Israel Matzav

Tenet was too busy to worry about Al-Qaeda

The big story in the American media this morning is that George Tenet's CIA never developed a plan to go after Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda before 9/11.

The CIA’s top leaders failed to use their available powers, never developed a comprehensive plan to stop al-Qaida and missed crucial opportunities to thwart two hijackers in the run-up to Sept. 11, the agency’s own watchdog concluded in a bruising report released Tuesday.

Completed in June 2005 and kept classified until now, the 19-page executive summary finds extensive fault with the actions of senior CIA leaders and others beneath them. “The agency and its officers did not discharge their responsibilities in a satisfactory manner,” the CIA inspector general found.

“They did not always work effectively and cooperatively,” the report stated.

Some of my American readers may be wondering what Tenet was doing if he was too busy to worry about al-Qaeda during the run-up to 9/11. Here in Israel, we know what he was doing: He was worrying about the 'poor Palestinians.'

On June 14, 2001, Tenet got the 'security organizations' of the Government of Israel and the 'Palestinian Authority to agree to something with the august title of "Palestinian-Israeli Security Implementation Work Plan (Tenet cease-fire plan)." Like every other 'cease fire' plan, the Israelis ceased and the 'Palestinians' fired until Ariel Sharon launched Operation Defensive Shield in March 2002.

Three thousand Americans perished on 9/11 partly because the director of the CIA was more worried about 'saving' the potential creation of a 'Palestinian' state reichlet that was being pushed by the US State Department than he was about going after the group that had bombed the USS Cole on October 12, 2000.

At Captain's Quarters, Ed Morrissey points out:

Tenet has often complained that counterterrorism funding didn't give the CIA enough resources to do the job. The IG doesn't necessarily deny that, but it points out that Tenet transferred significant funds away from CT operations and planning for non-CT purposes. Even after Tenet told the CIA in 1998 that he wanted no resources spared for CT, funds never got transferred from other priorities to CT. The CTC also left money on the table unspent, which indicates that funding wasn't a big problem at the time.

I wonder how much of those resources was diverted by Tenet to training 'Palestinian police' who would eventually murder Jews and to trying to bring about the creation of a 'Palestinian state.'

The misguided attempt began in 1996, when the CIA led an effort - engineered by then deputy director George Tenet - to train the Palestinian authorities in anti-terror tactics.

The initiative was secretly authorized by President Clinton, who later signed a Presidential order sanctioning the expansion of the program to include chaperoned tours of the CIA and FBI headquarters buildings for Palestinian security chiefs. The covert training and funding operation continued over the next two years, existing wholly outside of the public's view.

In 1998, President Clinton - anxious to cement his legacy as Middle East peacemaker - pushed for an expanded and formalized security assistance effort which would be included as a provision in the Wye River agreement.

While the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was initially reluctant to accept such an idea, Clinton managed to browbeat the Israeli delegation into compliance, an acquiescence which ensured the continuation and growth of the formerly covert training program.

In doing so, the President ignored the warnings of several veteran Israeli counter-terrorist officials, who repeatedly warned their American counterparts that several high-ranking Palestinian terrorists such as Al-Aqsa Brigades leader Nasser Awis were simultaneously serving as senior security officials in the Palestinian Authority, with responsibility for conducting counter-terrorist operations.

Within months of the Wye agreement, the first Palestinian trainees arrived aboard U.S. government aircraft. Their training regimen was rigorous, far superior to the domestic 'boot camps' offered by the Palestinian government or terrorist groups.

The Palestinian units were ferried to various military installations, where they were given advanced small-arms training on firing ranges normally used by the U.S. Army and special forces units. Additionally, the recruits were taught how to effectively protect high-value targets and 'motorcade operations,' skills that could easily be transferred into protecting terrorist leaders from Israeli capture.

Many of the former CIA trainees turned terrorists have since praised the CIA course, including Jaara, who made a point to extol the CIA's 'shooting' course.

Perhaps most disturbingly, however, was that the Palestinian officers were given 'interrogation' training, which, in the hands of those who work in the espionage services of groups such as Fatah, could prove extremely valuable.

American officials reasoned that - emboldened by their new training - Palestinian authorities would immediately and aggressively crack down on terrorist groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, who were consistently breaking ceasefire agreements during the late 1990s.

To the U.S. government's dismay, many of the Palestinian security officers quickly joined or began aiding the very terrorist groups which they had been trained to combat.

Security personnel were also observed transferring arms and their American training to militia groups such as the Tanzim, which was led by convicted terrorist Marwan Barghuti.

Indicative of the Clinton administration's staggering ignorance over this issue was a class of 18 Palestinians brought to a top-secret location near CIA headquarters in 1998 for a course in 'anti-terrorist techniques'.

American officials failed to realize, however, that most of the men hailed from cities where militant infiltration of the police forces was acute, such as Nablus.

Not surprisingly, as detailed in the San Francisco Chronicle, several of the students went on to become some of the most dangerous terrorists in the Palestinian territories, including the infamous Khaled Abu Nijmeh, who used his CIA training to supervise multiple suicide bombings in 2001 and 2002 in Bethlehem.

More than half of the original class of 18 went on to become fighters in the Al-Aqsa brigades.

Beginning in 1999, Israeli government officials began suggesting that the American training effort be scaled back, in order to better judge its overall effectiveness. In addition, Prime Minister Ehud Barak complained to the White House that Yasser Arafat was using his seemingly close relations with the CIA to bolster his negotiating position, which had become increasingly aggressive.

Tel Aviv's requests fell on deaf ears in Washington, which stubbornly clung to the pipe dream that Arafat's police forces would - given enough American aid and training - eventually confront the various militant organizations.

This expectation was abruptly dashed during the intifada of 2000, in which large numbers of Palestinian police joined militant groups in fighting the Israeli Defense Force.

The sight of Palestinian police stripping off their uniforms and engaging in raging street battles with Israeli forces became commonplace. At the same time, the Palestinian authorities failed miserably to curtain the actions of terrorist organizations, who operated with total impunity inside the territories.

posted by Carl in Jerusalem @ 10:19 AM