Israel Matzav

How Israel could still lose the Gaza war

I know that most of you justifiably think that Israel won the Gaza war that it undertook through Operation Cast Lead. And for now, at least, you are correct. Yes, Israel should have gone all the way and destroyed the Hamas terror organization altogether, but the war was definitely not a draw. Hamas was soundly defeated.

That does not mean that there are no moves Israel could make that would turn Hamas defeat into victory and Israel's victory into defeat. In fact, one such move is being contemplated right now in the dying days of the Olmert-Livni-Barak government. That move is trading 1,000 terrorists (and reopening the crossing points between Gaza and Israel) for one kidnapped IDF soldier: Gilad Shalit. Making that trade would allow Hamas to claim victory. Evelyn Gordon explains.

First, on a purely tactical level, it would instantly restore Hamas's fighting ranks to full strength. Nobody knows exactly how many Hamas operatives were killed in Gaza, but even the highest estimates do not exceed several hundred. Hence the mooted prisoner release would completely replace them.

Worse, it would replace them with far more skilled and experienced terrorists. Though the IDF killed a few high-level operatives in Gaza, most of the casualties were rank and file. In contrast, the prisoners Hamas is demanding by name are high-level planners, organizers, bomb-makers and operations experts. Hence in terms of operative capabilities, Hamas would actually emerge stronger than it was before the Gaza operation.

...

The Gaza operation's impact on Palestinian attitudes toward Hamas remains unclear. Initial reports indicate that while there may have been some disenchantment in Gaza, the organization actually gained support in the West Bank, where its wildly inflated claims of its own heroism and Israel's casualties, reported as fact by Al Jazeera, have apparently been widely believed. But that could change once the truth emerges.

The proposed Schalit deal, in contrast, would give Hamas an undeniably genuine achievement that no other terrorist group has ever come close to matching.

Even the infamous Jibril exchange, one of the most lopsided deals in the country's history, traded 1,150 terrorists for three soldiers, or a ratio of 383:1. The Tannenbaum swap exchanged 435 terrorists for one drug dealer and three dead bodies. The Schalit deal's proposed ratio is over 1,000:1 - almost three times the highest ratio ever previously accepted.

No rational person looking at that figure could fail to conclude that Hamas brought the IDF to its knees. And certainly, no Palestinian will.

The Gaza operation's impact on Palestinian attitudes toward Hamas remains unclear. Initial reports indicate that while there may have been some disenchantment in Gaza, the organization actually gained support in the West Bank, where its wildly inflated claims of its own heroism and Israel's casualties, reported as fact by Al Jazeera, have apparently been widely believed. But that could change once the truth emerges.

The proposed Schalit deal, in contrast, would give Hamas an undeniably genuine achievement that no other terrorist group has ever come close to matching.

Even the infamous Jibril exchange, one of the most lopsided deals in the country's history, traded 1,150 terrorists for three soldiers, or a ratio of 383:1. The Tannenbaum swap exchanged 435 terrorists for one drug dealer and three dead bodies. The Schalit deal's proposed ratio is over 1,000:1 - almost three times the highest ratio ever previously accepted.

No rational person looking at that figure could fail to conclude that Hamas brought the IDF to its knees. And certainly, no Palestinian will.

Read the whole thing.

It's become so politically incorrect to say that we cannot trade prisoners for Shalit that even Gordon - who is generally a very right-wing columnist - proposes an awkward sort of trade for Shalit.

THERE ARE various creative proposals for pressuring Hamas over Schalit that the country has yet to try, and should. Here is one (which might require legislation): Select a large number of prisoners who would in any case be released in a few years, once they finish serving their terms. Announce that if Schalit is returned, they will be freed immediately - but otherwise, they will never go home again. Inform their families, publish their names in the Palestinian press, drop leaflets explaining the new policy. Warn that as time passes, more prisoners will join the list of those who will not go home until Schalit is freed. And then let their families and friends pressure Hamas. They can probably do it much better than we can. And there is certainly no injustice in it: Anyone who joins a terrorist organization knowingly risks imprisonment or even death; this is the price of his own choices.

Sorry, but no, that won't work. First of all, the 'Palestinians' will never believe that Israel will 'never' release a prisoner. There have already been far too many instances in which Israel has released the most heinous of prisoners that should never have seen the light of day. Think Samir al-Kuntar. When it comes to prisoner releases, Israel has absolutely no deterrent power whatsoever. No one believes us. If we tried to do what Gordon suggests, the 'Palestinians' would laugh in our faces.

What we should have done was insisted on Shalit's release as a condition for stopping Operation Cast Lead. Hopefully, the next government will be smart enough to demand that condition the next time. Because unfortunately there will be a next time.

posted by Carl in Jerusalem @ 9:46 PM