US 'doesn't know' where Syria's chemical weapons are
Remember how the US couldn't find the weapons of mass destruction that Saddam Hussein was reported to have sent to Syria - and therefore concluded that they didn't exist? Well, it's happening again. The United States' military and intelligence agencies are now admitting that they
don't know where Syria's chemical weapons are being stored. Maybe they should ask Israel? (Hat Tip:
Memeorandum).
The judgment comes from top U.S.
military commanders and is supported by recent intelligence community
assessments, according to three U.S. officials who work closely on
Syrian intelligence matters. At the heart of the concern is that the
Syrian military has transferred more and more of its stock of sarin and
mustard gas from storage sites to trucks where they are being moved
around the country. While U.S. intelligence agencies
first saw reports
that Syria was moving the weapons last year, the process has
accelerated since December, according to these officials. Also
worrisome, said two of the officials, is intelligence from late last
year that says the Syrian Scientific Research Center—an entity
responsible for Syria’s chemical-weapons stockpile—has begun to train
irregular militias loyal to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in how to
use the chemical munitions.
The
assessment that Syria is moving large amounts of its chemical weapons
around the country on trucks means that if Obama wanted to send in U.S.
soldiers to secure Syria’s stockpiles, his top generals and intelligence
analysts doubt such a mission would have much success, according to the
three officials. “We’ve lost track of lots of this stuff,” one U.S.
official told The Daily Beast. “We just don’t know where a lot of it
is.”
The
large-scale movement of weapons, if it is in fact occurring, would
violate one of Obama’s earliest declared red lines concerning Syria.
Last August he said,
“We have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players
on the ground, that a red line for us is, we start seeing a whole bunch
of weapons moving around or being utilized.”
The recent assertions from U.S. officials build on statements made last
month by chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey and
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper.
After being asked by
Sen. John McCain on April 17 if he had confidence that the United States
could secure the stocks of chemical weapons in Syria, Dempsey initially
expressed vague confidence. But after McCain pressed him on this point,
he could not give the assurance McCain wanted: “Not as I sit here
today,” he said, “simply because they have been moving it, and the number of sites is quite numerous.” A week earlier, Clapper had also told
Congress that he did not know if the United States could secure Syria’s
chemical weapons. “It would be very, very situational dependent to
render an assessment on how well we could secure any or all of the
facilities in Syria,” he said.
Of course, last year the Obama administration was singing a different tune, but they can be more flexible now that the elections are over.
But other U.S. officials said one
of the problems in tracking the chemical stocks in Syria once they were
loaded onto trucks was finding out where those trucks were headed. One
official said U.S. spy satellites in November picked up clear
photographic evidence of trucks being loaded at known chemical-weapons
storage sites outside Damascus. But this official also said the
satellite did not track the movement of the trucks in the country. “You
have to remember that satellites are not unmanned aerial vehicles,” this
official said. “We saw the trucks being loaded, but we did not see
where they went.”
I guess that's why the Israelis blow them up right away if they see them heading to Hezbullah in Lebanon.
Read the whole thing. As usual with this administration, the problem is that they have no goal in Syria and they actually have trouble deciding which side they're on - Assad's or the Muslim Brotherhood's. Unfortunately, they have all but killed any non-Muslim Brotherhood opposition to Assad.
What could go wrong?
Labels: Bashar al-Assad, chemical weapons, degrading US military capabilities, military intelligence, Syria, Syrian uprising
Furious Netanyahu cancels security cabinet meeting over leaks
In
earlier posts, I reported on developments relating to Iran that emanated from Tuesday's security cabinet meeting, which was supposed to be top secret. While Prime Minister Netanyahu did not blame the media for publishing those stories ('they're just doing their job'), he is furious at ministers for leaking the stories to the media. Therefore, he
canceled a continuation session that was to be held on Wednesday after all the ministers arrived at his office.
Netanyahu, according to a statement issued by his office, said at the outset of the meeting that "something grave happened shortly after the conclusion of the meeting yesterday: leaks from the security cabinet meeting."
Netanyahu convened the security cabinet on Tuesday for an annual meeting on the country's intelligence assessments, a meeting that dealt in depth with the Iranian issue.
Netanyahu said the security of the country rests on the ability of the security cabinet to hold classified and in-depth discussions where all the "facts, opinions and ramifications" are presented.
"This is basic tool for managing the country's security. Someone yesterday harmed in a grave manner the confidence that the citizens put in this body. He broke the basic rules governing discussions in the security-cabinet. He also harmed the good name of all those who were in the meeting and did not leak the information," he said.
Netanyahu's ire was apparently aroused by the lead headline in Wednesday's Yediot Aharonot, which read: "Disagreement about Iran among the intelligence agencies."According to the story, the members of the security cabinet were shocked to hear that the country's different intelligence agencies – the Mossad, Shin Bet, and Army Intelligence – do not agree about the Iranian issue.
According to the report, the disagreement is over the so-called "zone of immunity," that period where the Iranians will have progressed on their nuclear program beyond the point where an Israeli attack would be effective.
Netanyahu, adjourning the second part of the meeting, told the ministers that he did not have anything against the media, which was just doing its job. "I have a grievance against the person who broke the most basic trust needed to hold security cabinet meetings, and harmed the ability to hold classified meetings. I have a responsibility to the citizens of Israel and to the country's security, and therefore I am disbanding this meeting."
Of course, the real question is why 19 ministers were invited to such a meeting in the first place.
Read the whole thing.
Labels: Binyamin Netanyahu, Iranian nuclear threat, Israeli attack on Iran, military intelligence, Mossad, security cabinet, Shin Bet
Middle East Intelligence Chief: Expect the unexpected
Military Intelligence Chief Aviv Kochavi said on Monday that we should
expect the unexpected in light of the instability in our region.
"It will be an environment that deals with a series of crises, regional and internal, which raises the level of sensitivity of all players, and which could lead, without prior planning, to an eruption," said Kochavi.
The annual intelligence evaluation is produced by the the Research Division of Military Intelligence, and is based on intelligence gathering by the IDF and the intelligence community at large.
It is designed to create a current regional evaluation and point out strategic and operational challenges. The report will be sent to the government as well.
Last month, during a briefing to the Foreign Ministry, Kochavi estimated that Syrian President, "Bashar al-Assad will not survive the uprising, even if it takes some more time." Kochavi expressed his concern that the Golan Heights region might become a terror hotbed, similar to the Sinai Peninsula.
What could go wrong?
Labels: Arab spring, Islamist, military intelligence
Why the IDF didn't rescue Gilad Shalit?
If you read the previous post, you already know that I spent Sunday at an amusement/water park with Mrs. Carl and the six youngest kids. For the record, that basically means that I was the driver and the custodian of our 'stuff.' There was one ride - maybe two - in the whole place that was suitable for adults. And neither Mrs. Carl nor I were going on it. Mrs. Carl went swimming with the two daughters, but I delegated taking the three little boys swimming to son # 2 (age 23). I thought it would be too cool for swimming and didn't particularly feel like going. No matter. In a closed amusement park in Israel, even the 7-year old was allowed to run around by himself. The lost children announcements all dealt with 2 and 3-year olds (really!).
In any event, because I was limited to Twitter on Sunday, I almost missed an important article in Haaretz which was blogged by Jonathan Tobin (those who read my Twitter feed may have seen this retweeted already - hint, hint). I have written many times on this blog that the rumor here in Israel was that the IDF never tried to rescue Gilad Shalit because his family was staunchly opposed to any rescue attempt fearing
what happened to Nachshon Wachsman HY"D (May God Avenge his blood). Actually, as Tobin points out, it's worse than that.
The IDF totally abdicated responsibility - and ought to have to answer for it.
But an article in today’s Haaretz offers at least a partial answer to a question many friends of Israel have been wondering about in the days since the announcement of the deal with Hamas to free Gilad Shalit: Why was the Israel Defense Forces unable to rescue him at any point during his more than five years of captivity?
According to Ronen Cohen, a recently retired colonel in Israel’s military intelligence, “The IDF never took responsibility for the soldier and did not even set up a team to deal with bringing him back. They simply passed it on to the Shin Bet [security service].”
Cohen said the IDF had “partial intelligence” about Shalit at one point but that this information ceased to be relevant in December 2008 when Operation Cast Lead — Israel’s counter-attack against Palestinian missile fire from Gaza — took place.
It should be specified that cracking Hamas’ Gaza stronghold is a challenge that would daunt any military strategist. The densely packed area is a warren of refugee housing that provides a plethora of places to hide weapons, personnel and captives. It is entirely possible if not likely any rescue operation would have resulted in Shalit’s death as well as the deaths of many of the soldiers sent to rescue him.
Nevertheless, the fact that the IDF never set up a unit or operational group specifically tasked with the Shalit problem is troubling. Perhaps the chain of command mandated that, as Cohen says, once Shalit was kidnapped he became the responsibility of the intelligence services. But the result of this failure to prepare or work on this critical situation was made clear when, as Cohen also points out, Israel failed to take advantage of the chaos in Gaza during Cast Lead to try to rescue Shalit.
Gee, that would explain
this, wouldn't it?
Read the whole thing. The IDF would undoubtedly defend itself by placing the blame on the two previous chiefs of staff - Dan Halutz (2006-08) and Gabi Ashkenazi (2008-11). But that's not an answer. Did the IDF reevaluate the standing orders regarding Shalit when Halutz resigned? When Ashkenazi wasn't reappointed? If not, why not?
Labels: Benny Gantz, Dan Halutz, Gabi Ashkenazi, Gilad Shalit, Hamas, military intelligence
'The Left won't wake up until it's too late'
This past week, the IDF's outgoing director of military intelligence, Amos Yadlin (pictured) gave a very
pessimistic assessment of Israel's strategic situation.
“The next conflict, even if it is limited in scale,” warned the former IAF general, “will be much bigger, much broader, and with many more casualties than we saw in Operation Cast Lead or the Second Lebanon War.”
Such a conflict, predicted the 59-year old Yadlin, will be played out on two or more fronts; moreover, Israel’s enemies “believe that the only way to overcome Israel’s deterrence is through longrange missile fire and improving air defense capabilities.”
Pulling no punches, Yadlin warned that the cutting-edge anti-aircraft system that Syria has purchased from Russia could send the IDF and IAF’s capabilities “back to their status in the 1970s Suez years,” according to a source present at the meeting.
“With the S-300, we are talking about relatively cheap missiles – but no less deadly,” Yadlin cautioned during his foreboding address to the committee. In addition, he said, the Russians are upgrading older Syrian weapons systems to make them far more advanced.
In outlining how the weapons deal benefited Damascus, the MI chief said the Syrians are conducting “intense efforts to acquire extremely advanced weapons – so advanced that everything just off of the production line in Russia ends up in Syria.”
And that's not even counting Iran.
In an interview with Arutz 7, military historian, Dr. Uri Milstein, expressed even more pessimism.
But perhaps even more serious was the forecast by Israel's IDF military history expert Dr. Uri Milstein, a respected researcher and iconoclastic analyst . “I have begun to have my doubts as to whether the IDF is up to the task of defending this country,” Milstein told Arutz 7. “Our enemies have grown stronger, while in some circles, our motivation has fallen. Part of our society is frightened. Even if more people die on their side, they are more willing to sacrifice than we are.”
...
Speaking to Arutz 7, Milstein, who has long been critical of the IDF and political establishment's management of Israel's defense, said that little has changed since the Yom Kippur war, which Milstein critiqued in the first of over two dozen books he has written over the years. Describing Yadlin's straightforward presentation of the troubles Israel is facing as “better late than never,” Milstein said that Yadlin, who was military intelligence chief during the Second Lebanon war, had apparently learned a lesson.
In the past, Milstein has written that in that war, as in previous battles, Yadlin and other security chiefs did not realize that advanced weapons alone are not enough for victory. “Now it seems he does understand the situation,” Milstein said. “During the Second Lebanon War we did not achieve our goals of defeating Hizbullah, and instead they grew stronger. During Operation Cast Lead we attempted to strike a death blow to Hamas, but they just got stronger. So, obviously, the situation will be more difficult next time,” he said. Milstein doubts that the IDF will be able to achieve the goals it needs to during the coming war. “Our enemies have gotten much stronger, and they know how to accept losses much better than we can.”
The problem, Milstein says, is the left. “In the leftist bastions of Ramat Aviv and Kfar Shmaryahu, they are still convinced that peace will come if we give up Judea and Samaria and the Golan. They probably won't change their minds even if missiles rain down on Tel Aviv. The only way they will change their mind is if we do surrender these areas, and they find that the Arabs still make war against us.”
Milstein, who was appointed official historian of the paratroopers by the late Rafael Eitan, has written histories of each of Israel's wars, including the War of Independence. In 1995 he published a work critical of Yitzchak Rabin during his tenure as commander of the Palmach pre-state fighting organization, called “The Rabin File: How the Myth Was Inflated.” After Rabin's assassination, Milstein was discharged from Bar-Ilan University on account of his writings about Rabin.
One theme in his books is that Israel has been in thrall to the left, at least since the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War. Nearly all aspects of the IDF are politicized, he says, from the way its history is presented to the way it trains officers. If is this “intellectual prison” that Israel must break free from if it hopes to prevail in the next war. But, he says, “unfortunately for us, the left is still a prisoner of this false vision of peace with the Arabs.”
Let's see anyone beyond Arutz 7 notice Milstein's analysis first. Anyone think one of the big newspapers will pick it up? With the possibly exception of Yisrael HaYom or Caroline Glick's column in the JPost, don't hold your breaths.
Labels: Amos Yadlin, IDF, military intelligence, Uri Milstein, Yitzchak Rabin
