton on this....
An overwhelming majority of 88% believes that ISIS is a radical group that
does not represent true Islam and 8% believe it does represent true Islam.
4% are not sure or do not know. In the Gaza Strip, 16% (compared to 3% in
the West Bank) say ISIS represents true Islam.
79% support and 18% oppose the war waged by Arab and Western countries
against ISIS.
This is actually a pleasant surprise.
We asked the public about the US elections and which presidential candidate,
Hilary Clinton or Donald Trump, it viewed best for the Palestinians. A large
majority (70%) said there is no difference between the two candidates, while
12% said Clinton is better and 7% said Trump is better.
I'd love to see a survey of what US citizens in Israel think of the US elections.... I don't like either of them, and am tempted to 'stay home.'
Labels: Bashar al-Assad, Free Syrian Army, Gaza, ISIS, Judea and Samaria, Palestinian polls, Palestinian whining, Shiites v. Sunnis, Sunni, Syria, Syrian uprising
Sunni Gulf States critical of Iran deal
The Sunni states in the Persian Gulf are extremely critical of the Iran nuclear sellout. But less because of the nuclear issue than because of the release of sanctions and the
lack of restrictions on Iran's terror support. You know, the things Obama-Kerry decided were '
less important.' This is from the first link and it's from Jonathan Spyer.
“Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states can only welcome the nuclear deal,
which in itself is supposed to close the gates of evil that Iran had
opened in the region. However, the real concern is that the deal will
open other gates of evil, gates which Iran mastered knocking at for
years even while Western sanctions were still in place.”
From this perspective a particularly notable and dismaying aspect of
the deal is its removal of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and
its Quds Force commander, Maj.-Gen. Qasem Soleimani, from the list of
those subject to sanctions by the West.
The ending of sanctions on the IRGC, and more broadly the likely
imminent freeing of up to $150 billion in frozen revenue, will enable
Iran to massively increase its aid to its long list of regional clients
and proxies. Iran today is heavily engaged in at least five conflict
arenas in the region.
...
In Syria, beleaguered dictator and Iranian client Assad remains in
control in the west and south largely because of Iranian support and
assistance – up to $1b. per month, according to some estimates. For as
long as Assad remains, the war remains, allowing such monstrous entities
as Islamic State and al-Qaida to flourish.
...
In Iraq, the Iranian-supported Shi’ite militias of the Hashd
al-Shaabi are playing the key role in defending Baghdad from the advance
of Islamic State. These militias are trained and financed by the
Revolutionary Guards and organized by Soleimani and his Iraqi right-hand
man, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, also thought to be an IRGC member.
In Yemen, the Iranians are offering arms and support to the Ansar
Allah, or Houthi rebels, who are engaged in a bloody insurgency against
the government of President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi.
Among the Palestinians, Tehran operates Palestinian Islamic Jihad as a
client/proxy organization, and is in the process of rebuilding
relations with the Izzadin Kassam, the powerful military wing of Hamas.
All this costs money. In a pattern familiar to the experience of
totalitarian regimes under sanctions in the past, Iran has preferred to
safeguard monies for use in service of its regional ambitions, while
allowing its population – other than those connected to the regime – to
suffer the consequent shortages.
Still, in recent months, things weren’t going so well. Assad has been
losing ground to the Sunni rebels. Hezbollah has been hemorrhaging men
in Syria. The Shi’ite militias were holding Islamic State in Iraq but
not advancing. Saudi intervention was holding back further advances by
the Houthis in Yemen. Hamas was looking poverty-stricken and beleaguered
in its Gaza redoubt.
The sanctions, plus these many commitments, were bringing the Iranian
regime close to an economic crisis that would have confronted the
regime with the hard choice of lessening its regional interference or
facing the consequences.
No longer. The deal over the nuclear program is set to enable Tehran
to shore up its investments, providing more money and guns to all its
friends across the Middle East, who will as a result grow stronger,
bolder and more ambitious. This, from the point of view of the main
powers in the Sunni Arab world, is the key fallout (so to speak) from
the deal concluded in Vienna. IRGC “outreach” to Shi’ite minorities in
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and to the Shi’ite majority in Bahrain, is also
likely to increase as a result of the windfall.
...
Similarly, in Lebanon the West is supporting and equipping the Lebanese
Armed Forces, without understanding that the Lebanese state is largely a
shell, within which Hezbollah is the living and directing force. In
Syria, the US is pursuing a half-hearted campaign against Islamic State,
while leaving the rest of the country to its internal dynamics.
What could go wrong?
Labels: Hezbullah, Iran sanctions regime, Iranian nuclear threat, Iranian Revolutionary Guard, Lebanon, P 5+1, Persian Gulf, Qassem Suleimani, Saudi Arabia, Shiites v. Sunnis, Sunni, terrorism
Hillary Clinton doesn't get ethnic conflict
Yedidya Atlas makes a convincing case that US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton doesn't get Syria - and doesn't get ethnic conflict in general. Really, that's not surprising. I doubt most westerners get ethnic conflict, and that's been a problem for
western understanding of the Middle East for many years.
This isn't Kansas (Hat Tip:
Ricky G).
The “Syrian people” is a composite of religious and ethnic groups who historically oppose each other. The dominant group, approximately two thirds of the population are Sunni Muslims; 12 percent are Alawites; 9 percent are Kurds; 10 percent are various Christian sects (Arab Christians, Assyrians and Armenians); and the remainder are a hodgepodge of religio-ethnic groups including Druze, Turkmens and Circassians.
Let’s focus on the Sunni, the Alawites and the Kurds. The Sunni majority includes the Muslim Brotherhood. It is subjugated by the ruling Alawites led by the al-Assad family. The Sunni majority, which lost power in the takeover of Syrian rule by the Alawite-dominated secular nationalist Syrian Baathist Party in a 1963 coup, began to cause increasingly violent unrest led by the Muslim Brotherhood. This later developed into open revolt.
In 1980, after an assassination attempt against President Hafez al-Assad failed, he came down on them like a ton of bricks, literally. In 1982, the city of Hama, a Muslim Brotherhood stronghold, was destroyed by regular Syrian army forces, including tanks and artillery, commanded by Rifat al-Assad, Hafez’s younger brother. An estimated 20,000 residents of Hama were killed. The revolt was quelled and the Alawite al-Assad family continued to rule.
However, the real dispute goes way back. The Sunni majority view the Alawite minority as heretics. The Alawites, or Alawi as they called themselves because of their adherence to Ali (the Muslim prophet, Mohammad’s cousin and son-in-law), were originally called by the Sunnis the “Nusayri” after the Shi’ite Ibn Nusayr in the 9th century, indicating their break with Islam. After 1920 and French rule in Syria (which included Lebanon), the persecuted Alawites ingratiated themselves with the new rulers.
The French encouraged Alawites to join the French-commanded Syrian army and dominate the officer corps as a counterweight to the hostile Sunni majority. This subsequently set the stage for the Alawite dominance of the Baath Party and the 1963 takeover of the Syrian government.
Syria is the scene of an ongoing civil war of sorts between the Sunni majority led by the Muslim Brotherhood and the minority Alawite controlled regime led by the al-Assad clan with various minor religio-ethnic players scattered over the field. If the al-Assad regime falls, it is not merely the al-Assad family that is in trouble, the entire Alawite population can expect similar or worse persecution by the Muslim Brotherhood led Sunnis as they attempt to turn the clock back to a modern version of the Ottoman period. Bashar al-Assad is fighting for both Alawite dominance and survival.
Secretary Clinton and Co. must realize that life is not a Hollywood movie and Syria isn’t a western country. Syria is a serious mess and there is no happy ending in sight soon.
Read the whole thing.
The West in general, and the United States in particular, being melting pots of different ethnic groups, finds it hard to fathom that these kinds of ethnic differences really matter. But in the Middle East (and in some other parts of the World), they do. And no matter how 'modern' these societies seem, these ethnic tensions continue to lurk beneath the surface.
Labels: Alawite, Bashar al-Assad, Hillary Clinton, Sunni, Syria, Syrian uprising
Should Israelis be speaking up about Syria?
While Israelis are watching the goings on in Syria with great interest, you don't hear a lot of Israelis speaking out in support of the Assad regime's opponents. Should we be? One Israeli
thinks we should.
Our northern neighbors are protesting in favor of human rights, against torture and in the name of democracy – yet here all we have is silence. A handful of experts are explaining to us, with an academic yawn, that what we are seeing in Syria is an uprising, and beyond that there seems to be no interest around here.
There is nobody that would write a song for our Syrian brothers and post it on YouTube, as was the case with Libya, and there is nobody that would engage in debates about the possibility of better days to come without Assad and the Baath Party.
Moreover, there is not even a genuine debate or question marks over the readiness of certain groups in Israel to hand over Mount Hermon to an eye doctor in a precarious position in Damascus.
We can explain the above by referring to a rather unclear tendency adopted around here in recent years: Presenting a neutral façade any time a dramatic event takes place in the region. As though if we conduct ourselves like Switzerland in the United Nations, people will think we are indeed Swiss.
I was with him right up until that last paragraph (okay, there are a few more after it). The issue isn't that Israelis want to - or can be - Switzerland. The issue is that we don't know whether those who are trying to throw out Assad will be more hostile to us or will be willing to reconcile with us. I am followed on Twitter by at least one prominent Syrian who is living in exile and who is opposed to the Assad regime. Unfortunately, I don't hear anything coming out of Syria that indicates that the protesters are leading toward the type of democracy he advocates. Instead, what I hear is to throw out the Alawite and replace him with a Sunni. That's not the sort of thing I'm going to go spending my political or monetary capital on any more than I would spend it on throwing out Gadhafi to put al-Qaeda in power in Libya (which is essentially what the Americans and Europeans are now doing).
When there's a secular democratic Syria that wants to live in peace with us, I'm all ears, and will be happy to much on Kosher humus and falafel in Damascus. In the meantime, I have more important battles to fight - like keeping the Golan out of Assad's hands.
Labels: Alawite, Sunni, Syrian regime change
