Israel Matzav

The perception of the war as protracted and even unending is heightening the IDF's consciousness of the need for forbearance and reducing the eagerness for large-scale, expensive operations that achieve quiet for only a brief period. The policymakers in the current General Staff note the limited usefulness of the two previous strategies: attrition (September 2000 to April 2002) and conquest (Operation Defensive Shield, spring 2002). The Palestinians were neither worn down nor vanquished. Under their pressure - and for this purpose it is immaterial whether it was President George Bush who squeezed the trigger with his two-state road map, or whether the political trigger was squeezed by Ariel Sharon in consultation with himself - Israel withdrew from settlements which, in the absence of such pressure, were categorized as real estate assets.

The significance of a withdrawal like this was addressed by the Military Guide to Terrorism, which says that bin Laden & Co. believed that they, and not the Americans who equipped and trained them, expelled the Soviets from A fghanistan, and that the Shiites in Lebanon believed that they and their suicide bombers, and not any independent activities of the Reagan administration, expelled the Americans from that country.

Israel has no genuine military option in Gaza. A southern version of Operation Defensive Shield, which decision-makers will be tempted to try when Hamas is blamed for failing to prevent a serious terrorist attack, is liable to become bogged down already in the first row of houses in Jabalya.

This week, officers who served in Gaza recalled a briefing by chief of staff Shaul Mofaz to the GOC Southern Command Doron Almog and the divisional commander, Yisrael Ziv, when Operation Defensive Shield's continuation was being considered (the plan was eventually dropped). Almog and Ziv were surprised to hear then that, for Mofaz, success would have been the sight of the commander's jeep, flying an Israeli flag and circling the central square in Gaza City; straggling behind the jeep, there could have been a lengthy and vulnerable line of military convoys on the "Tanzer" route, Gaza's main street. However, there would have been no military advantage to such an operation, as forces would have had to return to their bases afterward, unlike the situation in the West Bank. Army divisions would not be effective in the dense tangle of towns, neighborhoods and refugee camps in Gaza. Indeed, following the evacuation, operations of the kind mounted from 2000 to 2005 are no longer effective. These mostly followed the pattern of a quiet night raid, the arrest of wanted persons and a noisy rescue, and produced most of the casualties among the forces, armed militants and civilians.

It follows from this also that the IDF, even if it will not dare say so explicitly, for fear of invading the political echelon's terrain, believes that the pullout from Gaza - in the chosen format - was a mistake. A more correct evacuation, and the model for the future, occurred in the northern West Bank. If there will be another evacuation, by government decision, the IDF will recommend using that model.