Why Obama-Kerry are preventing a Netanyahu-Abu Mazen meeting even though Netanyahu already conceded almost everything
In an earlier post, I reported that the Obama-Kerry junta has been
preventing a meeting between Prime Minister Netanyahu and '
moderate' '
Palestinian' President
Mahmoud Abbas Abu Mazen.
Ben Caspit explains why.
While American sources claimed Abbas’ statement was “inaccurate,”
senior Palestinian and Israeli officials alike confirmed that the
Americans were not enthusiastic about such a meeting taking place. They
believe it would be explosive and cause the situation to deteriorate
even further. The Americans have learned from experience. They bear the
battle scars of countless disappointments. They would therefore prefer
to spend time preparing for such a meeting, honing positions,
coordinating expectations and going for a sure thing.
For the past few months, the Americans have been very concerned that they could lose Abbas. The Palestinian president’s status among his own people is getting weaker by the day,
and demonstrations against him are turning violent. A quiet uprising of
sorts against him is already underway in the refugee camps, and it
erupts every so often. In some instances, there has even been an
exchange of fire between insurgent Palestinians and security forces. The
last thing Kerry wants to see is Abbas resign or be deposed and have
the West Bank slip into administrative and military chaos. He’s already
had enough problems like that.
The real drama is taking place behind the scenes on various fronts. Kerry met recently
with the leader of the Israeli opposition, Knesset member and Zionist
Camp head Isaac Herzog. While both sides deny they discussed the
political situation, it is quite safe to assume that they did not skip
over the topic.
Herzog is in the middle of advanced negotiations
to join the current government.
Netanyahu made him a very tempting
offer in which Herzog’s party would receive the Foreign, Defense and
Justice ministries. Herzog does want to join the government. He knows
that the position of defense minister (offered for just half a term, in
another year and a half) could help him overcome his image as a weakling
and give him that special something he needs to become prime minister.
Before he can join, however, he will have to convince his own party’s
Central Committee to extend his term as chairman until late 2017. That
is what Netanyahu wants in exchange for the deal. The prime minister is
not willing to forego all these strategic assets only to see Herzog
deposed a few months later and replaced with a new party chair who will
lead the Zionist Camp out of the coalition. If that happened, Netanyahu
would be exposed in every direction.
...
Kerry and the peace team he put together (which has since come apart)
are committed to achieving something. They have no interest in leaving
the negotiations in ruins. It is quite possible he would prefer that negotiations were renewed
after Herzog joins Netanyahu’s government and leads it to the political
center. Not only is Netanyahu’s current government incapable of
conducting negotiations, it wouldn’t last the first 15 minutes. Bringing
24 new Knesset members from the center-left into the coalition would
turn this government into something very different. I assume that Kerry
is kept abreast of the secret contacts between Herzog and Netanyahu and
is keeping his fingers crossed for them.
But there is another issue that is even more significant. On Sept. 2,
Al-Monitor revealed that in his meeting with Abbas on March 17, 2014,
President Barack Obama handed Abbas a proposal for a framework agreement with Israel.
This proposal was based on an earlier draft of a framework agreement
reached between the Israelis and the Americans. That agreement was the
outcome of intense negotiations between Kerry, Netanyahu and their
respective staffs, conducted over many long weeks via video
conferencing. The talks took place on an almost daily basis and lasted
for hours. They eventually resulted in a very volatile document in which
Netanyahu agreed to create a mechanism to rehabilitate the Palestinian
refugees. He even agreed to take in a limited number of refugees (to be
determined by Israel), as well as to the principle of the 1967 borders
serving as the basis for each state (with land swaps).
The one point that Netanyahu refused to concede was the status of
Jerusalem. The Americans inserted an especially explosive clause (making
Jerusalem the capital of two states) and presented it to Abbas.
The Palestinian leader has been true to form and has yet to respond
to Obama’s proposal. Kerry seems concerned that in any potential meeting
between Netanyahu and Abbas, this draft will be raised for discussion.
The ensuing explosion would be nuclear. There is no way Netanyahu could
survive politically once that happened. When the Americans informed the
Israelis about their changes to the draft, the Israelis responded with a
shrug. Netanyahu’s adviser, attorney Yitzhak Molcho, told the
Americans, “You can add whatever you want. The Palestinians will still
say no.”
So Netanyahu has already conceded the 1967 lines (1949 armistice lines) as a 'basis for negotiations,' has already conceded '100% land swaps,' has already conceded the 'right of return,' but hasn't yet conceded Jerusalem. The difference between Netanyahu and Olmert 2008 or Barak 2000 is... quite small.
Aren't you glad we elected a 'right wing government'?
Labels: 1949 armistice lines, Abu Mazen, agreed land swaps, Barack Hussein Obama, Binyamin Netanyahu, Jerusalem is the capital of Israel, John Kerry, Palestinian refugees, right of return, Yitzchak Herzog
Netanyahu demands Beit El bloc
A report indicates that Prime Minister Netanyahu has demanded that Israel retain the Beit El bloc (including Shilo, pictured above) in any 'peace agreement' with the 'Palestinians.' It goes without saying that
the 'Palestinians' have rejected the demand.
In most discussions of the blocs, there are three that are
generally mentioned – the Ariel bloc, which includes most of the towns
of central Samaria; Maale Adumim bloc, encompassing eastern suburbs of
Jerusalem; and the Gush Etzion bloc. But a report on Army Radio Thursday
said that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu was demanding that Israel
retain a fourth bloc – the area around Beit El, north of Jerusalem.
According to the report, Netanyahu told Kerry that Israel could
not give up these areas, which played a major role in Jewish history.
Shilo, for example, was the home of the temporary Sanctuary (mishkan)
before the building of the Holy Temple in Jerusalem, Nabi Samuel is the
burial place of the Prophet Samuel, and Beit El itself was the site of
the famous dream of the Biblical Jacob, in which he saw angels ascending
and descending from heaven.
If that's the case, how does he plan to give up Hebron or Bethlehem? Or does he include them as part of the Gush Etzion bloc?
Netanyahu also has another demand, which is rational, but which is unlikely to get a fair hearing.
In addition to demanding the fourth bloc, the report said,
Netanyahu has nixed the idea of a “centimeter for centimeter” land swap,
as the PA has demanded. At least part of the swap would come in the
form of cash, or in the value of the land, cities, and industrial base
that Israel would be surrendering to make the plan work.
Of course, the 'Palestinians' have rejected both demands. I wish our government had the courage, the conviction and the unity to just dig in and keep to our positions like the 'Palestinians' do. We're constantly running around looking for concessions we can make, while they just keep saying no.
Labels: agreed land swaps, Beit El, Binyamin Netanyahu, settlement blocs
Overwhelming majorities of Jews say there won't be an agreement and we won't give up Jordan Valley
A new poll of Israeli Jews finds that 80% don't expect an agreement between Israel and the 'Palestinians,' and
73% aren't willing to leave the Jordan Valley for the sake of
peace a piece of paper.
The survey was conducted by Maagar - Interdisciplinary Research and
Consulting Institute Ltd., managed by Professor Yitzhak Katz. The survey was
conducted by telephone 8-9 January 2014 of a sample of 507 respondents,
constituting a representative sample of adult Israelis (including Israeli
Arabs).
Results published in Makor Rishon and Maariv on 10 January 2014.
Statistical error +/- 4.5 percentage points.
Will the negotiations today via the USA lead to a peace agreement between
Israel and the Palestinians?
No 80% Yes 9% Other 11%
Are you ready to forego the presence of the IDF in the Jordan Valley as part
of a peace agreement with the Palestinians?
No 73% Yes 20% Other 7%
Would you support a peace agreement based on the retention of the settlement
blocs in Judea and Samaria, exchange of territories - Arab communities in
the Triangle in exchange for territories in Judea and Samaria - recognition
of Israel as a Jewish State and staged withdrawal from the Jordan Valley?
Support 34% Oppose 53% Other 13%
I guess someone forgot to tell John Kerry.
Labels: agreed land swaps, Jordan Valley, Judea and Samaria, Palestinians, two-state solution
79% of Israeli Jews expect 'peace talks' to fail
Someone at the JPost needs to fix the headline (hopefully they will by the time you see this post).
79% of Israeli Jews don't believe the newest round of 'peace talks' will succeed. What a shock....
The poll found that seventy-nine percent of Israeli Jews think the new
round of negotiations have a low chance of success of yielding a peace
agreement, while 18% believe they have a high chance of succeeding. The
numbers were very different among Arab Israelis, among whom 41% think
there is a low chance of success and 47% believe there is a high chance.
There were also large differences between Jewish and Arab Israelis
regarding their perception of the sincerity of the sides in the
diplomatic talks. Among Israeli Jews, 63% believe the Israeli government
is truly interested in returning to the negotiating table and just 29%
believe the Palestinian Authority wants the negotiations. Among Arabs,
58% say the Israelis are sincere about the talks and 85% believe the
Palestinians are truly interested in the negotiations.
As for the prospects of a referendum on any potential deal passing....
Under the conditions of a permanent peace agreement with security
arrangements, a demilitarized Palestinian state, international
guarantees, and a Palestinian declaration of the end of conflict, 63%
of Israeli Jews oppose withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders with land
swaps, 58% oppose dismantling settlements while leaving the Ariel, Maale
Adumim, and Gush Etzion blocs intact, and 50% oppose transferring Arab
neighborhoods in Jerusalem to the PA along with a special arrangement
for the holy places. Seventy-seven percent of Israeli Jews oppose
recognition of a Palestinian “right of return” involving the return of a
small number of refugees and financial compensation for the rest.
If
a referendum were held today on a peace agreement including withdrawal
from Judea and Samaria and an evacuation of settlements, 58% of Jewish
respondents and 33% of Arab respondents believe the agreement would be
rejected by the people. Only 29% of Jewish respondents and 58% of Arab
respondents believe it would win a majority.
Yes, each and every one of the items in the first paragraph was proposed by Ehud Olmert to Abu Mazen in 2008. Abu Mazen rejected the proposal.
And in a result that is sure to lead to cries of racism....
Eighty-eight percent of Israeli Arabs and 46% of Israeli Jews think that
all Israeli citizens should vote in such a referendum, while four
percent of Israeli Arabs and 49% of Israeli Jews think that the vote
should be limited to Jewish citizens only.
Maybe Israeli Jews aren't so dumb after all.
Labels: agreed land swaps, Jerusalem is the capital of Israel, Judea and Samaria, Middle East peace process, Palestinian state, referendum law, settlement blocs
Steinitz: Israel willing to make serious territorial concessions
In an interview with London's Daily Telegraph, International Affairs Minister Yuval Steinitz says that Israel is willing to make 'serious territorial concession' for 'peace.'
Let's go to the videotape.
More after the video.
In order to reach agreement, Israel was willing to relinquish territory in the
West Bank. “We are prepared to make considerable concessions and it’s not
going to be easy,” said Mr Steinitz. “Both sides will have to make very
significant concessions and very difficult concessions. We will probably
have to make very serious territorial concessions. And the Palestinians will
have to make also both territorial concessions - because there will be
settlement blocks - but more important still they will have to recognise the
very existence of the Jewish people and the Jewish state.”
The Palestinians must recognise not only Israel’s right to exist but its
status as a Jewish state, said Mr Steinitz. They will also have to abandon
the “right of return” for refugees who were driven from Israel during the
war of 1948. As for Jerusalem, which the Palestinians claim as their
capital, Mr Steinitz said the status quo was the only option.
“We are ready for a two states for two people solution,” he said. “If we reach
an end of conflict peace agreement with the Palestinians, we will have a
referendum. I can tell you, I am confident that most Israelis will support
it - even if we will have to make considerable and difficult concessions,
including territorial concessions. But on one condition: that Israelis will
be totally convinced that what we are getting in return is genuine, enduring
peace and real security.”
This doesn't sound great, but let's think about it for a second. Note what's not mentioned here. Steinitz says we're not making concessions on Jerusalem or on 'refugees.' And there's no mention of 'land swaps.' What do you think the odds are of reaching an agreement on this basis? It won't happen. If this is the government's true stand, there's not going to be an agreement. Bibi is just playing for time. Which is really all he can do unless he's willing to openly confront Obama and parts of his own coalition.
What could go wrong?
Labels: agreed land swaps, Binyamin Netanyahu, Jerusalem is the capital of Israel, Judea and Samaria, Palestinian refugees, Yuval Steinitz
Soccer Dad's Middle East Media Sampler
Here's Soccer Dad's Middle East Media Sampler for Thursday, November 17.
1) Assad family values
According to BusinessWeek, Bashar Assad has stayed in power with the help of his personal wealth. The question remains how much longer can he buy loyalty? The magazine reports, Assad Spending Spree May Rebound as Syria Runs Short of Cash (h/t TurtleWoman777 ):
President Bashar al-Assad is paying Syrians, via subsidies and higher government salaries, to stay loyal to his government as it clamps down on an eight-month uprising. He may not be able to afford that policy for long.
A month after the unrest began, Assad dismissed a Cabinet that had been tasked with curbing government outlays, raising taxes and making the economy more competitive. The new administration increased subsidies on energy and other products. Civil service pay was raised by 30 percent. Syria has spent $3 billion from a $5 billion rainy-day fund defending the pound this year, central bank Governor Adib Mayaleh says.
Opening the purse-strings hasn’t stopped the protests, and their suppression by security forces, at a cost of thousands of lives, has left Syria increasingly isolated. The Arab League has suspended Syria amid calls for Assad to step down, and Turkey -- a neighbor and key trade partner -- is threatening commercial sanctions to add to those already imposed by the U.S. and European Union. In that environment, Assad’s bid to buy support may backfire as the money runs out and the economy shrinks, alienating supporters among Syria’s business community.
And when the money runs out ( or maybe before ) guess who's itching to take over? Uncle Rifaat!
On Sunday, Rifaat al-Assad took charge of a new opposition movement in exile. Afterwards, in an interview with AFP and Le Monde, he urged Arab and world powers to negotiate his nephew's safe departure from power.
But Rifaat's former close ties to the regime and his current gilded life -- since quitting Syria in 1984 he has lived in luxury properties in London, Paris and Marbella -- may undermine his appeal to other opposition groups.
"The solution would be that the Arab states guarantee Bashar al-Assad's security so he can resign and be replaced by someone with financial backing who can look after Bashar's people after his resignation," he argued.
Rifaat has what we would call a history. It was he who was in charge of the Hama massacre. Those seeking to depose his nephew may not be all that thrilled with having him on board with their efforts. The reason Rifaat left Syria was that he attempted a coup against his brother.
2) Controlling
Stephen Farrell of the New York Times has a video report Controlling the message in Gaza, about how Hamas uses propaganda to stay in power. While he quotes Gaza residents who claim that Gaza is much safer since Hamas routed Fatah, he also notes that it comes at a price. For example mannequins have to have their eyes covered.
3) Fighting Gaza?
The New York Times reports Israeli Army May Need to Hit Gaza, General Says:
“We cannot continue with one round after another,” the official, Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz, told a closed meeting of the Parliament’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. He said the point at which a military operation would become necessary was “drawing closer.”
...
Any such operation would have to be ordered by the political leadership, not the military. Nevertheless, the comments raised the prospect of another armed conflict in Gaza, where a fierce three-week Israeli military campaign in the winter of 2008-2009 drew international opprobrium.
At that time, Israel, prompted by years of persistent rocket fire on its southern communities, mounted a devastating air and ground offensive that left as many as 1,400 Palestinians dead and many homes and parts of Gaza’s civil infrastructure in ruins. Thirteen Israelis were also killed during the war.
I wish the reporter had acknowledged that at least half of those killed were combatants.
Also it's frustrating to read "Since then, Israeli security officials say, while an informal cease-fire has largely prevailed..." and then a few paragraphs later, "The relative calm since has been punctuated by a trickle of rocket fire and occasional Israeli airstrikes." The rocket fire means that there is no cease fire to prevail.
4) To swap or not to swap?
Gulf News reports PLO to drop land swap formula from talks:
The Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) announced on Monday that it will very soon drop the "land swap" formula, which the it branded as a grave mistake that was included in any agreement with Israel.
Speaking to Gulf News, Tayseer Khalid, a member of the PLO Executive Committee, said that the formula was only mere talk by Israelis and mediators. "We have never signed an agreement with Israel, which states any shape of land swap formula," he added. "Land swap formula is a heresay in the track of negotiations," he said.
While searching for this article it appears that this isn't the first time the Palestinians have said this. They said it last year too.
In its statement Saturday, the Fatah council said it was categorically opposed to proposals for a land swap between Israel and the Palestinians under the pretext that “illegal settler gangs can’t be put on an equal footing with the owners of the lands and rights.”
Israel has long assumed that any final status agreement would include land swaps.
Daled Amos has found that the idea of land swaps isn't just hearsay.
Whichever way it is, the idea of land swaps is one of those ideas that "everyone knows" is necessary for peace. So regardless of what they said in the past, if Fatah is now saying it won't allow land swaps, isn't Fatah now an obstacle to peace?
Labels: agreed land swaps, Bashar al-Assad, Gaza, Middle East Media Sampler, Soccer Dad, Syrian uprising
The problem with 'agreed swaps'
We keep hearing spin from Washington about how '1967 lines with agreed swaps' has 'always' been American policy and no one should be surprised by it and so on and so on.
But that's spin for a lot of reasons.
Dore Gold explains some of them.
So where did the idea of land swaps come from? During the mid-1990s there were multiple backchannel efforts to see if it was possible to reach a final agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. The Palestinians argued that when Israel signed a peace agreement with Egypt, it agreed to withdraw from 100 percent of the Sinai Peninsula. So they asked how could PLO chairman Yasser Arafat be given less than what Egyptian president Anwar Sadat received.
As a result, Israeli academics involved in these backchannel talks accepted the principle that the Palestinians would obtain 100 percent of the territory, just like the Egyptians, despite the language of Resolution 242, and they proposed giving Israeli land to the Palestinians as compensation for any West Bank land retained by Israel. This idea appeared in the 1995 Beilin-Abu Mazen paper, which was neither signed nor embraced by the Israeli or the Palestinian leaderships. Indeed, Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) subsequently denied in May 1999 that any agreement of this sort existed.
There is a huge difference between Egypt and the Palestinians. Egypt was the first Arab state to make peace, and in recognition of that fact, Prime Minister Menachem Begin gave Sadat all of Sinai. Moreover, the Israeli-Egyptian border had been a recognized international boundary since the time of the Ottoman Empire. The pre-1967 Israeli boundary with the West Bank was not a real international boundary; it was only an armistice line demarcating where Arab armies had been stopped when they invaded the nascent state of Israel in 1948.
In July 2000 at the Camp David Summit, the Clinton administration raised the land swap idea that had been proposed by Israeli academics, but neither Camp David nor the subsequent negotiating effort at Taba succeeded. Israel's foreign minister at the time, Shlomo Ben-Ami, admitted in an interview inHaaretz on September 14, 2001: "I'm not sure that the whole idea of a land swap is feasible." In short, when the idea was actually tested in high-stakes negotiations, the land swap idea proved to be far more difficult to implement as the basis for a final agreement.
After the collapse of the Camp David talks, President Clinton tried to summarize Israeli and Palestinian positions and put forward a U.S. proposal that still featured the land swap. But to his credit, Clinton also stipulated: "These are my ideas. If they are not accepted, they are off the table, they go with me when I leave office." The Clinton team informed the incoming Bush administration about this point. Notably, land swaps were not part of the 2003 Roadmap for Peace or in the April 14, 2004 letter from President Bush to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.
It was Prime Minister Ehud Olmert who resurrected the land swap idea in 2008 as part of newly proposed Israeli concessions that went even further than Israel's positions at Camp David and Taba. It came up in these years in other Israeli-Palestinian contacts, as well. But Mahmoud Abbas was only willing to talk about a land swap based on 1.9 percent of the territory, which related to the size of the areas of Jewish settlement, but which did not even touch on Israel's security needs. So the land swap idea still proved to be unworkable.
Writing in Haaretz on May 29, 2011, Prof. Gideon Biger, from Tel Aviv University's department of geography, warned that Israel cannot agree to a land swap greater than the equivalent of 2.5 percent of the territories since Israel does not have vast areas of empty land which can be transferred. Any land swap of greater size would involve areas of vital Israeli civilian and military infrastructure.
Furthermore, in the summaries of the past negotiations with Prime Minister Olmert, the Palestinians noted that they would be demanding land swaps of "comparable value" - meaning, they would not accept some remote sand dunes in exchange for high quality land near the center of Israel. In short, given the limitations on the quantity and quality of territory that Israel could conceivably offer, the land swap idea was emerging as impractical.
Read it all. If Obama wanted to kill the 'peace process' he could not have done better than '1967 lines with agreed swaps.'
One thing Dore doesn't address is the fact the giving Egypt 100% of Sinai back under Camp David was a mistake. It was. That doesn't make the 'Palestinian' case comparable, and I'm sure that's why Dore glossed over the issue - he didn't want to distract people from his main argument. But giving Egypt back 'every last grain of sand' was a serious mistake. It raised the 'Palestinians' expectations, and it made the Egyptians believe that they could one day go to war with Israel again without suffering any consequences. If an aggressor loses a war, there ought to be a price to pay. And there is - except when the aggressor is attacking Israel.
What could go wrong?
Labels: 1949 armistice lines, agreed land swaps, Dore Gold, Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, two-state solution
