Israel Matzav

Why Obama won't break with Assad

Tony Badran attempts to figure out why Barack Hussein Obama cannot bring himself to break with Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad.

What explains this strange hesitancy to definitely break with Assad? Administration officials resort to realism, pointing to the Libyan precedent to rationalize the policy. Alternately, those averse to a more assertive US posture justify their preference in terms of reluctance to get out ahead of the Syrian people. But this argument is unconvincing, as the Syrian people have been well ahead of Washington for a while now.

In addition, although US officials are expressing weariness at the perception of Washington “imposing” its narrative on the Syrian uprising, the fact of the matter is that, by continuously espousing options already thoroughly rejected by the protest movement, the administration is, effectively, taking a stand entirely out of touch with the pulse of the Syrian uprising.

The constantly fluctuating American position must be confusing to the protesters—not to mention regional actors looking to Washington for clarity and leadership— but it also risks backfiring, even at the tactical level. The Syrians, for instance, have already warned Ford not to repeat his Hama trip elsewhere in Syria. And so, now that it came out that that trip was also “unscripted,” should the administration back off at this moment, it would appear as though it was retreating before Assad.

Advocates of circumspection argue that calling on Assad to step down would make the US look weak should he manage to survive. But it is US dithering that creates that perception.

In the end, the issue is not whether Assad will hang on for a while before his regime’s inevitable collapse. Nor is it whether he has lost legitimacy in the eyes of his people—he clearly has. What matters is for the super power to signal unequivocally its break with Assad. What the administration misses with its declaratory policy is that when it calls for Assad to “lead the transition,” or for a pathway “in cooperation with the government,” the only words the regime and the protesters hear are “Assad” and “lead,” as well as a US call for the protesters to join hands with their tormenters.

This is why what the US says matters. Assad derives a reflected legitimacy from US engagement and continued recognition of his leadership. That is why Foreign Minister Walid Mouallem, in his warning to the US ambassador, nevertheless made a point of saying that the regime did not expel Ford “because we had hoped to maintain better relations in future.” This is precisely why the Obama administration’s public position should be that the US does not see a future for this regime.

President Obama’s continued reluctance to break with Assad is often attributed to his “realist” tendencies. What the US president needs to recognize, however, is that charting a realist Syria policy requires recognizing that the Assad regime is finished. In other words, it means catching up with what the Syrian protesters already know.

There's another factor at work here. Breaking with Assad would mean admitting that there is no 'stable' government to whom Israel can be pressured to turn over the Golan Heights. Since Obama's only real foreign policy goal in this region is to shrink Israel, that would mean admitting that Obama's only goal is unattainable.

What could go wrong?

Labels: Barack Hussein Obama, Bashar al-Assad, Golan Heights, Syrian uprising

posted by Carl in Jerusalem @ 6:06 PM