Stuxnet may have helped - rather than hindered - Iran's nuclear program

I've been meaning to post this since Friday. Ruthie Blum explains how Stuxnet, the computer worm that afflicted Iran's nuclear program three years ago, may have helped, rather than hindered, Iran's nuclear ambitions.

Indeed, according to a new report, published in the Royal United Services Institute journal, Stuxnet may have done more harm to the West than good.

The study, "Are Cyberweapons Effective? Assessing Stuxnet's Impact on the Iranian Enrichment Program," was conducted by King's College academic Ivanka Barzashka and calls into question commonly held assumptions about the famous computer worm and the consequences of its performance.

"Considering Stuxnet's destructive potential, it is surprising that more machines were not affected," writes Barzashka. "Clearly, the Iranian operator managed to contain the problem … Iran's ability to successfully install and operate new centrifuges was not hindered."

Barzashka based her detailed report on International Atomic Energy Agency physical inventory data showing that "uranium-enrichment capacity grew during the time that Stuxnet was said to have been destroying Iranian centrifuges."

"An increase in enrichment capacity or centrifuge performance shortens the time Iran needs to manufacture the nuclear material for a bomb," Barzashka says. "If anything, the malware, if it did in fact infiltrate Natanz, has made the Iranians more cautious about protecting their nuclear facilities, making the future use of cyberweapons against Iranian nuclear targets more difficult."

In a funny yet predictable twist coming from a British academic, Barzashka's conclusion from her own research is that cyberwarfare is not the way to go about extending goodwill gestures toward Iran while engaging in talks. What the rest of us can and should glean from her study is that even Stuxnet seems to have sped up, rather than retarded, Iran's nuclear program.

What could go wrong?