Israel Matzav: Obama and Tehran have a common agenda

Sunday, February 26, 2012

Obama and Tehran have a common agenda

In Friday's Daily Beast, Leslie Gelb confirms what many of us have suspected all along: That the Obama administration's real agenda is to prevent Israel from attacking Iran, and not to stop the Iranians from obtaining a nuclear weapon.

Of course, there is no actual collusion between Iran and the United States; they don’t trust each other. But both have reached the conclusion that war is worse than continued uncertainty—at least for the time being, as far as the United States is concerned.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has been driving the process. Moscow is one of Tehran’s last reliable friends, which makes Russia agreeable to Iran, but suspect in the West. Nonetheless, Lavrov has presented Iran with an unpublished, and perhaps vague, step-by-step proposal with reciprocity at each step. The idea is for both sides to move gradually toward Iran’s limiting (not eliminating) its nuclear capacity, plus extensive inspections and the West’s lifting economic sanctions against Iran plus giving security guarantees.

U.S. officials and other sources claim a breakthrough occurred in the Russian-Iranian talks last month. The big concessions, they said, were made by Tehran. Iran would hold its uranium enrichment to 5 percent, well below the threshold needed to make nuclear weapons, maintain only one uranium facility, and allow extensive inspections. These diplomatic mumblings were never spelled out in an official document. Instead, they were followed by a general and short letter sent from Saeed Jalili, head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. The addressee was EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, posting officer for the P-5+1 (the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany).

Next comes a small, but consequential buy-in to this process by the United States. At a press conference last week with Ashton, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called the letter “an important step.” Ashton pronounced herself “cautious and optimistic.” In diplomatic parlance, that’s not chicken feed. And remember, they were making nice to a mere 200 word letter that said practically nothing, suggesting they were really giving a nod to something else going on.

A variety of diplomats said that the hidden information was spelled out in a recent op-ed by Hossein Mousavian, a key figure on Iranian nuclear matters. In it, he urged each side to meet the other’s bottom line. The West would allow Iran to produce reliable civilian nuclear energy (in other words, continue uranium enrichment at low levels), and Iran would commit to intrusive inspections. Also, Iran would agree to provisions that would prevent its development of nuclear weapons or a short-notice breakout capability. In return, the West would remove sanctions, and normalize Iran’s nuclear standing at the U.N. Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Mousavian added that he regarded the Lavrov plan as well as statements by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (proposing to limit uranium enrichment to 20% in return for the West supplying fuel rods for Iran’s research reactor) to be “the most conducive path to reaching such a deal.” This, again, was a nice little link to the authenticity of the Russian plan, but still nothing official.

The players in this game awaited another positive signal earlier this week, when international inspectors arrived back in Iran. But they were denied access to a key military facility and publicly announced their disappointment and departure Wednesday. Those who say the game goes on insist this is just a temporary setback, part of an Iranian strategy to look tough at home even as they maneuver abroad. The chest-thumping for home consumption was further punctuated this week by a senior Iranian general threatening a preemptive military strike against any “enemy” who threatened Iran.

Read the whole thing.

Jonathan Tobin fills in the missing pieces.

An attack on Iran by Israel would be a perilous undertaking, so it is not surprising Israel’s government has not made up its mind about making such a decision. However, both Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak understand that even if the West undertakes a complete oil embargo of Iran sometime later this year that would not guarantee Tehran would wave the white flag on its nuclear plans. They also know the longer they wait the chances for a successful strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities will diminish.

But the biggest factor influencing their decision will be their level of trust in President Obama’s promises on Iran. The administration has done little to inspire confidence in their sanctions plan due to the reluctance with which they have pursued the project. The Israelis know Obama’s default position will always be a preference for negotiations even if talks with Iran are not merely doomed to failure but will actually serve the Islamist regime’s purpose of delaying action.

Even more worrisome is that the administration’s determination to squelch unilateral action by Israel seems to be greater than its alarm about Iran. Hence, the multiple statements by American defense and military figures seeking to throw cold water on the idea of an attack on Iran may have had the opposite effect on Israel than Obama intended. Rather than convince them to listen to the Americans’ advice and rely on their diplomatic tactics to stop Iran, they may have instead persuaded Netanyahu and Barak that Obama has no intention of ever taking action. While Obama must continue to insist an Iranian nuke is a non-starter while he is running for re-election, the Israelis understand the White House may be singing a far different tune next January once Obama’s lease on the premises is extended for another four years.

Yes. One way or the other, this will be resolved by November. Don't expect Israel to sit by and take one in the gut for Obama.

What could go wrong?

Labels: Barack Hussein Obama, Iran sanctions regime, Iranian nuclear threat, Israeli attack on Iran