Former Israeli ambassador to Iran: 'Obama being duped'; talks to continue
Uri Lubrani, who was Israel's last ambassador to Tehran in 1979, says that he fears that President Obama is being '
duped' in agreeing to nuclear talks with Iran (Hat Tip:
Dan F).
“I am very, very skeptical about this meeting,” Uri Lubrani, a senior adviser on Iran to Vice Prime Minister Moshe Yaalon, told The Times of Israel.
“It’s just another trick in a package of tricks meant to buy time,” said Lubrani, who served as Israel’s head of mission in Tehran, with the rank of ambassador, from 1973-1978, the final years of Israel’s warm relations with Iran before the fall of the Shah.
...
“The Americans don’t understand the Iranians. They have not even understood that it is possible to stop talking.” Lubrani was apparently indicating that the US has failed to see through Iran’s stalling tactics, and should have already recognized that the diplomatic route was leading nowhere.
Lubrani, whose career extends back to a stint as an adviser on Arab affairs to prime minister David Ben-Gurion and an ambassador to Iran with close ties to the Shah during the late seventies, also said that Israel is “too weak and too poor” to do anything non-military in terms of regime change in Iran. The Americans, who do have the capacity, have been sending the wrong signals.
Iran’s dissatisfied citizens “look at Syria, and they see that the people there (rising up against the regime) are being shot and that nothing is being done” by the outside world to help them, Lubrani said. If they attempt to rise up, the Iranian people “understand that this will be their fate as well.”
European Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton described Saturday's talks as '
useful' and the parties have agreed on another round of talks on May 23 in Baghdad.
After a day in which diplomats had spoken of a more engaged tone from Iranian officials compared to the 15 months of angry rhetoric on either side that has filled the hiatus since the last meetings, Ashton called the talks useful and constructive.
"We want now to move to a sustained process of dialogue," Ashton told a news conference, saying negotiators would take a "step-by-step" approach. "We will meet on May 23 in Baghdad."
"The discussion on the Iranian nuclear issue have been constructive and useful," she said. "We want now to move to a sustained process of serious dialogue, where we can take urgent, practical steps to build confidence."
But Iranian chief negotiator Saeed Jalili is still insisting on Tehran enriching uranium to 20% purity for '
peaceful purposes.'
"Any right which is indicated in the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be respected," Jalili told a news conference after his country's first talks with six world powers in more than a year.
"Enrichment of uranium is one of these rights that every individual member state should benefit from and enjoy for peaceful purposes," he said.
"We witnessed progress, there were differences of opinion ... but the points we agreed on were important," Saeed Jalili told a news conference after his country's first talks with the six powers in more than a year.
"The next talks should be based on confidence-building measures, which would build the confidence of Iranians," Jalili said, adding an Iranian request for lifting of sanctions should be one of the issues included.
Great. Just great. (/sarc).
Bottom line: I don't believe Obama is being duped. He just wants this issue to go away for long enough for him to be reelected. And unfortunately, it just might do that.
What could go wrong?
Labels: Barack Hussein Obama, Catherine Ashton, Iran sanctions regime, Iranian nuclear threat, Saeed Jalili
Iran photoshops Catherine Ashton
Here's a picture of European Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton with Iranian chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili.
But this is not how the picture appeared in the Iranian newspapers. To see how it appeared there, go
here.
It's okay. I'm sure Jalili didn't look her in the eye or something.
Heh.
Labels: Catherine Ashton, Saeed Jalili
Iran could break out within a month; P 5+1 talks end in failure
Unsurprisingly, the P 5+1 talks with Iran in Istanbul on Friday and Saturday
ended in failure.
Announcing the failure of two days of negotiations, EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton said no new date for another meeting had been set. She blamed what the six consider unrealistic demands by Iran — an end to UN sanctions and agreement that Iran could continue to enrich — for the disappointing results.
Should that really surprise anyone? Didn't we know from the outset those were Iran's demands?
Proposals by the six for improved UN monitoring of Iran's nuclear activities were rejected by Teheran, as were attempts to kickstart dialogue through reviving a subset of international talks focusing on Iran shipping out a limited amount of its enriched uranium in exchange for fuel for its research reactor, Ashton said.
"We had hoped to have a detailed and constructive discussion of those ideas," she said. "But it became clear that the Iranian side was not ready for this unless we agree to preconditions related to enrichment and sanctions.
"Both these preconditions are not the way to proceed," she told reporters.
While no new talks were planned, Ashton said "our proposals remain on the table.
"Our door remains open. Our telephone lines remain open.
"The process can go forward if Iran chooses to respond positively," she said. "We will now wait to see whether they do."
Do they seriously expect Iran to change its mind now? What a bunch of fools....
By the way, the Iranians profess to be prepared to continue to talk (of course they are - talking buys them time!) and
blame the P 5+1 for setting pre-conditions.
Iranian chief negotiator Saeed Jalili said his negotiating team had gone “far and beyond what was expected of us” to reach agreement and accused the other side of pushing not “dialogue, but dictation.”
He also told the semiofficial news agency Press TV, “We are still prepared for further negotiations with the P5+1, based on common issues.
[We are] prepared for comprehensive talks.”
But Laura reports that at least one Obama administration official apparently still sees the Iranian position as a
negotiating ploy.
We are "disappointed, but I would not honestly say it’s unexpected," a senior U.S. administration official told journalists Saturday. "The Iranians are notoriously tough negotiators. There was bound to be a serious test of international resolve."
"I think it remains to be seen whether the Iranians are serious about engaging in practical steps to get from where we are," the senior U.S. official continued. "And I don't think [we are going to figure that out} in one or two meetings. I think there is still time to test that."
Just how dangerously wrong is that administration official? Please consider
this (Hat Tip:
IMRA - 16-page pdf link). As you consider it, recall that Iran has already gone from 3.5% enriched uranium (low enriched uranium or LEU) and would need to get to 95% enriched uranium (high enriched uranium or HEU) to produce a nuclear weapon.
Iran is developing fuel cycle technology as part of what it asserts is a purely civilian nuclear program. Since 2007, it has been enriching uranium using gas centrifuges at Natanz. The greatest challenge for a potential nuclear weapons proliferator is acquiring the fissile material2 and any civilian fuel cycle program has the potential to power both nuclear reactors and nuclear bombs. Specifically, the same centrifuges that produce low-enriched uranium (LEU) for reactors could make highly-enriched uranium (HEU) for a bomb. There is, therefore, no question that Tehran has the technical capability to produce a nuclear weapon,3 if it chooses to do so, but there is still ambiguity regarding Iran’s intentions. Tehran could, at minimum, be interested in maintaining the option of developing nuclear weapons in the indefinite future.
How concerned should we be about the possibility of a nuclear Iran? When could Iran produce a bomb, if it decided to do so? How do we know when we are running out of time? Iran’s breakout potential, the time required to make a bomb, is an important measure of the Iranian threat and, as such, plays a significant factor in weighing policy options toward Tehran. Such estimates create a baseline for Iranian latent weapons capabilities, which provide a tangible measure of the relative imminence of the threat and are a touchstone for policy.
...
Calculations using IAEA data show that the total enrichment capacity at Iran’s commercial-scale enrichment facility at Natanz has grown during 2010 relative to previous years. The boost in capacity is due to an apparent increase in centrifuge performance. The effective separative power of the IR-1 during 2010 is estimated to be 0.77 kg-SWU/yr – a 60 percent increase from 2009. The observed increase in performance could be partially due to salvaged separative work lost as hold up, but a technological improvement in Iran’s centrifuges would not be surprising. Data from Iran’s pilot plant appear to corroborate an increase in centrifuge performance. An increase in IR-1 enrichment capacity would reduce Iran’s time to produce bomb-grade material. We cannot definitively conclude what caused the measured jump in performance, but only that such an increase is observed. Contrary to statements by U.S. officials and many experts, Iran clearly does not appear to be slowing down its nuclear drive.
...
Once Iran has enough LEU for one bomb, the amount of LEU stops being a limiting factor on the timing -- given a certain number of centrifuges, it would take exactly the same amount of time for Iran to enrich to HEU if it had enough stockpiled feedstock material for 1, 2 or 3 bombs. The amount of LEU is important for how many bombs Iran can make, not how quickly it can produce them. If LEU is shipped out of the country, as was the plan under the recent deal to refuel the Tehran Research Reactor, unless Iran is left below one bomb’s worth of LEU, this would not add time to the clock for the production of the first bomb.
Similarly, if Iran started with 20 percent enriched uranium as feedstock, this would substantially reduce its time to a bomb. Currently, Iran has produced about 40 kg UF6 (27 kg U)28 or roughly 20 percent of the amount needed to produce a SQ of HEU. At its current enrichment pace, it would take Iran about 3.5 years to produce the necessary 20 percent uranium. However, Iran could install more cascades for 20 percent enrichment (there is allocated space for a total of 6 cascades at PFEP). If all 6 cascades or 3 cascade systems are running, Iran could produce enough 20 percent material for bomb feedstock in about a year.
...
The quickest way for Iran to break out is to expel safeguards inspectors and use the entire enrichment capacity at current facilities to produce HEU. The approach considered below is simplified and assumes that Iran could repipe cascades to enrich from LEU concentrations to HEU and the IR-1 will maintain the same effective performance regardless of the cascade shape. The batch recycling option, or running the product through existing 164 machine cascades, would require more time and is not considered here.
...
If Iran started from 20 percent enriched uranium, it would take less than a month to enrich enough HEU for a bomb, if the tails are set at +3.5 percent U235. This would need about 146 kg U as feedstock. Alternatively, if material is scarce, Iran could set the tails to 0.7 percent. This scenario would require 129 kg U, and it would take a month and a half to produce the HEU.
Read the whole thing.
What could go wrong?
Labels: breakout capacity, Catherine Ashton, Iranian nuclear program, P 5+1, Saeed Jalili
Hmmm....
Another document dump from Wikileaks reports that Syria told an Iranian delegation to Damascus in December 2009 that
Syria will not retaliate for an Israeli strike on Iran - even if the Israelis get there through Syrian airspace.
Written by the United States Embassy in Damascus, the cable dated Dec. 20, 2009, summed up the visits earlier that month of Iranian National Security Advisor Saeed Jalili, Vice President and head of the Environmental Department Mahammed-Javad Mahamadzideh and Defense Minister Ahmad Ali Vahidi to Damascus.
The cable cited an unnamed Syrian official who claimed that in the talks the Syrians told the Iranians that they would not participate in an Iranian retaliation to an potential Israeli strike.
“We told them Iran is strong enough on its own to develop a nuclear program and to fight Israel,” the Syrian official was quoted as saying in the cable. “We’re too weak.”
According to the cable, Syria resisted Iranian entreaties to commit to joining Iran if fighting broke out between Iran, Hizbullah and Israel.
The unnamed source told the embassy officials that the Iranian delegation came to Syria “to round up allies” in anticipation of an Israeli military strike.
“It [an Israeli strike on Iran] is not a matter of if, but when,” the source was quoted as having heard from the Iranians.
The cable noted with interest that Qassem Suleimani, the commander of the Al Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps – the force responsible for supporting Iranian proxies throughout the region – had accompanied the Iranian national security adviser Jalili on his visit to Damascus.
According to the cable, Jalili and Soleimani met with Syrian Foreign Minister Wallid Muallem, as well as unspecified members of Hizbullah.
“Suleimani represents the business end of the resistance,” the source said. Suleimani is reported to have played a key role in recent years in arming Hizbullah and Hamas with long-range rockets and missiles.
The source went on to tell the embassy officials that the Syrian military predicted that Israel would fly over Syria on its way to attack Iran and was conducting surveillance of Syrian radar stations with drones ahead of such an operation.
It's about time someone in this region looked out for their own self-interest. Heh.
Labels: Israeli strike on Iran, Qassem Suleimani, Saeed Jalili, Syrian self-interest, Walid Moallem, Wikileaks
Uri Lubrani, who was Israel's last ambassador to Tehran in 1979, says that he fears that President Obama is being 'duped' in agreeing to nuclear talks with Iran (Hat Tip: Dan F). 
