Israel Matzav

Fate of Camp David accords shows why 'land for peace' is not viable

Menachem Begin made one big mistake when he entered into a peace treaty with Egypt - he made peace with the Egyptian leader, Anwar Sadat, and not with the Egyptian people. While Sadat's successor, Hosni Mubarak, continued to abide by the treaty (and Begin went through with the bargain by giving the Sinai to Egypt after Sadat's death), Mubarak allowed his state-controlled media to continue to stir the anti-Semitic pot against Israel for the last 30 years. Now that Egypt stands on the verge of democracy, the only thing that continues to hold them to the treaty is the billions of dollars in US aid that they would stand to lose if they abrogated it altogether and if the US government of the day decided to respond in kind.

Elliot Jager, whom I would characterize as a moderate. argues cogently that what is happening today with the Egyptian treaty calls into question whether 'land for peace' is viable at all, precisely at the moment that Israel is being pressured to extend it to the 'Palestinians.'

Egyptians say they view the need to obtain Israeli approval for shifting troops into Sinai an affront to their national pride and their country's sovereignty. Egypt's Supreme Military Council has been pushing hard to amend the peace treaty, arguing that new security threats demand permanently lifting the ceiling on the number of troops allowed into the Peninsula. The treaty does contain a clause that allows security arrangements to be amended by mutual agreement — though both Cairo and Jerusalem agree that ad hoc solutions have been exhausted. Israel's Haaretz newspaper supports official Egyptian demands to amend the treaty; Egypt's Al Ahram said what Egyptians really want is to have it abrogated altogether. Indeed, leading Egyptian figures have repeatedly emphasized that the peace treaty is not "sacrosanct."

Thus, in advance of anticipated presidential elections in Egypt this winter, Barak has been floating the idea of holding a strategic dialogue with Cairo. The goal would be to find ways to make the treaty more palatable to Egyptian voters indoctrinated against Israel by the venomous cant of their media. Barak hopes that the treaty can be salvaged by amending the demilitarization clauses — which probably would result in Israel losing its veto over how many Egyptian troops can be stationed in Sinai. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is opposed to changing the treaty but said that he would bring any proposed changes to the Cabinet.

Hosni Mubarak, while in power, did nothing to foster support for the peace treaty and occasionally diverted attention away from Egypt's domestic woes by playing the anti-Israel card. Egypt's de facto ruler, Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, has followed a similar line. Still, if Tantawi or one of his henchmen continues to rule, the bare bones of the treaty are likely to be preserved, in return for continued U.S. military aid ($40 billion since the 1970's). On the other hand, virtually all of Egypt's declared presidential candidates from across the political spectrum have staked out positions that put into question the long-term viability of the treaty.

But modifying the treaty to appease popular anti-Israel sentiment could open a Pandora's box of demands on Israel. If today's limit on the number of soldiers is an "affront" to Egyptian sensibilities, who's to say forbidding the Egyptian Air Force from holding maneuvers over Sinai won't be the next "affront" to be overcome? The Jordan-Israel peace treaty is no less unpopular. Wouldn't amending the treaty with Egypt put pressure on King Abdullah II to push for similar amends? Moreover, any viable Israeli deal with the Palestinian faction led by Abbas would require the demilitarization of the West Bank. What signal would backtracking on the demilitarization of Sinai send to the Palestinians?

If the treaty with Egypt must be gutted in order to save it, something may be terribly wrong with the underlying land-for-peace approach.

Read the whole thing.

The biggest problem with 'land for peace' is not the exchange itself (which is unreasonable in any event - why should parties who lost wars of aggression be able to get the land they forfeited back for a piece of paper, and where else in the world other than Israel has that happened), but the fact that the 'peace' has always been made with the leaders and not with the people. While some people may not have considered the possibility that some day the Arabs would demand democracy, they - including Israel's leadership - most certainly should have considered it.

Labels: Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty, Land for peace, Palestinians

posted by Carl in Jerusalem @ 1:45 AM