Israel Matzav

It's put up or shut up time in Iran

Israel's Institute for National Security Studies says that it's time to put up or shut up in Iran. Either real sanctions have to be implemented, a military attack has to be undertaken (or both), or we will end up resigning ourselves to a change in the balance of power in our region. All that's happening now is that Iran is buying time.

The main solution, agreed to by almost all involved, is to level strong sanctions. However, there is a lack of consensus on what these should be and how to apply them. Recently, the idea has been floated that sanctions should be applied mainly on those who are involved in Iran's nuclear project – the Revolutionary Guards. It is a worthy notion, but almost impossible to implement. It is worthy, because it would not affect the man in the street, who is anyway oppressed by the regime. It is impossible to implement, because it is quite difficult to think of any effective sanctions that would target only the Revolutionary Guards.

The only sanctions that make sense that could influence the Iranian regime to cave in and at least suspend the uranium enrichment program and agree to institute the inspections according to the Additional Protocol are the Iraqi-type sanctions. These should limit imports into Iran of anything but foodstuffs, medicines, and other humanitarian aid, if and when necessary. No other imports including oil distillates or technical equipment would be supplied to Iran until it agrees to the above conditions. It is a mistake to assume that any less severe sanctions would do the trick. Iran would go on and continue enriching without giving much thought to the outside pressure. If this is not undertaken by the Security Council, the US should implement it with all the friends it can muster.

What would happen if this is not done? The one remaining way to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power is military action against Iran's nuclear installations. This is a route fraught with dangers and uncertainties. Depending on how successful the attack would be, the Iranian program could suffer a severe setback. However, there is a high probability that Iran would attempt to retaliate. Moreover, the Iranians would be able to reestablish their facilities within a few years and the vicious cycle would recommence. If both suggested routes of action are not applied or they fail to achieve the expected results, then within a few years a nuclear Iran will likely emerge and begin activating its plans for regional hegemony. This would cause a major upset of power distribution in the region, possible new wars, and possibly the complete loss of American hegemony in the Gulf region. On a global scale, the nuclear non-proliferation regime would suffer, perhaps beyond repair.

Unfortunately, it is the latter possibility that seems to be in the offing. Unless the US – which for all its rhetoric seems resigned to this outcome – takes strong sanctions action now, this is probably what will happen. Iran should not be given the time to accomplish this.

The article also has an interesting survey of how we got to this point. Note how many items fall into the Obama administration's court.

How did this come about? Several factors combined to achieve the net result, most of them not of Iran's doing: the election of a new US president who believed in engagement as the sole way to resolve conflicts (and may still want to believe this); the unwillingness, for years, of the IAEA to acknowledge Iran's ultimate goal; the (unclassified) 2007 US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that raised the possibility that Iran abandoned its quest for nuclear weapons; the reluctance of the US to assume the lead role in confronting Iran, and letting the EU-3 deal, albeit ineffectively, with the situation; the contrary attitude of Russia and China, which are watching the West struggle to find a solution while throwing it a bone from time to time in supporting some sanctions resolutions that are not achieving their aim; and the exceptional spanner in the works embedded in the quite unproductive suggestion to transfer some of Iran's low enriched uranium (LEU) outside the country and return it as medium enriched uranium fuel for its Tehran Research Reactor.

I believe that ultimately (maybe 50 years from now, but ultimately) it will be concluded that the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran will be shown to have originated fraudulently in the American political Left as an attempt to prevent the Bush administration from taking military action against Iran.

I hope they enjoy living under Shari'a law.

posted by Carl in Jerusalem @ 12:05 PM