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Sunday, February 19, 2012

A report from behind the lines in Syria

Dr. Jonathan Spyer recently visited Syria. Barry Rubin interviews him about what's going on there.
Barry Rubin: How important are revolutionary Islamists in the opposition? Can you explain about the larger — perhaps largest — group, traditional Sunnis?

Jonathan Spyer: In Idleb province, where I was, there was an undoubted presence of Salafi Islamists among the FSA fighters. But they were not a majority, and I certainly had no indication at all of the presence of foreign Islamist fighters. These were clearly local men. The regime, of course, has been keen to say that the opposition to it consists of al-Qaida. I would advise skepticism toward any claims made by the Assad regime.

However, Idleb province is a very traditional, religious Sunni area. There is undoubtedly a strong sectarian element to the fury and hatred that people have toward the Assad regime. People stress that this does not extend to ordinary Alawi or Shia Syrians, but I would counsel caution regarding this. So I don’t think Salafi Islamism is dominating the revolt, even in very traditional and religious places like Idleb. But at the same time, there is a strong religious and sectarian motivation among the rebels. You won’t be surprised to learn that the number of secular humanists in Idleb province is rather small.

Barry Rubin: What were your observations about the Free Syrian Army?

Jonathan Spyer: The FSA is really a name for what is in fact a large number of independent militias organized around local strongmen. No one seems to regard the notional FSA leadership in Antakya, Turkey, as the actual center of the organization. Rather, the militias operate according to their own interests and vary in numbers and qualities from town to town. In Sarmeen, where I was, for example, the FSA is commanded by a 25-year-old former lieutenant in Assad’s airborne forces, and gives the impression of being a serious force. In Bini’ish, a neighboring town, the impression is one of a more thrown-together, improvised force.

In terms of weaponry, they have rifles, heavy machine guns, RPG-7s and mortars. These weapons would have great difficulty standing up to a frontal assault from Assad’s advanced Russian armor. Many FSA men that I spoke to understand that they would be unable to defend the “free zones” if these were attacked in force, and they talk more in terms of a long-term strategy of guerrilla warfare to wear down the regime.

Barry Rubin: Why is there a debate in the opposition about whether or not to engage in armed struggle?

Jonathan Spyer: There are voices in the opposition who from the beginning had been concerned that armed struggle was an arena in which the rebels couldn’t win, and it would enable Assad to portray them as terrorists, al-Qaida, and so on. But such voices are heard less and less. Most people understand that whatever the merits of such an argument, it is too late. The people in insurgent areas regard the FSA as their protectors, and have a very clear and evident emotional loyalty to the Jaish al-Hurr (Free Army) which they don’t feel toward the political opposition, which is more or less irrelevant.

Regarding armed struggle, then, this issue is now a done deal. The armed opposition to Assad is in many ways the most significant element of the uprising. In terms of power on the ground, when the government forces leave an area, the people who get to make decisions are the ones who control the armed element, for obvious reasons. It’s worth remembering that this is Syria. The way the current regime came into existence in the first place is because many years ago the military element in the Syrian Baath Party started to wonder why it was taking orders from the civilian political element and decided to stop doing so. Hence the Alawi officers Salah Jadid and then Hafez al-Assad came to run the country. I am not trying at all to say that the FSA is emerging as a contender for power, but merely that the militias on the ground fighting Assad are a fact, and there is no question of them ceasing activities voluntarily while Assad remains in power.
Read the whole thing.

They aren't all al-Qaeda, but it doesn't sound like a lot of them are going to want better relations with Israel when this is over anyway.

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