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Wednesday, July 18, 2012

Syria's chemical weapons threat

I've been out of pocket due to work for the last few hours....

Wired has a review of Syria's chemical weapons capabilities and how they might come into play in the event of the fall of the Assad regime.
How bad is it? Earlier in the year, reports surfaced out of the Pentagon that it might take up to 75,000 troops to handle Syria’s illicit arsenal. And that’s one of the better scenarios. In the last few days open source reports indicated that the Assad regime is moving Syria’s chemical weapons from their storage locations. This has fueled speculation about possible use against rebel forces and stoked fears of regional proliferation.

Congress is clearly concerned. On Sunday, Sens. McCain, Graham, and Lieberman issued a joint statement expressing their alarm over the movement of the chemical weapons and urged President Obama to “respond accordingly.” House Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Rogers recently told the National Journal, “I am convinced that the administration needs to be much more aggressive in its contingency planning regarding chemical weapons.” Of course the military and intelligence communities are monitoring Syrian developments, but prudent options are hard to come by.

So what are the real hazards associated with Syria’s WMD program?

The best open source reporting available from the CIA and groups like the Nuclear Threat Initiative indicate that Syria has a robust, decades-old chemical weapons program that has produced a variety of both mustard and nerve agents for use on multiple weapons systems ranging from missiles, rockets, artillery, and aerial bombs. There is also a great deal of unconfirmed reporting that Syria may also have a biological weapons program, but that the program has yet to produce weapons. The most threatening long-range delivery system that Syria possesses is the North Korean produced 700-km range SCUD-D. This arsenal makes Syria a forbidding regional threat, especially if the regime becomes seriously threatened by the rebellion or outside intervention.

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Eliminating Syria’s WMD is not an easy task either. The facilities are hardened targets — going after them will require the latest bunker-busters. And blowing up chem/bio facilities or missiles means risking releasing the actual agent and creating a humanitarian crisis for those caught downwind.

Beyond airstrikes, the long-term elimination of Syrian WMDs requires a boots-on-the-ground commitment.

Then there’s the problem of Syria’s missiles. Many speculate that elements of Assad’s arsenal could find their way into the hands of extremist groups like Hezbollah. My assessment is that the long-range missiles aren’t that much of a terrorist threat. Most of Syria’s long-range missiles are complicated liquid-fueled systems that take specialized troops and facilities to store, fuel, and employ. Transferring them to Hezbollah leaves them vulnerable and risks use that invites massive retaliation.

The real proliferation threat is smaller chemical rockets designed to work with multiple rocket launcher systems, which Syria is thought to possess. The insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that rockets make a handy tool for asymmetric warfare. If the regime loses control of its arsenals and the weapons find their way into the wild — like what happened in Libya — chemical rockets could be a lingering threat for years. Imagine if extremists were to smuggle a few chemical-tipped rockets across the porous Iraqi border with Syria and fire them from improvised rocket launchers at the sprawling U.S. Embassy complex in Baghdad. Making matters worse is the possibility of former Assad regime WMD experts finding refuge with extremist groups.

The final threat from Syrian WMDs is the menace posed to larger nonproliferation efforts. Regimes seek WMDs for multiple reasons, but the common thread is a deterrent against outside attack. Syrian WMDs create a paradox for the international community looking to stem the spread of WMDs. If the West stays out of Syria, this reinforces the perceived deterrent value of WMDs. This will further fuel the nuclear ambitions of Syria’s ally Iran. However, the reverse scenario is also true. If the West intervenes against Assad and he is forced out of power, this could make nuclear weapons more attractive as well. If chem/bio weapons didn’t deter aggression, then nuclear weapons might.
Read it all.

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1 Comments:

At 1:30 AM, Blogger Sunlight said...

Remember the aerial/satellite photos of the flat bed trucks that moved over that way from Iraq, as everyone said NOPE no WMD here... move on (so to speak). Do we think someone has an inventory and provenance chain of custody list for this stuff? If it proliferates, will Holder be shipping some of it to the cartels in Mexico? Only half kidding about that. This is not good.

 

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