Israel Matzav

Soccer Dad's Middle East Media Sampler

1) Now you see it

Dore Gold writes about The Significance of the November 2011 IAEA Report on Iran:

The November 2011 IAEA report was important in a number of ways. First, it showed that the IAEA no longer had "suspicions" about the Iranian weaponization program - it had what it called "credible" information. The annex of the report, moreover, devotes a whole section to the "credibility of information." It was not relying on the Iranian laptop that was at the heart of Heinonen's 2008 presentation, but also on a much larger volume of documentation. The IAEA report states that the agency had over a thousand pages of material to substantiate its claims. In case there were suspicions that this material came from U.S. intelligence agencies alone, the annex makes sure to clarify that the sources for the IAEA involved "more than ten Member States." Second, the material that the IAEA presented pointed clearly to the fact that Iran wanted to develop a deliverable nuclear weapon. There was documentation in Farsi detailing the safety arrangements that would have to be put in place for conducting an actual nuclear test. The Iranians had also sought to obtain uranium for a secret enrichment program, that would not be under IAEA safeguards. The uranium that would come out of this clandestine program would be further processed to produce the uranium metal required for a nuclear warhead. The planned warhead design also underwent studies that investigated how it would operate if it was part of a missile re-entry vehicle and had to stand up to the stress of a missile launch and flying in a ballistic trajectory to its target. The IAEA concluded that "work on the development of an indigenous design of a nuclear weapon including the testing of components" had been executed by the Iranians. That "indigenous design," however, required external help. The IAEA report discloses that aspects of Iran's nuclear weapons "design concept" came from a foreign country, presumably from a nuclear-weapon state. Third, the IAEA report provided further proof that Iran's inventory of enriched uranium, which the agency monitored, was continuing to grow despite the reported damage caused to Iran's centrifuges. Lately, it has been suggested that Iran's centrifuges are operating less efficiently. If Iran had 839 kg. of low-enriched uranium, according to the June 2009 IAEA report, it had 2,427 kg. according to the May 2010 IAEA report. In September 2011 the IAEA report stated that Iran had enriched a total of 4,543 kg. of low-enriched uranium. The November report put that number at 4,922 kg. If all Iran requires is a little over 900 kg. of low-enriched uranium to produce sufficient weapons-grade uranium for a single bomb, then Iran already has enough uranium on hand for at least four or five nuclear bombs, should it decide to further enrich its stock of low-enriched uranium. Iran's smaller stock of 20 percent enriched uranium also continued to grow, albeit in smaller quantities. Finally, it is important to recall when reviewing this information that at the end of 2007, the U.S. published the "key judgments" of its National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran. That document asserted with "high confidence" that Iran had halted the weaponization component of its nuclear program back in 2003. The release of that declassified summary caused enormous diplomatic damage at the time, undercutting the effort to pressure Iran.

Benjamin Weinthal makes a few suggestions How to punish Iran.

The most important target should be the Central Bank of Iran, which enables the bulk of Iran’s international trade and energy transactions. To his credit, President Obama implemented strong Iran energy sanctions in 2010, and the 27-member EU largely replicated them. But the Obama administration has not yet used its economic muscle to compel the EU into disrupting the CBI’s operation. The EU and United States have sanctioned a number of Iranian banks—Melli, EIH, and Saderat—for their involvement in the country’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. Banks Melli and Saderat are subsidiaries of the CBI. But they have not yet sanctioned CBI, the most important bank, partly because Europe has so far declined to help. The EU, now reeling from Greek bailouts and the pending collapse of Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s government in Italy, has shown little desire to extend punishment to CBI. ... There is another potential lever against Iran: EU sanctions against Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. In 2007, President George W. Bush sanctioned the IRGC—which directs Iran’s terrorist activities from Argentina to Afghanistan—as a global terrorist entity. The EU, particularly Germany, has not done the same. The IRGC controls as much as 75 percent of Iran’s economy, including its nuclear program, and its forces led the crackdown on the pro-democracy Green movement in 2009.

The editors of the New York Times argue in The Truth about Iran:

We’re not sure any mix of sanctions and inducements can wean Tehran of its nuclear ambitions. We are sure that a military attack would be a disaster — and the current saber-rattling from Israel should make everyone nervous. A military strike would not set back Iran’s program for very long. It would rally Iranians around their illegitimate government. And it would produce a huge anti-Israeli and anti-American backlash around the world — whether or not Washington had tried to stop it.
The last round of sanctions was approved 17 months ago. Since then, Russia and China have balked at further penalties while stalling on implementing those already approved. So long as that enabling continues Iran will keep pushing its nuclear program forward.

That sounds like resignation.

The editors of the Washington Post write in Running out of time to stop Iran’s nuclear program:

The Obama administration has been saying since last month, when it revealed an Iranian plot to murder the Saudi ambassador to the United States, that it intended to press for tougher sanctions. But in briefing reporters this week, officials appeared to back away from measures that would have real impact — such as a Treasury ban on transactions with Iran’s central bank. Though that step has strong support in Congress, the administration is wary that, by effectively shutting down Iran’s oil exports, it would provoke a spike in energy prices that would damage the fragile global economy.
That is a legitimate concern. But President Obama has said repeatedly that Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon is unacceptable — and the IAEA report makes clear the danger is growing, not diminishing. If Iran is to be stopped without the use of military force, the president, and the country, should be willing to bear some economic pain. The alternative — allowing Tehran to go forward — would be far more costly.

The difference between the approaches of the two papers is striking. The Washington Post argues for more sanctions with military action (mentioned in the editorial, but not quoted here) as a last resort; the New York Times doesn't believe that sanctions will help but that attacking Iran is worse than Iran obtaining nuclear weapons.

Here's the article in the New York Times, Nuclear Agency Says Iran Has Used New Technology, from February 2008, that reports on the found laptop, cited by Dore Gold.

But officials with the United Nations agency said Iran had refused to deal with the evidence that served as the basis for American charges that Iran had tried to design a weapon. Much of it was contained in a laptop computer slipped out of the country by an Iranian technician four years ago and obtained by German and American intelligence agencies. A National Intelligence Estimate published in early December by American intelligence agencies concluded, to the surprise of many in the White House, that Iran had suspended its work on a weapons design in late 2003, apparently in response to growing international pressure, adding that it was not clear whether the work had resumed. That report threw into disarray the Bush administration’s efforts to increase pressure on Iran. Since early last summer Mr. Bush has been trying to persuade the United Nations Security Council to ratchet up sanctions against Iran and pass a third resolution intended to cause more economic pain to the country.

2) Then you didn't

In 2008, the proper response to revelations about Iran's nuclear program were being discussed. In an Editorial Observer column for the New York Times, Carol Giacomo wrote:

In those days Americans were reeling from the shock of 9/11 and completely focused on hunting Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. In Washington, though, talk quickly shifted to the next target — Iraq. Bush administration officials drove the discussion, but the cognoscenti were complicit. The question was asked and answered in policy circles before most Americans knew what was happening. Would the United States take on Saddam Hussein? Absolutely. As a diplomatic correspondent for Reuters in those days, I feel some responsibility for not doing more to ensure that the calamitous decision to invade Iraq was more skeptically vetted.

I recall plenty of journalistic skepticism towards President Bush's plans to attack Iraq in 2003. The assumption that the case for war was made in bad faith is a belief of many reporters and pundits, but there's no evidence that the Bush administration knowingly fabricated its case. In the case of Iran's nuclear efforts, this skepticism has become the excuse for inaction as threat developed. I doubt that we'll see similar mea culpas from journalists lamenting that their doubts made effective political and diplomatic action against Iran untenable.

Labels: Iranian nuclear threat, Middle East Media Sampler, Soccer Dad

posted by Carl in Jerusalem @ 3:56 PM