Israel Matzav

Chasing Abu Mazen up a tree without a ladder

Just how misguided was President Obama's demand for a 'complete settlement freeze'? Analyst David Makovsky explains.

As Obama entered office, a very different political landscape began to emerge between Israelis and Palestinians. A new Netanyahu government was formed after the February 2009 elections in Israel. The new administration was not keen on picking up the Annapolis process where Olmert and Abbas left off. Abbas, for his part, found himself cornered: He did not trust Netanyahu and he felt trapped by Obama's call for a complete settlement freeze in the spring of 2009. As Abbas has stated both in public interviews and in a private conversation we had in Ramallah this summer, he had never insisted upon a settlement freeze being a precondition for talks during previous negotiations with Olmert. Nor had Arafat made this a precondition in negotiations with Rabin and Barak. In several public interviews over the last year, Abbas has blamed the United States for instilling a settlement freeze as his own precondition (although to be fair to the administration, it never called it a precondition). Abbas feels Obama, in his words, got him "up a tree" without a "ladder" -- he could not be outflanked by appearing to be less pro-Palestinian than President Obama.

While the United States was correct in pinpointing settlements as a major irritant, setting the bar as high as a complete construction freeze led to even opponents of the settlement cause in Israel to be silent. There were no rallies in Israel saying "Yes to Obama" once Netanyahu said he was already willing not to geographically expand the settlements. This was a position he did not take in the past. The administration could have instead assumed the position of non-expansion instead of a total freeze. Had the administration taken this alternate position, this issue would have been defused and final status negotiations would not have been prejudged. Instead, Arab critics would judge the settlement moratorium as falling short of a full freeze, even though the United States has done more than any of its predecessors. Neither my colleague Robert Malley or myself are huge fans of settlements. Yet I agree with what Malley told the New York Times on October 6, 2010, regarding the U.S. approach of settlements. "The original sin," Malley wrote, "was putting so much emphasis, an issue we couldn't resolve." He added, "We've spent the whole year trying to undo the damage of that step."

Indeed, something odd would transpire. With the bar set so high, the Abbas government rejected the U.S.-endorsed settlement moratorium of November 2009 as falling short of what was truly needed. Yet, by August 2010, what was insignificant the previous fall had suddenly become indispensible. Abbas insisted that the settlement moratorium must continue. Suddenly, the inconsequential become indispensible in a remarkable turn of events. Moreover, nine of the ten months in which the moratorium was in place were utterly wasted by the Palestinians. Moreover, the Arab states did not come through with their promise of early 2009 to match Israelis steps towards the Palestinians with steps of their own towards Israel. All this, in turn, was used by the Israelis as a reason not to extend the moratorium in September 2010. The November 2009-August 2010 period was an opportunity utterly lost, a loss magnified by the fact that developments on the ground were good. Economic growth in the West Bank was 9 percent last year, according to the International Monetary Fund. (Economic growth cannot be divorced from international economic assistance, and that may come under budgetary pressure given changes in U.S. midterm elections.)

Indeed. The 'Palestinians' took the opportunity to miss an opportunity. With a little help from their friend.

Labels: Abu Mazen, Barack Obama, Binyamin Netanyahu, settlement freeze

posted by Carl in Jerusalem @ 4:13 AM