'Palestinians' claim they will be majority by 2017
The 'Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics' claims that by 2017, the majority of people between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea will be 'Palestinians
The number of Palestinians in historical Palestine totaled 5.8 million at the end of 2012. while there were 5.9 million Jews end of 2011 according to estimates by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics for 2011, and by end of 2012 is expected to reach 6.0 million Jews. The number of Palestinians and Jews will total about 6.5 million of each by the end of 2016. By providing current growth rates to remain the same. However, the number of Palestinians in historical Palestine will total 7.2 million compared to 6.9 Jews by the end of 2020.
But that assumes you believe the 'Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.' I don't and you shouldn't either
The problem with Olmert's words, as I have demostrated on previous occasions and was demonstrated by yet another study released last week by the Begin - Sadat Center for Strategic Studies,
is that there is no need to expel Jews from Judea and Samaria in order
to maintain a Jewish majority. Quite simply, the 'Palestinian'
population figures that are being used to construct a 'demographic time
bomb' are a hoax:
Population statistics and
predictions of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) are
unreliable. A BESA study that subjects Palestinian demography to
rigorous analysis shows that the 2004 Palestinian population of the West
Bank and Gaza stood at 2.5 million; not the 3.8 million claimed by the
Palestinians. The 1997 PCBS population
survey – which has been widely used as the basis for subsequent studies -
inflated numbers by including over three hundred thousand Palestinians
living abroad and double-counting over two hundred thousand Jerusalem
Arabs included in Israel’s population survey. Later
PCBS broadcasts echoed the forecasts of the 1997 study, reporting
unrealized birth forecasts, including assumptions of mass Palestinian
immigration that never occurred, and disregarding significant
Palestinian emigration from the territories to Israel and neighboring
Arab countries. The resulting PCBS report for 2004 inflated the size of the Arab population in the West Bank and Gaza by over fifty percent. The
BESA study and further demographic research indicate that Israeli
concerns about demographic pressure from the West Bank and Gaza have
Here are a few details:
numbers include at least 325,000 residents who are living outside of
the territories. This number was the main cause for the jump between the
Israeli and Palestinian counts in the mid-1990s. The head of the PCBS
quantified this figure in the release of the 1997 Census result.
top of the population base, the PCBS developed a projection for births
to 2015. By 2003, the PCBS expected that there would be 143,000 births
in the territories. The Palestinian Ministry of Health statistics showed
a much lower rate of births in the territories. Instead
of the 907,000 births predicted by the PCBS for the seven years from
1997–2003, we found consistent evidence from Palestinian agencies that
actual births 308,000 fewer than forecast.
- Immigration assumptions are also an important aspect of the Palestinian forecast. The
original Palestinian assumption was that statehood would occur in 1999
and that people would immigrate at a rate of 50,000 people per year,
starting in 2001. This inclusion is what made the Palestinian
Authority forecast the highest growth rates in the world, which over
time turned into the highest forecasted birth rates in the world. However,
actual activity at the borders showed net emigration of only
10,000-20,000 persons per year since 1997. From 1997–2003, the PCBS
projected 236,000 new entrants, whereas Israel border records show
74,000 left; a difference of 310,000.
- Migration to Israel across the Green Line is also a significant consideration. According
to an Israeli Ministry of the Interior report, 105,000 people have
changed from the status of Palestinians to Israelis under family
reunification programs since 1997.
- In contrast to the
3.8 million PCBS broadcast in 2004: 2.4 million in the West Bank and 1.4
million in Gaza; our study produced a significantly lower population
figure of 2.49 million: 1.4 million in the West Bank and 1.1 million in
Gaza by mid-2004.
- The PCBS assumed annual growth over 4.7% for
Gaza and 4.4% for the West Bank; however, the actual growth rate was 2.9
percent for Gaza and 1.8% for the West Bank.
- Our study shows
total fertility rates (TFRs) of 5.2 for the West Bank and 5.4 for Gaza.
These numbers were comparable to the PCBS 2004 Household Survey, which
yielded numbers of 5.2 for the West Bank and 6.6 for Gaza. PCBS
fertility rates support the level of births found in our study for West
Bank and Gaza. The PCBS forecast substantially overstated births for
West Bank and Gaza because it applied reasonable rates, but included
Palestinians living abroad and Jerusalem Arabs.
correcting the current population figures, in a separate yet unpublished
study, we developed a forecast based on recent growth and fertility
- We found that the
current 2 to 1 Jewish to Arab majority in the West Bank and Israel will
remain stable through 2025 because of high Jewish fertility rates (the
highest of any Western nation), high but declining Arab fertility rates,
and continuing modest Jewish immigration, and neutral migration into
the Israel Arab sector. The West Bank forecast starts with
updated figures from our study and uses fertility forecasts published by
the UN and the PCBS for the territory.
- The key assumption
behind the Jewish population growth is the Jewish fertility rate.
Previously, the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) had assumed
that Jewish TFRs would top off at 2.6 births per woman (in the high case
scenario), or decline to 2.4 or 2.1 (in the medium and low case
- However, between 2000 and 2004, the Jewish fertility rate actually rose to 2.71.
Our research considers three slightly higher fertility scenarios for
Israeli Jews (with a base birth rate of 2.7 births per woman), and
projects fertility rates in 2025 of 2.4, 2.7, or 3 for the low, medium,
and high cases respectively.
- For Israeli Muslims, the ICBS
projected that the 2000 rate of 4.7 births per woman would continue
until 2025 in its high case scenario. The medium and low PCBS
projections would fall gradually 3.8 and 2.6 respectively. However, since 2000, the actual rate among Israeli Muslims has rapidly dropped to 4.36, following along the lowest trajectory developed by the ICBS. Similarly, the overall Israel Arab (including Christian Arabs and Druze) TFR has fallen to 4.0 in 2004.
Thus, we predict three new scenarios for Israel Arabs: birth rates
starting at current level of 4.0 births per woman and moving to 2.4, 3,
and 4 by 2025 for the low, medium, and high projections, respectively.
West Bank Arabs, the UN population estimates (which come from the PCBS)
predict that by 2025, the TFR will drop from 5.4 to 3.2 births per
woman for the middle scenario. Our study predicts a drop from 5 to 4
births per woman for the high scenario (a higher birth scenario than
provided by PCBS), or a significant drop from 5 to 2.4 births per woman
for the low scenario. This drop in TFR is consistent with the entire
Middle East region, where dramatic drops in TFR were registered across
the board between 1970-1975 and 2000-2005.
mid-case scenario for Israel and the West Bank presented by our study
posits that by 2025, the Israeli Jewish portion of the population will
decline from the current 67 percent to 63 percent. In the lowest-case
scenario, the Jewish population will decline to 56 percent of the
population, whereas in the highest-case scenario the Jewish population
will grow to 71 percent of the population in Israel and the West Bank.
For Israel proper, the mid-case scenario posits that the percentage of
Israeli Jews will drop from the current 81 percent to 77 percent in
2025. The low-case scenario could see the percentage of Israeli Jews
drop to as low as 72 percent, and the high-case scenario could see the
percentage of Israeli Jews rise to 83 percent.
contrary to popular belief, there has been tremendous stability in the
demographic balance in the area, which, barring large-scale migrations,
can be expected to continue over the next twenty years. Thus, we find
that Israeli concerns about demographic pressure, especially those from
the West Bank, have been exaggerated. In truth, while the
long-term outcome could change either way depending on fertility and
migration patterns, the demographic challenges in Israeli society remain
similar to the levels seen since 1967. Moreover,
the false PCBS figures have influenced infrastructure planning
including water and land use, and have served as the basis for American
and international foreign aid to the PA.
There's a more recent but less detailed post here
. You may also want to go here
Labels: demography, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics