Andrew McCarthy argues that Congress should refuse to vote on President Hussein Obama's sellout to a nuclear-armed Iran because
Obama has yet to fulfill the conditions set out in the Corker-Cardin law (Hat Tip:
Sunlight).
The Corker legislation — formally known as the Iran Nuclear
Agreement Review Act of 2015 — is crystal clear. In its very first
section, the act requires the president to transmit to Congress “the
agreement. . . . including all related materials and annexes.” It is too
late to do that now: the act dictates that it was to have been done
“not later than five days after reaching the agreement” — meaning July
19, since the agreement was finalized on July 14.
Underscoring the mandate that all relevant understandings in the Iran
deal — including, of course, the essential understandings — must be
provided to lawmakers, the act explicitly spells out a definition of the
“Agreement” in subsection (h)(1). Under it, this is what the
administration was required to give Congress over six weeks ago in order
to trigger the afore-described Corker review process:
The term ‘agreement’ means an agreement related to the nuclear
program of Iran . . . regardless of the form it takes, . . . including
any joint comprehensive plan of action entered into or made between Iran
and any other parties, and any additional materials related thereto,
including annexes, appendices, codicils, side agreements, implementing
materials, documents, and guidance, technical or other understandings,
and any related agreements, whether entered into or implemented prior to
the agreement or to be entered into or implemented in the future.
The act could not be more emphatic: To get the advantage of the
favorable Corker formula that allows him to lift the anti-nuclear
sanctions with only one-third congressional support, the president was
required to supply Congress with every scintilla of information
regarding verification. In particular, the act expressly demands
disclosure of the terms pertinent to whether the IAEA is capable of
executing aggressive inspections in Iran and has a plausible,
enforceable plan to do so.
That is why, in conjunction with providing Congress the entire
agreement, including any and all “side deals” between Iran and the IAEA,
the act mandates that Secretary Kerry provide a “verification
assessment report.” In it, the Obama administration must demonstrate not
only how it (i) “will be able to verify that Iran is complying with its
obligations and commitments” and (ii) will ensure the “adequacy of the
safeguards and other control mechanisms” to ensure that Iran cannot
“further any nuclear-related military or nuclear explosive purpose.” The
administration must further explain:
the capacity and capability of the International Atomic Energy
Agency to effectively implement the verification regime required by or
related to the agreement, including whether the International Atomic
Energy Agency will have sufficient access to investigate suspicious
sites or allegations of covert nuclear-related activities and whether it
has the required funding, manpower, and authority to undertake the
verification regime required by or related to the agreement.
Nor is that all. In making this report, the administration is required
to rebut a presumption, based on solid experience, that Iran will cheat.
Specifically, it is to be presumed that the jihadist regime will “use
all measures not expressly prohibited by the agreement to conceal
activities that violate its obligations,” and that it will “alter or
deviate from standard practices in order to impede efforts that verify
that Iran is complying with those obligations and commitments.”
Understand: It is indisputable that (a) the administration has not
provided the Iran–IAEA side deal; (b) the IAEA is not up to the
inspection task; (c) the Iranian regime is drastically restricting the
IAEA’s access to suspect sites, even to the point of insisting that it
will “self-inspect” by providing its own site samples rather than
permitting IAEA physical seizures, a point on which Obama and the IAEA
have remarkably acquiesced; and (d) Obama claims the Iranian regime can
be trusted despite his deal’s laughably inadequate verification
standards. To the contrary, the act dictates that (a) the administration
must provide the side deal, (b) the IAEA must be capable of doing
credible inspections; (c) the IAEA must be permitted by Iran to do
credible inspections; and (d) the Iranian regime must not be trusted and
will presumptively cheat.
Do you sense something of a disconnect between what Obama has proposed
and what the act requires?
Read the whole thing. McCarthy goes on to explain why the Corker-Cardin bill was never intended to cover an agreement that cancels the non-nuclear sanctions on Iran, and why this is really all about the next President's ability to cancel the deal.
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