Greetings from Paris - Charles DeGaulle where once again Every Landing Always Late. They've admitted to two hours and fifteen minutes so far. And to think that I ran like crazy thinking I had only an hour and fifteen minutes to make a connection (American left more than two hours late from Charlotte last night, but made up much of that time on the way).
That's okay, because I will have some time to work after I finish this post (and maybe another one) and Paris may be one of the most appropriate places in the world to talk about Shimon Peres, who passed away this morning at the age of 93, because he was fluent in French and because in his later years he so emulated the French.
Israel owes a lot to Shimon Peres, especially our alleged nuclear capability, which was his doing in the early 1960's. I saw a Facebook post this morning that claimed that Peres 'saved' the country from hyperinflation in the 1980's, but the person who wrote it was a child at the time, and I was an adult. I don't believe that's accurate.
Palestinian Communications Minister Imad Al-Faluji, Al-Safir, 3 March 2001. (Translated by MEMRI):
Whoever thinks that the Intifada broke out
because of the despised Sharon’s visit to the Al-Aqsa Mosque is wrong..
. . This Intifada was planned in advance, ever since President
Arafat’s return from the Camp David negotiations, where he turned the
table upside down on President Clinton.
Yasser Arafat’s wife Suha (pictured above) said the following (from Palestinian Media Watch):
On the personal level, I miss him very, very
much. [Our daughter] Zahwa also misses him, you can’t imagine. She
didn’t know him. She knows that Arafat sent us away before the [Israeli]
invasion of Ramallah. He said: ‘You have to leave Palestine, because I
want to carry out an Intifada, and I’m not prepared to shield myself
behind my wife and little girl.’ Everyone said: ‘Suha abandoned him,’
but I didn’t abandon him. He ordered me to leave him because he had
already decided to carry out an Intifada after the Oslo Accords and
after the failure of Camp David [July 2000].
Imad Faluji, PA Minister of Communications:
Whoever thinks that the Intifada started because
of the hated Sharon’s visit to Al-Aqsa Mosque is mistaken. That was only
the straw breaking the Palestinian people’s patience. This Intifada was
already planned since [Arafat] the President returned from the recent
talks at Camp David [July 2000].” [Private filming of speech by Faluji, Dec. 5, 2000]
The Israel Project
notes that American diplomat Dennis Ross recounts in his book The
Missing Peace how the Israelis called Washington with proof that the
Palestinians were “planning massive, violent demonstrations
throughout the West Bank and the next morning, ostensibly a response to
the Sharon visit.” Washington pressured Arafat to dampen the violence, but the Palestinian leader – again per Ross – “did not lift a finger to stop the demonstrations, which produced the second Intifada.”
Who was Shimon Peres. Some interesting quotes are here. He did some good for the State of Israel, but he took many actions, especially in his later years, that were based on delusions of grandeur that harmed many people.
It's come to this: Saudi editorial blasts Abu Mazen for not responding positively to Netanyahu invitation
It's finally happened. A major Sunni Arab country has told Abu Bluff where to get off. And it's a big one: It's 'our friends, the Saudis.'
The editorial, published Sunday in the Saudi Gazette, a daily published
in Jeddah that has a woman editor-in-chief, seemed to depart in tone
from the widely-held position in the Arab world that Israel is
responsible for the impasse with the Palestinians. It likened
Netanyahu’s proposal that the two leaders address each other’s
parliaments, to Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s 1977 invitation to
Egyptian president Anwar Sadat to visit Israel, and implied it could
also lead to a breakthrough. Begin made the invitation “and the rest is
history,’’ the editorial said.
“For all its shortcomings, Camp
David demonstrated that negotiations with Israel were possible and that
progress could be made through sustained efforts at communication and
cooperation,’’ it added.
As another example of how “official
visits can bend the arc of history’’ the paper cited then-US President
Bill Clinton’s 1998 visit to the Gaza Strip to address the Palestinian
National Council on the day it deleted clauses calling for the
destruction of Israel from the PLO charter.
Well, except that deletion had not legal effect, but let's leave that for now.
The editorial said that Palestinians had rejected overtures from
Netanyahu with the explanation that his hard-line position on all core
issues made dialogue impossible.
“But the Palestinians should note that at that time, Egypt and Israel were mortal enemies having fought three wars.’’
The
editorial went on to second guess the Arab world for rejecting Camp
David, saying “in hindsight if the provisions had been carried out,
Israel and the Palestinians might not be in the impasse they are at
present.’’ Saudi Arabia was a leader of the Arab opposition to Camp
David.
'Moderate' 'Palestinian' President Mahmoud AbbasAbu Mazen sent 'Palestinian' Christian mouthpiece Hanan Ashrawi out to respond.
‘’Whoever wrote this editorial is totally unaware of the reality of
this so-called invitation,’’ said PLO spokeswoman Hanan Ashrawi. “It is
a very obvious public relations trick that’s been overused. If
Netanyahu wants peace, let him abide by the requirements of
international law, the two-state solution and the 1967 boundaries.’’
...
Ashrawi took issue with the analogy to Egyptian-Israeli peacemaking.
“It’s not a question of Egypt and Israel, two countries that wanted to
make peace, it’s a question of an occupying force that is destroying the
other state and it’s about people under occupation who have no right
and no power.’’
Funny. I don't recall Begin or Sadat imposing any preconditions... and I am old enough to remember.
Ashrawi said she thinks that “below the surface there are contacts
[between Israel and Saudi Arabia] and all sorts of security
considerations and Israel is positioning itself to be a regional
power.’’ But she added: “No matter what happens, they won’t recognize or
normalize with Israel because it hasn’t respected Palestinian rights
and international law. Once the Palestinian issue is resolved things
can move. Before that they might have secret contacts, but they can’t
afford to lose their own constituency.’’
Except that the 'Palestinians' have made the 'Palestinian issue' impossible to resolve by rejecting any form of compromise.
Here's betting that Abu Mazen and Ashrawi go to their graves without seeing any kind of compromise or 'Palestinian state.'
Every time Israel's interests are in conflict with America's, must
Israel capitulate to American dictates or risk compromising the two
countries' long alliance? A cursory look at recent history reveals that
Israel has consistently rebuffed American pressure when critical
interests were at stake, strengthening the relationship.
How Menachem Begin responded to the demand for a 'Palestinian state.'
In this updated clip, shared by Israel's industry minister Naftali Bennet, legendary Prime Minister Menachem Begin reacts to criticism over his opposition to the creation of a Palestinian state.
Let's go to the videotape (Hat Tip: Zvi S).
חבל על דאבדין ולא משתכחין. Woe for those who are lost and are no longer found.
If anyone knows of a free platform out there other than Blogger, please let me know - I am getting tired of the amount of time it takes to write a post.
Michael Freund argues that it is possible for Israel to say no to the United States, that Israel has done so in the past, and that the sky did not fall in.
Take, for example, the Reagan plan.
On
September 1, 1982, US President Ronald Reagan delivered a nationally-televised
address in which he called for a “fresh start” in the Middle East peace process.
He laid out a series of proposals which included a construction freeze on Jewish
communities in Judea and Samaria and a transition period leading to
“self-government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in association
with Jordan.”
Astonishingly, the plan was drawn up in consultation with
various Arab leaders, while Israel was kept in the dark until right before
Reagan’s speech.
But Jerusalem reacted quickly and with
resolve.
On September 2, then-prime minister Menachem Begin interrupted a
vacation in Nahariya, returned to Jerusalem and convened a special cabinet
meeting, which lasted for three hours.
Afterwards, the government issued
a communique that was striking in its audacity. It contained a point-by-point
rebuttal of Reagan’s speech, stating that, “The positions conveyed to the Prime
Minister of Israel on behalf of the President of the United States consist of
partial quotations from the Camp David Agreement or are nowhere mentioned in the
agreement or contradict it entirely.”
It went on to state that, “the
positions of the Government of the United States seriously deviate from the Camp
David agreement, contradict it and could create a serious danger to Israel, its
security and its future.”
And guess what? The sky did not fall in, the
sun still rose the next morning, and Israel and the United States continued to
be friends, even if there was tension in the relationship.
Several days
later, Begin went even further, sending a personal letter to Reagan which should
be required reading for every Israeli diplomat and statesman lacking a
backbone.
With a mixture of grace and determination, Begin made clear to
the leader of the Free World that as much as he valued the ties between Israel
and the US, he would not compromise his core principles or Israel’s national
interests.
“Dear Ron,” wrote Begin, “What some call the ‘West Bank,’ Mr.
President, is Judea and Samaria; and this simple historic truth will never
change. There are cynics who deride history. They may continue their derision as
they wish, but I will stand by the truth,” he said.
“And the truth,”
insisted Begin, “is that millennia ago there was a Jewish kingdom of Judea and
Samaria where our kings knelt to God, where our prophets brought forth the
vision of eternal peace, where we developed a rather rich civilization which we
took with us, in our hearts and in our minds, on our long global trek for over
18 centuries; and, with it, we came back home.”
After spelling out his
objections to Reagan’s peace plan, Begin concluded with a paragraph as piercing
as it was heartfelt. “Mr. President,” he stated, “you and I chose for the last
two years to call our countries ‘friends and allies.’ Such being the case, a
friend does not weaken his friend, an ally does not put his ally in jeopardy.
This would be the inevitable consequence,” Begin asserted, if the president’s
proposals were to become reality.
“I believe they won’t,” the prime
minister concluded, before quoting from the prophet Isaiah: “For Zion’s sake
will I not hold my peace, and for Jerusalem’s sake I will not
rest.”
Barack Hussein Obama is not Ronald Reagan in any sense. There are two key differences between Reagan 1982 and Obama 2014 that must be pointed out.
First, Reagan in 1982 was in his first term, and faced a re-election campaign to which Jews could contribute financially (which they did) and at the polls (which they largely did not).
Second, Reagan had a basic commitment to Israel's continued existence as an ally of the United States, while Obama seems to have no such commitment.
But read the whole thing. At the end of the day, we have no choice but to say no. Survival has to come ahead of our relations with the United States.
Defense establishment kept Golda Meir in the dark in the lead-up to Yom Kippur War
This was one of the posts I had planned to run on Friday, but did not get to run it.
This past week, some of Golda Meir's testimony to the Agranat Commission (which investigated the government's and the IDF's failure in the Yom Kippur War) was released for the first time. While the headline was that Golda told the Commission that had Israel pre-empted we might not have been resupplied by the US, this is the piece that is truly shocking.
"At the time that this
telegram was sent by you, did the intelligence services or anyone else
bother you with anything urgent? Any other information? The problem here
is that they [in the report] claim that it is only an exercise."
"...I would like to read to you what the
Military Intelligence Directorate received that day: 'We learned that
Syria has evacuated Soviet experts, and that planes have begun taking
them from Damascus to Moscow. The same sources informed us that even the
families of the Soviet diplomats have begun arriving in Moscow from
Damascus. The sources added that the Syrians explained the evacuation by
saying that Egypt and Syria were planning to wage a war against Israel.
For your information."
Meir: "I don't know."
Yadin: "The IDF chief of staff and the defense
minister told us that on Friday evening they had not received such a
telegram. Did you not get one?"
Meir: "No."
Later in that meeting, the commission
discusses certain intelligence information that was not handed over to
the Prime Minister's Office.
Meir: "It may be that the Military
Intelligence Directorate did not feel obligated to share information
with us, but it is very hard for me to understand how it wasn't shared
with the chief of staff."
...
"...Until the very last minute we were still trying to
follow Military Intelligence's conception, that everything that was
happening on the northern and southern fronts was a result of their fear
of an attack by us. To try at the last minute through the Americans to
tell the Russians, and have the Russians tell the Egyptians that we have
no such intention. ... We thought that at the last minute maybe we
could still save. ... For some reason based on what Keating told us
[Kenneth Keating, who was, for a time, the U.S. ambassador to Israel],
it would be at 6 p.m. At one point I said, maybe it was a misprint?
Maybe he meant that it would be at 16:00 [4 p.m.]. ... We thought that
they would still have time to get the message to the Russians and
subsequently to the Egyptians and Syrians, that we are not planning to
attack."
...
Agranat: "I am just trying to
understand the frame of mind. ... I understand that one consideration,
maybe the main one, was that they were afraid of us and therefore we
wanted to communicate the message: know that we have no intention of
launching an attack. But shouldn't the other consideration have been not
that they are afraid of us, but that they want to attack us and they
want to take us by surprise? Or was the assessment that there was a 'low
likelihood' as Military Intelligence calls it, meaning that it wouldn't
happen?"
Meir: "No, because though the Military
Intelligence assessment was as it was -- the conception. I am wary of
speaking in front of two former chiefs of staff, but I think that the
conception was that if the conscription army was on full alert, that
means the air force, and additional units were called up and are there
to assist -- that is enough force to stave off ..."
"On the day of October 5, the chief of staff said, and I
quote: 'We have taken all the preparatory measures. Over this holiday,
the IDF has declared a state of high alert; all vacations have been
cancelled on the lines.' ... That means that the conception was that
blocking [the enemy] is a conscription army on high alert."
It was also disclosed last week that Israel had listening devices on the Egyptian side of the Suez canal. Astoundingly, military intelligence chief Eli Zeirarefused to activate them (while leaving his superiors and the political echelon with the impression that they had been activated).
The week prior to the war was
critical. On October 1, a Monday, the Egyptian army began the "Tahrir
41" exercise, concealing their preparations for an actual attack.
According to Bar Joseph, the Military Intelligence echelon directly
subordinate to Zeira, including the head of research Brig. Gen. Aryeh
Shalev, collection department director Col. Menachem Digli and Unit 848
commander Ben Porat, demanded that the devices be activated and made
operational. But Zeira refused "both because he was afraid of what would
happen to them (the listening devices) and because he was convinced
that no war would break out."
For example, upon discovering that the Soviet
Union was evacuating nationals on the day before the war, Zeira
confessed that "in my view, the Soviet thing is the most problematic and
serious." But he still concluded by saying "I don't see the Egyptians
and the Syrians attacking us."
Col. (res.) Yossi Langotsky, who served as the
commander of the Military Intelligence Directorate's operational
technology unit (in charge of operating the listening devices) confirms
Bar Joseph's sentiments. "I can personally attest to the fact that
during the week prior to the war Digli and Ben Porat approached Zeira
several times and asked for his authorization to activate the devices,
but to no avail. To assuage Zeira's concerns over the safety of the
devices, Digli told him that 'after all, it is for emergency situations
and times of uncertainty like this that these devices were designed.'
There are no words to describe the height of Zeira's arrogance. Despite
the terrible implications of a possible surprise attack, he stuck to his
misguided conception and avoided activating the devices that were
designed precisely to protect against such a surprise," Langotsky says
angrily.
On the other hand, the officials to whom Zeira
was himself subordinate -- the IDF chief of staff and the defense
minister -- were convinced that the assessment indicating a low
likelihood of war relied entirely on intelligence collected by the
special devices.
"Hanoch Bartov, Elazar's biographer, said that
the IDF chief of staff was convinced, up until the start of the war,
and even shortly afterward, that Zeira had activated the special means
of collection," says Adam Raz, a doctoral student in the Political
Science Department of Tel Aviv University, who researched the topic.
"Ben Porat recounted a conversation he had with Elazar, in which he said
that between October 1 and 6 he had asked the Military Intelligence
chief twice if all the sources were being utilized, and the answer was
affirmative. Digli has also said in the past that Elazar had told him
after the war that 'when I asked Eli (Zeira) if, when he says that there
is a low likelihood, he is relying on those sources (the listening
devices) as well, and his answer was affirmative.'"
Later, Elazar explained to Ben Porat: "the
false information that I received about the activation of the means
confused me even more, because I knew what they were capable of. If
there was no intelligence of impending war coming from them (the
devices), that means that everything is okay. It is now very clear to me
that I was not told the truth."
When facing the Agranat commission, Elazar
testified that "the incident (failure to activate the listening devices)
was not decided by me nor was it brought to my knowledge… I learned
only after the war that the […] was not turned on in those days. That is
precisely what it was made for -- to give us warning. That was its sole
function, and in essence I did not know that it was turned off."
...
Zeira was asked by the Agranat
commission why he had decided on his own accord not to use the devices
rather than consulting with the chief of staff, while "his superiors
were led to mistakenly believe that the topic had been incorporated into
his assessments." Zeira's reply was that "it is not my nature to
delegate authority upward…I don't bring things that are under my
authority to my superiors, usually, and I don't tell them 'I know it is
my responsibility, but I am handing off the responsibility to you. You
decide.'"
Bar Joseph argues that the decision makers'
faith that the devices were operational but providing no indication that
a war was imminent carried fateful weight in the decisions that were
made. It is the reason they did not rush to deploy the army along the
Sinai and Golan Heights fronts and why they did not recruit the
necessary reserves units. That faith also painted the rest of the
intelligence that came in from the region in a different light.
"During the week before the war broke out, the
decision makers are confident that the listening devices are fully
operational. They don't ask if the devices are working but rather what
information they are yielding. They say so in their Agranat commission
testimonies very clearly, and explain that their confidence that they
would receive notice 48 hours in advance relied on them. Zeira knows
that they think the devices are working, and for reasons known only to
him he does not correct them. That is the most terrible part of this
story. In my opinion, it was not a mistake. It was calculated," Bar
Joseph says.
According to Langotsky, "Zeira first gave the
green light to activate the devices only on Thursday afternoon, and only
for a technical check. The check began overnight between Thursday
October 4 and Friday October 5. His instructions were to complete the
test and report the findings to him personally at his house no later
than 6 a.m. Friday morning, Yom Kippur eve." In other words, when Zeira
says to Dayan that it is "totally quiet" in the "chatter on the Egyptian
lines" it is, according to Langotsky, at least three hours after the
devices were shut off, following a mere technical check. Bar Joseph
claims that due to a malfunction, one of the devices continued to work
for several hours more, but since it was just a technical check and not
full operational eavesdropping, it did not really help.
But Dr. Haim Shine (whom I think I knew in the 1960's), who was seriously wounded in the Yom Kippur War, urges readers not to let Golda Meir off so easily.
For
many years I have refrained from using the word "failure" in regard to
the army's lack of preparedness for that war and the way the country's
leaders made decisions during those days. Immediately after I was
released from a long hospital stay, where I was treated for a serious
war injury, I told the late Menachem Begin what I had seen in battle. He
asked me never to use the word "failure" because mothers had lost their
children in the war, and we mustn't compound their pain with the term
"failure." When I read Meir's Agranat commission testimony, it became
clear to me that it was not a failure at all -- it was in fact a true
crime.
The writing was on the
wall, written in huge red letters, and the irresponsible and
shortsighted leaders simply refused to read. The writing is now written
in small black letters on gravestones in various military cemeteries.
Meir was never fit to
serve as prime minister in the first place. She didn't understand the
first thing about the most fundamental, existential issues facing the
State of Israel. She was a representative of the Mapai establishment
that ruled the country for generations, and refused to step aside. Meir
lacked the ability to stand up to the heads of the defense
establishment. Her opinion did not matter to them, and when it came to
classified information, they didn't even bother informing her.
Then-Defense Minister Moshe Dayan's well-publicized heroism and
then-Military Intelligence Director Eli Zeira's arrogance and
overconfidence turned Meir into a marginal character in the mechanism
that made fateful decisions.
After the war, efforts
were made to be lenient with her, in many ways due to pity or other
external considerations. I feel suspicion mixed with contempt toward all
the embarrassing arguments that we must give her credit for her conduct
in the days after the initial surprise of the war. Unfortunately, as
someone who was seriously wounded in that war, giving her credit feels
to me as artificial, worthless and dishonest.
That reminds me of another Prime Minister and Defense Minister we had more recently.... Isn't it sad that 40 years later we have learned nothing?
Revealed: Alexander Haig only cabinet member to defend Israel after Osirak bombing
At a ceremony commemorating the life of Rav Menachem Mendel Schneerson zt"l (May the Memory of the Righteous be a Blessing), whose yahrtzeit (anniversary of the date of his death) is this coming Tuesday, Sherwood "Woody" Goldberg, who was Alexander Haig's Chief of Staff, discloses that Haig was the only Reagan cabinet member to defend Israel after it destroyed Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor (32 years ago today on the Gregorian calendar).
In
a surprise raid On June 7, 1981 -- 32 years ago today -- Israeli F-16s
and F-15s bombed and destroyed a nascent nuclear reactor in Saddam
Hussein's Iraq.
As
Goldberg told it, President Reagan and his staff were furious at
Israel. Not only did she attack Iraq without consulting Washington,
seek permission nor give any warning about the attack - but Israel used
American fighter jets to get the job done.
When
the Americans learned of the strike, Reagan called an emergency cabinet
meeting the next day to determine how the administration would respond.
Goldberg
related that, one-by-one, President Reagan polled Vice President George
H.W. Bush and his cabinet. To a man, the reaction was harsh: "Crush
Israel!" was the response from the President's men.
That is, until it was Haig's turn to weigh-in.
"One
day you will get down on your knees and thank Israel for doing that,"
Haig said according to Goldberg, making him the lone dissenter.
Needless
to say, America did not "crush" Israel although there were tensions in
the immediate aftermath. Less than 10 years later America was at war
with Iraq to defend Kuwait in the Gulf War, a k a "Operation Desert
Storm."
While
we may never know if President Reagan ever did kneel in gratitude to
Israel, a nuclear-armed Iraq may have deterred America from that
obligation to our ally or cost a great many more American lives.
Yes, time proved Haig prescient.
It is well known that in June 1991, after the first Gulf War, George H.W. Bush's Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, presented Israel's Air Force Commander David Ivri with a satellite photo of the Iraqi reactor:
"For General David Ivri," Cheney wrote on the photo, "with thanks and
appreciation for the outstanding job he did on the Iraqi Nuclear Program
in 1981, which made our job much easier in Desert Storm." Ivri, when he
was Israeli ambassador to Washington a few years ago, liked the photo
so much he had it hanging in his office.
And yet, ten years earlier, only one US cabinet member defended Israel and saw that it had done the right thing. The difference? In 1981, we had a Prime Minister who was a courageous leader instead of a politician blowing with the winds.
You all have probably heard the term hasbara so many times that even if you're not Hebrew speakers, you know what it means. Basically, the term means public diplomacy aimed at changing public opinion in Israel's favor. At the Shmuel Katz blog, David Isaac argues that it hasn't changed much in the past 30 years, and that the biggest problem today is the lack of focus. While efforts by Isaac, myself and some more prominent sites (CAMERA, MEMRI and Palestinian Media Watch) are helpful, they don't make up for the lack of focus from the government. This is how Katz describes one time - many years ago - that Israel's hasbara was effective.
And Shmuel felt that to properly counter the Arab propaganda juggernaut,
Israel must have a juggernaut of its own, that its public relations
efforts must have a focus. Shmuel described how he stopped the outburst
of propaganda against Prime Minister Menachem Begin in the U.S. in the
immediate aftermath of his election. Begin first asked Shmuel to go, but
then Begin was advised to send a whole team. Shmuel said the team could
go, but without him. There needed to be a focus. Begin acceded and
Shmuel stopped the onslaught within 10 days of his arrival in the U.S.
Isaac then goes on to describe the present government efforts, and why in what appears to be the incoming government, they are not likely to be effective.
The need for focus brings up another problem — that leadership of the
effort be in the right hands, lest it prove counterproductive. For
example, a focus on Israel’s desire for peace and willingness to do just
about anything to obtain it — a focus that no doubt some elements in
Israel would find appealing — could only lead to even greater
denigration of Israel for failing to achieve it.
Nor can an information campaign be conducted divorced from public
policy. For example, in his effort to cobble together a governing
coalition, Benjamin Netanyahu has offered to put Tzipi Livni, head of
the Hatnua party, who made “peace” the focus of her platform, in charge
of negotiations with the Palestinian Arabs. Aaron Lerner of IMRA
(Independent Media Review and Analysis) points out some of the pitfalls.
From day one, Livni will be making every effort to lay the failure of
the talks on Netanyahu. One possibility is that Livni makes backdoor,
unauthorized concessions to the Palestinian Arabs, putting overwhelming
international pressure on Netanyahu to accept them. Or negotiations
fail and Livni could have her staff prepare reams of working papers
supporting concessions Netanyahu refused to approve that she would leak
to the international press. Finally, Netanyahu might fire Livni leading
her to launch a dangerous campaign along these lines against him.
No information campaign can counter the enormous damage stemming from
the policy decision to put Livni in charge of negotiations with the
Palestinians. But this also underscores how consideration of the
strategic importance of public diplomacy could protect Israeli leaders
from making policy decisions convenient in the short term but harmful
both to themselves and Israel in the long-run.
Part of the problem is that we have a Prime Minister who has not yet decided who he is, or if he has decided, his decision and his vision do not fit with those of the people who elected him. Netanyahu wants to go down in history as a peacemaker. To do that, he must take major risks to bring about an agreement with the 'Palestinians' and yet to do so in a manner that will not see his legacy ruined by Israel being wiped off the map within a short time after the agreement is implemented. The conditions for that formula to happen do not presently exist. But given that Netanyahu is in his 60's and is seeking his place in history, saying that the time is not ripe does not resolve his personal issue.
On the other hand, most of the Likud's voters and MK's are now well to Netanyahu's right, at least when it comes to the 'peace process.' When Ariel Sharon was confronted with the Likud being too Right to accept the Gaza expulsion, he pitched Left and took a substantial number of MK's with him. Netanyahu cannot do that. He is one of only three Likud MK's in the top 30 of their slate who has accepted the 'two-state solution.' Were Netanyahu to pitch Left, it is doubtful that he could even take the one third of MK's necessary to set up his own faction in the Knesset, particularly if Likud and Yisrael Beiteinu split again once the government is formed as was the original intent.
Because of that, Netanyahu cannot decide what message he wants to send. And therefore Israel's hasbara efforts continue to languish.
I'm not sure we'd be any better off with a government of the Left. We have tried - and failed - several times over the past 20 years to reach an agreement with the 'Palestinians.' And while those failures may have brought us some positive feelings in the short term, in the long term, the warmth from the 'international community' has worn off all too quickly.
A group called the 'US campaign to end the Israeli occupation' is dragging the ad above around Washington DC this week, following delegates from the AIPAC convention as they attempt to lobby Congress.
“At a time when the sequester is cutting billions of dollars from
programs to help those in need, it is grotesque that AIPAC is lobbying
Congress this week for ever-increasing amounts of military aid to
Israel, especially as these U.S. weapons are used by Israel—in violation
of U.S. laws—to abuse Palestinian human rights,” stated Josh Ruebner,
National Advocacy Director of the U.S. Campaign to End the Israeli
Occupation.
A three-day mobile truck ad has been tasked with following AIPAC
attendees during their conference as they lobby Members of Congress for
more weapons for Israel.
But, the ad show, planned to be showcased on Monday, will be set up at
three Washington D.C Metro train platforms looks at the U.S. budgetary
trade-offs taking place at the expense of the country’s local community
needs.
“We see visual media as an essential tool in communicating marginalized
social justice issues to a mainstream audience. We hope that this ad
campaign will spur U.S. taxpayers to question more actively where their
money is being spent at such a critical time,” said Ahmad Barclay, Lead
Information Architect with Visualizing Palestine.
...
AIPAC’s conference will focus instead on pushing for a Congressional
legislation that would designate Israel as a “major strategic ally” of
the United States. If enacted and adopted, the legislation will give
Israel a status that no other nation on earth enjoys with America.
It is also reported that the legislation will make it easy for Israel to obtain a U.S. approval for a strike against Iran.
I doubt that any legislation is going to make it 'easy' to obtain a green light for a strike on Iran. Congress isn't the commander in chief of the US armed forces, and an order to stand down (or not stand down) in the face of an Israeli attack against Iran would not come from Congress. Moreover, it's no secret that the US can do a far better job of destroying Iran's nuclear capability than we can, and the hope here is that the US will do so, because it's in the US's interest to do so.
As to the major strategic ally status, I could not find this anywhere online, but if I recall correctly, Menachem Begin raised the issue with Ronald Reagan 30 years ago, so it's not exactly new.
LATMA discloses the Left's plan to defeat Netanyahu
This week's LATMA tribal update presents the Left's plan to defeat Prime Minister Netanyahu.
Let's go to the videotape.
On, by the way,the scene where the guy is trying to register to the company is a very realistic depiction of how the Israeli bureaucracy works. It's amazing that this country has any industry at all.
I don't know how many of you thought about this when you heard about the national unity government, but I will guarantee you that every Israeli thought about it. "It" was the 1967 Six-Day War. Charles Krauthammer explains.
Forty-five years later, in the middle of the night of May 7-8, 2012, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu shocked his country by bringing the main opposition party, Kadima, into a national unity government. Shocking because just hours earlier, the Knesset was expediting a bill to call early elections in September.
Why did the high-flying Netanyahu call off elections he was sure to win?
Because for Israelis today, it is May ’67. The dread is not quite as acute: The mood is not despair, just foreboding. Time is running out, but not quite as fast. War is not four days away, but it looms. Israelis today face the greatest threat to their existence — nuclear weapons in the hands of apocalyptic mullahs publicly pledged to Israel’s annihilation — since May ’67. The world is again telling Israelis to do nothing as it looks for a way out. But if such a way is not found — as in ’67 — Israelis know that they will once again have to defend themselves, by themselves.
Such a fateful decision demands a national consensus. By creating the largest coalition in nearly three decades, Netanyahu is establishing the political premise for a preemptive strike, should it come to that. The new government commands an astonishing 94 Knesset seats out of 120, described by one Israeli columnist as a “hundred tons of solid concrete.”
So much for the recent media hype about some great domestic resistance to Netanyahu’s hard line on Iran. Two notable retired intelligence figures were widely covered here for coming out against him. Little noted was that one had been passed over by Netanyahu to be the head of Mossad, while the other had been fired by Netanyahu as Mossad chief (hence the job opening). For centrist Kadima (it pulled Israel out of Gaza) to join a Likud-led coalition whose defense minister is a former Labor prime minister (who once offered half of Jerusalem to Yasser Arafat) is the very definition of national unity — and refutes the popular “Israel is divided” meme. “Everyone is saying the same thing,” explained one Knesset member, “though there may be a difference of tone.”
Director Harry Hunkele has made a full-length documentary about the negotiations that led to the Camp David treaty between Egypt and Israel. The movie is called Back Door Channels and it will be opening in theaters in the fall of 2011.
Hunkele is an American who believes that what happened in 1979 can happen again. A 'peace agreement' can be reached.
"It’s my great hope that people will view the film and realize that what once happened can happen again," Hunkele says in an interview to Ynet. "All it takes is courageous politicians, but sadly I think that’s the key ingredient missing in today’s world.
"Carter, Begin and, of course, Sadat, paid a terrible price for peace. Politicians take notice of such things and no one since, with the exception of Rabin, has dared to push for peace."
I don't know what terrible price Carter paid for the peace treaty. For that matter, I'm not sure Begin paid a terrible price either, although Israel paid an economic price for it, and may yet - God forbid - have to fight another war because of it. Sadat paid a terrible price - he was murdered.
And as to the claim that Rabin is 'the only one who pushed for peace' since, I believe that depends on how you define 'push for peace.' Had Rabin lived, I do not believe that he would have continued with the Oslo Accords. I believe that he saw where the 'Palestinians' were heading. In his last speech in the Knesset, Rabin said he would never agree to a 'Palestinian state.' And by the way, Rabin was dragged into the Oslo Accords by Shimon Peres and his poodles. So did they 'push for peace'?
Here's the opening scene of the movie. Let's go to the videotape.
And here's the trailer. Let's go to the videotape.
Outrageous: Al-Jazeera's introduction to 9/11 documentary blames Menachem Begin for inspiring 9/11
Al-Jazeera has produced a 'documentary' about 9/11, which they call the Image War. This is a 47-minute video. I'm not watching the whole thing and neither should you. Just watch the first three minutes or so. They include footage of the bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem in the 1940's (a bombing about which the British were warned numerous times and refused to heed the warnings - the British had their military headquarters in the hotel using anyone else who was there as a human shield), and say that 'ironically' it was Menachem Begin who inspired al-Qaeda. Simply outrageous.
Yoram Ettinger writes that saying 'no' - even to the United States - need not be the end of the World for Israel. In fact, Ettinger claims that saying no has worked out quite well.
In 1981, Prime Minister Menachem Begin ordered the bombing of Iraq's nuclear reactor. In 1982, he launched a comprehensive war on the Palestinian Liberation Organization's terrorist headquarters in Lebanon. Both operations were executed irrespective of bullying and pressure from the U.S. and notwithstanding the fragile 1979 Israel-Egypt peace treaty. Begin realized that failing to eradicate these threats would imperil Israel's survival, erode its power of deterrence and thus undermine Israel's deterrence-driven peace with Egypt and its strategic cooperation with the U.S.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the Israel-Egypt peace treaty did not collapse. Once again, Arab leaders did not rush to rescue the PLO, demonstrating that the Palestinian issue was not a crown jewel of Arab policymaking. Moreover, Egypt – just like all other Arab countries – would not sacrifice its own national interests on the altar of the Palestinian issue.
While the U.S. Administration condemned Israel for the large scale military operations, and imposed a brief military embargo, these operations resulted in the 1981 and 1983 strategic Memoranda of Understanding between the U.S. and Israel, which enhanced joint national security projects, upgrading Israel's long-term strategic posture.
From 1983 to 1992, during his two terms as prime minister, Yitzhak Shamir was severely criticized by U.S. Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush for crushing Palestinian terrorism during the First Intifada and expanding Jewish communities in Judea, Samaria and East Jerusalem. At the same time, however, U.S.-Israel strategic cooperation was bolstered at an unprecedented level while he was in power. Washington recognized that U.S.-Israel cooperation never revolved around the Arab-Israeli conflict. Mutually-beneficial U.S.-Israel ties were based upon shared values, common threats such as Islamic terrorism, ballistic missiles and rogue regimes, and joint interests such as research and development and job creation in the high-tech market and in the defense industries.
In August 1948, U.S. Ambassador to Israel James McDonald recorded Prime Minister David Ben Gurion's response to the American demand (accompanied by a regional military embargo) to end the "occupation" of Arab land or agree to a land swap, to accept the internationalization of Jerusalem and to allow the return of the Arab refugees: "Speaking with solemn emphasis, [Ben Gurion] added that as much as Israel desired friendship with the U.S. and full cooperation with it and the U.N., there were limits beyond which it could go. Israel cannot yield to anything which, in its judgment, would threaten its independence or its security. The very fact that Israel is a small state makes more necessary the scrupulous defense of its own interests; otherwise it would be lost … Ben Gurion warned President [Harry S.] Truman and the State Department that they would be gravely mistaken if they assumed that the threat or even the use of U.N. sanctions would force Israel to yield on issues considered vital to its independence and security. [He] left no doubt that he was determined to resist, at whatever cost, 'unjust and impossible demands.' On these he could not compromise ["My Mission," 1951, pp. 49-50]."
Ben Gurion's defiance transformed Washington's image of the Jewish state from a strategic liability to a potential strategic asset.
Poor Menachem: Snatching defeat from the jaws of victory
Israel's leadership has a long and painful history of snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. Here are some examples.
Thus, the sweeping strategic advantages, won in victories of the Six Day War, have been foolishly squandered.
The Sinai Peninsula with its strategic depth, mineral wealth and economic potential is now deteriorating into a lawless “no-go” region, rapidly falling under the control of the most ruthless extremists on the face of the globe. In the wake of the “Tahrir tsunami,” Israel is facing an emerging lose-lose strategic predicament which will soon force it to decide between:
• Allowing Sinai to degenerate into an Afghanistan-like haven for al-Qaida and other jihadi organizations,
• Allowing a Muslim Brotherhood-controlled Egypt to remilitarize the area in order to reestablish law and order, and
• Reasserting Israeli control of Sinai, effectively repudiating the peace agreement.
Admittedly, the three decades of Egyptian prickly nonbelligerence provided Israel with significant benefits – in return for considerable strategic sacrifices. But from here on in, the challenges will be daunting to say the least. All options are gravely menacing... After all, all poor Menachem got was “a piece of paper.”
This was neither unpredictable nor unpredicted.
However, the sober voices who warned against the wisdom of or the need to make such sweeping concessions to the depleted and disintegrating regime in Cairo were dismissed as deranged warmongers. It seems that future generations will yet be called on to pay the price of this strategic myopia, a price, which could far outweigh the temporary benefits of the acrimonious and relatively brief interbellum.
...
If it took about a generation for the folly of relinquishing Sinai to become tangibly evident, with 2005’s disengagement it took a matter of weeks.
In a stunning triumph of irrationality over reason, Israel six years ago surrendered all for nothing, erasing 30 years of Zionist endeavor in Gaza in a fortnight. With dizzying speed all ominous warnings of dangers came true; all promises of benefits proved false. But worse of all, it conveyed an unmistakable strategic message to the Arabs: With the Jews, no concessions are necessary! If confronted with adequate resolve and violence, they will capitulate unconditionally.
In a stroke, Ariel Sharon’s mendacious promise that “the fate of Netzarim will be the fate of Tel Aviv” was inverted. Now the Arabs had every reason to believe that “the fate Tel Aviv will be the fate of Netzarim.”
There are three other areas today where Israel could still snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. One - the Golan Heights - is on hold right now due to the uprising in Syria. But the government is on the verge of capitulating in two other areas: Our dealings with the 'Palestinians' and our economy, which is one of the strongest in the world.
I'd like to conclude with a quote from Anwar Sadat that I had never heard before.
"Poor Menachem [Begin]... I got back... the Sinai and the Alma oil fields, and what has Menachem got? A piece of paper” – Anwar Sadat on the Peace Agreement with Israel, The New York Times, October 19, 1980.
Having now completed Yehuda Avner's The Prime Ministers, it is clear to me that the Begins and the Sadats liked each other personally. Yet Sadat understood that he was getting the far better end of the deal. No one else in Egypt accepted Israel, and therefore what is happening now was readily foreseeable albeit it took a little longer than expected. Why does Israel keep giving away its assets for paper?
Unfortunately, Netanyahu joins a long list of backpedaling Israeli leaders whose talk doesn’t match up with their walk. In “Surrender to Washington” (The Jerusalem Post, May 20, 1983), Shmuel Katz gives a rundown of the more prominent examples of Israeli collapse in the face of American pressure.
In 1973, in spite of the disastrous opening of the Yom Kippur War, Israel was on the brink of overwhelming victory and, as then foreign minister Abba Eban asserted, the government was not even thinking of a cease-fire but only of victory. It nevertheless accepted a cease-fire resolution dictated – via Moscow – by U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger.
Then it abandoned its proposal (generously put forward in spite of Israel’s tremendous advantage in the field) to restore the status quo ante, and agreed to withdraw both from the large enclave it held inside Egypt and from the canal – all for good relations with the U.S., which was seeking Egyptian favours.
Several months later, it repeated the performance on the Syrian front. After weeks of resistance to Kissinger’s demands, the Golda Meir government caved in, returned to Syria the captured enclave and, for good measure, a slice of the Golan Heights captured in 1967.
Here was manifestly – in both cases – acceptance of the posture of defeat in the field – where Israel had lost 3,000 dead – all for those good relations.
A further price was yet to be paid – in 1975 – by further withdrawal in Sinai. The Rabin government at first refused to hear of surrender of the vital Mitla and Gidi passes and the Abu Rudeis oilfields – but in the end it capitulated, demonstratively as a favour to Washington.
Now came the turn of the Likud. The allegedly formidable, intransigent Mr. Begin turned out to be formidable and intransigent only temporarily. Throughout the negotiations on the “peace plan,” he finally accepted nearly every American formulation – which he had declared in the process unacceptable, jettisoning cherished and long proclaimed principles.
At the Camp David conference, which came after nine months of preparatory negotiations with Washington, only an emasculated remnant remained of his original autonomy peace plan. Nor did the agreement contain a hint of Zionist purpose, of the Jewish relationship and right to the Land of Israel; on the contrary, it quashed (if it were to be consummated) any hope of future Israeli sovereignty in Judea and Samaria.
In the negotiations for the subsequent peace treaty, President Anwar Sadat at the last moment demanded the nullification of the clause which would prohibit Egypt from going to war with Israel in fulfillment of previous pacts with the other Arab States. Begin – correctly – proclaimed this would make the treaty a “sham treaty.”
President Jimmy Carter, however, anxious for a foreign policy success, pressed Begin, and an annex satisfying Sadat was introduced into the text.
Big words followed by little deeds is a hallmark of Jewish leadership extending to pre-state days. Vladimir Jabotinsky, Shmuel’s mentor and hero, remarked on the phenomenon in a satirical feuilleton he wrote in May 1939, under the pen name Echad Rosho (the Bad One). Jabotinsky avoided ad hominem attacks and denied that the title of the piece “Mr. Ben Bouillon” referred to Mr. David Ben-Gurion. (Similarly, any resemblance to Mr. Benjamin Netanyahu is purely coincidental.)
In all fairness to Begin, by May 1983, he was a broken man. It was six months after his wife's death and he would resign just a couple of months later and leave the position to Yitzchak Shamir. Of course, Begin also caved in to the Egyptians several times during the negotiations over the Camp David accords in the late '70's.
But Israeli Prime Ministers have an unfortunately long history of talking big and doing little. What could go wrong?
The Menachem Begin Heritage Center is beginning an effort this week to raise the sunken ship Altalena. The Altalena was an arms ship brought to Israel by the Irgun Tzvai Leumi (National Military Organization), which was then commanded by Menachem Begin. In June 1948, while the War of Independence raged, the ship was sunk by the Palmach unit (the precursor of the IDF) led by Yitzchak Rabin on the orders of David Ben Gurion.
The salvage operation should take about two weeks.
The Altalena was a ship carrying Irgun weapons and fighters, many of whom were Holocaust survivors, to Israel in June 1948. Former prime minister Menachem Begin, then the Irgun's commander, boarded the ship as it approached Israel, and the Altalena was fired upon by Yitzhak Rabin's Palmach unit near Tel Aviv's shore and later sunk on a command from David Ben-Gurion.
...
The ship is seen by many Israelis as a symbol of the dangers of violence between Jews in Israel.
A representative of the Menachem Begin Heritage Center said that the search for the ship would begin this week, and that remains are expected to be found within two weeks.
MK Ya'acov Katz (National Union), who attended the meeting said that "lifting the ship and making it a memorial is important in order to perpetuate the national consensus that a Jew will never lift a hand against his brother."
"There will never be a civil war," Katz exclaimed, repeating a well-known Begin quote from after the Altalena affair.
This would never have happened with Labor in power.
The picture at the top of this post includes - from left to right - Yoni HY"D, Cela (their mother), Bibi and Iddo Netanyahu. Yoni Netanyahu died in the raid on Entebbe 35 years ago today (on the second calendar). According to Mike Evans, Bibi's decision to go into politics was connected to Yoni's death in Entebbe. I cannot tell you whether it is true, but it's a good story.
Perhaps the greatest symbol of Israel’s sacrifice is Yonatan Netanyahu, the commander of Sayeret Matkal who was killed in action during Operation Entebbe in Uganda. Character and dedication come through in a letter he wrote to his parents on December 2, 1973: “We are preparing for war and it’s hard to know what to expect. What I am positive of is that there will be a next round and others after that. But, I would rather opt for living here in continual battle than for becoming part of the wandering Jewish people. Any compromise will simply hasten the end. As I don’t intend to tell my grandchildren about the Jewish State in the twentieth century as a mere brief and transient episode amid thousands of years of wandering, I intend to hold on here with all my might.”
Radical Islamists call America the “Great Satan,” and Israel the “Little Satan.” The reason is obvious; the Jewish people in Israel have, with their own blood, defended America and the Western world against radical Islam since the days of Netanyahu’s death on July 4, 1976.
On July 4, 1980, I read his story in The Jerusalem Post. It deeply touched me, and I made my way to the Netanyahu home to express my sympathies for his sacrifice. His father, Benzion Netanyahu, answered the door and graciously invited me inside for tea. After a few moments, we were joined by Yoni’s brother, Binyamin. The pain in his eyes over the loss of his beloved brother was apparent. I asked him if I could pray for him. He politely acquiesced. I held his hands in mine and prayed, “Jonathan loved David; you loved Jonathan. Out of the ashes of your despair will come strength from God, and you will be the prime minister of Israel twice.”
I wept as I prayed. Binyamin Netanyahu looked at me as if I had little if any sense, and said, “I’m not going into politics; I’m going into business.”
I was so moved by the encounter that I requested a meeting that week with then-prime minister Menachem Begin through his personal secretary, Yehiel Kadishai. When Begin came through the door of his office, I said, “Mr. Prime Minister, yesterday I met the prime minister of Israel.”
He said, “You are mistaken; it wasn’t yesterday that we met.”
I said, “No, it is not you.”
He laughed and asked who his competition was. I responded, “Benjamin Netanyahu. He will be prime minister twice. Will you give him a job?”
At that time, Begin didn’t know Netanyahu, but his senior adviser Reuven Hecht, also in the room, did, and spoke highly of him. Begin agreed. The following night, Hecht offered Netanyahu a position in the Israeli Embassy in Washington under Moshe Arens.
For over 20 years, I kept the story in confidence and did not tell Netanyahu that I had asked for an appointment for him... until he demanded that I tell him the truth. He smiled and said, “Oh, so you’re the one. I don’t know whether to kiss you or kick you in the rear.”
Without a doubt, the prime minister has maintained the courageous and moral clarity of his brother, Yonatan.
I am an Orthodox Jew - some would even call me 'ultra-Orthodox.' Born in Boston, I was a corporate and securities attorney in New York City for seven years before making aliya to Israel in 1991 (I don't look it but I really am that old :-). I have been happily married to the same woman for thirty-five years, and we have eight children (bli ayin hara) ranging in age from 13 to 33 years and nine grandchildren. Four of our children are married! Before I started blogging I was a heavy contributor on a number of email lists and ran an email list called the Matzav from 2000-2004. You can contact me at: IsraelMatzav at gmail dot com
