The Jordan Valley obsession
Maariv, a Hebrew-only daily, reports that the Defense Ministry has told the United States that it cannot accept the American '
security plan' for Israel and the 'Palestinians.'
The US's security plan
involves a slow transition from IDF patrols over the region to
Palestinian Authority (PA) forces, with an international presence,
according to reports. IDF drones would also be deployed over the area,
as a means of gathering information about any terrorist activity that
could potentially develop there.
The Israeli government has insisted that the region is of crucial
importance to Israel's future, and has been critical of plans to hand
over the area to the PA. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has insisted
that in the event that Israel withdrew from Judea and Samaria, as per Kerry's plans, the Jordan Valley be kept under Israeli control.
The US's plan is based on the 1967 "Allon Plan," which received wide
acclaim at the time. The plan insists that the Jordan Valley is the key
to Israel's security, even in the event of a withdrawal to 1949
Armistice Lines; however, analysts have noted that the rest of Judea and Samaria is actually more crucial to Israel's security than the Jordan Valley itself.
Despite this, the Israeli government has insisted that its only "red
line" would be maintaining its presence in the Valley. On Sunday, a
Ministerial Cabinet approved a bill to annex the Valley on that premise.
Read the last clause of the second sentence of the third paragraph again:
however, analysts have noted that the rest of Judea and Samaria is actually more crucial to Israel's security than the Jordan Valley itself.
If that's true - and one look at a topographical map makes it very obvious why that's true - why is Israel obsessing with the Jordan Valley. In my view, it's a gamble to kill the deal altogether. If Israel were insisting on the high ground of the Samarian mountains (which is what really is critical from a security perspective), then you could in theory reach a compromise on the borders.
But if we insist on the Jordan Valley - and on what would be a logistical nightmare of transiting people between Jerusalem and the Jordan Valley through the 'Palestinian state' on a regular basis - I believe that insistence is grounded in the hope (at least at the Defense Ministry - I believe that Netanyahu genuinely wants a deal) that it will cause the 'negotiations' to bog down and collapse.
Right now, that potential collapse of the 'negotiations' may be our best hope.
Labels: Binyamin Netanyahu, borders and security, defensible borders, interim borders, Jordan Valley, Judea and Samaria, secure borders, temporary borders
Deri has lived through everything and learned nothing
If any of you are thinking of wasting your votes on the Shas party in the upcoming election, please think again. Former leader Aryeh Deri has returned to the party leadership, and he's still stuck in the '90's. He still believes that a '
long-term deal' with the 'Palestinians' is possible.
Support
for an interim agreement in which Israel would withdraw from parts of the West
Bank without evacuating settlements has come in the past from politicians on the
Center-Left, including Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Kadima leader Shaul
Mofaz, but never from the leader of a party that for many years was considered
right-wing.
“Shas is not Right or Left,” Deri said. “We ask rabbis what to
do and we go by what they say. We aren’t nationalist. We believe Israel is ours
because God gave it to us. I don’t believe I am an occupier. Our rabbis will
decide what is best to do to avoid blood being spilled.”
When asked if
Shas mentor Rabbi Ovadia Yosef regretted having the party abstain from voting on
the Oslo Accords in 1993, Deri said Yosef has written that the accord did not
prove itself and led to terrorist attacks. He said Yosef currently does not
believe there is a partner on the Palestinian side for negotiations.
“The
rabbi believes we should not pursue a final-status agreement,” Deri said. “He is in favor of
pursuing longterm interim agreements as long as they do not endanger Israelis.
That would be the best. Then we can get to see how they turn out. The advantage
of long-term interim agreements is that they can be stopped and changed if they
don’t work.”
Shas was seen as more moderate when it was led by Deri and
abstained on the Oslo Accord vote. When he was succeeded by Eli Yishai, the
party moved to the Right.
Until now it was unclear whether the party
would moderate its message on diplomatic issues with Deri’s return, but he made
clear that it would.
And you wondered why
Shas weakened in Thursday's poll results.... This will probably weaken them even more.
Labels: interim borders, Knesset elections 2013, Shas
Former Mossad director: No chance of final deal with 'Palestinians'
Former Mossad director Ephraim HaLevy, who in the past has advocated talking to Hamas, has concluded that there is no chance of Israel reaching a final solution with the 'Palestinians,' and therefore he believes that Israel should try to reach an
interim deal.
The chances of realizing an ultimate peace treaty are low, said Halevy, who underscored that even if such a treaty were to be signed, it would take years to implement, and that regime changes on both sides of the divide, as well as in Europe and the United States, would mean that the people who signed the agreement would not be the ones to implement it, as a result of which the agreement would take on a different character and might even be stalled.
Another option was a dual border, which is essentially a political and security border. There was a moderate probability of realizing that option, but Halevy doubted that the weak and divided PA was capable of being a partner to such a process.
Yet another option was a Palestinian state within interim borders, and a special arrangement for Jerusalem. Here again, the probability of realization was characterized as moderate.
“If there is an interim border, the exact delineation will in future be of less gravity to both sides,” said Halevy.
The final option was no borders, on the path to a bi-national state – an option he said was possible, but not desirable to either side.
The team concluded that in this instance, the probability of realization was moderate-to-high, because Israeli governance was weak, and the government had little desire to advance toward an agreement. The PA, it said, is weak and undivided and unable to reach an agreement under the threat of Hamas; and Hamas, which is moderate to powerful, could resort to terrorism to torpedo any agreement.
There is powerful support on the part of both the Israeli and the Palestinian public for two states for two peoples, said Halevy, but there is also distrust on both sides, and settler opposition to evacuation is sufficiently powerful to stymie any agreement.
Halevy did not have a high opinion of the influence of the superpowers, which he said were “strong on statements but weak on power.”
Given the existing circumstances, the best option, according to Halevy, is one of interim borders. It is the most feasible, and would be most acceptable if a commitment were put in writing that this was not the final word, he said. His team believes that the penalty that each side would pay for no solution is so high that any other solution would be preferable.
Read the whole thing.
An interim deal would be suicidal on Israel's part for four reasons. First, because even if the 'Palestinians' agreed to it (a highly unlikely event that HaLevy wishes away in his calculations), they would insist on it having a termination date. Then what? Whenever the interim deal terminates we would be where we are today diplomatically but in a much worse position security-wise.
Second, the 'Palestinians' may not even wait for the deal to terminate to attack us. They may conclude that the borders are sufficiently advantageous to them, and they may succeed in importing enough weapons (just how are we going to stop that in Judea and Samaria, whose terrain is much less hospitable to 'security arrangements' than Gaza's) to decide that the time has come to attack. Or even if they don't go for all-out war, all it would take is an occasional rocket falling on Jerusalem, Tel Aviv or the airport to make life here completely chaotic. Anyone who thinks we're really going to go to war with the 'Palestinians' over a rocket that does anything less than down a loaded commercial jet needs to look at what has happened in Gaza since 2005 despite all the promises that if Hamas shot rockets at us the IDF would go right back in, be unrestrained, etc.
Third, HaLevy assumes that majorities both in Israel and among the 'Palestinians' want a 'two-state solution.' That's incorrect on both sides. Israelis want it until you get down to the nitty gritty of what we would have to give up. The 'Palestinians' don't even go that far. Survey after survey of the 'Palestinians' shows that a 'Palestinian state in the West Bank based on the 1967 borders with agreed changes' (the standard way that 'everyone knows' we're going to resolve the conflict) is not the end of the game for them. They would continue the conflict in a bid to destroy the Jewish state. Under those circumstances, an 'interim solution' would be even more dangerous than a 'permanent' one.
Fourth, the 'Palestinians' will never agree to an interim deal anyway, because they know that an interim deal would be a permanent deal for all the same reasons that HaLevy says a permanent deal is impossible.
And this is without even getting into the elephant in the room named Hamas, and what to do about Gaza and its control of Gaza.
The 'interim solution' is no solution - not even on an interim basis.
Labels: Ephraim HaLevy, final status negotiations, interim borders, Middle East peace process
The 3 no's of Ramallah
In the immediate aftermath of the Six Day War, Israel hoped to trade much of its newly liberated territory for peace with the Arab world. Instead it was met with what is known as
the 3 no's of Khartoum.
Finally, the leaders of thirteen Arab states gathered at a summit conference in Khartoum, Sudan from August 29 to September 1. There they pledged to continue their struggle against Israel. Influenced by Nasser, "their conditions were quite specific: no peace with Israel, no negotiations with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and 'maintenance of the rights of the Palestinian people in their nation.' The Khartoum Declaration was the first serious warning to the Israelis that their expectation of an imminent 'phone call' from the Arab world might be a pipe dream" (Sachar).
The three no's of Khartoum remained in effect until the Egyptians broke ranks more than twenty years later and signed a treaty with Israel. For that 'crime,' Egypt was expelled from the Arab League and its President, Anwar Sadat, was murdered. Israel has (foolishly) been trying to trade 'land for peace' ever since.
Over the weekend, the 'moderates' of Fatah met and formulated the
three no's of Ramallah, thereby effectively putting the kibosh on any 'land for peace' deal in the foreseeable future. The three no's - summarized across the masthead of Sunday's paper edition of the JPost: No to Israel as a Jewish state, no to interim borders, and no to land swaps.
The Fatah Revolutionary Council concluded its fifth convention in Ramallah over the weekend by declaring its refusal to recognize Israel as a Jewish state.
The council also urged the Palestinian Authority leadership to work toward foiling a new Israeli law requiring a referendum before any withdrawal from Jerusalem and the Golan Heights that has not been passed by two thirds of the Knesset.
The Palestinians are opposed to any understandings between Israel and the US that could harm their interests, the council said.
“The council affirms its rejection of the so-called Jewish state or any other formula that could achieve this goal,” said a statement issued by the council.
“The council also renews its refusal for the establishment of any racist state based on religion in accordance with international law and human rights conventions.”
...
In its statement Saturday, the Fatah council said it was categorically opposed to proposals for a land swap between Israel and the Palestinians under the pretext that “illegal settler gangs can’t be put on an equal footing with the owners of the lands and rights.”
Israel has long assumed that any final status agreement would include land swaps.
The Fatah leaders said they supported PA President Mahmoud Abbas’s policies, especially with regard to the peace process with Israel.
“The council salutes President Mahmoud Abbas for adhering to the basic rights, first and foremost the right of return for Palestinian refugees,” the statement said. “Also, the council salutes President Abbas for standing up against pressure aimed at resuming the peace talks without achieving the demands of the Palestinians.”
The council dismissed plans to supply Israel with weapons in return for reviving the stalled peace talks. It added that the Palestinians would not accept any understandings between Israel and the US which could “harm Palestinian rights and prolong occupation.”
The reported US package of incentives to Israel does not serve the cause of peace, the Fatah council cautioned.
...
In its sessions, the council also reiterated its opposition to the idea of creating a Palestinian state with temporary borders. A PA official said there was no change its position on this issue.
“The PA leadership dismisses the idea of a state with temporary borders, the official said.
“We insist that the issue of borders and security be the first to be discussed when the negotiations resume.”
And the Israeli government response?
An Israeli government official on Saturday night called on the Palestinians to resume direct negotiations without any preconditions.
“Let us meet and talk,” he said.
The official said he was disappointed by the council’s statement with respect to a Jewish state.
“I would ask the Palestinians the following question: If the Jewish state is fundamentally illegitimate in your eyes, what sort of peace are you offering us? “It is clear that their refusal to recognize the Jewish state’s legitimacy is the true obstacle to peace and reconciliation,” the official added.
The blame for this state of affairs can be laid at the doorstep of the Obama White House. Before President Arrogant took office in January 2009, the 'Palestinians' were apparently on the verge of agreeing to an arrangement that included a land swap. Obama took office with a 'fierce moral urgency' to reach a solution, and promptly demanded an Israeli 'settlement freeze' that no Israeli government could give. Abu Mazen could not let Obama be more 'Palestinian' than he is, and so adopted Obama's position as his own. As
Jennifer Rubin wrote on Friday,
Unlike the Bush team, which actually had the parties talking to each other, this crew can only bicker about what it is that they offered Israel in order to induce the PA to return to the table. If there has been a less competent Middle East negotiating team, I can’t recall it.
Indeed. It's time for Israel to shut down the 'negotiations' altogether until there's regime change - in Washington.
Labels: interim borders, settlement freeze extension, territorial exchange, Three no's of Khartoum, Three no's of Ramallah
